Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Deb Narayan Chatterjee
1999-02-22
Bhaskar Bhattacharya, Vinod Kumar Gupta
body1999
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. This mandamus appeal is at the instance of a respondent in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and is directed against the order dated June 19, 1997 passed by a learned Single Judge of this court in Civil Order No. 12276(W) of 1992 thereby disposing of the writ application filed by the respondent no. 1 herein with a direction that the appellant will consider the question of giving appointment to the available candidates including writ petitioners no. 1, 2, 5, 6, 11, 12 and 13 from 1985 panel of handicapped persons in filling up any vacancy hereafter in any post in any non-works or in any department except in work area. By the said order, a further direction was given to the appellant to treat the existing and future vacancies in Durgapur Steel Plant ("DSP") as reserved category vacancy for handicapped persons and not to fill up those vacancies without offering appointments to the available candidates of 1985 panel of handicapped persons. 2. The respondents writ petitioners who were fourteen in number complained in the writ application that they were all physically handicapped persons and their names were sponsored by the Employment Exchange for consider ration for appointment at DSP and after necessary interview the DSP authorities sometime in the year 1985 empanelled them for the purpose of future appointments. In course of exchanges of affidavits it was however detected that out of fourteen petitioners only seven were empanelled under various categories while the remaining seven were not empanelled. Ultimately, only those seven writ petitioners viz. petitioners no. 1, 2, 5, 6, 11, 12 and 13 pressed the said writ application. The grievance of the aforesaid petitioners is that although they were empanelled, none of them were given employment. 3. The appellant contested the said writ application and in its affidavit-in-opposition the defence taken by the appellant was that the life of the said panel had expired after six months and as such no appointment can be given from a panel which is not alive. There is no dispute that the panel was prepared on March 22, 1985. Thus, according to the appellant on the expiry of September 22, 1985 there was no valid panel. 4.
There is no dispute that the panel was prepared on March 22, 1985. Thus, according to the appellant on the expiry of September 22, 1985 there was no valid panel. 4. The learned Single Judge on consideration of the entire materials on record held that although according to the Rules, 3% of the employees should be kept reserved for physically handicapped persons, except two persons no other person was given appointment from the said panel. The learned Trial Judge also overruled the contention of the appellant that the panel had lapsed inasmuch as two persons from the said panel, whose names appeared serially after petitioners were given appointment one in the year 1989 and another in the year 1991. The learned Trial Judge further found that from 1984 about 4000 posts were filled up and 3% of the aforesaid posts come to 120 (approx) but the appellant has filled up only two persons from the panel. 5. In view of the aforesaid findings, the learned Trial Judge was of the opinion that 3% quota for handicapped persons were not filled up and in view of the fact that two persons from the said panel of 1985 were given appointment even in 1989 and in 1991, the submission of the appellant that the said panel had expired was without any basis. The learned Trial Judge, therefore, allowed the writ application in part as indicated earlier. 6. Being dissatisfied, the Steel Authority of India Limited has preferred the instant mandamus appeal. 7. Mr. Gupta, the learned advocate appearing in support of this appeal has contended that the panel having expired after the lapse of six months, the writ petitioners were not entitled to get any relief in the writ application after the lapse of seven years. In support of such contention Mr. Gupta has relied upon two decisions of the Apex Court viz. the case of State of Bihar and Ors. vs. Md. Kalimuddin and Ors. reported in 1996 (2) SCC 7 and the case of Gursaran Singh and Ors. vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee and Ors. reported in 1996 (2) SCC 459 . 8. In the case of State of Bihar and Ors. vs. Md.
the case of State of Bihar and Ors. vs. Md. Kalimuddin and Ors. reported in 1996 (2) SCC 7 and the case of Gursaran Singh and Ors. vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee and Ors. reported in 1996 (2) SCC 459 . 8. In the case of State of Bihar and Ors. vs. Md. Kalimuddin (supra) it was held by the Apex Court that if according to statutory rules a panel lapses, a court could not stop it from lapsing in exercise of judicial discretion unless its constitutional validity was questioned. In the said decision, the panel was prepared on January 19, 1991 and part III of the Rules provided for appointment and promotion. Clause VI thereof provided that list of candidates prepared for direct appointment would be valid for one year from the date of approval of the project by the Selection Committee. Therefore, in the said case before Apex Court there was a statutory Rule limiting the life of the panel. In the instant case the appellant could not produce any statutory Rule limiting the life of the panel. It was contended by Mr. Gupta that in view of Circular dated 29/31 October, 1979 issued by the concerned authority of DSP, the panel for promotion as well as recruitment would remain valid for six months. The law is now settled that a circular issued by an authority cannot take the place of a statutory Rules. Therefore, the aforesaid case cited by Mr. Gupta is not applicable to the fact of the present case. 9. In the case of Gursaran Singh (supra) it was held by the Supreme Court that where a State commits illegality and irregularity in favour of any individual or group of individuals, others cannot claim the same illegality or irregularity on the ground of denial thereof to them. According to the Supreme Court only the claim which is just and legal can constitute a ground of discrimination on the basis that it had been extended to some and denied to others. In this case, it appears from record that two persons from 1985 panel were given appointment in the year 1989 and 1991 respectively. On consideration of the said fact and other materials, the learned Trial Judge found that the panel was very much alive. Thus, it is very difficult to accept the submission of Mr.
In this case, it appears from record that two persons from 1985 panel were given appointment in the year 1989 and 1991 respectively. On consideration of the said fact and other materials, the learned Trial Judge found that the panel was very much alive. Thus, it is very difficult to accept the submission of Mr. Gupta that his client gave illegal appointments to those two persons. On the other hand, in view of the fact that no subsequent panel has been prepared in course of last fourteen years, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge rightly observed that the said panel was still subsisting. Therefore, as pointed out by the learned Trial Judge, those two persons from the panel having been given appointment there was no justification of refusing appointments to others. 10. As indicated earlier, the learned Trial Judge specifically found that 3% of the total posts should be kept reserved for handicapped persons, and that in course of last fourteen years about 4000 employees were given appointment whereas only two persons were appointed from handicapped category. 11. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the learned Trial Judge was justified in passing a direction for considering the case of the seven writ petitioners whose names appeared in the panel. We, therefore, find no force in the aforesaid contention of Mr. Gupta. 12. Under the aforesaid circumstances, we direct the appellant to consider the case of the aforesaid seven writ petitioners for appointments if they are found eligible and suitable. The appellant is also entitled to consider their case of appointment in the post which has since been re-designated. If there is no existing vacancy, the appellant will consider their case for the very next available vacancies or in other words, no candidate should be appointed without considering the case of the above seven writ petitioners. 13. With the above observation the appeal is disposed of. 14. Re: C.O. No. 16328 (W) of 1992. Diresh Chandra Sen and Ors. vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. Since the grievance of the writ petitioners in this writ application is similar to the one which is disposed of by us in M.A.T. No. 2307 of 1997, we allow the said writ application with a similar direction to consider the case of the petitioners no. 1 (Diresh Chandra Sen), no. 4 (Bhutnath Mondal), no. 5 (Smt. Gita Dutta) and no.
1 (Diresh Chandra Sen), no. 4 (Bhutnath Mondal), no. 5 (Smt. Gita Dutta) and no. 10 (Sri Karunamoy Mukherjee) for the post of Group-C, L3 Grade and case of petitioner no. 8 (Jagabandhu Dey) for the post of Group-D, L1 Grade. Other petitioners are not interested to press the application. Let this writ application be allowed with similar direction as given earlier in the M.A.T. No. 2307 of 1997 to consider the case of those petitioners immediately after considering the case of the seven respondents of the aforesaid appeal. The writ application is thus disposed of. 15. Re: C.O. No. 2744 (W) of 1993. Sharirik Pratibandhi Unnayan Samity vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. In this writ application Sharirik Pratibandhi Unnayan Samity, a registered society is the petitioner and the grievance of the petitioner is similar to the one in other two writ applications just disposed of. For the same reason we allow the said writ application by directing the Steel Authority to consider the case of the following members of the petitioner association. For the Post of Farash:- 1. Sm. Gita Bhadra/Debnath daughter of I.K. Bhadra. 2. Sm. Sikha Chattopadhay daughter of A.K. Chattopadhay. 3. Sm. Chaudi Chatterjee daughter of Khudiram Chatterjee. For the Post of Peon :- 4. Santosh Kumar Paul son of G.C. Paul. 5. Ramalesa Panja son of M.K. Panja. For the Post of USW Non-works department:- 6. Prabir Panja son of S.S. Panja. 7. Sankar Rana son of L.D. Rana. For the Post of Category 4-Misce.:- 8. Kanailal Sarkar son of B.N. Sarkar. 16. The writ petitioner did not press the claim of other members of the Association. All the aforesaid cases will be considered in accordance with the seniority in the panel. 17. With the above observation, this writ application is also disposed of. In the facts and circumstances there will be no order as to costs. 18. We make it clear that on consideration of the cases of 23 persons in the above three matters the disputed panel of 1985, should be deemed to have been exhausted. Vinod Kumar Gupta, J. : I agree. Appeal and C.O.S. allowed.