JUDGMENT M.Y. EQBAL, J. 1. In this writ application petitioner has prayed for quashing the order passed by respondent no. 2 General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, South Bihar Chotanagpur Area Electricity Board, Ranchi by which he has granted reduction in the AMG charges only to the extent of 30,723 units for the year 1979-80 and 14,851 units for the year 1980-81 and held that the petitioner is not entitled for any proportionate reduction upto the duration of 59 minutes and has further wrongly taken contract demand at 285 KVA and 320 KVA for the year 1979-80 and 1980-81 respectively. 2. This case has very chequered history. Petitioner's case is that it had entered into an agreement with respondent Bihar Electricity Board, hereinafter referred as the Board for High Tension service with sanctioned load of 200 KVA for the year 1979-80 petitioner was served with bill of Rs. 67,150=88 for payment of AMG charges. Although petitioner paid the said amount but raised claim that petitioner is not liable to pay any AMG charges on account of frequent trippings and non-supply of electricity. On receipt of the bill petitioner made a claim before the respondent no. 2. The petitioner was again served with a bill of AMG for the year 1980-81 for Rs. 81,909=54 for which petitioner made another claim under clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement before respondent no. 2. Since the claims made by the petitioner were not decided in time petitioner filed writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 1320 of 1987. The said writ petition was disposed of with a direction to respondent no. 2 to dispose of the claim made by the petitioner under clause 13 of the agreement. The claims were ultimately rejected by the respondent no.2 and fresh demand was raised against the petitioner. Petitioner then filed another writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 176 of 1988(R) challenging the decision of respondent no. 2 whereby their claims were rejected. This Court by judgment dated 7.4.1988 allowed the writ petition and quashed the demand made by the respondent/Board. Respondent/Board thereafter preferred Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court and the matter was ultimately decided in Civil Appeal No. 164 of 1989. 2 whereby their claims were rejected. This Court by judgment dated 7.4.1988 allowed the writ petition and quashed the demand made by the respondent/Board. Respondent/Board thereafter preferred Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court and the matter was ultimately decided in Civil Appeal No. 164 of 1989. The Hon'ble Supreme Court disposed of the appeal by directing the Chief Engineer of the respondent-Board to decide the claim on the basis of hours of non supply and to assess the proportionate deduction of the AMG bill in respect of the disputed hours and after giving such proportionate reduction a fresh bill will be issued by the Board. It appears that in compliance of the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court respondent no.2 General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer gave a fresh hearing to the petitioner on the claims in respect of both the year 1979-80 and 1980-81 and disposed of the claim by the impugned order dated 26.4.1990. A copy of the order has been filed and annexed as annexure-11 to the writ application. On the basis of the decision taken by respondent no. 2 after giving proportionate reduction a fresh bill was raised which is Annexure-13 which is impugned in this writ petition. 3. Mr. Mittal learned counsel appearing for the petitioner at the very outset submitted that the claim with regard to non-supply of prescribed quota of wheat by the State Government is concerned the petitioner does not want to press that part of the order by which claim of the petitioner on this ground has been rejected. However, learned counsel assailed the other finding of respondent no. 2 arrived at in the impugned order. Learned counsel firstly submitted that when the contract demand under the agreement was only 200 KVA but calculation was made by the respondent taking a contract demand at 285 KVA for the year 1979-80 and 312 KVA for the year 1980-81 which is absolutely illegal, arbitrary and wholly without jurisdiction. Learned counsel submitted that nowhere in the impugned order it is mentioned as to on what basis calculation was made by respondent treating contract demand at 285 KVA and 312 KVA. Learned counsel submitted that nowhere in the impugned order it is mentioned as to on what basis calculation was made by respondent treating contract demand at 285 KVA and 312 KVA. Learned counsel then submitted that the finding of the respondent Chief Engineer that the petitioner is not entitled for any proportionate reduction upto 59 minutes and the proportionate reduction shall be allowed only where the power failure is more than one hour is absolutely illegal and against the series of judgments passed by this court. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent has committed serious illegality in not allowing proportionate reduction for every interruption irrespective of the duration. In this connection learned counsel relied upon the decision in the case of M/s Suprabhat Steel Ltd. vs. Bihar State Electricity Board as reported in 1994 BBCJ-369 and also in the case of M/s Bihar Gases Ltd. vs. Bihar State Electricity Board reported in 1999 Vol-1 PLJR-105. Learned counsel lastly submitted that the impugned order passed by respondent needs fresh consideration in the light of the decision of this court. 4. On the other hand Mr. V.P. Singh learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Board firstly submitted that the respondent-Chief Engineer recorded the finding of fact after considering documentary evidence produced by the parties and therefore this court in exercise of writ jurisdiction is not suppose to interfere with the such finding of fact. Learned counsel further submitted that the respondent Chief Engineer rightly held that proportionate reduction can be allowed only when there is interruption of supply of electricity for more than 59 minutes. 5. Before appreciating rival contentions of the parties it would be useful to first look into the ratios decided by this court and the Supreme Court in series of decisions on this point. In the case of M/s Suprabhat Steel Ltd. vs. Bihar State Electricity Board ( 1994 BBCJ 369 ). The question inter-alia falls for consideration before the Division Bench was that the following questions arose for consideration before the Division Bench:– (a) Whether for granted remission in the AMG and the maximum demand charges, the total hours of non-supply is relevant. (b) Whether the Board is entitle to ignore, while considering the claim of the consumers for grant of remission, interruption upto 59 minutes. (c) Whether Log Book maintained by consumers are relevant and should have been taken into consideration by respondent no. (b) Whether the Board is entitle to ignore, while considering the claim of the consumers for grant of remission, interruption upto 59 minutes. (c) Whether Log Book maintained by consumers are relevant and should have been taken into consideration by respondent no. 2 while disposing of the claim of the consumers. 6. So far remission is concerned their lordship held as under:– "Clause 13 of the agreement cannot be interpreted in a restrictive manner as was argued by Mr. Chatterjee. Clause 13 as noticed hereinbefore on the other hand must be construed liberally. The Board is bound to grant remission for any duration if a case therefore is made out. We fail to understand as to why tripping upto 59 minutes is considered to be tripping for short duration or for that matter in connection of business of supply of electrical energy. Trippings, load sheddings or power cuts in whatever form, distruption in supply of electrical energy takes place on once or the other factors enumerated in Clause 13, a consumer as matter of right would be entitled to proportionate remission of annual minimum guarantee or maximum demand charges. In such a case it may be open to the Board to show that a trippings or power cuts etc. would not come within the purview of clause 13 of the agreement but when, if any trippings, power cuts or load shedding etc. take the consumer would become entitled invoke the provisions of Clause 13, subject to the condition laid down i therein. In a case, however, the where consumer invoke clauses 13 of the agreement on the ground that he was prevented from taking supply of electrical energy, the burden of proof shall be on him." 7. On the question of consideration of records maintained by consumer also it was observed that:– "With regard to the question as to whether the records maintained by the Board only can be taken for consideration, for the disposal of the claims preferred by the consumers we may observe that the same would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In a case where the remission is claimed only on the basis of trippings, load shedding or power cut on the part of the Bihar State Electricity Board, if it be shown that all the High Tension electrical consumers were supplied electricity through the same feeder, the records maintained by the Board should be the prima facie evidence for claim or proportionate guarantee of Annual Minimum Guarantee and Maximum Demand Charges. But the same does not mean that the records maintained by the consumers are not admissible in evidence. A consumer is entitled to prove that he had made such arrangements so as to correctly and faithfully record the trippings, load sheddings and power cuts. He is also entitled to show that the Board has not maintained its records correctly." 8. In the case of M/s. Hind Agriculture Farm vs. B.S.E.B. (1995 Vol. 2 PLJR 405), a question falls for consideration before the Division Bench was whether the consumer is entitle to remission proportionate to the Board's inability to supply of power and whether the Board can adopt its own method in calculating the period for which there was disruption in the supply of electrical energy. Their lordship observed that:– "Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the impugned order, we are of the opinion, that though the mode of calculation adopted by the General Manager-cum-chief Engineer may be called ingenious, it does not have the sanction of clause 13, as quoted above. The material provision in the H.T. Agreement provides that a consumer is entitled to remission proportionate to the Board's inability to supply power; the twist introduced in the impugned order that had the supply of energy been wholly uninterrupted even then the total units consumed by the consumer would have been less than the minimum guarantee units appears to be a consideration extraneous to the provision of the statutory contract and therefore, any calculation made on that basis cannot be sustained in the eye of law." In the case of Balajee Wire Products vs. Bihar State Electricity Board (1995 Vol. 2 PLJR-810) In that case while deciding the claim under clause 13 of the agreement the Chief Engineer did not take into account interruption in supply of less than 1/2 an hour for computing the total hours of non-supply of energy. 2 PLJR-810) In that case while deciding the claim under clause 13 of the agreement the Chief Engineer did not take into account interruption in supply of less than 1/2 an hour for computing the total hours of non-supply of energy. It was held that:– "In my opinion, this approach for examining a claim of remission on account of Board's failure to supply energy is wholly erroneous and foreign to the provisions contained in clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement. I may clarify here that the refusal to allow remission on the ground that the consumers' failure to consume the guaranteed units was not due to the Board's failure to supply energy but on account of factors for which the consumer himself was responsible may not be per se unreasonable and arbitrary. Objectively speaking there may be some substance in this line of reasoning. But it must be borne in mind that the Chief Engineer derives its power to adjudicate upon a claim for remission of minimum guaranteed charges from clause 13 of the agreement. It, therefore, follows that he must confine himself to that provision and must not take into consideration elements and factors which are foreign to that provision. Clause 13 on a plain meaning of the language provides that the consumer is entitled to remission proportionate to the Board's inability to supply electrical energy. In case of the Board's inability to supply electrical energy the hypothetical question of the consumer's ability or inability to consume, had the Board been able to maintain a continuous supply is quite immaterial and irrelevant." 9. In the said decision this court also laid down the mode of calculation for granting proportionate remission in the matter of payment of AMG charges. In a recent case of M/s Bihar Gases Ltd. vs. Bihar State Electricity Board a Bench of this court again considered the question as to mode of calculating remission in respect of the guarantee charges and following its earlier decision in the case of Balajee Wires Products vs. Bihar State Electricity Board (supra). It was held that remission guaranteed energy has to be calculated to multiply the total number for granted energy units and not short fall units by dividing hours of non-supply of electricity by a total hours in a year. 10. It was held that remission guaranteed energy has to be calculated to multiply the total number for granted energy units and not short fall units by dividing hours of non-supply of electricity by a total hours in a year. 10. From perusal of the impugned decision taken by the General Manager-cum-chief Engineer it appears that the Chief Engineer has held that single interruption of few minutes upto the duration of 59 minutes is to be treated as ordinary incidence in the business of power supply and has to be ignored for the purpose of granting remission. Accordingly the Chief-Engineer ignored most of the interruption which was of short duration and allowed remission only in respect of such interruption which were for an hour and more. The Chief Engineer further calculated the amount taking the contract demand of 285 KVA for the year 1979-80. Similarly on the basis of contract demand of 312 KVA for the year 1980-81 the AMG unit was worked out. The case of the petitioner was that upto 1988 the contract demand was only 200 KVA and it was only after 11.6.1988 the contract demand was increased to 250 KVA. From perusal of the impugned order it does not appear as to on what basis the contract demand was taken as 285 KVA and 312 KVA. The Chief Engineer ought to have given reasons while treating the contract demand of 285 KVA and 312 KVA. 11. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and discussions made above I am of the opinion that the claims raised by the petitioner needs reconsideration by the Chief Engineer as the claims have not been decided in accordance with law. 12. I, therefore, allow this writ application set aside the impugned order passed by respondent no. 2 as contained in Annexure-11 to the writ application and the bill raised by the respondent-Board and remit the matter back to the Chief Engineer to decide the question of proportionate remission in the AMG charges in the light of the decision of this court referred to hereinabove and in the light of the direction and observation made hereinabove.