JUDGMENT Arjith Pasayath, C.J. 1. This original petition has been filed under Art.226 and Art.227 of Constitution of India, 1950 (in short, the Constitution), after petitioner's application before Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench (in short, the Tribunal) was rejected on ground that it had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain that petition. 2. Factual position is as follows: Petitioner was working as Pharmacist in Central Reserve Police Force, Madhya Pradesh (in short, C.R.P.F.). By order dated 29th July 1999, he was relieved to take up his posting at 132 Bn. C.R.P.F., Assam on transfer. He did not report for duty there, but applied for medical leave. Before any order on his medical leave application was passed, petitioner proceeded to his native place in Kerala, from where he sent a representation for retention at Shivpuri stating certain reasons for that. He also applied for voluntary retirement. Meanwhile, he received order dated 7th October 1999 passed in respect of his representation, stating that same should be directed through Group Centre, Shivpuri. He was also asked to report for duty at 132 Bn. as directed earlier. Application was filed before Tribunal challenging both these orders. Tribunal held that mere fact that intimation regarding representation was received by him within State of Kerala did not confer any jurisdiction on Tribunal to entertain the application as no cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. 3. In support of application, it is submitted by learned counsel for petitioner that S.19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (ia short, the Act) deals with jurisdiction and it, inter alia, provides that where cause of action has arisen either in whole or in part within its territorial jurisdiction, an application can be entertained. Learned counsel for Central Government, on the other hand, submitted that mere receipt of an intimation does not constitute and give rise to a cause of action. When case was taken up, we wanted learned counsel for petitioner to state as regards jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the Writ Application and nature of such application. It was urged by learned counsel for petitioner that under Art.226 (2) of Constitution, Writ Application can be entertained. According to him, receipt of intimation within territorial jurisdiction of Tribunal as well as of this Court constitutes and gives rise to cause of action. It was urged by learned counsel for petitioner that under Art.226 (2) of Constitution, Writ Application can be entertained. According to him, receipt of intimation within territorial jurisdiction of Tribunal as well as of this Court constitutes and gives rise to cause of action. Therefore, Tribunal should have entertained the application and in any event, this Court can entertain writ application and interfere in the matter as injustice has been done to him. 4. So far as nature of Writ Application is concerned, an evasive reply was given to the effect that no specific nature of a Writ Application need be identified because prayer was in terms of Art.226(2) of Constitution, and it can be called a Writ under Art.226 (2) of Constitution. Submission is misconceived. A Writ can be in the nature of one of the categories enumerated in Art.226. Art.226 (2) deals with jurisdiction of High Court, and not with nature of Writ. It is submitted that in the instant case, Writ may be in the nature of certiorari and, therefore, Writ Petition is styled as one under Art.227. Writ of certiorari brings in the concept of superintendence under Art.227 of Constitution. For appreciating basic features of Art.226 and 227, a comparison and contrast is necessary. It is only in so far as a writ of certiorari is concerned that this power can be said to be available under both these articles under Art.226 by its very terms, and under Art.227 as a part of power of superintendence. But here too there is distinction same being that exercise of power under Art.226 is regarded as an exercise of original jurisdictions whereas power under Art.227 is revisional in nature [see Umail v. Radhikabhai AIR 1980 SC 1272. 5. Since petitioner's case revolves round Art.226(2' of Constitution, which in terms refers 10 Art.226(1)' both provisions need to be extracted. Art.226 (1) and 226 (2) read thus: "226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs. 5. Since petitioner's case revolves round Art.226(2' of Constitution, which in terms refers 10 Art.226(1)' both provisions need to be extracted. Art.226 (1) and 226 (2) read thus: "226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs. (i) Notwithstanding anything in Art.32, every High Court shall have power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to Issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within these territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (i) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x It needs to be noted here that clause (1A), which had been inserted by 15th Amendment Act, 1963, has been renumbered clause (2) by Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. As a result of the view taken by apex Court in Election Commission v. Saha Venkata 1953 SCR 1145, Rashid v. Income Tax Commissioner 1954 SCR 738 , Khajoor Singh v. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 532 and Collector of Customs v. E. T. Commercial Co. AIR 1963 SC 1124 , it was location or residence which gave territorial jurisdiction to a High Court under Art.226, the citus of the cause of action being immaterial for this purpose. Object of clause (IA) inserted by 15th Amendment Act, 1963 was to provide that the High Court within which cause of action arises wholly or in part, would also have jurisdiction to entertain a petit on under Art.226. Prior to insertion of clause (1A) writs did not run beyond the territories relating to which High Court exercises jurisdiction. Object of clause (IA) inserted by 15th Amendment Act, 1963 was to provide that the High Court within which cause of action arises wholly or in part, would also have jurisdiction to entertain a petit on under Art.226. Prior to insertion of clause (1A) writs did not run beyond the territories relating to which High Court exercises jurisdiction. Clause (IA) re-numbered as clause (2) provides that if cause of action arises wholly or in part within the territorial jurisdiction of High Court, it may issue writ against a person who is resident within the jurisdiction of another High Court. Determining factor is whether cause of action wholly or in part has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. 6. By 'cause of action' it is meant every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a Judgment of the court [see Cook v. Gill (1873) 8 C.P. 107]. In other words, a bundle of fact is accessary for plaintiff" to prove in order to succeed in the suit. Apex Court had occasion to refer to Cooke's case (1873) 8 C.P. 107 (supra) in S. K. Gupta v. Damodar Valley Corporation AIR 1967 S.C. 96 . At page 98, it is: "Expression 'cause of action', in the present context, does not mean 'every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed' as was said in Cooke v. Gill (1873) 8 C.P. 107 (116), in a different context, for if it were so, no material fact could ever be appended or added and, of course, no one would went to change or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. That expression for the present purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basic constituted by new facts. Such a view was taken in Robinson v. Union Property Corporation Ltd. (1952 2 All. E .R. 24) and it seems to us to be the only possible view to take. Any other view would make the rule futile. The words 'new case' have understood to mean 'new set of ideas'. Dor son v. J. N. Ellia and Ltd. (1962 1 All. E. R.302). This also seems to us to be a reasonable view to take. Any other view would make the rule futile. The words 'new case' have understood to mean 'new set of ideas'. Dor son v. J. N. Ellia and Ltd. (1962 1 All. E. R.302). This also seems to us to be a reasonable view to take. No amendment will be allowed to introduce a set of ideas to the prejudice or any right acquired any party by lapse of time." Cause of action is the media upon which Curt arrives at a conclusion in favour of plaintiff which he has to prove before he can succeed. It is something more than a ground or unity of title. It not only includes facts accessary to support plaintiff's title, but also facts which entitle him to relief against a particular person. Cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by defendant, nor does it depend upon character of the relief prayed for by plaintiff. It was observed by Lopes, L. in Mst. Chand Kaur v. Pratap Singh 15 Ind. App. 156 it refers entirely to grounds set forth in the plaint on cause of action, or in. other words, to media upon which plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. Regarding the meaning of expression 'cause of action', reference to dictum of the Privy Council in Md. Khalil v. Mekbub Ali AIR 1949 P.C. 78 in Para.61 of the Judgment would be appropriate: "61. other words, to media upon which plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. Regarding the meaning of expression 'cause of action', reference to dictum of the Privy Council in Md. Khalil v. Mekbub Ali AIR 1949 P.C. 78 in Para.61 of the Judgment would be appropriate: "61. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x (1) The correct test in cases falling under O.11, R.2 is whether the claim in the new suit is in fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation of the former suit [Moonshee Buzloor Fuheer v. Shumroonnissa Begum: (1967) 11 Moo I 551: 2 Bar 259 (P.C.)] (2) The 'cause of action' means every fact which will be necessary for plaintiff to prove it transversed to order to support his right to the Judgment [Real v. Brown: (1889) 22 QBO 138: 58 L.J.Q.B. 476] (3) If the evidence to support the two claims is different [Brwsoon v. Humphrey: (1884) 14 QBO 141: 53 L.J.Q.B. 746] (4) The causes of action in the two suits may be considered to be away if in substance they are identical (Brunsoon v. Numphroy, Supra). (5) Cause of action has no relation whether to the defence that may be act up by defendant nor does it depend upon character of the relief prayed for the plaintiff. It refers............to media upon which plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion, in his favour [Mst. Chand Kaur v. Pratap Singh: (1887) 15 I.A. 185; ILR 16 G. 98 (P.C.)]. This observation was made by Lord Watson in a case under S.43 of the Act of 1882 (corresponding to Order II, R.2) where plaintiff made various claim in the same. " Elements "of a cause of action are: First, breach of duty owing by one person to another; second, damage resulting to other from the breach. Commission or omission of an act by defendant, and damage to plaintiff in consequence thereof, must unite to give a good cause of action. No one of these facts by itself is a cause of action. Commission or omission of an act by defendant, and damage to plaintiff in consequence thereof, must unite to give a good cause of action. No one of these facts by itself is a cause of action. Question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a Writ Petition has arises within territorial limits of a particular High Court or not is to be decided in the light of the nature and character of proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ application, petitioner has to establish that within the territorial limits of Court's jurisdiction, prima facie a legal right claimed by him has either been infringed or is threatened to be infringed by respondents and such infringement may take place by causing him actual injury or threat thereof. It is necessary to make a distinction between actual or apprehended injury to writ petitioner', and indirect effect or remote consequences upon him. For giving rise to cause of action for filing a Writ Petition what is material is whether or not within the territorial limits of said High Court there has been proximate or direct effect on petitioner. Correct test would be to find out whether by reason of making of the impugned order petitioner is likely to suffer any loss or injury within the territorial limit of Court, and merely feeling of an alleged effect of older would not constitute cause of action. Same view was expressed by Calcutta High Court in Everest Coal Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Coal Controller 1986 (90) Cal. W.N. 438. 7. Territorial jurisdiction of a Court and cause of action are interlinked. To decide the question of territorial jurisdiction, it is necessary to find out the place where cause of action arose [see Nasiruddin v. STAT AIR 1976 SC 331 ] and U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U.P. AIR 1995 SC 2148 Clause (2) of Art.226 of Constitution is of wide amplitude. A petition under Art.226 of Constitution can be entertained in following cases: (a) High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the person of authority against whom relief is sought resides or is situate. (b) The High Court within whose jurisdiction cause of action in respect of which" relief is sought under Art.226 has arisen, wholly or in part. 8. A petition under Art.226 of Constitution can be entertained in following cases: (a) High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the person of authority against whom relief is sought resides or is situate. (b) The High Court within whose jurisdiction cause of action in respect of which" relief is sought under Art.226 has arisen, wholly or in part. 8. On a plain reading of Clauses (i) and (2) of Art.226 of Constitution, it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise power to issue directions, orders or writs in view of any of fundamental rights conferred by Part III of Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action wholly or in part has arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdictions notwithstanding that the spur of such Government or authority or residence of person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. 9. Case at hand bears some resemblance to the one adjudicated by apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. M/s Swaika Properties AIR 1985 SC 1289 . It was observed by apex Court in said case that only service of notice under S.52(2) of Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act on the owner of a land situated in State of Rajasthan intimating State Government's proposal to acquire that land for public purpose was not sufficient to invest the Calcutta High Court with jurisdiction entertain a petition under Art.226 of constitution. In the facts of thai case, it was held that cause of action either wholly or in part did not arise within the territorial limits of Calcutta High Court and that service of notice was not an integral part of cause of action within the meaning of Art.226 of Construction. 10. In the case at hand, only intimation had been received within the territorial limits of Tribunal and this Court. That itself is not sufficient to clothe this Court or Tribunal with jurisdiction "to entertain writ application. It was brought to our notice that a view similar to this has beady been taken by a Full Bench of this Court in O.P. Nos. 11321 and 12019 of 1993 disposed of on 13th August 1999. Thus, from any angle, as highlighted above, writ petition is misconceived. Original petition fails and is dismissed.