Judgment Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. This revisional application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is at the instance of a plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction and is directed against order dated June 5, 1999 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 7th Court, Alipore in Misc. Appeal No. 230 of 1999 thereby setting aside order dated April 19, 1999 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, 5th Court, Alipore in Trial Suit No. 64 of 1999. 2. The petitioner herein filed a suit being Title Suit No. 64 of 1999 in the 5th Court of learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Alipore praying, inter alia, for a decree for declaration that he is a monthly tenant at will of the north-eastern portion of the ground floor of the suit premises as mentioned in the schedule of the plaint and for permanent injunction restraining the opposite parties from disturbing his peaceful possession in the suit property. In the said suit, the petitioner further prayed for a decree for declaration that the opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 had no right or authority to evict the petitioner otherwise than in due course of law. A further decree for permanent injunction restraining the opposite party No.3 and/or his men and agent from doing any wrongful act to dispossess the petitioner from the suit property was also prayed. 3. In connection with the aforesaid suit, the petitioner filed an application for temporary injunction restraining the opposite parties from interfering with the possession of the petitioner and his family in the suit property. 4. It may be mentioned here that in the schedule of the plaint as well as the application for temporary injunction, the suit property was described as one room measuring more or less 1000 sq.ft of north-east portion of the ground floor covered space of premises No. 11A, Bourn field Row, P.S. Ekbalpur, Calcutta with common bath and privy for residential purpose. 5. The learned trial Judge on April 19, 1999 by Order No.2 issued notice upon the opposite parties to show-cause why the prayer of the petitioner for temporary injunction should not be granted and at the time passed an ad interim order directing the parties to maintain status quo as it stood on that date till May 18, 1999. 6. 5. The learned trial Judge on April 19, 1999 by Order No.2 issued notice upon the opposite parties to show-cause why the prayer of the petitioner for temporary injunction should not be granted and at the time passed an ad interim order directing the parties to maintain status quo as it stood on that date till May 18, 1999. 6. Instead of showing any cause of filing any application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the opposite party No.3 preferred a Misc. Appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 230 of 1999 before the learned District Judge at Alipore and immediately after the admission of the said appeal, he prayed for stay of the operation of order dated April 18, 1999 before the learned District Judge although the same was going to expire just after four days. 7. The learned District Judge immediately after admission of the said M/s. Appeal granted an ad interim order of stay of operation of the order impugned in the said Misc. Appeal. 8. Being dissatisfied, the present petitioner moved a revisional application before this court being C.O. No. 1390 of 1999 which was disposed of by this court on May 20, 1999 thereby setting aside the order passed by the learned District Judge and the learned first appellate court was directed to hear out the Misc. Appeal within a week. 9. Pursuant to the direction given by this court, the learned first appellate court below by the order impugned herein has disposed of the said Misc. Appeal thereby setting aside the order passed by the learned trial Judge. 10. Being dissatisfied, the plaintiff has come up in revision. 11. Appeal within a week. 9. Pursuant to the direction given by this court, the learned first appellate court below by the order impugned herein has disposed of the said Misc. Appeal thereby setting aside the order passed by the learned trial Judge. 10. Being dissatisfied, the plaintiff has come up in revision. 11. It appears from the order passed by the learned first appellate court below that in setting aside the order passed by the learned trial Judge, the learned first appellate court below took into consideration various documents filed before the said appellate court indicating that a litigation was going on between opposite party No.3 and his brother on one side and the opposite party No.2 and another on other side over the self-same property and that the opposite party No.3 in that proceeding claimed that he and his brother were tenants in respect of the suit property and that they were illegally dispossessed from the suit property only a week or a fortnight prior to the alleged date of fresh tenancy in favour of the present plaintiffs. The learned first appellate court had also relied upon the documents filed by the opposite party No.3 before that court showing that this court in a criminal revisional application directed re-delivery of possession in favour of the opposite party No.3 against an order passed on an application under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, after taking into consideration the aforesaid fact, the learned first appellate court below inferred that those facts were known to the present petitioner and as such he did not take the tenancy in good faith. Therefore, the order passed by the learned trial Judge was set aside. 12. Mr. Roychowdhury, the learned counsel appearing in support of this application has firstly contended that the appeal having been preferred against an ad interim order of status quo, the learned first appellate court below acted illegally and with material irregularity in taking into consideration new material produced by the opposite party No.3 before such court. According to Mr. Roychowdhury, an appellate court under such circumstances was required to consider whether on the basis of materials on record, the learned trial Judge was justified in passing the order of ad interim status quo. According to Mr. Roychowdhury, an appellate court under such circumstances was required to consider whether on the basis of materials on record, the learned trial Judge was justified in passing the order of ad interim status quo. If a party decides not to either show cause as directed or file any application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code for variation of the ad interim injunction on the alleged ground of suppression of material fact, Mr. Roychowdhury submits, such party cannot rely upon any new document in such an appeal against an order of ad interim injunction. According to Mr. Roychowdhury the learned first appellate court acted illegally and with material irregularity in relying upon those documents by not complying with the formalities required under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. Mr. Roychowdhury next contends that even those documents do not suggest lack of bona fide on the part of the petitioner in the matter of taking a tenancy. Mr. Roychowdhury contends that the order passed in the criminal revisional application cannot be binding upon his client in view of the fact that the present petitioner was not made a party in the said revisional application. Mr. Roychowdhury further contends that even the documents relied upon by opposite party No.3 show that the subject matter of the proceeding under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the subject matter of the instant proceeding are not identical. 14. Mr. Roychowdhury lastly contends that even a direction by a criminal court for restoration of possession in a proceeding under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not binding upon a Civil Court between selfsame party and notwithstanding such order of the Criminal Court, a Civil Court is entitled to pass an order of injunction the effect of which will be to stay the operation of the order of the Criminal Court. Mr. Roychowdhury in this connection relies upon a decision of this court in a case reported in 1998(2) CLJ page 284. 15. Mr. Mr. Roychowdhury in this connection relies upon a decision of this court in a case reported in 1998(2) CLJ page 284. 15. Mr. Dasgupta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party No.3 has on the other hand supported the order passed by the learned first appellate court below and has contended that the learned first appellate court below on consideration of the materials on record having held that the plaintiffs failed to prove prima facie case and that the order of injunction was obtained by suppression of fact, this court sitting in revision should not interfere with such order. Mr. Dasgupta contends that a first appellate court has all the power of a trial Court and as such can take into consideration subsequent events for the purpose of doing effective justice between the parties. Mr. Dasgupta contends that the documents relied upon by his client before the learned first appellate court were all matter of subsequent events and as such the learned first appellate court was entitled to take into account those subsequent events and as such the order impugned herein cannot be said to be either illegal or without jurisdiction. Mr. Dasgupta submits that the materials on record unmistakably proved that his client was illegally dispossessed from the suit property by taking recourse to a proceeding under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the landlord had given undertaking before the learned Magistrate that she would not induct anyone in the disputed property. Therefore, creation of the alleged fresh tenancy on the self-same day shows that the petitioner was colluding with the landlord and was trying to delay the implementation of the order of restoration passed by this court in the criminal revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, Mr. Dasgupta prays for dismissal of the instant revisional application. 16. After hearing the learned counsels for the parties and after going through the order impugned herein I find that the learned first appellate court below while setting aside the ad interim order of status quo passed by the learned trial Judge has concluded that the plaintiff did not apply for temporary injunction in good faith and in arriving at such conclusion relied upon the documents filed by the opposite party No.3 along with the application for stay filed before the appellate court. The learned first appellate court was quite conscious that the learned trial Judge had no occasion to consider those documents as it appears from the penultimate page of the order impugned but inspite of such observation, by relying upon those documents inferred lack of bona fide on the part of the petitioner in making application for temporary injunction. Thus, after vacating the order of status quo, the learned appellate court below sent the record back to the learned trial Judge for disposal of the application for temporary injunction in the presence of the parties. 17. In my view, a person aggrieved by an ad interim order of temporary injunction has three-fold remedies. Firstly, he can answer the show cause notice by filing written objection to application for temporary injunction putting forward his defence and thus convince the court that the plaintiff is not entitled to the injunction and that the order of ad interim injunction should be vacated. Secondly, such person can come forward with an application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code for immediate variation of the ad interim injunction thereby not only drawing attention of the court to fraud or suppression on the part of the plaintiff in obtaining ad interim injunction but also exposing his own defence to the prayer of temporary or ad interim injunction. Lastly, without taking recourse to the aforesaid two ways of vacating the ad interim injunction, the aggrieved person may straightway prefer an appeal before an appellate court under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code. But if he decides to choose the above mentioned remedy by way of an appeal before filing written objection or application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code, he must be prepared to accept all statement made in the application for temporary injunction to be true and he should persuade the appellate court that even if the allegations of the otherside are true, the trial court ought not to have granted an ad interim order of injunction. But without showing cause as ordered by the trial Judge or without filing any application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code, the aggrieved person cannot insist on showing cause or placing his defence before the appellate court for the first time. Such procedure will be against the scheme of Order 39 of the Code. But without showing cause as ordered by the trial Judge or without filing any application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code, the aggrieved person cannot insist on showing cause or placing his defence before the appellate court for the first time. Such procedure will be against the scheme of Order 39 of the Code. Similarly, in such an appeal the scope of investigation is very limited. The appellate court will only consider whether on the basis of the materials on record, the learned trial Judge was justified in granting an ad interim order of injunction. 18. This court is quite conscious of the provision contained in Order 43 Rule 2 of the Code which says that the rules of Order 41 shall apply, so far as may be, to a Miscellaneous Appeal under Order 43 of the Code. Therefore, in an appropriate case, the provision contained in Order 41 Rule 27 may be made applicable provided of course, the conditions mentioned therein are present, and in such a case the provision contained in Order 41 Rules 28 or 29 are to be complied with. 19. At any rate, in the case in hand, the learned appellate court below did not exercise such powers. 20. In view of what has been stated above, I am of the firm view that the learned first appellate court below acted illegally and with material irregularity in taking into consideration the materials placed before it by the opposite party No.3 in holding that the petitioner did not come with clean hand. As pointed out earlier, it was the duty of the first appellate court to merely see whether the learned trial Judge was justified in passing the ad interim order of status quo on the basis of materials before the learned trial Judge. 21. As regards the other points canvassed by Mr. As pointed out earlier, it was the duty of the first appellate court to merely see whether the learned trial Judge was justified in passing the ad interim order of status quo on the basis of materials before the learned trial Judge. 21. As regards the other points canvassed by Mr. Roychowdhury that the subject matter of the proceeding under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that of the instant proceeding are different or that findings made by this court in a Criminal Revisional jurisdiction against an order on an application under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not binding upon a Civil Court particularly when the petitioner was not a party to the criminal proceeding, I do not propose to make any observation herein for the simple reason that such questions do not fall for consideration unless those facts are properly brought to the record of the case and that the main injunction matter is yet to be heard by the learned trial Judge on merit. 22. I, therefore, set aside the order passed by the learned first appellate court below and hold that on the basis of materials on record the learned trial Judge rightly granted an ad interim order of status quo as a strong prima facie case was made out by the petitioner and the balance of convenience and inconvenience was in favour of granting such order. It goes without saying that the petitioner would• suffer irreparable injury if the status quo as regards possession was not maintained. 23. The opposite parties are at liberty to file written objection to the application for temporary injunction within a fortnight from the date of reopening of the court after puja vacation. They are also at liberty to file application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code if so advised. The learned trial Judge will dispose of the application for temporary injunction positively within a month from the date of reopening in accordance with law and will not be influenced by this order as the scope of ad interim temporary injunction is different from that of the main temporary injunction after contested hearing. No Costs. Application disposed of.