Judgment Ronojit Kumar Mtira, J.: 1. This application was made under clause 13 of the Letters Patent and section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the transfer to this Court certain eviction proceedings being E.O./146/ 1995 (L.I.C. of India vs. S.N. Bhalotia & Ors.) pending at present before the Estate Officer. It has also been prayed in the petition that the eviction proceedings upon being transferred to this Court be heard analogously with the Suit No......... of 1995 (L.I.C. of India vs. S.N. Bhalotia) which at present was pending before this Court. The petitioner had obtained an ex parte ad interim order on June 23, 1999 and the proceedings before the Estate Officer had been stayed. Parties had filed their affidavits in accordance with the Court's direction in that respect. 2. In order to decide the contentions of the parties and the prepositions of law put forward by counsels on their behalf I found it essential to refer to the facts and circumstances of the case. The petitioner was a lessee, under the respondent No.1 Life Insurance Corporation of India, hereinafter referred to as LIC, of the second floor of the Oriental Building being premises Nos. 2 & 3 Clive Row, Calcutta. According to the respondent, the lease had expired but the petitioner continued to remain in possession. It had also been alleged that the petitioner had "assigned or transferred or sublet or otherwise inducted the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 above named" in the subject premises. The petitioner has denied the allegations in its affidavit in reply, and alleged that the tenancy was "governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956". In these circumstances, the LIC had instituted a suit before this Court against the petitioner in 1995 and the prayers in the plaint included, appointment of a receiver for the preservation of the subject premises and a permanent injunction restraining the petitioner from inducting any tenant in the premises. By an order dated January 31,1995 the LIC obtained an ad interim relief, in an interlocutory application made by it in the suit, and this Court appointed a receiver who was to "make an inventory of the sub-tenants in the said demised premises and submit a report to this Court. By an order dated January 31,1995 the LIC obtained an ad interim relief, in an interlocutory application made by it in the suit, and this Court appointed a receiver who was to "make an inventory of the sub-tenants in the said demised premises and submit a report to this Court. He will also see that no other third person is inducted in the said premises." By a further order dated February 8, 1995 the receiver was directed by Court "to circulate to the parties" the report of the receiver. That application of the respondent and also an application made by the petitioner were disposed of by this Court by an order dated April 26, 1995 directig status quo as regards possession was to continue as on that date. The respondent did not file any affidavit. In the presence of counsels for the parties by an order dated April 28, 1995 the Court further directed that "the order dated 26th April, 1995 will not prevent the Life Insurance Corporation of India to initiate appropriate proceeding for eviction in accordance with law if it is so advised." 3. The Estate Officer issued a notice dated September 9, 1995 under section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the Public Premises Act, and the petitioner had received it. The Estate Officer issued a further notice dated November 14, 1995, intimating the petitioner that proceedings under the Act had been initiated and that hearing would take place on December 2, 1995. The petitioner made an application before the Estate Officer for dismissal of the proceedings and by an order dated March 7, 1997 the Estate Officer found that it was open to the Estate Officer to proceed with the eviction proceedings. The petitioner preferred a revisional application before this Court, which was pending hearing as on date. A further application had been made by the petitioner challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer to hear such proceedings and by an order dated December 22, 1997 the Estate Officer dismissed the application. The petitioner challenged the order before this Court in an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and this Court disposed of the matter by expressing its disinclination to interfere and liberty was given to the petitioner to urge the question of jurisdiction in the estate proceedings. 4. The petitioner challenged the order before this Court in an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and this Court disposed of the matter by expressing its disinclination to interfere and liberty was given to the petitioner to urge the question of jurisdiction in the estate proceedings. 4. According to the petitioner the Estate Officer had framed the issues in the absence of the advocate for the petitioner and thereafter had rejected prayers made by the petitioner for addition of two issues with regard to the maintainability and jurisdiction of the proceedings. It was alleged by the petitioner that the respondent was allowed to disclose documents during the proceedings, and that the Estate Officer had rejected the prayer of the petitioner to allow time to the petitioner to consider the documents and proceeded to record evidence. Inspite of the assistance of a stenographer, the petitioner had also alleged, the Estate Officer had refused the petitioner's prayer for recording the evidence in question and answer form, or to record objections raised by the petitioner and allowed the witness for the respondent to take assistance of notes during the course of deposition and also to be prompted. According to the petitioner, the manner in which the Estate Officer had conducted the proceedings LIC had been favoured at the cost of the petitioner and that. in those circumstances the petitioner had made this application and obtained an ex parte ad interim order staying the proceedings before the Estate Officer. 5. It had been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the proceedings before the Estate Officer were proceedings within the meaning of section 24(1) (b) (i) of the Code of Civil Procedure. He cited and relied on the decision reported in AIR 1966 SC 1888 . It was submitted by counsel for the petitioner that even though proceedings before the Estate Officer may not be generally understood to include a suit but in actual fact that was so and he cited and relied on the decision reported in AIR 1961 PUNJ 87. He cited and relied on the decision reported in AIR 1966 SC 1888 . It was submitted by counsel for the petitioner that even though proceedings before the Estate Officer may not be generally understood to include a suit but in actual fact that was so and he cited and relied on the decision reported in AIR 1961 PUNJ 87. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Estate Officer was a Court within the meaning of section 3 of The Indian Evidence Act and for the purpose of clause 13 of the Letters Patent, and that was apparent from the provision in section 8 of the Public Premises Act, and in support of this contention counsel cited and relied on the decisions reported in AIR (1966) CAL 504, AIR (1954) MAD 340 and AIR (1967) SC 1494. He argued that though an action could not be instituted in this Court, yet by virtue of its powers of superintendence this Court was competent to transfer to itself an action which had been instituted and was pending before a Court subordinate to this Court, both under clause 13 of the Letters Patent and section 24 (1)(b)(i) of the Code of Civil Procedure, inspite of there being an express bar to the original jurisdiction of this Court. In support of his argument he cited and relied on the decisions reported in AIR (1951) CAL 286, AIR (1951) CAL 129, AIR (1949) BOM 42, AIR (1914) PC 41, AIR (1955) CAL 258, AIR (1968) SC 1481, 1973(1) SCC 446 , AIR (1990) SC 113. As regards the allegations of bias of the Estate Officer, it was submitted that a reasonable apprehension of bias was required to be shown, and in this case one event should not be considered in isolation, but the cumulative effect of all factors should be considered and in support of this submission he cited and relied on the decisions reported in 80 CWN 777, 1969 (1) QB 577, 1968 (3) ALL ER 304. It was also argued that this Court had inherent power to transfer the proceedings to itself for the ends of justice. The conduct of the Estate Officer, contended counsel for the petitioner, was an instance where for the ends of justice the petitioner was entitled to an order in its favour. 6. It was also argued that this Court had inherent power to transfer the proceedings to itself for the ends of justice. The conduct of the Estate Officer, contended counsel for the petitioner, was an instance where for the ends of justice the petitioner was entitled to an order in its favour. 6. The suit which had been instituted before this Court, according to LIC, was in accordance with law and the order appointing receiver for the protection of the subject-matter of the suit had given it the required relief, and in effect served the purpose of instituting the suit. It was contended by counsel for the LIC that in terms of the provisions set out in the Public Premises Act it was entitled to and it had instituted proceedings before the Estate Officer for the eviction of the petitioner, alleged to be an unauthorised occupant, and that leave to institute such proceedings had also been given by this Court in its order dated April 28, 1995. He submitted that the petitioner had challenged before this Court the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer and the maintainability of the proceedings and in the various orders made by the Court, as mentioned earlier, the question stood finally adjudicated and the petitioner was estopped from urging the same all over again in this petition. It was contended on behalf of the LIC, that in accordance with the provisions of the Public Premises Act, jurisdiction of the Civil Courts were barred as regards eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises, and though the Estate Officer did exercise certain quasi judicial powers, it was not competent to effect all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and was not a Court within the meaning of either clause 13 of the Letters Patent or section 24(1) (b) (i) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of the contention counsel cited and relied on the decisions reported in AIR (1992) PUNJ & HAR 248, JT 1998 VOL. IX SC 55, AIR (1972) TRIPURA 1, AIR (1980) MP 106, AIR (1966) SC 1718, AIR (1951) MAD 676, AIR (1982) CAL 285, AIR (1963) SC 884. In support of the contention counsel cited and relied on the decisions reported in AIR (1992) PUNJ & HAR 248, JT 1998 VOL. IX SC 55, AIR (1972) TRIPURA 1, AIR (1980) MP 106, AIR (1966) SC 1718, AIR (1951) MAD 676, AIR (1982) CAL 285, AIR (1963) SC 884. When a specific forum had been erected for the purpose of adjudication of certain disputes, it was submitted on behalf of the LIC, the legislators did not intend that those disputes should be adjudicated by some other forum merely by assuming jurisdiction and transferring those to the forum intending to adjudicate those disputes and the decisions reported in 1996(2) CRN 440 and 1998(2) CLT 351 were relied on. As regards the allegation of bias, it was contended by counsel for the LIC that the advocates for the petitioner who had earlier recorded its grivances in writing to the Estate Officer, had not done so in respect to its allegations in the petition, for the simple reason that the allegations were more afterthoughts which had been created for the purpose of making this application. 7. The legislative competence of the Parliament was not in dispute in this application. The object of enacting the Public Premises Act was to provide a special remedy in respect to the eviction of unauthorised occupants of Governmental premises by avoiding a long-term legal process. It must have been the intention of the legislature in promulgating the enactment that the recovery of Government properties from unauthorised occupants required special laws expediting the process of the general1aw. Indeed the process of eviction under the general law was time-consuming and expensive. Therefore, there can be little doubt that the Public Premises Act had been enacted to ensure special consideration in respect to Government properties and which would be less expensive. 8. The Estate Officer was empowered under section 5 of the Public Premises Act to order eviction, upon being satisfied that the public premises in question were in unauthorised occupation. The section does not confer any power on the Estate Officer to decide the questions of title to land but for the purpose of satisfying himself to make an order he was entitled to consider the question of, both title and possession. That the Estate Officer was not a Court, had been held in the decision reported in AIR (1970) TRIPURA 1. That the Estate Officer was not a Court, had been held in the decision reported in AIR (1970) TRIPURA 1. In the des ion reported in AIR (1980) MP 106 it had once again been decided that the Estate Officer was not a Court, as because the provisions contained in the Limitation Act were not applicable in the proceedings before him and the-jurisdiction of civil courts was entirely barred in matters governed by the Public Premises Act. It would stand to reason, that where this Court had the power to transfer to itself any proceeding pending before a lower Court such transfer would be valid transfer even though the proceedings sought to be transferred could not in law be initially instituted before this Court. Such power, this Court would exercise by virtue of the provisions contained in clause 12 of the Letters Patent and also section 24(1)(b)(ii) of the Civil Procedure Code. Where however, the legislature in its wisdom had by enactment put a bar on the Court's jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding, as was done in the Recovery of Debts Due to Bank and Financial Institutions Act and as in section 15 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 there could be no question of the Court exercising its powers under the provisions of clause 12 of the Letters Patent or section 24(1) (b) (ii) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Had that been the intention of the legislature, surely such bar would not have been introduced into the Act. It would be pertinent to consider the contents of the section 15 of the Public Premises Act, and section 15(a) being relevant for the purpose of this case the section is quoted below:" 15. Bar of jurisdiction.- No Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of(a) the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises." 9. It was not denied nor disputed by the petitioner that there was a bar of the jurisdiction of the Courts. The petitioner sought. Bar of jurisdiction.- No Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of(a) the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises." 9. It was not denied nor disputed by the petitioner that there was a bar of the jurisdiction of the Courts. The petitioner sought. to contend that inspite of such bar this court in exercise of its powers under section 24(1) (b) (ii) of the Code of Civil Procedure was quite competent to transfer proceedings which were pending before the Estate Officer to itself, and that by reason of the contents in section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act the Estate Officer was a Court. I don't see any reason why the explanation in section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act would be resorted to or that it would have any application when sufficient explanation in that respect had been provided in section 24(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. There was no statutory provision nor any authority which would or could establish that section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act would be applicable in explaining whether "Estate Officer" was a ':Court". Sub-section (3) of section 24 of the Code provides; "24. (3) For the purpose of this section, (a) Courts of Additional and Assistant Judges shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Court. (b) 'Proceeding' includes a proceeding for the execution of a decree or order." The power of this Court and the District Judge as regards transfer under this section was concurrent. There could be little doubt that the allegations were mere after-thoughts, concocted for' the purpose of making this application. It was quite clear in sub section (3)(a) quoted above that "Court" meant, this Court, and the District Court, that is the Courts of the District Judge, the Additional and the Assistant Judges only. There was no mention of the Estate Officer to be a subordinate Court within the meaning of the section. The term "proceedings" had also been clarified in sub-section (3)(b), and the meaning I am afraid does not include eviction proceedings before the Estate Officer. 10. In those circumstances, I would be inclined to hold that by reason• of the bar of jurisdiction of this Court as provided in section 15 of the Public Premises Act, this Court was not "competent to try" the eviction proceedings pending before the Estate Officer. 10. In those circumstances, I would be inclined to hold that by reason• of the bar of jurisdiction of this Court as provided in section 15 of the Public Premises Act, this Court was not "competent to try" the eviction proceedings pending before the Estate Officer. It was abundantly clear from the contents in sub-sections 3(a) and 3(b) of the Code, quoted above, that the Estate Officer was not and could not be taken to mean a Court within the meaning of the section, nor the eviction proceedings to include "other proceedings". The matter had been argued at length by counsel for the petitioner, and several decisions had been relied on, though none of the decisions related to transfer of eviction proceedings pending before an Estate Officer nor substantiated the contention of the petitioner that inspite of a statutory bar of jurisdiction and being not competent to entertain a matter, this Court had assumed jurisdiction. For this Court to try and entertain a matter, though there was no original jurisdiction for the matter to be instituted in this Court, was a different proposition altogether, because in these circumstances this Court would assume jurisdiction since there was no statutory bar to the assuming of such jurisdiction. The paramount feature of-course was, that in the latter circumstances this Court was competent to try and entertain, whereas in the instant facts before this Court, this Court was not, by reason of the statutory bar. All other considerations in the premises were rendered quite futile. It was apparent from the allegations contained in the petition, and the annexures thereof, that from the very outset the proceedings before the Estate Officer was not acceptable to the petitioner for reasons undisclosed to this. Court. The grounds sought to have been taken in the petition were, I, would tend to agree with the respondent, frivolous and an after-thought. The allegations that the witness for the LIC was allowed to be prompted 'and refer to notes during the course of giving evidence were bereft of any particular whatsoever. There was indeed no contemporaneous recording of the alleged grievances of the petitioner in any form before the Estate Officer. The alleged apprehension of the petitioner that it would not get justice before the Estate Officer, was futile and without any basis whatsoever. 11. For those reasons this application is dismissed. There was indeed no contemporaneous recording of the alleged grievances of the petitioner in any form before the Estate Officer. The alleged apprehension of the petitioner that it would not get justice before the Estate Officer, was futile and without any basis whatsoever. 11. For those reasons this application is dismissed. The petitioner shall pay costs of this application to the L.I.C. assessed at 200 GM. 12. A xerox of this judgment duly signed by the Assistant Registrar of this Court be made available to the parties upon their advocates-on-record undertaking to apply for and obtain certified copy thereof on payment of the usual charges. 13. Counsel for the petitioner prayed for stay and the prayer was not entertained. Application dismissed.