Judgment - N.J. PANDYA, J.:---The appeal is filed against the order of the Executing Court below Exhibit- 1 in Regular Darkhast No. 88 of 1993 by the Ld. Principal Judge of the family Court No. 2, Pune. 2. Originally Darkhast was filed in the Civil Court on 7th November, 1989 where, on account of establishment of the family Court, the judgment Debtor had objected to the transfer of Darkhast proceeding from Civil Court to Family Court, Pune. Instead of allowing the Civil Court to pass a transfer order with regard to the Darkhast proceedings, the decree holder withdrew that Darkhast from the Civil Court on 15th October, 1993 and filed Darkhast No. 83 of 1993 on 16th October, 1993. 3. In this background, the objection is still taken on behalf of the Judgment Debtor that this Darkhast is to be filed straightway in the Family Court, and therefore, this being the execution of an order, which was passed by the Civil Court and not by the Family Court, the Family Court will not get jurisdiction to execute the order unless Darkhast was transferred to it by the Civil Court. 4. In our opinion, this objection is too much technical. Rightly or wrongly, the petition was allowed to be withdrawn and was filed as a fresh Execution Petition in the Family Court. In respect of that very execution proceedings, this point is now taken that this is a direct filing and not having been transferred by the Civil Court, the Family Court will have no jurisdiction. 5. This point was not taken before the Trial Court. Applying the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, unless the point of jurisdiction is taken at the first instance, in appeal unless it is shown that the prejudice is caused, this point will have no meaning. 6. So far as the order of the trial Court is concerned, because of the subsequent proceeding of the year 1993, it seems to have been completely misled as to the date from which the amount is due in respect of the dates in connection with which the arrears are sought. 7. The arrears are sought from 5th January, 1983 to 31st October, 1987 and the amounts to be executed are two in number viz. Rs. 250/- awarded under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Rs. 7. The arrears are sought from 5th January, 1983 to 31st October, 1987 and the amounts to be executed are two in number viz. Rs. 250/- awarded under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Rs. 100/- awarded under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 8. Inspite of the fact that there was an order under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when a Matrimonial Court under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act by way of permanent alimony passed an order for the amount, it is obviously in addition to the amount awarded under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. It is nobody's case that the Matrimonial Court was unaware of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Unfortunately, the District Judge, who passed the order in Misc. Application No. 41 of 1993 has referred to the order of the trial Court granting permanent alimony of Rs. 100/- and has expressed his opinion that this was probably in addition to it. 10. In a proceeding arising out of the judgment of the Ld. District Judge, the Ld. Single Judge of this Court has indicated that the petitioner-wife should get it clarified from the District Court who has used the word "probably". 11. As a result of this, on page 94 submission was made on behalf of the judgment Debtor that the erroneous order or uncertain order cannot be executed. 12. In our opinion, there is no uncertainty at all. Passing a reference of a word "probably" cannot be made a decree uncertain. The operative portion is very clear saying that there is no uncertainty in it. What is to be looked into by the Executing Court is the operative portion of the decree and not the reasoning set out in the judgement. 13. Either on the two points, therefore, in our opinion, there is no substance. 14. The appeal therefore succeeds and the respondent/judgment debtor is directed to deposit the amount within four weeks from today in the trial Court failing which warrant shall be issued by the trial Court for recovery of the amount. Order accordingly. 15. certified copy be expedited. Order accordingly. -----