H. N. NARAYAN, J. ( 1 ) THESE two revisions arise out of an eviction proceedings initiated by thre landlord under the Provisions of Section 21 (l) (h) and (p) of the kar- nataka Rent Control Act ("the act" for short ). The impugned order is questioned by the landlord and tenant aggrieved by the adverse order passed by the trial court against them by allowing the eviction petition filed under Section 21 (l) (h) of the act and dismissing the petition under Section 21 (l) (p) of the act. The landlord who initiated eviction petition under the Provisions of Section 21 (1) (a) of the act has given up the same at the trial. The jural relationship of the parties is not in dispute. The eviction petition is taken under Section 21 (1) (h) and (p) of the act. The requirement is pleaded by the landlord at para 2 of his petition. It is his case that he is a goldsmith carrying on business in his premises at yelahanka town and he requires the petition premises to carry on his business as his landlord has been demanding him to vacate the premises. It is also his case that he has got two shop premises in yelahanka town, one of his sons is running a jewellery shop in one of the said shops and the petitioner has got two sons and his sons are living separately having independent avocation. The respondent-tenant is in occupation of the petition premises on a monthly rent of Rs. 400/-; the petition premises is situate in the business place and near the bus stand and is more convenient and suitable to carry on the goldsmith work and he can cater to the needs of his customers. Hence, the premises is required for his bona fide use and occupation. ( 2 ) IT is also his case that the respondent-tenant is running his own independent shop situate at hospital road, yelahanka which he has acquired after he becoming a tenant in the schedule shop premises and therefore, he is liable to be evicted. ( 3 ) THE tenant has disputed the landlord's reasonable requirement to occupy his own premises. It is the tenant's contention that originally there were four portions owned by the landlord out of which, three portions were let out to him during July 1978 on a monthly rent of Rs. ( 3 ) THE tenant has disputed the landlord's reasonable requirement to occupy his own premises. It is the tenant's contention that originally there were four portions owned by the landlord out of which, three portions were let out to him during July 1978 on a monthly rent of Rs. 200a and advance of Rs. 1,000/ -. The tenant was residing with his family members on the hind two portions and carrying on his business in front portion. Landlord constructed a residential portion abutting the rear portion of the premises and occupied the same. At that time, the landlord requested the tenant to vacate one portion which was adjacent and abutting the portion in occupation of the landlord. He therefore vacated the same. Thereafter, the landlord requested him to vacate one more shop to start his goldsmith business in the rear portion along with his son. The tenant complied with the said request and vacated the said portion also. The landlord thereafter constructed the first floor just above the front portion of the building. The landlord's son hari prasad occupied the 1st floor portion. Therefore, the entire requirement of the landlord is met. Therefore, there are no bona fides in the present petition to occupy the petition premises in which the tenant has been carrying on his jewellery business and the petition is filed with oblique motives. He also contended that he has no other premises of his own and he would be put to great hardship if an order of eviction is granted. He has filed additional objections further detailing the accommodation available to the landlord, specially after he allowed the landlord to occupy the major portion of the tenanted premises. ( 4 ) THE parties got themselves examined and relied upon some oral evidence. They got marked certain documents in support of their respective contentions. ( 5 ) THE trial court upon consideration of the evidence let in by the parties, allowed the petition under the Provisions of Section 21 (l) (h) and dismissed the petition under Section 21 (l) (a) and (p) of the act. The parties are thus before this court in these two revisions assailing the said adverse orders passed by the trial court against them. The parties are thus before this court in these two revisions assailing the said adverse orders passed by the trial court against them. ( 6 ) SRI g. s. visweswara, learned counsel for the tenant assailed the order of eviction granted by the trial court under the Provisions of Section 21 (l) (h) of the act and contended that the particulars furnished by the tenant under ex. R. 6 the rough sketch which was confronted to the landlord clearly indicates that the landlord is the owner of the petition shop premises measuring 10 x 20 ft. And they are bifurcated into four. The entire premises was initially leased to him. Subsequently, one of the shops premises facing the road was handed over to the landlord for the purpose of carrying on jewellery shop and subsequently, the hind portion of the said shop which was in occupation of the tenant was also handed over to the landlord, specially, after the landlord occupied the house constructed on the rear side. This was so done to enable the landlord to convert the said premises as workshop and to carry on the jewellery business in the front shop and this accommodation is quite sufficient for the landlord to carry on his business. It is an admitted fact that one of his sons is in occupation of the first floor portion and carrying on his own business and another son is doing footwear business elsewhere at mathikere extension. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the landlord while justifying the order of eviction granted in his favour under the provision of Section 21 (1) (h) of the act contended that the learned trial judge clearly erred in rejecting his petition under Section 21 (l) (p) of the act without appreciating the fact that acquisition of property in the name of the tenant's wife attracts the provision of Section 21 (l) (p) of the act. While the learned counsel for the landlord has assailed the order of the trial judge in dismissing his petition under the provision of Section 21 (l) (p) of the Act, the tenant has assailed the order of eviction granted by the trial judge for bona fide use and occupation as provided under Section 21 (l) (h) of the act. (A ). (A ). The short question that arises for consideration in these two revisions is whether the order of the trial judge in granting eviction under the provision of Section 21 (l) (h) and dismissal of petition under Section 21 (l) (p) of the Act, is not sustainable. 7 (B ). Undisputed facts are these: the landlord owns a non-residential premises consisting of four small shop premises in the ground floor which are contiguous to a residential portion and hind portion and also to a non-residential portion in the first floor. The two portions in the front portion and one portion in the rear side was in occupation of the tenant. The landlord was carrying on his jewellery business elsewhere in the tenanted premises. He requested the tenant to give possession of the front shop portion while he was residing in the rear side shop, he started his own business in the front portion; subsequently the landlord built a residential house in the vacant land situate on the hind portion of the shop premises. He thereafter occupied the said premises. He was making use of the shop situate in the hind portion for making jewels while carrying on jewellery business in the front shop. It is undisputed that the first floor portion is in occupation of the second son of the landlord who is carrying on some business while another son is carrying on footwear business in mathikere extension which is far away from the petition premises. Petition is filed on the ground that the landlord is carrying on his jewellery business in the rented premises and his own landlord is pressing him to vacate and therefore, he wants to occupy his own premises to do business as his business has increased since then. Ex. R. 6 the sketch produced by the tenant was confronted to the landlord at the trial. It clearly indicates that the landlord is the owner of two shop premises measuring 10 x 20 ft. And they were bifurcated into four. The entire premises was initially leased to him. ( 8 ) THE question for consideration is whether the accommodation available to the landlord to carry on his business is sufficient under the circumstances explained by the tenant and whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and reasonable. In other words, whether there is need to occupy the premises. The entire premises was initially leased to him. ( 8 ) THE question for consideration is whether the accommodation available to the landlord to carry on his business is sufficient under the circumstances explained by the tenant and whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and reasonable. In other words, whether there is need to occupy the premises. In this context, a reference may be made to the observation made by the apex court in mst. Bega Begum and others v Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L. rs and others, which reads as follows: "reasonable requirement undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire. The connotation of the terms "need" or "requirement" should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction". A reference may also be made to the decision of the apex court in M. M. Quasim v Manohar Lal Sharma and others , wherein it is held as under:"the time honoured notion that the right of re-entry is unfettered and that the owner landlord is the sole judge of his requirement has been made to yield to the needs of the society which had to enact the rent acts specifically devised to curb and fetter the unrestricted right of re-entry and to provide that only on proving some enabling grounds set out in the rent Act, the landlord can re-enter. One such ground is of personal requirement, if it is pointed out that there is some vacant premises with the landlord which he can conveniently occupy, the element of need in his requirement would be absent. To reject this aspect by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very raison d'etre of the rent act. To reject this aspect by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very raison d'etre of the rent act. Undoubtedly, if it is shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession, that by itself may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim but in such a situation the court would expect the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is not suitable for the purpose of his occupation or for the purpose for which he requires the premises in respect of which the action is commenced in the court". it is undisputed that the landlord was doing goldsmith business in the rented premises and on his own request, the tenant vacated initially one shop premises measuring 10 x 10 ft. And further allowed him to occupy the rear portion which is another shop measuring 10 x 10 ft. As it was very convenient for the landlord to convert it into a workshop. Presently, he is in occupation of a non-residential premises measuring 10 x 20 ft. He has constructed a residential portion behind this premises and is in occupation of the same. It is nowhere stated by the landlord that this accommodation is insufficient for his business and that business is increased since then. Therefore, the requirement for additional accommodation is not reasonable as there is no pleading or evidence to show that his business has increased since then. The trial judge has not adverted himself to this part of the evidence of the landlord while considering his requirement for additional accommodation. He has in fact erroneously discarded the evidence of the tenant while upholding the claim of the landlord. In this background, the court has to see whether the landlord can act as a sole judge of his requirement. It is for the court to judge having regard to the circumstance of the case whether the requirement is reasonable and bona fide. In other words, whether there is any need for the landlord to occupy the premises in question, specially in the background that the requirement pleaded is for additional accommodation. I find it difficult to uphold and concur with the finding of the trial judge. In my opinion the landlord has to fail on this count. The eviction granted by the trial judge is liable to be set aside. I find it difficult to uphold and concur with the finding of the trial judge. In my opinion the landlord has to fail on this count. The eviction granted by the trial judge is liable to be set aside. ( 9 ) THAT takes me to the vexed question whether the tenant has acquired or allotted a suitable premises built, acquired or allotted a suitable premises and is therefore liable for forfeiture of tenancy under the Provisions of Section 21 (l) (p) of the act. ( 10 ) IT is contended by Sri G. S. Visweswara, learned counsel for the tenant that the pleading is insufficient on this aspect and the evidence 'fall short of proof of the requirement of clause (p) of Section 21 (1) of the act. It is further contended by him that the tenant himself has not acquired or allotted the premises to come within the mischief of clause (p) of Section 21 (1 ). Acquiring the premises in the name of his wife or son is not an acquisition by the tenant himself. He has relied upon the decision of this court in Dr. H. Hanumanthappa v M. Krishnamurthy and the judgment of the apex court in the case of B. R. Mehta v Smt. Atma devi and others. ( 11 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for the landlord drew inspiration from the decision of the apex court relied on by the same court in B. R. Mehta's case, supra, in Prem Chand v Sher Singh and contended that acquisition or allotment of any suitable premises by the tenant or his wife or son divests the tenant his right to occupy the premises of the landlord. In Dr. H. Hanumanthappa's case, supra, there was no difficulty for this court to confirm the order of eviction granted by the trial judge under clause (p) of Section 21 (1) of the act in view of the admission made by the tenant himself in evidence that Karnataka housing board, Bangalore, had allotted him a house under middle income group at koramangala and possession had been delivered to him in the year 1978 and that he leased the said house to his friend for a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- during 1980 and he continued to stay in the tenanted premises. 1,00,000/- during 1980 and he continued to stay in the tenanted premises. His lordship Justice vasantha kumar, j. , as he then was, made certain observation as obiter which is not relevant for the purpose of considering this question. The question is whether the wife of the tenant acquiring or allotted possession of any suitable premises, p nounts to acquisition or allotment and falls within the definition of cl. (p) of Section 21 (1) of the act. ( 12 ) INSOFAR as this factual aspect is concerned, the landlord has pleaded his case at para 6 of his petition in the following words:"that the respondent is having his own independent shop situated at hospital road, yelahanka which he had acquired after he became a tenant in the schedule shop premises, as such the respondent is liable to vacate the schedule shop in law". ( 13 ) THE tenant has disputed this claim stating that he has no other premises of his own. The landlord who got himself examined as P. W. 1 in the trial court has stated thus:"respondent has got 3 or 4 shops he is owning a shop building opposite to the petition premises. He is running a tea shop in that building. He has got 2 or 3 shops at deshathpet road at yelahanka and he is running cut piece and ready-made business in those shops". ( 14 ) THE landlord has produced two tax paid register extract in respect of the properties which are marked at exs. P. 8 and p. 9 to substantiate his contention that the respondent has acquired shop premises under exs. P. 8 and p. 9. This is the evidence let in by the landlord to prove his case for eviction under the provision of Section 21 (l) (p) of the act. The tenant has disputed this evidence of P. W. 1 stating that he is not the owner of the premises shown under exs. P. 8 and p. 9. However, he admitted that his eldest son is running a shoe corner in the said premises. It is on the basis of entries made in exs. P. 8 and p. 9, learned counsel for the landlord contended that the property described in exs. P. 8 and p. 9 belonged to his wife santhosh bhatia, wife of p. c. bhatia. However, he admitted that his eldest son is running a shoe corner in the said premises. It is on the basis of entries made in exs. P. 8 and p. 9, learned counsel for the landlord contended that the property described in exs. P. 8 and p. 9 belonged to his wife santhosh bhatia, wife of p. c. bhatia. ( 15 ) THE relevancy of the cause title and the absence of proper plead-ings are some of the factors which go a long way in considering this aspect. In the cause title of the petition, the landlord has mentioned the name of the tenant as bhatia without giving his surname or father's name. P. w. 1 has not even whispered that the property mentioned in exs. P. 8 and p. 9 belonged to the wife of the tenant. However, the attention of the court is drawn to ex. R. 1 where the tenant is described as p. c. bhatia. Except this document, there is no material to show that these properties stand in-the name of the tenant's wife. ( 16 ) IT is contended by Sri G. S. Visweswara, learned counsel for the tenant that without admitting this argument of the landlord for argument sake that the properties belonged to his client's wife, the tenant had no opportunity to meet the relevant contentions raised by the landlord at the time of arguments and that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that the property of the wife is the property of the husband and unless the husband has legal right to stay with his wife in her property, the tenant is not liable for eviction under the provision of Section 21 ( l) (p) of the act. ( 17 ) THE intention of the legislature in divesting the tenant of his right is based upon the fact that the tenant had legally acquired another residence as of right. The tenant is liable for eviction under this provision of the act on proof of one of the following events contemplated under the said clause (p) viz. , that the tenant should (a) built (b) acquired vacant possession of (c) has been allotted a suitable building. The tenant is liable for eviction under this provision of the act on proof of one of the following events contemplated under the said clause (p) viz. , that the tenant should (a) built (b) acquired vacant possession of (c) has been allotted a suitable building. Since the tenancy is a right vested in the tenant, the main purpose of the rent legislation is the protection of tenant's right from eviction and clause (p) makes tenant liable for eviction, its effect is to divest the tenant of his right of tenancy. This right is given to the landlord on proof of the fact that the tenant has built or acquired vacant possession or allotted a suitable building. It is always for the landlord to show and prove that the building so built by the tenant built or acquired or allotted to the tenant is suitable for his residence or non-residential purpose as the case may be. It is for the tenant to rebut this evidence in proof of acquisition. ( 18 ) THE question whether the provision of this clause (p) is not attracted where the tenant has not acquired vacant possession of the property, allotted or acquired by him, came up for consideration before this court in Gangadhara Setty v Thirukappa Setty. In the said case, a doubt has been expressed as to the applicability of the provision under the said circumstance. It is held "that when the building built by the tenant is not vacant at the time the petition is presented, the landlord cannot seek eviction of the tenant from the tenanted premises. This is in regard to the construction possible of the provision itself. This case needs to be decided on such interpretation. It has been discussed so that the legislature will have a second look at the provision". ( 19 ) IN my opinion, no such doubt arises if proper construction is given to the Provisions of the act and in Dr. H. Hanumanthappa's case, supra, this very question is settled. Therefore, there is no scope for giving an interpretation contrary to the purpose and intendment of the act itself. ( 20 ) TWO decisions which have direct bearing on this vexed question viz. , the interpretation of clause (p) of Section 21 (1) were placed before this court for consideration. I have already referred to the decision rendered in Dr. H. Hanumanthappa's case. ( 20 ) TWO decisions which have direct bearing on this vexed question viz. , the interpretation of clause (p) of Section 21 (1) were placed before this court for consideration. I have already referred to the decision rendered in Dr. H. Hanumanthappa's case. The judgment of the apex court in b. r. mehta's case, supra, has set at rest this controversy. ( 21 ) IN b. r. mehta's case, supra, the Supreme Court was considering what is the true meaning of the expression "tenant" as before or after commencement of the act built, acquired vacant possession of, or being allotted the residence in terms of clause (h) of Section 14 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958. It is unnecessary for me to remind myself that clause (p) of Section 21 (1) of the act reads on the same line. The tenant who suffered an order of eviction passed by the court below, confirmed by the Delhi High Court, appealed to the Supreme Court stating that the appellant-tenant had not built, acquired any vacant possession of, a residence and allotment of government quarter in favour of his wife who was staying away from him on account of family disputes, does not amount to acquisition of vacant possession by the tenant himself and therefore the eviction order passed by the trial court was illegal. ( 22 ) THE appellant before the Supreme Court was the tenant of a residential premises. He was staying with his wife and children in the tenanted premises. He was going on official tours for some time. His wife was a school teacher at Delhi and that the landlord initiated eviction proceedings against the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement. Subsequent to the presentation of this eviction petition, the appellant's wife was allotted a flat, a government quarter as she was in employment as a teacher in the government girls' secondary school. According to the appellant, she went there to live in the house allotted to her leaving the rest of her family members in the tenanted premises and subsequently she shared the said premises allotted to her with her colleague and family members who stayed with her for 3 years and thereafter vacated the premises. It is stated that, that the said premises was allotted jointly in favour of the appellant's wife and her colleague. It is stated that, that the said premises was allotted jointly in favour of the appellant's wife and her colleague. ( 23 ) IT was contended in the eviction proceedings that the tenant's wife had been allotted a residential flat and that she sublet the premises. She stayed in the quarters allotted to her on account of family disputes. It was contended on behalf of the respondent-landlord that there was no evidence to prove this family disputes which was the cause for her to leave the family and stay in the quarters. On the other hand, there was no evidence to show that the said quarters was allotted jointly to the appellant's wife and her colleague. The apex court found that there was no such evidence placed by the landlord or the tenant before the trial court. The Delhi High Court relying upon a decision in prem chanel's case, supra, confirmed the order of the trial court on that ground. However, the Supreme Court has rejected the contention that allotment of a house to a wife who is a government employee in all circumstances disentitled the tenant to retain the tenanted premises. (emphasis supplied) ( 24 ) HIGHLIGHTING the purpose of the provision of the Act, the apex court held that the purpose of the act is to control rents and eviction, in other words, to control unreasonable evictions and to ensure that in an atmosphere of acute shortage of accommodation, there is proper enjoyment of available spaces by those who want and deserve. In other words, to ensure that there is no unreasonable and unnecessary spaces in the hands of one tenant and other tenants and landlords' need of occupation of spaces remains unsatisfied, clause (h) of Section 14 (1) is an attempt in a way to ration out accommodation between tenants and landlords. Looked at from that point of view unless acquisition of a premises or a flat or allotment of a premises or part of a premises by the tenant in which he had domain which he can reasonably and alternatively use as a substitute for the place he is using in the tenancy it cannot lead to forfeiture of his right to occupy his tenanted premises. While laying down the proposition of law approving the judgment of Delhi High Court in Smt. Revti Devi v Kishan Lal, it is held that if he (tenant) goes to stay in the house of his wife, legally speaking, he has no right as such to stay and can be turned out from the house at any time by its legal owner, namely, the wife. There is no law according to which the husband and the wife could be deemed to be one person. Therefore, where proviso (h) required that the tenant himself should acquire vacant possession of another residence before he can become liable to eviction, the effect of its language cannot be whittled down by arguing that proviso (h) would apply even if it is not the tenant himself but his wife or his other relation were to acquire such other residence. Therefore, as a general proposition of law, the acquisition of other residence must be by the tenant himself before proviso (h) to Section 14 (1) of the act would apply. It is in this background the Supreme Court has laid down that the tenanted residence goes and the tenant could lose his tenancy because of his wife acquiring possession of flat or allotment of a flat because of her official duties over which the husband has no right or dominion of occupation. ( 25 ) HOWEVER, there is no impediment for the parties to place on record evidence indicating that the tenant has acquired premises benami in the name of his wife or sons showing that such acquisition of right in the property by the wife or son is only made by the tenant himself and not by other members as they had no source of income. Contiguous tenants who have no mind to vacate the tenanted premises would resort to such a course of action to defeat the very purpose and object of the rent act and the court of limited jurisdiction is within its jurisdiction to consider all the aspects while granting an order of eviction, especially under this provision of law. ( 26 ) IN this case, it is contended by the landlord that the tenant has acquired a suitable premises for his business which tenant has denied. ( 26 ) IN this case, it is contended by the landlord that the tenant has acquired a suitable premises for his business which tenant has denied. The tax demand extract register was produced at the trial in support of the claim that the tenant has acquired vacant possession of the suitable premises. The evidence let in by the landlord is not only vague, but very unsatisfactory. It is not even stated by the landlord that those two documents refer to the tenant or his wife. An attempt is made by the learned counsel for the landlord that the properties mentioned in the property register extract exs. P. 8 and p. 9 stand in the name of the tenant's wife. The tenant had no occasion to explain the circumstance under which the property was acquired by his wife. He had no opportunity of placing evidence in support of his contentions. The evidence on record no doubt shows that tenant's wife is staying with him and one of their sons is running business in the premises acquired by his wife. Under the circumstances, the court finds it difficult to accept the contention that the tenant has acquired vacant possession of the property. In my opinion the landlord has failed to prove the ground of eviction under the Provisions of Section 21 (l) (p) of the act. The conclusion reached by the trial judge therefore in my opinion is quite sustainable in law and does not call for interference. Therefore, the order of dismissal recorded by the trial judge under Section 21 (1) (p) of the act is liable to be confirmed. ( 27 ) IN the result, hrrp No. 89 of 1999 is dismissed while hrrp No. 1815 of 1998 is allowed. The eviction order passed by the learned trial judge under the Provisions of Section 21 (l) (h) of the act is set aside while the order of dismissal of the petition filed under Section 21 (l) (p) of the act is confirmed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .