Judgment :- Arijit Pasayat, C.J. Questioning legality of requirement to pay court fee of Rs. 100/- for filing of writ appeals, Original Petition has been filed. Petitioners in the Original Petition are appellants in writ appeal and since requisite court fees have not been paid, a defect was pointed out. In the Original Petition, it has been urged that when no fee is required to be paid for filing an Original Petition, there is no logic for demanding court fee for writ appeal. It is stated that such provision is ultra vires and is an unreasonable restriction on the right to prefer an appeal. 2. At this juncture, a journey over the legislative history relating to payment of court fees in State of Kerala would be appropriate. Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 (in short'the act) came into force with effect from 1.2.1962. Section 52 deals with'appeals Said provision reads as follows: "52. Appeals :- The fee payable in an appeal shall be the same as the fee that would payable in the court of first instance on the subject matter of the appeal: Provided that, in levying fee on a memorandum of appeal against a final decree by a person whose appeal against the preliminary decree passed by the court of first instance or by the court of appeal is pending, credit shall be given for the fee paid by such person in the appeal against the preliminary decree: Provided further that one third of the fee payable in an appeal shall be paid at the stage of admission of first appeal or second appeal as the case may be and the balance shall be paid within such period, not later than fifteen days from the date of such admissions as may be specified by the court; in case the appeal is admitted: Provided also that the court may, for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the period up to thirty days. Explanation (1) - Whether the appeal is against the refusal of a relief or against the grant of the relief, the fee payable in the appeal shall be the same as the fee that would be payable on the relief in the court of first instance. Explanation (1) - Whether the appeal is against the refusal of a relief or against the grant of the relief, the fee payable in the appeal shall be the same as the fee that would be payable on the relief in the court of first instance. Explanation (2) -Costs shall not be deemed to form part of the subject matter of the appeal except where such costs form themselves the subject matter of the appeal or relief is claimed as regards costs on grounds additional to, or independent of, the relief claimed regarding the main subject matter in the suit. Explanation (3) - In claims which include the award of interest subsequent to the institution of the suit, the interest accrued during the pendency of the suit till the date of decree shall be deemed to be part of the subject matter of appeal except where such interest is relinquished. Explanation (4) - Where the relief prayed for in the appeal is different from the relief prayed for or refused in the court of first instance, the fee payable in the appeal shall be the fee that would be payable in the court of first instance on the relief prayed for in the appeal. Explanation (5) - Where the market value of the subject matter of the appeal has to be ascertained for purpose of computing or determining the fee payable, such market value shall be ascertained as on the date of presentation of the plaint." Section 83 of the Act deals with 'power of High Court to make rules' and reads as follows: "83. Power of High Court to make rules:- (1) The High Court may make rules to provide for or regulate all or any of the following matters, namely (a) the fees payable for serving and executing processes issued by the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction and by the Civil and Criminal Courts subordinate thereto; (b) the remuneration of persons employed by the courts mentioned in clause (a) in the service or execution of processes; (c) the fixing by District and Sessions Judges and District Magistrates of the number of process-servers necessary to be employed for the service and execution of processes issued from their respective courts and the courts subordinate thereto; (d) the display in each court of a table in the English and in the local language or languages showing the fees payable for the service and execution of processes. (2) All rules made under sub-s.(1) shall be subject to confirmation by the Government and on such confirmation shall be published in the Gazette and shall thereupon have effect as if enacted in this Act." Kerala High Court Act, 1958 (in short'the HC act) came into force on 9.3.1959. Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1960 (in short'the Old rules') held -the field originally. Presently, Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1971 (in short'the rules') are in operation from 1.9.1971. Sections of the HC Act reads as follows: "5. Appeal from judgment or order of single Judge:- An appeal shall lie to a Bench of two judges from (i) a judgment or order of a single judge in the exercise of original jurisdiction; or (ii) a judgment of a single judge in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of original jurisdiction by a subordinate court." In the Rules, provision is made about the court fee payable in case of joint petitions. Rule 147A, which came into force on 23.5.1975, reads as follows: "147A. Rule 147A, which came into force on 23.5.1975, reads as follows: "147A. More persons than one may join in one writ petition as petitioners in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where, if such persons present separate writ petitions, any common question of law or fact would arise provided that each person joining in such writ petition shall pay the court fee payable under Article 11 (r) of Schedule II of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, as if each of them had tiled a separate writ petition." The Act was amended as per Act 6 of 1991 with effect from 5.12.1990 and Schedule II of Article 11 (r) was omitted. Before omission, said provision was having following effect: 11 (r) - Petition to the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution for a writ other than the writ of Habeas Corpus or a petition under Art.227 of the Constitution Twenty-five Rupees According to petitioners, when Article 11 (r) stood omitted there is no reason to continue fees payable on writ appeal. According to them, consequential article - Article 3(2)(c) in Schedule II - should have been amended and no fee should have been made payable. Otherwise, it is submitted, the right to file an appeal gets affected, the amount being quite high. 3. Learned Advocate General appearing for State submitted that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to direct omission of an entry relating to writ appeals. It is a policy decision of State and there is no scope for any interference in a writ application. Additionally, reasonable conditions can be imposed for entertaining an appeal. Therefore, stand that right is impaired is without any substance. Furthermore, amount fixed is not high, as contended. 4. Right of appeal is a creation of statute. But in exercise of such right, there is no inherent or constitutional right to file an appeal. While granting right, legislature can impose any condition. It was observed in Anant Mills Co. Therefore, stand that right is impaired is without any substance. Furthermore, amount fixed is not high, as contended. 4. Right of appeal is a creation of statute. But in exercise of such right, there is no inherent or constitutional right to file an appeal. While granting right, legislature can impose any condition. It was observed in Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1976 SC 1234) and State of Bombay v. M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. (AIR 1960 SC 980), that legislature can, while granting right of appeal, lay down a condition for deposit of tax as it is creation of statute. Legislature can also putrestriclion on it so as to curtail it. There is nothing Wrong if under same statute, a right of appeal is given and then some restrictions are put over it. Right to appeal is a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure. But such right is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice. It must be conferred by statute and can be exercised only as permitted by statute. There is no fetter in imposing conditions about deposit of fees etc. There are many fiscal statutes like Central Excise and Salt Act, Customs Act, Sales tax Acts of various States and many other similar statutes, which mandate deposit of disputed amount as a condition precedent for entertaining appeal. Condition of deposit of court fee merely regulates exercise of right of appeal. It is open to legislature to impose an accompanying liability upon a party upon whom legal right is conferred or to prescribe conditions for exercise of right. Any requirement for discharge of that liability or fulfilment of that condition in case the party concerned seeks to avail said right is a valid piece of legislation and Article 14 has no application. Observations in the case of Hannah Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation ((1949) 337 US 541) lend some support to the view we have taken. Any requirement for discharge of that liability or fulfilment of that condition in case the party concerned seeks to avail said right is a valid piece of legislation and Article 14 has no application. Observations in the case of Hannah Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation ((1949) 337 US 541) lend some support to the view we have taken. Head note 10 which is based upon the observations in the body of the judgment reads as follows: 10) A state statute which requires that in a stock-holder's derivative action a plaintiff who owns less than 5 per cent of the defendant corporation's outstanding shares or shares having market value not exceeding $ 50,000, give security for the reasonable expenses including counsel fees, incurred by the corporation and by other parties defendant and which makes the plaintiff liable for such expenses if he does not make good his claims, and subjects the amount of security to increase if the progress of the litigation reveals that it is inadequate or to decrease if it is proved to be excessive, does not violate the contract clause or the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution." 5. Provisions like Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short'CPC') which empowers courts to make rules to regulate procedures enables them to levy court fees, as the power to regulate procedure includes the power to impose fees in Courts. While considering the ambit of the Court Fees Act. 1870, it was observed by Privy Council that the Act was passed not to arm a litigant with a weapon of technicalily against his opponent, but to secure revenue for the benefit of the State. (See:Rachappa Subrao Jadhav Desai v. Shivappa Venkatarao Jadhav Desai - AIR 1918 PC 188). It is not open to Court to narrow or whittle down the operation of the Act by seeming considerations of hardship or the like. Provisions of the Act must be interpreted strictly and any demand of court fees has necessarily to be held as valid and in furtherance of the object, unless it is undeniable shown to be per se illegal 6. Object of levying court fees and nature of levy was illuminated by apex Court in P.M. Ashwalhanarayana setty v. State of Karnataka(A1R 1989 SC 100). Object of levying court fees and nature of levy was illuminated by apex Court in P.M. Ashwalhanarayana setty v. State of Karnataka(A1R 1989 SC 100). Court fees levied on ad valorem basis under corresponding Acts in Rajasthan and Karnataka were held not to be discriminatory considering nature of the right to appeal under provisions of Customs Act, requirement of depositing duty cannot be said to be without legal sanction. Imposing a condition for deposit of court fee as a pre-requisite for entertainment of an appeal cannot be said to be unreasonable restriction over right of appeal. 7. It has to be noted that under proviso to Section 30(1) of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, no appeal by an employer shall lie in respect of demand under clause (a) of said sub-section, unless memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by Commissioner to the effect that appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under order appealed against. Unlike some of the provisions like Section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962 permitting partial deposit, there is no such power of reduction or relaxation. It was decided by this Court in D. Narayanan Nair v. Union of India ((1990) 2 LLJ 500) that proviso which requires deposit of fee before resorting to appeal cannot be said to be illegal and the inconvenience caused to appellant to make payment is no reason to strike down said statutory provision. It was observed by Punjab and Haryana High Court in Piara Singh v. Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, Patiala (1987 LIC 818) that simple fact that compensation awarded has to be deposited before an appeal can be entertained would not furnish ground to entertain writ petition by-passing statutory remedy for appeal. In Nathamani Gounder v. State of Tamil Nadu ((1986) 2 LLJ 423), it was observed that if the legislature provides for no appeal in a particular case, or provides for an appeal subject to certain conditions, it is a piece of proper legislation. Even if a statute denied right of appeal, statute cannot be said to be bad legislation. Reference to other statutes where conditions are imposed for entertaining an appeal has been made for purpose of showing that even where apparently more onerous requirements and/or conditions have been imposed, that per se has been held to be no ground for declaration of a provision ultra vires. Therefore, requirement to deposit Rs. Reference to other statutes where conditions are imposed for entertaining an appeal has been made for purpose of showing that even where apparently more onerous requirements and/or conditions have been imposed, that per se has been held to be no ground for declaration of a provision ultra vires. Therefore, requirement to deposit Rs. 100/- as court fee cannot be said to be an unreasonable levy. The Original Petition is dismissed. C.M.P. No. 4578 of 1999 in the un-numbered Writ Appeal praying for waiver of court fee is also rejected consequentially.