Judgment :- Arijit Pasayat, C.J. Judgment of learned Sessions Judge, Manjeri finding appellant, Kizhakkakalh Muhammed alias Bava (here in after referred to as 'accused') guilty of offence punishable under S.302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC') is challenged in this appeal. Accused was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. It was alleged that he caused homicidal death of Alavikutty Master thereinafter referred to as 'deceased') on 22.5.1993. 2. Prosecution case in a nutshell which led to trial is as follows: Accused was living separately from his wife (P. W. 4). She had filed a petition for maintenance. The case was pending. Deceased had tried to bring about a settlement and a compromise. In terms of the decree obtained by P. W. 4, accused was to pay the Rs. 1,44,300/- and part of amount had been paid. Accused was not happy with the conduct of deceased and considered him 10 be a meddler in his personal affairs. On the fateful day, deceased was mercilessly stabbed by accused. P.Ws.1 to 3 are stated to have witnessed occurrence. P.W. 3 had sustained injury caused by accused during chase given by the latter when he tried to intervene. Information was lodged at police station by P.W. I. Investigation was undertaken on the basis of report Post-mortem was conducted by P. W.7. P.W. 6 was the Assistant Surgeon attached to Government Hospital, Tirur, who examined deceased and issued injury certificate, on 22.5.1993. On the next day, she examined P.W.3 and issuedExtP4 injury certificate. Dying declaration stated to have been recorded by P.W. 6 was also pressed into service to further the version of eye witnesses. Plea of insanity based on S, 84IPC was discarded. 3. Learned trial judge considering evidence of eye witnesses, found them to be reliable witnesses. P.W.3 had sustained injuries. P.W.1 had lodged information almost immediately after incident. That being position, stand of accused that F.I.R. was a concocted one or was brought into existence as a result of confabulation or deliberation was discarded. Time gap between the time of incident and time of lodging information was attributed to tee attend on given by witness for administering treatment to deceased. P.W. I wes a neighbour of both accused and deceased and there is no reason as to why he would falsely implicate accused. Reference was also made in first information report regarding deceased's statement about stabbing. P.W. I wes a neighbour of both accused and deceased and there is no reason as to why he would falsely implicate accused. Reference was also made in first information report regarding deceased's statement about stabbing. He was the person who had rendered immediate attention to deceased and had, in fact, pulled out the knife. P. W.2 testified that on hearing cries of deceased, while he was standing in front of P.W. 5's shop, he came running. Evidence given by P.W. I was corroborated by P.W. 2. It is to be noted that at the earliest point of time, presence of P.W.2 at the spot was indicated by informant. P.W. 3 also stated to have seen the occurrence and heard cries of deceased. P.W.4 was examined to tell background of the marital discord between her and the role played by deceased. Plea of insanity as set out by accused was, as aforesaid, not accepted. Accused was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for life. 4. M support of appeal, it was submitted that there was no acceptable evidence to fasten guilt on accused. Evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 ought not have been accepted. It is further stated that dying declaration should not have been accepted as it was not established that at the time of making so-called declaration, deceased was in a good physical state to give such declaration. Finally, it is submitted that plea of insanity shook! have been accepted. Learned counsel for State submitted that the conclusions of learned trial judge do not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. 5. We shall first deal with the question relating to acceptability of evidence. An attempt was made by learned counsel for accused to submit that witnesses were interested am!, therefore, their evidence should be discarded. Whenever an allegation of interested witness is made, foundation for the same must be laid. 6. Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases court has to adopt a careful approach and analyze evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible. 7. It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases court has to adopt a careful approach and analyze evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible. 7. In Dilip Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1953 SC 364), it has been laid down as under: "As witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has caused such an enmity against accused, to wish to implicate 'him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative could be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth However, we are not in sweeping generalization. Each cast" must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a genera! rule of prudence. There is no such genera! rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts." 8. This decision has since been followed in Guli Chand and Ors v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1974 SC 276) in which Vadivelu Thieverv. The State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 624) was also relied upon. 9. We may also observe that the ground that the witness being a close relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not be relied upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by apex court as early as in Dilip Singh's case (supra) in which apex court expressed its surprise over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the members of the Bar that relatives were not independent witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. the apex court observed: "We are unable to agree with the learned judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eye witnesses requires corroborate. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. the apex court observed: "We are unable to agree with the learned judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eye witnesses requires corroborate. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rules. If it is grounded on the reason that they arc closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavored to dispel in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan (AIR 1950 SC 54). We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgment of the courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel." In this case, apex court further observed as under: "A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has caused such an enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth." 10. Again, inMasalti v. State ofU.P. (AIR 1965 SC 202), apex Court observed: "Again it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of a partisan or interested witnesses. The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice." 11. To the same effect is the decision of apex Court in State of Punjab v, Jagir Singh (AIR 1973 SC 1407). 12. Next we shall deal with acceptability of dying declaration. Great emphasis is laid on the fact that deceased was brought in a critical condition and so could not have given a dying declaration. To the same effect is the decision of apex Court in State of Punjab v, Jagir Singh (AIR 1973 SC 1407). 12. Next we shall deal with acceptability of dying declaration. Great emphasis is laid on the fact that deceased was brought in a critical condition and so could not have given a dying declaration. We find that a positive statement has been recorded by the doctor about deceased having given dying declaration. Therefore there is no substance in the plea raised. So far as legality of recording of a confession or dying declaration is concerned, much has been said about the conduct of accused persons in not coming to rescue of deceased. 13. So far as absence of attempt to rescue the deceased aspect is concerned, it has to be noted that merely because the witnesses had not come to rescue of deceased, their evidence cannot be viewed with suspicion. The persons were outsiders and occurrence took place on all a sudden. Every person who witnesses commission of offence reacts in his own way. There is no hard and fast rule as to in which manner a person would react. To discard evidence of a witness on the ground that he did not react in any particular manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic and unimaginative manner, (see: Rana Pratap v. State of Haryana - AIR 1983 SC 680). A witness to a serious crime may not react in a normal manner. Witnesses witnessing commission of an offence do not react uniformly. Their course of conduct may not be of ordinary type, (see: Appa Bhai v. State of Gujarat - AIR 1988 SC 696). 14. At this juncture, it is relevant to take note of S.32 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short'Evidence Act') which deals with cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc. is relevant. 14. At this juncture, it is relevant to take note of S.32 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short'Evidence Act') which deals with cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc. is relevant. General rule is that all oral evidence must be direct, viz., if it refers to a fact which could be seen it must be the evidence of witness who says he saw it, if it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of witness who says he heard it, if it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any other sense, it must be the evidence of the witness who says he perceived it by that sense. Similar is the case with opinion. These aspects are elaborated in S.60. The eight clauses of S.32 are exceptions to the general rule against hearsay just stated. Clause(1) of S.32 makes relevant what is generally described as dying declaration, though such an expression has not been used in any statute. It essentially means statements made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to the circumstances of transaction resulting in his death. Grounds of admission are: firstly, necessity for the victim being generally the only principal eyewitness to the crime, exclusion of statement might defect the ends of justice; and secondly, the sense of impending death, which creates a Santen equal to the obligation of an oath. General principle on which this species of evidence is admitted is that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn and so lawful is considered by law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a Court of justice. These aspects have been eloquently stated by lyre LCR in R. v. Wood Cock ((1789)1 Lead* 500). Shakespeare makes the wounded Mecum, finding himself disbelieved while announcing the intended treachery' of Dauphin Lewis explain Have I met hideous death within my view, Retaining but a quantity of life, Which bleeds away, even as a form of wax, Resolveth from his figure. against the fire? Shakespeare makes the wounded Mecum, finding himself disbelieved while announcing the intended treachery' of Dauphin Lewis explain Have I met hideous death within my view, Retaining but a quantity of life, Which bleeds away, even as a form of wax, Resolveth from his figure. against the fire? What is the world should make me now deceive, Since I must lose the use of all deceit? Why should I then be false, since it is true That I must the here, live hence by truth?" (see King John, Act 5, Section 4) The principle on which dying declaration is admitted in evidence is indicated in legal maxim "nemo moriturus proesumitur mentiri" a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth. 15. This is a case where the basis of conviction of accused is the dying declaration. Situation in which a man is on death bed is so solemn and serene when he is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept in veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will be result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally Hie only eye witness in a serious crime, the exclusion of statement would leave Court without a scrap of evidence. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason Court also insists that dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of Court in its correctness. Court has to be on guard that statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. Court must be further satisfied that deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify assailants. Once Court is satisfied that declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that dying declaration cannot form sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. Rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. Once Court is satisfied that declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that dying declaration cannot form sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. Rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. Apex Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat ((1992X1) SVLR (Crime) 133:1992(2) SCC 474: (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (see: Mannu Raja v. State of M.P. ((1976) 2 SCR 764). (ii) If Court is satisfied that dying declaration is true and voluntary, it can base conviction on it without corroboration. (see: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav - AIR 1985 SC 416 zndRamavati Devi v. State of Bihar - AIR 1983 SC 154). (iii) Court has to scrutinize dying declaration carefully and must ensure that declaration is not the result of tutoring, promoting or imagination. Deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify assailants and was in a fit state to make declaration. (see:Ram Chandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor- AIR 1976 SC 1994). (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence, (see: Rasheed Beg v. State ofMadhya Pradesh -1974(4) SCC 264). (v) Where deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (see:KakaSinghv. StateofM.P. (AIR 1992 SC 1021). (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction, (see: Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. -1981 SCC (Crl.) 561. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain details as to occurrence, it is not to be rejected, (see: State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidit-AIR 1981 SC 617). (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, shortness of statement itself guarantees truth. (see:Surajdeo Ora v. State of Bihar - AIR 1979 SC 1505). (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, shortness of statement itself guarantees truth. (see:Surajdeo Ora v. State of Bihar - AIR 1979 SC 1505). (ix) Normally Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make dying declaration look up to medical opinion, But where eye witness said that deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail, (see: Nanahu Ram andAnr. v. State - AIR 2988 SC 912). (x) Where prosecution version differs from version as given in the dying declaration, said declaration cannot be acted upon, (see: State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan -AIR 1989 SC 1519). (xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declarations, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if plurality of dying declaration could be held to be truth, worth and reliable it has to be accepted, (see: Mohan Lai v. State of Maharastra - AIR 1982 SC 839). This position has again been reiterated in Jai Koran v. State of (NCT Delhi) (1999(8) Supreme 194). 16. In the light of above principles, we will consider acceptability of alleged dying declaration in the instant case. Dying declaration is only a piece of untested evidence and must like any other evidence, satisfy Court that what is stated therein is the unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. If after careful scrutiny the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. (see: Gangotri Singh v. State of U.P. - JT 1992(2) SCC 417; Govendhan Raoji Chanyare v. State of Maharashtra - JT 1993 (5) SC 87; Meesala Ramakrishnan v. State o fA.P. JT 1994(3) SC 232 and State of Rajasthan v. Kishore - JT 1996 (2) SC 595). We find no reason to entertain the appeal. It is dismissed accordingly.