JUDGMENT - A.B. PALKAR, J.:---This appeal has been admitted only on the substantial question of law as contained in Ground No. (3) which is to the effect : "(3) That, in the very nature of things, the provisions of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act could not have any applicability whatsoever to an arrangement whereby having given to the person concerned her share in the property as agreed to, the provision allowing such a person to live in the house during her life-time was not property as would be said to be covered by the provisions of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act." 2. The relevant facts are not even in dispute. Fakiraji and Narayan were brothers. Narayan predeceased Fakiraji and Janabai was his widow. The dispute is in respect of the suit house described in the plaint with sufficient clarity in para No. 1 Janabai was plaintiff No. 3 in the suit and it was her contention that 1/3rd portion of the suit house was given to her in partition effected between her and her husband's brother Fakiraji in 1938. After coming into force of Hindu Succession Act by virtue of section 14(1) she had become absolute owner of the said portion of the house in which she was residing since before the partition deed and on 20-5-1965 she had executed the registered gift deed of the same in favour of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2. So far as the other property gifted by her to plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, there is no dispute between the parties. 3. Plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 got their names recorded in the Municipal record and, therefore, a declaration was sought that the particular resolution of the Municipal Council, Warud bearing No. 14 passed in the meeting of 13th August, 1976 be also cancelled. The partition between Fakiraji and Janabai-widow of deceased Narayan was by a registered partition deed dated 28th June, 1938. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are the sons of Fakiraji. They resisted the suit contending that in partition between Fakiraji and Janabai the entire plot of land on which the house stands as well as the house were allotted to the share of Fakiraji. Therefore, Janabai had no right to execute gift deed in respect of any portion of the house. 2 and 3 are the sons of Fakiraji. They resisted the suit contending that in partition between Fakiraji and Janabai the entire plot of land on which the house stands as well as the house were allotted to the share of Fakiraji. Therefore, Janabai had no right to execute gift deed in respect of any portion of the house. Plaintiff No. 3 Janabai had only right of residence in 1/3rd eastern portion of the house during her lifetime. The trial Court passed the decree in favour of plaintiffs which has been confirmed by the 1st Appellate Court. 4. The only point that is required to be decided in view of the ground of admission of the appeal is whether Janabai had only right of residence in the 1/3rd eastern portion of the suit house and in spite of Hindu Succession Act having come into force she could not be said to have become full owner of that portion because in the partition between herself and her husband's brother, the entire house was given in the share of Fakiraji and she was given only agricultural land and right of residence in 1/3rd eastern portion of the house of which she could not be said to have become full owner even after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. 5. I have heard arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellants and respondents at length and I am satisfied that there is no scope for interference in the view taken by the courts below. It is an admitted fact the partition between Fakiraji and Janabai was effected in 1938 that is to say after coming into force of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. From the contents of the partition deed (Exhibit-44) it appears that Janabai and Fakiraji were living together even after the death of Janabai's husband. However, there was some dispute between them and there was a litigation in which Janabai was held entitled to half share in the entire property and this property was partitioned by them by the partition deed (Exhibit-44). Even otherwise, in view of the provisions of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 Janabai would have succeeded to the half share of her husband as admittedly her husband and Fakiraji were the only coparcener who held the property jointly. Even otherwise, in view of the provisions of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 Janabai would have succeeded to the half share of her husband as admittedly her husband and Fakiraji were the only coparcener who held the property jointly. The effect of partition deed was that Janabai's half share in the joint property held by her husband and Fakiraji was recognised and was allotted to her by effecting partition by metes and bounds and so far as the agricultural lands were concerned, they started separate cultivation and in the residential house Janabai started living in the 1/3rd eastern portion. By referring to provisions of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, Mr. J.N. Chandurkar, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that section 14(1) applies to any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the said Act. The suit property cannot be said to have been acquired by Janabai as according to the partition deed the entire house was given to the share of Fakiraji and she was allowed to reside in the 1/3rd eastern side portion during her lifetime. Therefore, the provisions of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act are not applicable and her case would fall under sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act according to which nothing contained in sub-section (1) of section 14 applies to any property acquired by way of gift or under a Will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a Civil Court or under an Award where the terms of the gift, Will or other instrument or the decree, order or Award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. The earlier discussion would clearly show that Janabai had already acquired half share in the property which belonged to her deceased husband and the effect of partition deed is to give her that half share by metes and bounds and as such it is only allotment of her half share which was even upheld by the Court and, therefore, the 1/3rd eastern portion of the house was the property which Janabai had acquired prior to coming into force of Hindu Succession Act. 6. 6. Shri Mohta, learned Counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 placed reliance on a decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Annasaheb Bhausaheb Patil v. Gangabai Annagonda Patil)1, reported in 1971 Mh.L.J. 657, particularly on para 11: "11. There is consensus of judicial opinion with regard to the ambit of sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act. It covers only those cases of grants where the interest in the grantee is created by the grant itself or, in other words, where the gift, Will, instrument, decree, order or Award is the source or origin of the interest created in the grantee. Where, however, the instruments referred to above are not the source of interest created but are merely declaratory or definitive of the right to property antecedently enjoyed by the Hindu female sub-section (2) has no application; and it matters not if in such instruments it is specifically provided in express terms that the Hindu female had a limited estate or that she shall not alienate the property or that the property would revert on her death to the next reversioner. Such terms are merely the reiteration of the incidents of the Hindu Law applicable to the limited estate." He also drew my attention to the decision of this Court in the case of (Jagannathpuri v. Godabai and another)2, reported in 1967 Mh.L.J. 813 in which it is held that the property allotted to widow at partition of family property and partition deed providing that widow shall not alienate the property then such prohibition becomes inoperative after enlargement of estate of widow. It has been specifically pointed out that partition deed cannot be deemed to be 'any other instrument' within the meaning of section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act. The following observations in the note contained on page 813 are material: "Held, that the partition deed was not an instrument which fall within the expression "any other instrument" contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act. The connotation of the word "Acquired" in sub-section (1) of section 14 is the widest and includes every kind of acquisition. The property would be included within the provisions of section 14(1). The connotation of the word "Acquired" in sub-section (1) of section 14 is the widest and includes every kind of acquisition. The property would be included within the provisions of section 14(1). At a partition where a Hindu woman had a right or an interest as a result of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, it cannot be said that on partition the woman was obtaining a new title. Even when there is prior title and on partition property is allotted to a woman, for the purpose of section 14(1) even this allotment of share amounts to acquisition. In sub-section (2) of section 14 the word "acquire" is used in a restricted sense viz. creation or acquisition of title for the first time where no prior title existed." 8. Even otherwise let us consider the matter from a different point of view. Had there been no partition between Fakiraji and Janabai then Janabai was entitled to half share in the entire property including the suit house. To take the view that because in the partition deed it is mentioned that the entire house is allotted to the share of Fakiraji, Janabai had only right of residence in 1/3rd eastern portion of the house and it does not become her absolute property under sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act would be tantamount to reducing her right to limited ownership because of the existence of partition deed which was a document which in fact accepted her half share and gave her some property by metes and bounds. It will not be out of place to mention that agricultural land was given to Janabai and Fakiraji not only equal in acreage but having some assessment of land revenue and the partition deed also mentioned the value of the suit house in which house of 1/3rd valuation i.e. worth Rs. 100/- was given to Janabai for residential purpose. It is not a case in which after partition in which entire house was allotted to Fakiraji he allowed Janabai to reside in 1/3rd portion as a licensee. Janabai was earlier residing in 1/3rd eastern portion of the house in her own right and was in possession of it. That property became her absolute property after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, I am convinced that the view taken by the courts below is correct. Janabai was earlier residing in 1/3rd eastern portion of the house in her own right and was in possession of it. That property became her absolute property after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, I am convinced that the view taken by the courts below is correct. There is no substance in the appeal and it must fail. 9. Appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. -----