This appeal filed by the defendant/appellant against the order dated 2.7.96, passed by the learned District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, in Title Appeal No. 1 of 1996 under Order.XLI Rule 23 remanding the case to the trial Court for fresh trial. 2. The appeal has arisen on the following facts and circumstances. The predecessor of the plaintiffs/respondents, Sukumar Shil, instituted Title Suit No. 189 of 1984 before the Court of Sadar Munsiff (presently described as Civil Judge Junior Division No. 1), Agartala, Tripura West, for a decree for declaration of title, .confirmation of possession over the suit land, perpetual injunction against the defendant restraining him from entering into suit and. The plaintiff also sought for a declaration that the Sale Deed No. 1-2053 dated 9.3.81 alleged to be executed by Haradhan Sutradhar in favour of the defendant as illegal fraudulent, collusive, malafide, void and not binding upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff pleaded that he purchased the 'A' Scheduled land measuring ten dhurs from the original owners ie, from Banka Behari Sutradhar Chowdhury and others, and possessor of the suit land described in Schedule A by a registered Sale Deed dated 22.6.73 on consideration, obtained possession of the land on the same date and since then the plaintiff was possessing the said land without any interruption from any quarter. The plaintiff also averred that he purchased the land with specific boundary and the measurement of the land increased to three karas, which were in exclusive possession of the plaintiff since June, 1973. The defendant created a registered Sale Deed in his favour purportedly executed by one Haradhan Sutradhar on 09.03.1981 in respect of the same land. The plaintiff also purchased three gandas and one kara of land mentioned in Schedule B, situated in the Eastern side of A Scheduled land, from Chand Mia & others. The defendant filed its written statement in the Court denying and disputing the claim of the plaintiff. The defendant pleaded specifically that the suit land in CS Plot No. 7490 was purchased by the defendant from Haradhan Sutradhar, who purchased the same from Banka Behari Sutradhar Chowdhury and Rameswar Sutradhar Chowdhury, who sold the same out of their share on partition of the properties amongst four co-owner brothers. The defendant pleaded specifically that the suit land in CS Plot No. 7490 was purchased by the defendant from Haradhan Sutradhar, who purchased the same from Banka Behari Sutradhar Chowdhury and Rameswar Sutradhar Chowdhury, who sold the same out of their share on partition of the properties amongst four co-owner brothers. The defendant took delivery of the possession of the suit land in CS Plot No.7490 as per CS plot and boundaries mentioned in his title deed and got the purchased land mutated in his name in Khatian No.27779. At the time of mutation, area of the said purchased land of defendant was physically measured and found to be .03 acre within the boundary. The defendant claimed to be the absolute owner in possession of land in CS Plot No.6490 and he was continuously possessing the said land. The defendant claimed that he filled earth in the suit land for raising the land and also got the plan approved by Municipality for construction of house. The defendant also averred that the plaintiff purchased 10 (ten) dhurs of land in CS Plot No. 7490 in the extreme Southern portion from the co-owners, viz Banka Behari Sutradhar Chowdhury, Shri Surendra Chandra Sutradhar Chowdhury, Shri Birendra Chandra Sutradhar Chowdhury and Shri Rameshwar Sutradhar Chowdhury. The Schedule A land comprising CS Plot No.7490 is exclusively owned and {Recessed by defendant and the plaintiff did never purchase any portion of CS Plot No.7490. The defendant, in addition, also set up by way of counter claim against the claim of the plaintiff under Rule 6A of Order VIII of CPC. The defendant accordingly sought for a declaration that the defendant was the owner in Raiyati-right of the land described in the Schedule, confirmation of his possession and for perpetual injunction restraining the plaintiff/opposite party, his agents from entering into the suit land. The counter claim was initially valued at Rs.25/- under section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act by the defendant. The plaintiff filed its written statement against the counter claim, which was subsequently registered and numbered as Title Suit No.75 of 1995. The learned trial Court took up both the cases together and framed the following issues : 1. Whether the suit is maintainable ? 2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? . 3. Whether the plaintiffs have right, title and interest over the suit land ? 4. The learned trial Court took up both the cases together and framed the following issues : 1. Whether the suit is maintainable ? 2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? . 3. Whether the plaintiffs have right, title and interest over the suit land ? 4. Whether the plaintiffs possessed the suit land prior to the date of institution of the suit ? . 5. Whether the sale deed No. 1 -2053 dated 9.3.81 is collusive, sham, void and illegal? 6. Has the defendant/counter claimant right, title and interest in the land described in the Schedule A of the plaint ? 7. Whether the defendant/counter claimant was in possession of the Schedule A land and whether he was dispossessed by the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit ? 8. Whether the defendant is entitled to get recovery of the possession of the A Schedule land ? 9. Whether plaintiff are entitled to get any relief if so to what extent ? 10. Whether the defendant is entitled to get any relief as counter claim, if so, to what extent ? In deciding the issue Nos- 3, 4 and 5, on consideration of the evidence on record more particularly Ext 7 (Khatian in the name of Sukumar Shil, the deceased plaintiff), thelearned trial Court held that the plaintiff did not acquire right, title and interest in CS Plot No.7490. The trial Court also held that the Sale Deed No.1-2053, marked as Ext 1, dated 9.3.81, executed by Haradhan Sutradhar and others in favour of the defendant was valid on consideration of Exts A, B and Ext 1. The trial Court also took note of the mutation proceeding in respect of the suit land initiated at the instance of the defendant which was contested by Minati Shil the daughter-in-law of original plaintiff. The competent authority on being satisfied, created a Khatian bearing No.27779 in favour of the defendant and CS Plot No.7490 was recorded in the name of the defendant vide Ext G, the certified copy of the mutation proceeding. The competent authority on being satisfied, created a Khatian bearing No.27779 in favour of the defendant and CS Plot No.7490 was recorded in the name of the defendant vide Ext G, the certified copy of the mutation proceeding. The trial Court held that the plaintiff failed to establish its right, title and interest over the suit land- The learned trial Court decided all the issues against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant, and accordingly dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, allowing the counter claim of the defendant (registered as and numbered as Title Suit No.75 of 1995). The plaintiffs preferred an appeal against the aforesaid two judgments and decrees dated 19.9.95 passed in Title Suit Nos 189 of 1994 and 75 of 1995 by way of a consolidated memorandum of appeal, which was registered and numbered as Title Appeal No. 1 of 1996. In the appeal, a ground was taken about the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Munsiff in trying the counter claim, Title Suit No.75 of 1995. According to the plaintiffs/appellants, the suit value of the counter claim Title Suit No.75 of 1995 was Rs.11,000/- on amendment of the plaint and, therefore, the learned trial Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the aforesaid suit since it exceeded the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. There was no challenge so far as the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Munsiff as regards Title Suit No. 189 of 1984 which was also dismissed by the trial Court. The learned District Judge found that since the learned Munsiff did not frame any issue as to whether the learned Munsiff had the pecuniary jurisdiction to try the Title Suit No.75 of 1995, the District Judge felt that said issue was required to be decided by the learned trial Court and accordingly, he set aside the judgment and decree in both the suits and sent back the cases to the learned Munsiff to try the cases on the said question. Hence the present appeal. 3. Mr. AK Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant/defendant, raised serious objection as to the legality and propriety of the action of the learned appellate Court in setting aside the valid decree obtained by the defendant. Hence the present appeal. 3. Mr. AK Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant/defendant, raised serious objection as to the legality and propriety of the action of the learned appellate Court in setting aside the valid decree obtained by the defendant. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant/appellant has submitted that at no point of time, was the question of pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Munsiff ever raised including that in the appellate forum, in deciding Title Suit No. 189 of 1984. The learned appellate Court did not find any error in the judgment and order of the learned Court so far as Title Suit No. 189 of 1984 was concerned. On the own showing of the learned appellate Court, the counter claim (Title Suit No.75 of 1995) which was valued at Rs.11,000 after amendment, exceeded only the pecuniary limits of jurisdiction of the learned Munsiff and, therefore, the learned appellate Court was not justified in setting aside the jucjgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court in Title Suit No. 189 of 1984 and remanding the same to be decided afresh on the question of jurisdiction, submitted Mr. Bhowmik, the learned senior counsel for the appellant. Mr. AK Bhowmik, the learned counsel for the appellant, thereafter submitted that the learned appellate Court of first instance fell into serious error in setting a aside the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No.75 of 1995 (the counter claim) on the alleged ground of pecuniary jurisdiction on mere defect of irregularity in the proceeding which did not effect the merits of the case or jurisdiction of the Court. Mr. Bhowmik, the learned senior counsel, submitted that a decree lawfully obtained by a party after a long drawn trial, was/is not to be set at naught on mere technicality. He further submitted that the question of pecuniary jurisdiction b was never seriously at issue before the trial Court. That in the written statement filed against the counter claim, the plaintiffs no doubt averred that the suit land would be valued at more than Rs.5,000 and as such, the learned trial Court had no jurisdiction to try the counterclaim. He further submitted that the question of pecuniary jurisdiction b was never seriously at issue before the trial Court. That in the written statement filed against the counter claim, the plaintiffs no doubt averred that the suit land would be valued at more than Rs.5,000 and as such, the learned trial Court had no jurisdiction to try the counterclaim. That there was no issue as such and after allowing the trial to proceed without raising any serious objection, the plaintiff was precluded from raising the issue of pecuniary jurisdiction on his failure to take the said issue at earliest possible opportunity. Lastly Mr. Bhowmik, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant/appellant, submitted that the learned trial Court had the inherent jurisdiction to try the suit. At any rate, in the absence of any failure of justice, the learned appellate Court was not justified in setting aside the judgment and decree ^ of the learned trial Court and remanding the same to the trial Court. Mr. Bhowmik, in support of his contention referred to a Single Bench decision of the Gauhati High Court in On the death of Mazid All, plaintiff, his legal heirs Mustt Maimuna Begum & others vs. Lakshman Rabidas, reported in AIR 1992 Gauhati 91 (1991 (1) GLJ 87). 4. Mr. KN Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, submitted that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court was upto Rs.5,000/-. at the relevant time. The counter claim (Title Suit 75 of 1995) on the face of the pleadings, exceeded the pecuniary jurisdiction. Referring to the proviso to Rule 6A of Order VIII CPC, Mr. Bhattacharjee, submitted that the learned trial Court under the circumstances could not have tried the counter claim which exceeded the pecuniary limits of jurisdiction of the trial Court. The learned senior counsel for the respondents, referring to paragraph 9 of the written statement filed in the counter claim wherein the point of pecuniary jurisdiction was specifically taken, submitted that it cannot be said that the said issue was never agitated by the plaintiff before the trial Court. The pecuniary jurisdiction has its own relevance and the Court could not have tried the suit on the face of the pleadings. Mr. Bhattacharjee,the learned senior counsel for the respondents, in £ support of contention, referred to two Single Bench decisions one of the Gujrat High. The pecuniary jurisdiction has its own relevance and the Court could not have tried the suit on the face of the pleadings. Mr. Bhattacharjee,the learned senior counsel for the respondents, in £ support of contention, referred to two Single Bench decisions one of the Gujrat High. Court in Bharvad Chhota Bhaga vs. Bharvad Jaga Dahya, reported in AIR 1999 Gujrat 17, and the other of the Kerala High Court in HV Dattathri Shastry vs. Vamana Rao Apte, reported in AIR 1975 Kerela 116. 5. On perusal of the judgment of the learned appellate Court, I do not find that the learned appellate Court found any fault with the judgment and decree dated 19.9.95, passed by the trial Court, so far as Title Suit No. 189 of 1984 was concerned. That was a suit filed by the plaintiff himself and the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court was never in challenge. Thus, the learned appellate Court was not justified in setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court in Title Suit No. 189 of 1984. As regards the Title Suit No.75 of 1995 ie, the counter claim presented by the defendant after amendment, the suit property was valued at Rs.11,000. The counter claim, therefore, was not in conformity with the proviso to Rule 6A of Order VIII CPC and thus, in the case in hand, the question for adjudication will be as to whether the appellate Court of first instance was justified in setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court on the sole ground of pecuniary limits of jurisdiction of the trial Court? In this context, it would pertinent to take into account provisions of section 21 CPC and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887. Section 21 CPC relates to objections to jurisdiction and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 relates to the procedure to be adopted in cases where objections are taken on appeal or-revision as to the valuation of a suit or appeal for the purpose of jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, the Code of Civil Procedure indicates about the place of suing in sections 15 to 20. Those pro visions in fact do not relate to the jurisdiction of the Courts, they only indicate the place of suing. As a matter of fact, the Code of Civil Procedure indicates about the place of suing in sections 15 to 20. Those pro visions in fact do not relate to the jurisdiction of the Courts, they only indicate the place of suing. A civil Court including a Court of Munsiff is a Court of competent jurisdiction to try a suit of civil nature. The inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Munsiff to try a suit of this nature was never at issue, what was at issue and assailed, related to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court which issue was agitated before the appellate forum. Section 21 CPC, as mentioned earlier, indicates about objections to the jurisdiction. Sub-section (1) of section 21 CPC in clear . terms envisions that no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or re visional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where the issues are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a.consequent failure of justice. Sub-section (2) of section 21 CPC, inserted by the CPC Amendment Act of 1976, specifically refer to the scope of objections as to the competence of the Courts with regard to its pecuniary limit. Sub-section (2) of section 21 CPC speaks that no objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to its pecuniary limits of jurisdiction shall be allowed by an appellate or revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. In both the circumstances, the Parliament insisted that in the absence of consequent failure of justice, no such objections are to be entertained. The Legislature in clear terms declared that objections on the ground of jurisdiction are not to be entertained by the appellate or revision Court even if be taken up at the earliest opportunity before the trial Court, when there was no failure of justice. A question regarding valuation of a suit is to be raised at the earliest opportunity and not at a later stage in appeal, second appeal or revision. A question regarding valuation of a suit is to be raised at the earliest opportunity and not at a later stage in appeal, second appeal or revision. By the aforesaid scheme, the Legislature gave a statutory recognition to the principle of Waiver with regard to the territorial jurisdiction as well as the pecuniary jurisdiction. Similar provisions are also traceable in section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. Section 99 CPC enjoins that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded on appeal, on account of mis-joinder (or non-joinder) of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceeding in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. From the foregoing provisions, it appears that the Legislature took all possible care to ensure that the time, energy and labour spent by the Court in adjudicating the issues do not go in vain if the parties concerned participated in the adjudication , process, joined the issues and allowed the Court to try the suit on merit without raising objections to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court at the earliest opportunity. These provisions of the statutes are made fool proof by providing adequate provisions for curing any irregularity. The provisions indicated above prohibit the appellate Court from entertaining any objection to jurisdiction on the ground of place of suing or pecuniary limit. In far and rare cases, the appellate or c revisional Courts may entertain an appeal or a revision on such ground only in the case of consequent failure of justice. 6. The decision in HV Dattathri (supra) referred to by Mr. KN Bhattacharjee, the learned senior counsel for the respondents, does not come to any aid of the respondents. The above decision is relating to proper course required to be followed by the appellate Court in determining the case finally under Order XLI Rule 24 instead of remitting the matter to the Court below. Bharvad Chhota Bhaga (supra) relied upon by Mr. Bhattacharjee, the Senior Advocate, pertains to the plea of jurisdiction. A plea of jurisdiction which goes to the root relating to the competence of the Court to adjudicate the subject matter can always be raised at any stage. The above mentioned decision does not come to any assistance to the respondents. 7. Bharvad Chhota Bhaga (supra) relied upon by Mr. Bhattacharjee, the Senior Advocate, pertains to the plea of jurisdiction. A plea of jurisdiction which goes to the root relating to the competence of the Court to adjudicate the subject matter can always be raised at any stage. The above mentioned decision does not come to any assistance to the respondents. 7. The Supreme Court in Kiran Singh & others vs. Chaman Paswan & others, reported in AIR 1954 SC 340 , laid down the law which was relied upon and referred by a Single Bench of the Gauhati High Court in deciding the case in Maimuna Begum & others (supra). The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, enunciating a principle of law in this regard, made the following observations: “Section 11 enacts that notwithstanding anything in section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure an objection that a Court which had no jurisdiction over a suit or appeal had exercised it by reason of over-valuation or under-valuation, should not be entertained by an appellate Court, except as provided in the section. Then follow provisions as to when the objections could be entertained, and how they are to be dealt with. The drafting of the section has come in - and deservedly for considerable criticism; but amidst much that is obscure and confused, there is one principle o which stands out clear and conspicuous. It is that a decree passed by a Court, which would have had no jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but for over-valuation or under-valuation, is not to be treated as, what it would be but for the section, null and void; and that an objection to jurisdiction based on over-valuation or undervaluation, should be dealt with under that section and not otherwise. The referring to section 578, now section 99 CPC, in the opening words of the section is significant. That section, while providing that no decree shall be reversed or varied in appeal on account of the defects mentioned therein when they do not affect the merits of the case, excepts from its operation defects of jurisdiction. Section 99 therefore gives no protection to decrees passed on merits, when the Courts which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a result of over-valuation or under­ valuation. It is with a view to avoid this result that section 11 was enacted. Section 99 therefore gives no protection to decrees passed on merits, when the Courts which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a result of over-valuation or under­ valuation. It is with a view to avoid this result that section 11 was enacted. It provides that objections to the jurisdiction of a Court based on over-valuation or under-valuation shall not be entertained by and appellate Court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is a self contained provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on over-valuation or under valuation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it. With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional Court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying sections 21 and 99 CPQ and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. The contention of the appellants, therefore, that the decree and judgment of the District Court, Monghyr, should be treated as a nullity cannot be sustained under section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act.” In the same decision, the Supreme Court observed that the words “unless the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits" clearly show that the decrees passed in such cases are liable to be interfered with in an appellate Court, but not in all cases and as a matter of course and only in cases where prejudice such as are mentioned in section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act result. And the prejudice envisaged by that section therefore .must be something other than the appeal being heard in a different forum. And the prejudice envisaged by that section therefore .must be something other than the appeal being heard in a different forum. The Court further held that the prejudice contemplated by the section was something different from the fact of the appeal having been heard in a forum which would not have been competent to hear it on a correct valuation of the suit as ultimately determined. A similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court in the cases of Hifalal vs. Kalinath reported in AIR 1962 SC 199 ; Nalla vs. Ambala Mills, reported in AIR 1966 SC 634 , and BR Rambhadria vs. Secretary, F&A Deptt, AP & others, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1653 . Section 167 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 also indicates that the Court of appeal or revision is not to disturb a decision 6n the ground of improper evidence or rejection of evidence if in spite of such evidence, there are sufficient materials in the case to justify the decision. Technical objections are not to be entertained. 8. In the instant case, admittedly, there was no issue as regards the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court and, therefore, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned appellate Court was not justified in entertaining the objection as to the competence of the trial Court with reference to its pecuniary jurisdiction. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and decree dated 2nd July, 1996, passed by the learned District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in Title Appeal No.1 of 1996, is set aside. Since the learned appellate Court did not go into the merits of the appeal and disposed the appeal only on the point of pecuniary jurisdiction, the same (Title Appeal No.l of 1996) is required to be heard on merits. The learned District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, is accordingly directed to dispose of Title Appeal No. 1 of 1996 on merits without going into the question of pecuniary jurisdiction again which has already been decided. The first appeal is allowed to the extent indicated. The parties shall appear before the learned District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, within two weeks from today arid thereafter the learned District Judge shall fix a date of hearing on the title appeal, hear the parties and dispose the title appeal as expeditiously as possible preferably within two months from the date of receipt of the records from this Court. The parties shall appear before the learned District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, within two weeks from today arid thereafter the learned District Judge shall fix a date of hearing on the title appeal, hear the parties and dispose the title appeal as expeditiously as possible preferably within two months from the date of receipt of the records from this Court. The appellant shall be entitled to the cost of this proceedings.