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1999 DIGILAW 582 (KAR)

G. RAJASHEKARA REDDY v. KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, CENTRAL OFFICES, BANGALORE

1999-11-02

CHANDRASHEKARAIAH

body1999
CHANDRASHEKARAIAH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who filed this writ petition died during the pendency of this writ petition and his L. Rs are brought on record. ( 2 ) THE petitioner while he was working as Divisional Controller of the respondent-Corporation from 9-4-1989 to 19-3-1990, was made as the chairman of the Selection Committee for the purpose of selection to the post of helpers. One Mr. Sriram Reddy who was the Administrative officer of the respondent-Corporation was also one of the members of the selection committee. After the selection, on certain allegations three charges were framed against the petitioner and Mr. Sriram Reddy. The said charges read as follows:"i. For gross misconduct and negligence in the discharge of your official duties in the matter of recruitment for the post of helpers 'b' in the Mysore Division in that you have failed to adhere to the definite criteria in relation to the job recruitment evolved by the Selection Authority for adjudging the suitabilities of the candidates bearing Reg. Nos. 142, 156, 692 and 194 at the time of interview by awarding arbitrary marks to them which act of yours is unbecoming of a servant of the corporation. II. For abusing the official position with an ulterior motive by altering the marks of the candidate bearing Reg. No. 1780 in all the criteria columns of your folder to favour him to get selected, which act of yours is unbecoming of a servant of the corporation. III. For gross misconduct and failure to maintain devotion to duty in that you failed to follow the definite criteria in relation to the job requirement evolved by the Selection Authority for adjudging the suitability of the candidate Reg. No. 863 by awarding positive marks for the criteria 'experience' although the candidate had nil experience at the time of interview". The disciplinary authority appointed the Enquiry Officer to hold an enquiry on these charges both against the petitioner and Sriram Reddy. The enquiry officer held the enquiry and submitted the report holding all the three charges framed against the petitioner are not proved. Insofar as Sriram Reddy is concerned, the enquiry officer has held that the three charges framed against him are proved. The enquiry officer held the enquiry and submitted the report holding all the three charges framed against the petitioner are not proved. Insofar as Sriram Reddy is concerned, the enquiry officer has held that the three charges framed against him are proved. The disciplinary authority disagreed with the views of the enquiry officer insofar as the petitioner is concerned in respect of charge numbers 1 and 3 and held that they are proved and so far as Charge No. 2 is concerned, the disciplinary authority agreed with the views of the Enquiry Officers. The disciplinary authority, insofar as Sriram Reddy is concerned, agreed with the views of the enquiry officer. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of removal of the petitioner and imposed the punishment of reversion to Sriram Reddy. ( 3 ) SRIRAM Reddy challenged the said action before this Court vide W. P. No. 24355 of 1991. This Court recorded the finding that the charges framed against Sriram Reddy do not amount to misconduct and consequently, quashed the order of punishment. This order was affirmed by the Division Bench in W. A. No. 972 of 1994 by order dated 2-12-1996. It appears as against the order passed by the Division Bench, the Supreme Court granted special leave and it is pending consideration. ( 4 ) THE charges framed against the petitioner are same. The enquiry is also a joint enquiry. When this Court has taken a view that the said charges do not amount to misconduct, I find no reason to differ with the said finding. Further, on the same set of facts it is not appropriate for this Court to pass an inconsistent order. ( 5 ) AS stated earlier the Enquiry Officer had taken a view that all the charges framed against the petitioner were not proved. The said finding was not accepted by the disciplinary authority. When such being the case, it is contented that the disciplinary authority ought to have afforded an opportunity to the petitioner after recording its reasons on the evidence available on records. In support of this the learned Counsel for the petitioner cited a decision Punjab National Bank and Others v Kunj behari Misra. Regulation 23 (25) of the K. S. R. T. C. (C and D) Regulations, 1971 reads as follows. In support of this the learned Counsel for the petitioner cited a decision Punjab National Bank and Others v Kunj behari Misra. Regulation 23 (25) of the K. S. R. T. C. (C and D) Regulations, 1971 reads as follows. "the disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own finding of such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose". The Supreme Court, in the decision referred to above had an occasion to consider the said rule which reads as follows. "the disciplinary authority, shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the enquiry officer on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own finding on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose". The conclusion reached by the Supreme Court considering the said rule reads as follows. "the result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7 (2 ). As a result thereof whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the inquiry authority on any article of charge then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the Inquiry Officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the Inquiry Officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority, which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file representation before the disciplinary authority records its finding on the charges framed against the officer". In this case also the disciplinary authority has not recorded any tentative reason for disagreement and has not afforded any opportunity to the petitioner to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the Enquiry Officer. In the said view of the matter the order of removal is liable to be set aside. ( 6 ) DURING the pendency of the petition, the petitioner died on 29-5-1992. In the said view of the matter the order of removal is liable to be set aside. ( 6 ) DURING the pendency of the petition, the petitioner died on 29-5-1992. In the meanwhile, the petitioner would also have attained the age of superannuation. Hence, question of issuing direction to reinstate the petitioner does not arise. Therefore, no purpose would be served by directing the respondent to reinstate the petitioner. ( 7 ) IN the result, I pass the following order. (i) Writ petition is allowed; (ii) The impugned order imposing the penalty of removal is quashed; (iii) The L. Rs of the deceased petitioner are entitled for all consequential benefits flowing therefrom. --- *** --- .