( 1 ) HEARD the arguments of learned Counsel on both sides. ( 2 ) THIS series of revisions is directed against the respective judgments of the learned District judge in Appeal Nos. 105 to 135 of 1994 of the respective petitioners herein dismissing their appeals filed by them challenging the respective orders of the Taxation Appeals Committee ('tag' for short), all dated 8-10-1993 which were made in regard to revision of the respective building tax. ( 3 ) CERTAIN undisputed facts giving rise to these batch of revisions are stated as follows: each of the petitioners herein happens to be the owner of different portions of one and the same building premises which was originally bearing Municipal No. 25 named Ramakrishna Market, situated in Bangalore City. The revision of its tax assessment was taken up by the Commissioner of B. C. C. in normal course. The annual property tax with respect to different portions of the building in ownership of the respective petitioners was separately made by the Commissioner and the demand notices dated 15-7-1997 were issued to them by him informing them of the revised figures of tax assessed with respect thereto and calling upon them to pay the same. As was contended by each of the petitioners the tax so revised by the Commissioner in respect of their respective portions of the building was 400 times more than its previous annual tax. Therefore, the revision of tax was challenged by each of the petitioners before the TAC of the bangalore City Corporation. ( 4 ) THE challenge to the Commissioner's revision of assessment was made by the petitioners on the ground that the respective portions of the building of which they are the owners were in actual occupation of their different tenants who have been paying them the monthly rents at the particular rates and when the 'rateable value' with respect thereto was calculated on the basis of the 'rental value' then the revision of tax assessment made by the Commissioner was exorbitant and it was liable to be drastically reduced. In their said appeals the respective orders, all dated 8-10-1993 were passed by the TAC reducing the assessment of tax made in each case roughly to the extent of about 40%. In their said appeals the respective orders, all dated 8-10-1993 were passed by the TAC reducing the assessment of tax made in each case roughly to the extent of about 40%. ( 5 ) NOT satisfied with these orders of TAC the petitioners approached the lower Appellate Court challenging the validity and correctness thereof with their respective appeals all filed on 14-11-1994. Obviously, the appeals having been filed after the expiry of the prescribed limitation period of 30 days, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in each of these appeals was also made by the appellants for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The ground urged in support of the contention of the delay was that they were not aware of the impugned orders of the TAC and they came to know of it for the first time when the demand notices dated 15-9-1994 were served on them on 20-9-1994 by the Bangalore City Corporation calling upon them to pay the tax as determined in the impugned orders. Thus, there had been a delay of 25 days and the reason for this delay shown in the affidavit was that during the relevant period two deaths had taken place in their family as a result of which they were in a state of shock and grief. ( 6 ) THE respondent-Corporation filed its statement of objections before the lower Appellate Court in support of the validity of the impugned orders of the TAC, as also contending that all the appeals were barred by time and are liable to be dismissed in limine. ( 7 ) ON consideration of the material obtainable on record as also the rival contentions put forward by both sides, the lower Appellate Court came to the conclusion that each of the appellants was very much present on 8-10-1993 when the impugned orders were passed and, therefore, he had the knowledge thereof with the result there was absolutely no explanation for the delay that was caused in filing the appeals after a period of about one year; and also that on merits the impugned orders did not suffer from any legal infirmity. ( 8 ) LEARNED Counsel representing petitioners vehemently argued assailing the validity and propriety of the aforesaid conclusions of the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court. ( 8 ) LEARNED Counsel representing petitioners vehemently argued assailing the validity and propriety of the aforesaid conclusions of the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court. Elaborating his argument it was submitted by him that the above conclusions reached by the lower Appellate Court were arbitrary and are not supported by material on record since the proceedings recorded in the order-sheet of TAC in each of these cases do not support the conclusion of the Court-below that the petitioners were present therein on 8-10-1993 and signed the order sheet. ( 9 ) THE original enquiry files of the TAC are available in these revision files. I am taken through the contents of original order sheet in these cases. I find sufficient force in the submission of the learned Counsel for petitioners that the contents of these order sheets do not support the conclusion of the lower Appellate Court that the petitioners were present before the TAC on 8-10-1993 and have signed the order sheets. None of the order sheets for the date 8-10-1993 contains the signature of the petitioners. ( 10 ) MR. E. G. Rajashekar, learned Counsel representing respondent-Corporation, invited the court's attention to cyclostyled pieces of separate papers where the blank places are filled in ink recording the presence of petitioner in each case and purporting to contain his signature as on 8-10-1993. Petitioners have stoutly denied before the lower Appellate Court about authenticity of the documents and their being present before the TAC on 8-10-1993. In the normal course of an enquiry the proceeding which takes place on a particular date of hearing shall have to be recorded in the order sheet of the case. The fact of the presence of the parties in the enquiry of the TAC on 8-10-1993 does not find mention in the relevant portion of the respective order sheets for the date 8-10-1993. Non-recording of this fact in the order sheet raises a grave suspicion as regards authenticity of the said separate and cyclostyled papers. They become undoubtedly suspect documents in view of the petitioners denial of they having signed any such paper on 8-10- 1993. Such suspect documentary material is unworthy of any importance and the same ought not to have been looked into and acted upon by the Court below for any purpose, whatever. They become undoubtedly suspect documents in view of the petitioners denial of they having signed any such paper on 8-10- 1993. Such suspect documentary material is unworthy of any importance and the same ought not to have been looked into and acted upon by the Court below for any purpose, whatever. Then there absolutely remains no believable evidence on record supporting the contention of respondent-Corporation that the impugned orders dated 8-10-1993 were passed in the presence of petitioners. That they could not have been passed in the presence of petitioners also gains ground and gets confirmed from the further indisputable fact that nowhere in the entire order sheet it is indicated that 8-10-1993 was the date of regular hearing fixed by the TAC in its enquiry proceeding for pronouncement of order or for any other purpose. This sole circumstance was sufficient to accept the case of each petitioner that he had no personal knowledge of the impugned order dated 8-10-1993 of the TAC and that they acquired it only on 20-9-1994 when they were served with the said demand notice dated 6-9-1994 and 15-9-1994. When such is the actual position, the delay that was caused in filing of their appeals in the Court below was only 25 days for which the uncontroverted explanation of the petitioners that two deaths had taken place in their family by reason of which they were prevented from taking steps in time to prefer the appeals calls for acceptance. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court was, therefore, patently wrong in holding that there had been delay of over one year in filing of the appeals for which the petitioners who were appellants before him, had no satisfactory explanation whatsoever. His finding in this regard is erroneous. ( 11 ) NOW coming to the merits of the case of each petitioner, on consideration of the relevant material obtainable on record, I find that, that the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court seriously erred in his further conclusion that there was no sufficient evidence for the petitioners showing that the impugned orders of the TAC were vitiated by any illegality. The method of assessment of property tax by the Corporation is dealt with by sub-section (2) of Section 108 and section 109 read with Section 117 of Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (the Act' for short ). The method of assessment of property tax by the Corporation is dealt with by sub-section (2) of Section 108 and section 109 read with Section 117 of Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (the Act' for short ). The relevant portions of these provisions which are material for our purpose are extracted below: "108. Description and class of property tax.-- (1) xxx XXX XXX. (2) The property tax shall be levied, at such percentage, not being less than twenty per cent and not more than twenty-five per cent of the rateable value of buildings and lands as may be fixed by the Corporation: provided that the percentage so fixed may be different in different areas and for different classes of buildings and lands. Explanation.-xxx xxx xxx". (3) For the purpose of assessing the property tax, the rateable value of any building or land shall be determined by the Commissioner: provided: xxx xxx xxx". 109. Method of assessment of property tax.--- (1) xxx XXX XXX. (2) The rateable value of a building or land shall be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which such building or land may at the time of assessment reasonably be expected to let from month to month or from year to year less a deduction in the case of buildings only of sixteen and two-thirds per cent of such annual rent and the said deduction shall be in lieu of all allowance for repairs or on any other account whatever: provided that- xxx xxx xxx". Section 117 provides for the Commissioner's powers to call for relevant information and inspection of the premises for the purpose of assessing the property tax in respect thereof. This section runs: "117. Commissioner's power to call for information and to enter upon premises and to condone omission to give notice.-- (1) For the purpose of assessing the property tax, the Commissioner may, by notice, call upon the owner or occupier of any building or land to furnish him within thirty days after the service of the notice. . . . . with returns of the rent payable for the building or land and with such other information as the Commissioner may require and every owner or occupier upon whom any such notice is served shall be bound to comply with it and to make a true return to the best of his knowledge or belief. (2) xxx xxx xxx. . . with returns of the rent payable for the building or land and with such other information as the Commissioner may require and every owner or occupier upon whom any such notice is served shall be bound to comply with it and to make a true return to the best of his knowledge or belief. (2) xxx xxx xxx. (3) xxx xxx xxx". ( 12 ) THE definition 'rateable value' given in sub-section (2) of Section 109 makes it clear that for assessment of any building to property tax the rateable value with respect thereto shall be deemed to be the gross 'annual rent' at which such building may at the time of assessment reasonably be expected to be let from month to month or year to year less a deduction in the case of a building of 16 2/3 % of the said annual rent in lieu of all allowances, repairs or on any other account. Then sub-section (2) of Section 108 postulates that the range of the property tax to which any particular building could be assessed between 20% and 25% of the 'rateable value' thereof. ( 13 ) IT is not in dispute that the building in question is situate in Bangalore City and is subject to the Rent Control Provisions under the Karnataka Rent Control Act. As to what would be fair assessment of the 'rateable value' of the building which may be fixed by Corporation or local authority for the purpose of assessment to property tax was the subject of consideration before supreme Court in Guntur Municipal Council v Guntur Town Rate Payers' Association. In a similar context the Supreme Court was seized of the point whether before fixation of fair rent of any premises the municipality was bound to make its assess- ment in the light of the provisions contained in the Rent Act of a particular State. It has laid down the following proposition throwing light on this test: "we are unable to agree that on the language of Section 82 (2) of the Municipalities Act any distinction can be made between the building, the fair rent of which has been actually fixed by the Controller and those in respect of which no such rent has been fixed. It is perfectly clear that the landlord cannot lawfully expect to get more rent than the fair rent which is payable in accordance with the principles laid down in the Act. Assessment of valuation must take into account the measure of fair rent as determinable under the Act. It may be that whether the controller has not fixed the fair rent the municipal authorities will have to arrive at their own figure of fair rent but that can be done without any difficulty by keeping in view the principles laid down in Section 4 of the Act for determination of fair rent". The same proposition is reiterated in subsequent decision of Supreme Court in Balbir Singh v mis. M. C. D. ( 14 ) IT was submitted by learned Counsel for petitioners that in each of these cases, at the instance of petitioners, fair rent in respect of each portion of the building in the ownership of the petitioners had been got assessed and fixed by the Rent Controller under the Karnataka Rent control Act and that it provides the sound and safe basis for the respondent-Corporation authorities to arrive at the rate of tax payable by the petitioners but the authorities have failed to take into account the fair rent fixed by the Rent Controller. Mr. H. N. Nagamohan Das was not able to place on record any said order of Rent Controller fixing the fair rent with respect to any portion of the building in question. ( 15 ) HOWEVER, on examination of the original case file record of the Corporation authorities, it transpires that the fixation of rateable value with respect to the said building had been made by its Commissioner in a highly arbitrary manner. The rental value with respect to different portions thereof admittedly in occupation of different tenants was imagi-narily fixed by him by not accepting the rate of rent which was stated to be paid by each of the tenants to the respective landlords. The Commissioner's opinion in the assessment order was that these figures given by the tenants were much less and, therefore, could not be accepted. Such an opinion of the commissioner in the absence of any other acceptable material on record furnishing reasonable basis for determination of the rent payable with respect to different portions of the building, is baseless. The Commissioner's opinion in the assessment order was that these figures given by the tenants were much less and, therefore, could not be accepted. Such an opinion of the commissioner in the absence of any other acceptable material on record furnishing reasonable basis for determination of the rent payable with respect to different portions of the building, is baseless. There does not appear to be sufficient justification for him not to accept the rate of rent stated by the tenants as being paid to the respective landlords of different portions of the building. In fact, the petitioners had in their respective appeals filed before the TAC and the lower Appellate Court as well, also furnished the detailed information about their tenants and the rents paid by them. Besides, there is another serious lacuna in the assessment orders of the commissioner and the impugned orders of the TAC in that they have failed to obtain the returns of relevant information from the tenants of different portions of the building in question by serving upon them notice as stipulated under Section 117 in correct revision of the tax in respect thereof. The cumulative effect of these serious lapses on the part of the Commissioner and the tac vitiates the validity of their orders and, therefore, they cannot at all be sustained in law. The tac should have proceeded to record the evidence of petitioners in support of their respective eases and would have also collected the relevant material from the concerned officials or record of the respondent-Corporation and then it ought to have proceeded to pass a speaking order on the basis of that legally admissible material on record. It having failed to do so, its impugned orders are liable to be set aside. The impugned judgments of the lower Appellate Court are, therefore, liable to be set aside and the revisions deserve to be allowed by remanding the matter to TAC for fresh disposal in accordance with law. ( 16 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid all these revisions are allowed. The impugned judgments all dated 29-3-1997 of the lower Appellate Court are set aside and the impugned orders of the respondent's Taxation Appeals Committee, all dated 8-10-1993, are quashed. ( 16 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid all these revisions are allowed. The impugned judgments all dated 29-3-1997 of the lower Appellate Court are set aside and the impugned orders of the respondent's Taxation Appeals Committee, all dated 8-10-1993, are quashed. All these matters are remitted to the said TAC with a direction to proceed afresh with its enquiry in each of the respective appeals and pass fresh speaking orders in accordance with law and the guidelines laid down by Supreme Court in its afore-cited decisions and also in the light of the observations made hcreinabove; after giving sufficient opportunity to each of the appellants as also to respondents to adduce relevant evidence on record and on consideration of that evidence and any other relevant material if produced by respondent 1.