JUDGMENT Satyabrata Sinha, J. 1. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 3.5.99 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court whereby and whereunder the writ petition filed by the appellant herein was dismissed. 2. The writ petitioner is the appellant. He filed the writ application, inter alia, praying for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing them not to interfere and/or disturb the peaceful possession of the lands in question including the pucca structures made thereon and further directing the respondents not to demolish the same which had been raised on the lands described in paragraph 2 of the writ petition on the basis of the sanctioned plan. 3. The petitioner allegedly purchased the lands in question measuring about 4 Cottahs 1 Chittack 7 Sq. ft. by a registered deed of sale dated 8.12.98 executed by Sri Anil Kumar Ghosh and Sri Provash Kumar Ghosh, constituted Attorney of Smt. Sudabala Ghosh, Smt. Ranu Bala Ghosh, Smt. Parul Bala Ghosh and Smt. Puspa Rani Ghosh. He got his name mutated before the authorities of the Mohanpur Gram Panchayat. Allegedly, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner obtained permission for sale of the land from the Gram Panchayat. After purchase of the said land he filed an application for sanction of a building plan purported to be in terms of Rule 19 of the West Bengal Panchayat Rules on 27.11.98 and such application was allowed on payment of requisite amount therefore. The appellant in his writ application has contended that the authorities of the respondent nos. 4 and 5, inter alia, intend to demolish the said structure on the ground that the said lands have already been acquired and in any event, such constructions have been made in violation of the provision of Section 46 of the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). 4. The respondents, on the other hand, inter alia, contended that by reason of acquisition of the land, the writ petitioner did not acquire any interest therein and furthermore, as the said land falls within the Metropolitan Development Area, the provision of the said Act applies and thus, no permission could be granted in violation and/or in derrogation of the provision of Section 46 thereof. 5. 5. The learned trial Judge in his impugned judgment inter alia, held upon perusal of the documents that the writ application is a speculative one as the lands in question had been acquired in terms of Section 3(1) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 for public purpose. It was further held that except .03 decimal in the South-Eastern Corner of Mauza Jafarnagar, the entire Plot No. 530 vested in the State free from all encumbrances as a result whereof the venders of the petitioner had no saleable title in respect thereof. As regard the purported permission granted by the authorities of the Panchayat it had been held that no resolution of the Panchayat had been brought on records which is required for the purpose of grant of such permission. 6. Upon taking into consideration the provisions of Rule 23F of the West Bengal Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Administration) Rules, 1981 wherein the procedures for grant of such sanction had been laid down, it was held that such procedures had not been followed nor such permission could be granted in utter disregard of the Panchayat Act as also the said Act. 7. Mr. Ashis Sanyal, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, inter alia, submitted that a finding of fact has been arrived at that at least a portion of the said property has not been acquired. According to the learned Counsel, nothing had been brought on records to show that the lands in question fall within 500 yards of the highway and, thus, the question of applicability of the said Act in this instant case did not arise. In any event, contends Mr. Sanyal, the construction having been raised on the .03 decimal of land which had not been the subject-matter of the acquisition, the C.M.D.A. authorities are not entitled to demolish the said structures without following due process of law. 8. Nobody had appeared before us on behalf of the State of West Bengal. 9. Mr. Sumit Kumar Panja, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of C.M.D.A. on the other hand, submitted that the allegations made in the writ application appear to be preposterous. According to the learned Counsel, the manner in which the deal has been completed raised a suspicion upon bona fides of the writ petitioner. 9. Mr. Sumit Kumar Panja, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of C.M.D.A. on the other hand, submitted that the allegations made in the writ application appear to be preposterous. According to the learned Counsel, the manner in which the deal has been completed raised a suspicion upon bona fides of the writ petitioner. It was also submitted that a part of the land in question falls right on the speedway and the rest thereof falls within a few feet therefrom and, thus, the provisions of the said Act are applicable in the instant case. 10. From the records which had been produced before the learned trial Judge, it appears that possession of the lands in question had been handed over to C.M.D.A. On or about 15.6.1981, the lands had been acquired under Section 4 of the Act II of 1948. The sale deed in favour of the petitioner was executed on 23.9.1998. The petitioner filed an application for grant of prior permission for Constitution of new structures before the authorities of the Gram Panchayat on 27.11.1998 but the deed was registered and the transactions were completed on 8.12.1998. The permission had also been granted to the previous owner on 1.1.1999. 11. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that from the fact as noticed hereinbefore, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the question as to whether the lands come within the purview of 500 yards from the highway and falls within the Metropolitan area and/or the question as to whether a portion of the land had not been acquired in terms of the provision of the Act II of 1948, as a result whereof the provision of the said Act is attracted, give rise to a disputed question of fact. Such a disputed question of fact could not have been entertained in a writ application. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court while exercising its power of judicial review ordinarily cannot go into a disputed question of fact. In fact, Mr. Sanyal, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, himself contended that such a disputed fact should be resolved at the first instance by a competent authority. 12. In fact, Mr. Sanyal, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, himself contended that such a disputed fact should be resolved at the first instance by a competent authority. 12. Once it is accepted that the writ petition involved serious disputed question which could not have been resolved without holding a trial on evidence, the writ petition was not maintainable at all. This writ application, therefore, was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Furthermore, before the learned trial Judge, the State had produced the records relating to acquisition of the land. The learned trial Judge as indicated hereinbefore had also arrived at a finding of fact that while granting the purported sanction the provision of West Bengal Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Administration) Rules, 1981 and in particular Rule 23F, 23G and 23H had not been followed. 13. Rule 23G and 23H of the West Bengal Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Administration) Rules, 1981 read thus: – "Rule 23G–Construction within Calcutta Metropolitan Area-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, any application under sub-rule (1) of Rule 19 pertaining to the Calcutta Metropolitan Area as defined in the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979 (West Bengal Act XIII of 1979) shall be subject to the provisions of any rule made, or any order or direction of a competent authority issued under the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979. (2) An application under sub-rule (1) shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the application be forwarded by the Gram Panchayat with its comments to the Zilla Parishad having jurisdiction and the Zilla Parishad, on receipt of such application and comments of the Gram Panchayat, shall, on a reference of the matter to the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority, if necessary, return the application and other documents within a period of thirty days from the date of such receipt with its approval or comments as the case may be, to the Gram Panchayat for action under sub-rule (4) of Rule 23F within a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of the application under sub-rule (1) of Rule 19. Rule 23H–Restriction for construction in the vicinity of airport or prohibited area-No person shall erect near or in the vicinity of any airport or of a prohibited area notified as such by a competent authority under any law for the time being force, any structure or building tending to hazard aviation or security, as the case may be. The Gram Panchayat, on receipt of such an application under sub-rule (1) or Rule 23F, and forward the date of its receipt to the Zilla Parishad with comments; the Zilla Parishad on receipt of the application and the comments of the Gram Panchayat, shall: – (a) Approve the proposal and the plan with or without any modification. (b) Refuse to approval the proposal and the plan, and return the application and the other papers within a period of thirty days from the date of their receipt by the Zilla Parishad to the Gram Panchayat for appropriate action under sub rule (4) of Rule 23F within a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of the application under sub-rule (1) of Rule 19." 14. It is, therefore, clear that the question raised in this writ application as also in this appeal are required to be considered by a competent Court of law having appropriate determination but on the petitioner's own showing, he, therefore, ought to have been directed to take recourse to alternative remedy available to him in law. 15. In Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & other, 1998 (8) SCC 1 , the law is stated in the following terms: – "Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a Bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural Justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field." For the reasons aforementioned; there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. I agree.