Judgment :- Arijit Pasayat, C.J. Accepting prayer for reference under S.256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short'the act), following questions have been referred for opinion of this Court by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, Cochin (in short'the Tribunal'): 1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law and fact in holding that since the parties concerned in this case were not heard by the Tribunal the issue of notice under S.148 by the assessing officer claiming that it was to give effect to the order of the Tribunal cannot be upheld? 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and also in the light of the facts and figures given in the enclosure to the reference application is not the notice and the assessment order within time in terms of S.151 without recourse to S.150(1) and is not the order vitiated for not considering the issue of limitation under the general provision of S.151 of the Act? 3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case does not the relevant order contain a finding/ direction?" 2. Factual position as set out in the Statement of Case is as follows:- Gool C. Dalai and Perin C. Dalai, two sisters, were co-owners of an agricultural estate which was sold resulting in realisation of some surplus. Such surplus was taxed by the income-tax authorities in the hands of an Association of Persons (in short 'A.O.P.') styled as "M/s. Gool C. Dalai & Perin C. Dalai". When the matter was finally adjudicated by Tribunal on said A.O.P. 's appeal, it came to hold that the two sisters were merely co-owners of the property and they had not done anything with the purpose of generating income which is sine qua non for being treated as an A.O.P. and therefore could not be assessed as an A.O.P. While disposing of the matter, certain observations were made. Treating the observations to be in the nature of a finding/ direction, assessing officer initiated action under S.148 of the Act against both the sisters by issuance of notices under S.148. According to assessing officer, same was necessary to give effect to the order of the Tribunal. In response to the notices, the sisters filed returns and therein the income as originally returned was disclosed. According to assessing officer, same was necessary to give effect to the order of the Tribunal. In response to the notices, the sisters filed returns and therein the income as originally returned was disclosed. It was contended that the time limit for reopening the assessment was clearly over and no assistance could be sought under S.150 as made out by the revenue. It was their stand that there was no valid direction from the Tribunal. Mere observation that the surplus realised from the land belonged to the members of the A.O.P. could not be construed as a direction within the meaning given to that expression under S.150(2) of the Act. Such submissions were rejected by assessing officer. The matter was carried in appeal before the Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Calicut (in short'Dy.C.I.T.(A)') without success. But in second appeal, Tribunal accepted the stand with the following observations: "The pre-requisites for treating such income as income of that party are: (a) that there must be a finding of the appellate or revisional authority that the income that is excluded is the income of that third party; and (b) that the third party had been given an opportunity to be heard in respect of that matter by the appellate or revisional authority". "In order to take advantage of Explanation 3 to S.153, it is incumbent upon the revenue to establish that the person whose assessment is sought to be reopened has been given an opportunity of being heard in the appeal, etc. proceedings as a result of which his assessment is sought to be reopened. Otherwise, the advantage of the Explanation 3 cannot be availed of. 3. According to learned counsel for the revenue, both the conclusions of the Tribunal are erroneous. Having accepted that the observation of the Tribunal was in the nature of a finding, it was not open to Tribunal to come to a conclusion that there was no valid notice to the parties whose interests were adversely affected. The earlier appeal before the Tribunal was filed by both the sisters and as an A.O.P. It was not the case of A.O.P. before the Tribunal in the earlier case that they had no knowledge of the proceedings. The earlier appeal before the Tribunal was filed by both the sisters and as an A.O.P. It was not the case of A.O.P. before the Tribunal in the earlier case that they had no knowledge of the proceedings. Learned counsel for the assessee, on the other hand, submitted that even if the earlier appeal was filed by both sisters and it is presumed that they had opportunity of knowing the contents of the order, yet the observation made by Tribunal in the earlier case cannot be construed to be a direction or a finding. It is submitted that in order to constitute a finding or a direction, the observation must be clearly linked with subject matter of issue and must be necessary for adjudication of the dispute. 4. It is to be noted that S.150 is in the nature of an exception to the provision relating to time limit prescribed for completion of assessments. The two provisions which are relevant for the purpose of adjudication of the present dispute are Ss.150 and 153. They read as follows: "S.150. Provision for cases where assessment is in pursuance of an order on appeal, etc. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in S.149, the notice under S.148 may be issued at any time for the purpose of making assessment or reassessment or recomputation in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order passed by any authority in any proceeding under this Act by way of appeal, reference or revision. (2) The provisions of sub-s.(1) shall not apply in any case where any such assessment, pH to in that sub-section relates to an assessment year in respect of which an assessment, reassessment or recomputation could not have been made at the time the order which was the subject-matter of the appeal, reference or revision, as the case may be, was made by reason of any other provision limiting the time within which any action for assessment, reassessment or recomputation may be taken." S.153. Time limit for completion of assessments and reassessments. Time limit for completion of assessments and reassessments. (1) No order of assessment shall be made under S.143 or S.144 at any time after (a) the expiry of (1) four years from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable, where such assessment year is an assessment year commencing on or before the 1st day of April, 1967; (ii) three years from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable, where such assessment year is the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 1968; or (iii) two years from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable, where such assessment year is an assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 1969; or (b) the expiry of eight years from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable, in a case falling within clause (c) of sub-s.(1) of S.271; or (c) the expiry of one year from the date of the filing of return or a revised return under sub-s.(4) or sub-s.(5) of S.139; whichever is latest. (2) No order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation shall be made under S.147 (a) where the assessment, reassessment or recomputation is to be made under clause (a) of that Section, after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year in which the notice under S.148 was served; (b) where the assessment, reassessment or recomputation is to be made under clause (b) of that Section, after (i) the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable, or (ii) the expiry of one year from the date of service of the notice under S.148, whichever is later. (3) The provisions of sub-ss.(1) and (2) shall not apply to the following classes of assessments, reassessments and recomputation which may be completed at any time (i) where a fresh assessment if made under S.146; (ii) where the assessment, reassessment or recomputation is made on the assessee or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under S.250, 254, 260, 262, 263 or 264 or in an order of any court in a proceeding otherwise than by way of appeal or reference under this Act; (iii) where, in the case of ? firm, an assessment is made on a partner of the firm in consequence of an assessment made on the firm under S.147. Explanation 2. Where, by an order referred to in clause (ii) of sub-s.(3), any income is excluded from the total income of the assessee for an assessment year, then, an assessment of such income for another assessment year shall, for the purpose of S.150 and this Section, be deemed to be one made in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in the said order. Explanation 3. Where, by an order referred to in clause (ii) of sub-s.(3), any income is excluded from the total income of one person and held to be the income of another person, then, an assessment of such income on such other person shall, for the purposes of S.150 and this Section, be deemed to be one made in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in the said order, provided such other person was given an opportunity of being heard before the said order was passed". S.150(1) overrides the provisions of S.149 prescribing the time-limit for issuance of a notice under S.148. S.150(1) provides such notice may be issued at any time for the purpose of making an assessment or reassessment or re-computation in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction as contained in an appellate order or revisional order etc. The conditions of S.150(1) are overriding as is clear from the non obstante opening clause. The bar of limitation is automatically removed in cases and circumstances falling within S.150(1). 5. The conditions of S.150(1) are overriding as is clear from the non obstante opening clause. The bar of limitation is automatically removed in cases and circumstances falling within S.150(1). 5. In view of the accepted position that both sisters had preferred the appeal, when assessment was made on A.O.P. one of the conclusions of the Tribunal that they had no opportunity of being heard in respect of the matter by the appellate authority does not stand to reason. It is in fact accepted by learned counsel for assessee that both the sisters were appellants in the earlier proceeding before Tribunal. The other question is whether observations made by Tribunal in the earlier case were germane for the purpose of recording a finding or giving a direction. The conclusions arrived at by Tribunal in the earlier case are contained in paragraphs 5 and 6. They read as follows: "5 It is admitted that the entire properties were inherited from the brother of the two ladies. They have done nothing by which they could be said to have generated income from the asset so received. They have not associated themselves in any business activities or any activity which would give rise to profits. The forest lands were surely leased out. The lease income is in the nature of rent. It is now well settled that unless two or more persons join in a common purpose or a common action with the object of producing income, the status of association of persons cannot be imported. It is well settled that in respect of dividends the mere fact that the co-owners have inherited the shares together would not give rise to an association of persons. Please see the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of G. Murugesan and Bros. v. C.I. T. (88 ITR 432). In respect of an agricultural estate which is owned by four persons each having 1/4th share in the income thereof the Supreme Court has held that the status of association of persons was not justified. (Commissioner of Agrl. Income-tax v. Raja Patan Gopal reported in 59 ITR 728). We. therefore, find that the assessees being merely co-owners of the properties have not done anything with the common object of generating income and, therefore, they cannot be assessed as association of persons. 6. (Commissioner of Agrl. Income-tax v. Raja Patan Gopal reported in 59 ITR 728). We. therefore, find that the assessees being merely co-owners of the properties have not done anything with the common object of generating income and, therefore, they cannot be assessed as association of persons. 6. In view of the fact that our finding cuts at the very root of the assessment itself, it is unnecessary to give a further finding whether the forest lands would be agricultural lands. No doubt, this matter can be pursued by the department in respect of the assessments of the two ladies in their individual capacity. It is unnecessary to give a finding here." (Underlining for emphasis) A bare reading of the quoted portion and the underlined portion as well makes it clear that the observations made, which formed the basis for taking action of reassessment, had definite bearing on the earlier adjudication. A "finding" can be, as observed by Apex Court in/. T. O. v. Muralidhar Bhagwan Das (1964) 52 ITR 335 (SC), only that which is necessary for the disposal of an appeal in respect of an assessment of a particular year. In that context, "finding" is the conclusion which the prescribed authority/forum has necessarily to reach so as to dispose of the appeal before it. The expression "finding" or "direction" cannot be treated as in vacuum. The words "in consequence of or "to give effect to any finding or direction" have to be collated with and cannot enlarge the scope of the finding or direction mentioned in the provision. The finding must be in respect of a particular person or persons and in respect to the particular assessment year. It is to be noted that decision in Muralidhar's case (supra) was rendered in relation to S.34(3) (second proviso) of the 1922 Act. Though S.153(3)(ii) is modelled on the lines of the earlier provision, Explanations 2 and 3 have enlarged the scope. Explanation 2 creates a fiction. Explanation 3 erodes the iron jacket of any person contemplated in Muralidhar's case (supra). It can be a person unconnected with appellant. That being the position, the answer to questions 1 and 2 are in the nagative, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. In view of these answers, it is not necessary to answer the third question. The references are disposed of accordingly.