JUDGMENT Sinha, A. C. J. The only question which arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether this Court has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit? 2. The plaintiff-respondent in Paragraph 11 valued the suit in the following terms :- "The market value of the suit premises exceeds Rs. 10,00,000/-, since in this suit the plaintiff is claiming possession of the suit premises from a trespasser, who has no right whatsoever to be in occupation and/or enjoyment of the suit premises, the plaintiff has valued this suit at the value of the said property being in excess of Rs. 10,00,000/-. In the premises this Hon'ble Court has and the City Civil Court at Calcutta has not the jurisdiction to receive, try and determine this suit." The prayers made by the plaintiff in the suit-are - "(a) Decree for khas possession and vacant possession of the suit premises, being the flat on the 8th floor of 3A, Shakespeare Sarani, Calcutta particulars whereof are contained in the Schedule ‘B' hereto; (b) Decree for mesne profits @ Rs. 5,000/- per diem from 1st Match, 1995 till vacant possession of the suit premises has been made over to the plaintiff." 3. Admittedly, the rent fixed for the tenament was Rs. 5,000/- per month. The terms and conditions of the tenancy had been fixed in terms of an indenture of lease dated 10th December, 1973. The suit has been filed, inter alia, on the ground that the period of tenancy has expired. 4. The learned trial Judge upon -referring the decisions in (1) Govinda Kumar Sur & Ors. V. Mohini Mohan Sell & Ors. reported in AIR 1930 Cal 42; (2) Govinda Ram Agarwalla v. Dulu Pada Dutt & Anr. reported in 32 CWN 1113; (3) Brigadier K.K. Verma & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr. reported in AIR 1954 Bombay 358 and (4) Smt. Shanti Devi v. Amal Kumar Banerjee reported in AIR 1981 SC 1550 , held that valuation of the suit. Under Section 7 Paragraph (v)(2) of the West Bengal Court fees Act, 1970 as has been done in the instani case is permissible. 5. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, inter alia, submitted that keeping in view the fact that the lease expired on 1st March, 1995 and suit having been filed on 6th April, 1995, the valuation of the suit would be Rs. 5. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, inter alia, submitted that keeping in view the fact that the lease expired on 1st March, 1995 and suit having been filed on 6th April, 1995, the valuation of the suit would be Rs. 2,35,000/- i.e. Rs. 60,000/- for recovery of possession (being 12 month's tent) and Rs. 1,85,000/- towards claim of the mesne profit. A suit, according to the learned Counsel, cannot be valued on the basis of the claim for post mesne profit. 6. On the other hand, the submission of the plaintiff-respondent is that upon expiry of the period of lease by efflux of time the appellant has become a trespasser. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Smt. Shanti Devi v. Amal Kumar Banerjee reported in AIR 1981 SC 1550 , wherein it has been held :- "Undoubtedly, Section III (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, which deals with determination of a lease by efflux of time, has to be read with Section 116 of the Act. But, in the present case, there is no allegation by the defendant that he was a tenant holding over within the meaning of Section 116 of the Act. Now, in order that a lease should be deemed to have been continued in favour of the defendant it was necessary to show that he remained in possession of the premises demised after the determination of the lease granted to him and the plaintiff had expressly or by necessary implication assented to his continued possession. There being no such plea of holding over, the matter falls to be governed by Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. If the period of lease had expired on January 10, 1970, the relationship of Landlord and Tenant ceased and the defendant became a trespasser." 7. Reliance in this connection has also been placed on (5) R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.P. & Ors. reported in 1995(5) SCC 698 , and (6) Krishna Kishore Firm v. The Govt. of A. P. & Ors. reported in AIR 1990 SC 2292 . 8. Reliance in this connection has also been placed on (5) R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.P. & Ors. reported in 1995(5) SCC 698 , and (6) Krishna Kishore Firm v. The Govt. of A. P. & Ors. reported in AIR 1990 SC 2292 . 8. It has been stated that the suit has been valued on the basis of the market value of the property under Section 7 (vi) (a) of the West Bengal Court Fees Act, 1970 which reads thus :- "(vi)-In a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property form- (a) a trespasser, where no declaration of title to property is either prayed for or necessary for disposal of the suit-according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint subject to the provisions of Section 11." 9. Under the Court Fees Act law as also under the West Bengal Court Fees Act suit has to be valued in terms of the provision thereof. A suit for recovery of immovable property from a tenant including tenant holding over after the determination of the tenancy, a suit for eviction of tenant would still be a suit between the Landlord and Tenant, not a suit between the owner and a rank trespasser. 10. It may be that even after the Court Fees Act, 1870, a suit for recovery of immovable property from a tenant including tenant holding over after the determination of the tenancy is governed by Section 7 (xi) (cc) of the said Act. Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act reads thus :- "Section 116: If a lessee or under lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the lessee or under lessee, or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in Section 106." 11. There is a distinction between a tenant continuing in possession after determination of lease without the consent of the Landlord and a Tenant doing so with the consent of the landlord. There is a distinction between a tenant continuing in possession after determination of lease without the consent of the Landlord and a Tenant doing so with the consent of the landlord. Whereas, the former he is called a tenant by sufferance, and in the case of the latter he is called a tenant holding over. 12. In (7) Ramlal Sahu v. Mossomat Bibi Shehra reported in AIR 1935 Pat 90, it has been held that the expression "holding over" after the determination of tenancy is wide enough to cover a case where a tenant continues to be in occupation even though the tenancy had been determined. 13. Valuation of the suit, therefore, was required to be done, as if it is suit between the Landlord and Tenant. So far as the suit between the Landlord and Tenant is concerned the mesne profit, if any, is to be completed upto the date of institution of the suit and not on the basis of any hypothesis. In terms of the Suits Valuation Act, the valuation of the suit has to be same as under the Court Fees Act. 14. In (8) Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar reported in AIR 1958 SC 245 , it has been held :- "What would be the value for the purpose of jurisdiction in such suits is another question which often arises for decision. This question has to be decided by reading Section 7 (iv) of the Act along with Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. This latter section provides that, where in any suits other than those referred to in Court Fees Act, Section 7, paras 5, 6 and 9 and para 10, Clause (d), Court fees are payable ad valorem under the Act, the value determinable for the computation of Court fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. In other words, so far as suits falling under Section 7, sub-section (iv) of the Act are concerned, Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act provides that the value as determinable for the computation of Court fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. There can be little doubt that the effect of the provisions of Section 8 is to make the value of the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value as determinable for computation of Court fees and that is natural enough. There can be little doubt that the effect of the provisions of Section 8 is to make the value of the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value as determinable for computation of Court fees and that is natural enough. The computation of Court fees in suits falling under Section 7 (iv) of the Act depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of Court fees that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value for Court fees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases; but it is the value for Court fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined. The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of Court fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa. Incidentally, we may point out that according to the appellant it was really not necessary in the present case to mention Rs. 15,00,000/- as the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction since on plaints filed on the Original Side of the Madras High Court prior to 1953 there was no need to make any jurisdictional valuation." 15. There cannot be any doubt that the tendency of a litigant to choose his own forum by reason of over valuing the suit has to be discouraged. 16. If the plaintiff does so, an application in demurer is maintainable in terms of Section 11 of the West Bengal Court Fees Act. 17. In (9) Ram Narain Prasad v. Atul Chander Maitra reported in 1994(4) SCC 349 , it has been held :- "Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, sets out how Court fees are to be computed upon certain suits. By reason therefore, on a suit between a Landlord and Tenant for the recovery of immovable property from the tenant, Court fees are to be paid according to the amount of the rent of the immovable property to which the suit refers, payable for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint. By reason therefore, on a suit between a Landlord and Tenant for the recovery of immovable property from the tenant, Court fees are to be paid according to the amount of the rent of the immovable property to which the suit refers, payable for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint. The plaint in this case sought the relief of eviction of the first respondent from the suit property upon the averments that the appellants were the landlords and the first respondent was their tenant and he was in arrears of rent. The suit could only be valued as an eviction suit, regardless of the fact that the first respondent had denied the appellants' title to the suit property so that this became an issue in the suit." 18. It is true that for the purpose of valuation of a suit for determination of the Court fees payable thereon, the averments made and the reliefs sought for in the plaint determines the character of the suit. Clause (v)(a) of Section 7 of the West Bengal Court Fees Act cannot, thus, be said to be applicable in this case as the same is applicable where a suit is filed against the defendant who was a trespasser from the very beginning. The word 'trespasser' has a variable meaning and it is used in different context in different statutes. So far as the West Bengal Court Fees Act is concerned, the word 'trespasser' must mean a trespasser from the very beginning and not a trespasser who had original title but lost the title because of efflux of time by reason of an agreement between the parties of by operation of law. 19. Clause (v)(a) and Clause (xi) of the Act, thus, must be read harmoniously. 20. Keeping in view the fact that assuming that the claim of damages at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- per diem is correct and for reasonable the valuation of the suit on the face of the plaint could have been made only as on the date of the institution of the suit as the suit is one between the Landlord and Tenant. 21. In Govinda Kumar Sur & Ors. v. Mohini Mohan Sen & Ors. reported in AIR 1930 Cal 42, is a pointer where such an interpretation had been given. 22. 21. In Govinda Kumar Sur & Ors. v. Mohini Mohan Sen & Ors. reported in AIR 1930 Cal 42, is a pointer where such an interpretation had been given. 22. In Smt. Shanti Devi v. Amal Kumar Banerjee reported in AIR 1981 SC 1550 , upon which strong reliance has been placed, the Court was concerned with a question as to whether the defendant was a tenant holding over and, as- no such plea had been taken, the same was not accepted. However, the said decision is not an authority for the proposition as regard applicability of the Court Fees Act in relation to tenant at sufferance. 23. Even in the unreported decision in (10) Parameswari Devi Saraogi & Ors. v. Hari Prasad Poddar & Anr. delivered on 11th September, 1996 by A. N. Ray, J. (as His Lordship then was), it has been held :"However, in view of the various binding authorities cited by Mr. Deb, it is impossible not to accept his submissions that after 31.3.89, the defendants became trespassers in Flat No. 10. The defendants, according to the plaintiffs point of view, on and after 1.4.89 were exterants and current trespassers. According to the defendants point of view, they are not trespassers but continuing tenants as per their second defence which is still to be mentioned. According to them, even without the aid of the second defence, since they were ex-tenants, the suit against them had to be valued under Clause (xiii). It .is here that the problem really arises. No doubt, the suit could be valued under Clause (xiii) and it could be treated as a Landlord-Tenant suit. But, if the plaintiffs treat the suit as one against trespassers and opts to invoke Clause (xi) of the West Bengal Court Fees Act, 1970, instead of Clause (xiii), can the plaintiffs be stopped from doing so by the defendants? If the above authorities are applied, the inescapable conclusion is that on and after 1.4.89, the defendants filed a dual capacity of being ex-tenants and of being present trespassers. This is the plaintiffs point of view. If the plaintiff chooses the trespasser point of view, then there is nothing which prevents the reliefs in this suit being valued at Rs. 2 lakhs. It is not an excessive or inflated or mala fide valuation and the mala fide nature of the valuation is not really alleged. This is the plaintiffs point of view. If the plaintiff chooses the trespasser point of view, then there is nothing which prevents the reliefs in this suit being valued at Rs. 2 lakhs. It is not an excessive or inflated or mala fide valuation and the mala fide nature of the valuation is not really alleged. What is argued is that the plaintiffs not only can value the suit under Clause (xiii) but must value it under the clause and that clause only. It is here that I am unable to agree with Mr. Gupta." (Emphasis supplied) 24. With the greatest of respect of the learned Judge, we are unable to accept the finding that the plaintiff is at liberty to value his suit either as a tenant or a trespasser. 25. For the purpose of Court Fees Act, the plaintiff who claims himself to be a former landlord has to value the suit under Clause (xiii). The theory of a "dual capacity" in the context of the provisions of the Act cannot have any application. 26. In that case it was held that it was not an excessive or inflated or mala fide valuation. The question which has been raised in this case had not been raised therein. The learned Judge himself, cannot be said to have decided that a part of a suit can be filed against the defendant as tenant and another part thereof as against the trespasser. The relationship between the parties must be governed by the statute. In any event, the decision of this Court in Govinda Kumar Sur & Drs. v. Mohini Mohan Sen & Drs. reported in AIR 1930 Cal 42, should prevail. 27. The decision relied upon by the learned Counsel in R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of A. P. & Drs. reported in 1995(5) SCC 698 , the Apex Court had made distinction between tenant holding over and tenant at sufferance. The decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent had not been rendered on Court Fees Act. But, merely a General Principle had been laid down therein. 28. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the learned trial Judge was not correct in holding that the suit is not over valued and this Court has pecuniary jurisdiction to maintain the same. But, merely a General Principle had been laid down therein. 28. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the learned trial Judge was not correct in holding that the suit is not over valued and this Court has pecuniary jurisdiction to maintain the same. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the impugned order is set aside but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. The office is directed to return the plaint to the plaintiffs for presentation thereof in an appropriate Court having jurisdiction over the matter. Ansari, J.: I agree.