Judgment :- N.V. BALASUBRAMANIAN, J. The above writ petitions are for a writ of declaration to declare s. 12 of the Finance Act, 1995 as ultra vires, illegal and void of the Constitution of India. 2. Sec. 12 of the Finance Act, 1995. 3. A common counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondents stating that the retrospective amendment made to s. 43(3) of the Act excluding tea bushes from the scope of plant is perfectly in order and it does not suffer from any infirmity. 4. Mr. G. Sarangan, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the expression, "plant" is defined in s. 43(3) of the Act in an inclusive manner and he referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Scientific Engineering House (P) Ltd. vs. CIT and submitted that the expression "plant" would include any apparatus to a businessman where he is carrying on business in respect of stock and trade and the tea bushes should also be regarded as "plant". He submitted that tea bushes have element of durability and they are assets for the assessee to carry on his business. He therefore, submitted that tea bushes satisfy all the tests of a "plant" as laid down by the Supreme Court in Scientific Engineering House (P) Ltd. case (supra). Learned senior counsel also referred to a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT vs. Sri Krishna Bottlers (P) Ltd. and submitted that the expression, "plant" should be given a wide meaning. Learned senior counsel submitted that tea bushes satisfy the various tests of the plant. He also referred to a decision in the case of Earl of Derby vs. Aylmer 6 Tax(Cases) 665 and submitted that even prior to the enactment of the Act, tea bushes have been regarded as "plant" and there are no reasons to modify the definition of the term "plant" to exclude tea bushes with retrospective effect. Learned senior counsel also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D. Cawasji & Co. vs. State of Mysore and submitted that the amendment made with retrospective effect sought to nullify the various orders passed by Tribunals holding that tea bushes are plants and hence, the amendment made by s. 12 of the Finance Act should be declared as invalid and unconstitutional. vs. State of Mysore and submitted that the amendment made with retrospective effect sought to nullify the various orders passed by Tribunals holding that tea bushes are plants and hence, the amendment made by s. 12 of the Finance Act should be declared as invalid and unconstitutional. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner also referred to the memorandum of Finance Bill explaining the reasons for the amendment wherein it has been stated that with the result of the judicial pronouncements, double deduction was claimed on tea bushes; one as replacement cost and another as depreciation allowance and to deny the double deduction in respect of replacement cost as well as depreciation allowance the legislature have amended s. 43(3) of the Act excluding tea bushes from the scope of the definition "plant". He submitted that it is not uncommon in the IT Act to claim depreciation on capital assets and claim revenue expenditure on repairs on the same assets and there is no question of any double deduction as the deduction granted under two different provisions cannot be regarded as double deduction. Learned senior counsel submitted that since the legislature have proceeded on a mistaken notion that there is a double deduction in the case of tea bushes by grant of depreciation, the amendment made should be declared as invalid and unconstitutional. 5. Mr. S. V. Subramaniam, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that under r. 8(2) of the IT Rules, 1962, the deduction is granted in respect of expenditure incurred on replacement of old tea bushes and such deduction is granted in lieu of depreciation and if depreciation is also granted on the cost of tea bushes, it would amount to grant to double deduction. Learned senior counsel submitted that the legislature has regulated the grant of depreciation in the case of tea bushes and this Court should be slow to interfere with the legislature wisdom in excluding tea bushes from the scope of the term "plant". Learned senior counsel submitted that under the Act, the grant of deduction is statutory and when the legislature in its wisdom has provided deduction only for replacement cost, s. 43(3) of the Act cannot be held to be invalid because of the exclusion of tea bushes from the scope of the term "plant". Learned senior counsel submitted that under the Act, the grant of deduction is statutory and when the legislature in its wisdom has provided deduction only for replacement cost, s. 43(3) of the Act cannot be held to be invalid because of the exclusion of tea bushes from the scope of the term "plant". Learned senior counsel referred to the decision of a single Judge of this Court in the case of Dollar Co. (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India. 6. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. Sec. 43(3) of the Act defines the expression, "plant" in an inclusive manner and the term, "plant" as defined prior to the amendment made by the Finance Act, 1995, reads as under, "Plant" includes ships, vehicles, books scientific apparatus and surgical equipment used for the purpose of the business or profession. An amendment was introduced by s. 12 of the Finance Act, 1995, and the expression "plant" in s. 43(3) of the Act was amended and after the amendment, s. 43(3) of the Act reads as under, "'Plant' includes ships, vehicles, books, scientific apparatus and surgical equipment used for the purpose of the business or profession but does not include tea bushes or livestock." The reason for the above amendment is explained in the Notes on Clauses of the Finance Bill, 1995 [vide 1995 (124) CTR(St) 38, 204 : 1995 212 ITR(St) 90, 298] and the relevant Notes on Clauses reads as under, 'Clause 12 seeks to amend sub-s. (3) of s. 43 of the IT Act relating to definition of "plant" for purposes of s. 28 to 41. It is proposed to exclude tea bushes from the ambit of the definition of "plant". This amendment is being made to override certain judicial pronouncements. It is also proposed to exclude livestock from the ambit of the definition of "plant". This amendment will take effect retrospectively from 1st April, 1962, and will, accordingly, apply in relation to asst. yr. 1962-63 and subsequent years. "The memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 1995 explaining the reason for amendment reads as under". Under sub-s. (3) of s. 43 of the term "plant" includes ships, vehicles, books, scientific apparatus and surgical equipment used for the purposes of business or profession. yr. 1962-63 and subsequent years. "The memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 1995 explaining the reason for amendment reads as under". Under sub-s. (3) of s. 43 of the term "plant" includes ships, vehicles, books, scientific apparatus and surgical equipment used for the purposes of business or profession. In certain judicial pronouncements, it has been held that the term "plant" includes tea bushes and, therefore, they would also be eligible for depreciation under s. 32. Rules 8(2) of the IT Rules, already provides for a deduction in respect of the expenditure incurred on replacement of old tea bushes by an assessee. The deduction under r. 8(2) is allowed in lieu of depreciation. As a result of the judicial pronouncements, double deduction is now being claimed on the tea bushes, -once as replacement cost and then as depreciation allowance. With a view to setting at rest the aforesaid controversy, s. 43(3) is being amended to provide that the term "plant" will not include tea bushes and livestock. The proposed amendments will take effect, retrospectively, from 1st April, 1962, and will, accordingly, apply in relation to asst. yr. 1962-63 and subsequent years. "7. In this connection, it is useful to refer to r. 8(2) of the IT Rules and the relevant Rules reads as under" Rule 8 : Income from the manufacture of tea. - (1) Income derived from the sale of tea grown and manufactured by the seller in India shall be computed as if it were income derived from business and 40 per cent of such income shall be deemed to be income liable to tax. (2) In computing such income an allowance shall be made in respect of the cost of planting bushes in replacement of bushes that have died or become permanently useless in an area already planted, if such area has not previously been abandoned and for the purpose of determining such cost, no deduction shall be made in respect of the amount of any subsidy which under the provisions of cl. (3) of s. 10 is not includible in the total income. "8. (3) of s. 10 is not includible in the total income. "8. The reason for the amendment of the definition of the term "plant" in s. 43(3) of the Act to exclude tea bushes is that under r. 8(2) of the IT Rules, the expenditure incurred by an assessee on replacement of old tea bushes is allowed as a deduction and the deduction under r. 8(2) is granted in lieu of depreciation. Some of the Tribunals have taken the view that tea bushes should also be regarded as". plant and on the basis of the orders of the Tribunals, deductions were claimed on the cost of tea bushes towards depreciation. Since two deductions were claimed; one towards the cost of replacement of old bushes; and another as depreciation, the legislature in its wisdom thought that only one deduction should be permitted and to but an end to the controversy arising in the whole, the definition of the term "plant" in s. 43(3) of the Act was amended excluding tea bushes and livestock from its scope. 9. In my view, whatever might have been the view of the Tribunal in its various orders on the scope of the definition of the term "plant" as regards tea bushes prior to the amendment, whether the expression, "plant" has to be construed in a wide manner and whether tea bushes satisfy all tests laid down for the plant in various decisions of the Supreme Court and they qualify themselves to be regarded as plant, after the introduction of the definition of the term "plant" excluding tea bushes from the scope "plant", tea bushes cannot be regarded as a plant at all. In this connection, it is relevant to refer to the following observation of Rowlatt, J. in Earl of Derby vs. Aylmer (supra). The learned Judge while considering the question whether a horse can be regarded as a plant held as under "I do not know whether a horse used for traction comes within that or whether it does not, but I am clearly of opinion that the diminished value of a breeding animal, merely due to the fact that having lived a year it is a year nearer its end, and therefore, is from that point of view less valuable, is not within this section. You need not take only the case of an animal; you may take the case of the value of a prolific tree. Of course, I am only dealing with the ideal. You have here an article which you are not wearing out by use. I neglect any question of abuse of the animal. You are not wearing it out by use. You have got an article whether it be an animal or a vegetable article, the life of which is only a limited term of years. As the years go on you take the produce and the reproduction of that animal, and when the years come to an end the animal or the tree or whatever it is, dies or is killed because it is no longer worth keeping. That diminished value, by reason of the efflux of time year by year of an animal or a tree, does not seem to me to be diminished value by reason of wear and tear; it is simply diminished value because you have invested your money in a source of production which is a wasting source of production, and I think it is not within these words." 10. Applying the above principles, there is no wear and tear of tea bushes in the course of a year. The tea bushes may become wasting assets, but the diminished value is not due to any wear and tear as understood for the grant of depreciation. The next question that arises is whether the provisions contained in s. 43(3) of the Act excluding tea bushes from the scope of the definition of plant should be declared as unconstitutional and void. It is well settled by the Supreme Court that an enactment can be declared as unconstitutional on the following two grounds. The Supreme Court in the case of, particularly para. 43, has laid down the following proposition of law "A law made by Parliament or the legislature can be struck down by Courts on two grounds and two grounds alone, viz., (1) lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. There is no third ground. We do not wish to enter into a discussion of the concepts of procedural unreasonableness and substantive unreasonableness - concepts inspired by the decisions of United States Supreme Court. There is no third ground. We do not wish to enter into a discussion of the concepts of procedural unreasonableness and substantive unreasonableness - concepts inspired by the decisions of United States Supreme Court. Even in U.S.A., these concepts and in particular the concept of substantive due process have proved to be of unending controversy, the latest thinking tending towards a severe curtailment of this ground (substantive due process). The main criticism against the ground of substantive due process being that it seeks to set up the Courts as arbiters of the wisdom of the legislature in enacting the particular piece of legislation. It is enough for us to say that by whatever name it is characterised, the ground of invalidation must fall within the four corners of the two grounds mentioned above. In other words, say, if an enactment is challenged as violative of Art. 14, it can be struck down only if it is found that it is violative of the equality clause/equal protection clause enshrined therein. Similarly, if an enactment is challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by cls. (a) to (g) of Art. 19(1), it can be struck down only if it is found not saved by any of the cls. (2) to (6) of Art. 19 and so on. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that Court thinks it unjustified. Parliament and the legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The Court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. In this connection, it should be remembered that even in the case of administrative action, the scope of judicial review is limited to three grounds, viz., (i) unreasonableness, which can more appropriately be called irrationality, (ii) illegality, and (iii) procedural impropriety [See Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for Civil Service which decision has been accepted by this Court as well. The applicability of doctrine of proportionality even in administrative law sphere is yet a debatable issue. [See the opinions of Lords Lowry and Ackner in R. vs. Secy. of State for Home Deptt. exp. The applicability of doctrine of proportionality even in administrative law sphere is yet a debatable issue. [See the opinions of Lords Lowry and Ackner in R. vs. Secy. of State for Home Deptt. exp. Brind. It would be rather odd if an enactment were to be struck down by applying the said principle when its applicability even in administrative law sphere is not fully and finally settled. It is one thing to say that a restriction imposed upon a fundamental right can be struck down if it is disproportionate, excessive or unreasonable and quite another thing to say that the Court can strike down enactment if it thinks it unreasonable, unnecessary or unwarranted." 11. Mr. G. Sarangan, learned senior counsel, in his fairness has not submitted that the amendment made is not beyond the legislative powers and it is also not his case that it offends any of the provisions of the Article in Part III of the Constitution of India. His submission is that the legislature have proceeded on a mistaken notion that double deduction was granted and to rectify the anomaly, s. 43(3) of the Act was amended with retrospective effect. In my view, a valid legislation cannot be declared as invalid merely because the Parliament might have proceeded on some wrong assumption and it is not a ground to invalidate the provisions of a statute. It is well settled that the beliefs and assumptions of the legislature do not make the law. Though the beliefs and assumptions of the legislature do not make the law, equally a wrong assumption made by the legislature for making the law will not undo the law validly made. Learned authors Kanga and Palkhiwala in their book, The Law and Practice of Income-tax, Eighth Edition, Volume I, at p. 3, have made the following observations, "Our duty ........... is to find out what the legislature must be taken to have really meant by the expressions which it has used, without necessarily attributing to (it) a precise appreciation of the technical appropriateness of its language [Per Viscount Simon LC, City of London IT Comrs. vs. Gibbs CIT vs. Simpson. An omission on the part of the legislature should not be readily inferred. [CIT vs. National Taj. vs. Gibbs CIT vs. Simpson. An omission on the part of the legislature should not be readily inferred. [CIT vs. National Taj. The Court is entitled, and indeed bound, when construing the terms of any provision found in a statute to consider the context [CGT vs. Getti 1972 (82) ITR 599, 605 (SC), Ramsay vs. IT 54 Tax(Cases) 101, 184 (HL), CIT vs. Casino, CIT vs. Nathu Hans Raj 1978 (105) ITR 43 (Guj), Gopal vs. ITO and any other parts of the Act which throw light upon the intention of the legislature and which may serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would be if considered alone and apart from the rest of the Act [per Lord Herschell, Colquhoun vs. Brooks 2 Tax(Cases) 490, 500 (HL), CIT vs. Narsee, CIT vs. Srinivasa 1981 (24) CTR(SC) 358, K. P. Varghese vs. ITO, CIT vs. Gopal Singh, CIT vs. Maharaj Visweswar Singh, Ramchandra Mardarajdeo vs. Collector of Taxes, CIT vs. Santosh . But the Court must disregard any assumption of the legislature as to the prevailing law, if it is mistaken, though the result might be that the legislative provision cannot be given the effect intended by Parliament;" the belief or assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law, "[per Lord Radcliffe, IR vs. Dowdall 33 Tax(Cases) 259, 287 (HL), Davies vs. Davies 44 Tax(Cases) 273, 294 (HL), Davies Jenkins & Co. Ltd. vs. Davies (Inspector of Taxes), CIT vs. Maniram, Ayrshire vs. IT 27 Tax(Cases) 331 (HL), IRC vs. Ayrshire Employers Mutual Insurance Association Ltd. 1948 16 ITR(Suppl) 80 (HL), See also CIT vs. Saroop Krishan 1985 46 CTR (P&H) 296 :" That part, I am not able to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no double deduction by the grant of depreciation. As already seen, r. 8(2) of the IT Rules provides that while computing income from the manufacture of tea, the entire replacement cost of tea bushes is allowed as a deduction and once the entire cost of replacement by infilling tea bushes is allowed, the grant of depreciation on the same tea plant would amount to double deduction on the same expenditure. Learned senior counsel referred to some of the provisions of the Act and submitted that under the provisions of the Act, both the depreciation and the revenue expenditure would be allowable with reference to the same machinery. In my view, the analogy is not quite accurate as the deduction for depreciation is granted on the capital cost and the revenue expenditure is allowed as business expenditure. In other words, the deductions are not given with reference to the same expenditure but they are given with reference to different kinds of expenditure, or more particularly, two different expenditure altogether. However, in the case of replacement by infilling tea bushes, on the same expenditure the deduction is granted under r. 8(2) and depreciation is also claimed on the cost of tea bushes planted. Therefore, it cannot be said that the legislature have proceeded on wrong assumption in the matter of grant of double deduction. No doubt, it may be true that in the case where tea estates are purchased or acquired, there may not be double deduction, but the legislature in its wisdom has thought that the assessee when he is a purchaser of a tea estate should be content to get deduction in cases where there is a replacement of tea bushes by infilling tea bushes. Therefore, I am not able to accept the submission of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner that the basic assumption of the legislature that there is a possibility of double deduction is erroneous. 12. Moreover, under the Act, the gross income is subject to deductions allowable by the Act and the deductions can be claimed only if they are provided in the Act. In other words, the deductions are statutory in nature and there is no general right to get the deduction. Therefore, when the legislature in its wisdom have proceeded on the basis that double deduction should not be granted on the same expenditure and regulated the grant of deduction on the said expenditure, I am of the view that the exclusion cannot be declared to be invalid under the provisions of the Constitution of India. Therefore, when the legislature in its wisdom have proceeded on the basis that double deduction should not be granted on the same expenditure and regulated the grant of deduction on the said expenditure, I am of the view that the exclusion cannot be declared to be invalid under the provisions of the Constitution of India. Though the petitioner may not be able to claim deduction at the time of purchase or acquisition of tea estate, when the entire tea bushes are replaced in a systematic manner during the course of years, the petitioner may become eligible to get deduction on the infilling charges incurred for replacing tea bushes. The Parliament, in my view, has regulated the grant of deduction and prevented the claim for double deduction. Hence, I am unable to accept the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the section as amended is invalid in the eye of law. 13. In this connection, it is profitable to refer to two decisions of the Supreme Court. The first is the decision in the case of Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India vs. Union of India wherein the Supreme Court has pointed out the scope of the taxation power of the Parliament and made the following observation, "It is now well settled that though taxing laws are not outside Art. 14, however, having regard to the wide variety of diverse economic criteria that go into the formulation of a fiscal policy, the legislature enjoys a wide latitude in the matter of selection of persons, subject-matter, events, etc., for taxation. The tests of the vice of discrimination in a taxing law are, accordingly, less rigorous. In examining the allegations of a hostile, discriminatory treatment, what is looked into is not its phraseology, but the real effect of its provisions. A legislature does not, as an old saying goes, have to tax everything in order to be able to tax something. If there is equality and uniformity within each group, the law would not be discriminatory. In examining the allegations of a hostile, discriminatory treatment, what is looked into is not its phraseology, but the real effect of its provisions. A legislature does not, as an old saying goes, have to tax everything in order to be able to tax something. If there is equality and uniformity within each group, the law would not be discriminatory. Decisions of this Court on the matter have permitted the legislature to exercise an extremely wide discretion in classifying items for tax purposes, so long as it refrains from clear and hostile discrimination against particular persons or classes." The next decision is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. State of Bihar, wherein the Supreme Court pointed out that the economic wisdom of a tax is within the exclusive province of the legislature and the Court should not interfere when the legislature in its wisdom has made a provision of law. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court, I am unable to accept the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the section is invalid. 14. The next question that arises is whether the section suffers from infirmity on the ground that full retrospective effect has been given from the date of enactment of the IT Act. The power of the Parliament to make a law with prospective or retrospective effect is not questioned. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that the expression "plant" has been construed in a broad manner and there is no justifiable reason to unsettle the settled law with retrospective effect. As already observed, learned senior counsel referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in D. Cawasji & Co. vs. State of Mysore (supra). In considering the question whether the retrospective effect given to the definition of the term "plant" by the Finance Act, 1995, is correct or not, it is necessary to bear in mind that the cases of both the petitioners relate to the asst. yr. 1994-95 and by virtue of the retrospective effect to the amendment, the petitioner is not prejudiced. Further, when r. 8(2) of the IT Rules was enacted, the legislature thought that the assessee would be entitled to only one deduction i.e., in respect of expenditure incurred on the replacement cost of tea bushes. yr. 1994-95 and by virtue of the retrospective effect to the amendment, the petitioner is not prejudiced. Further, when r. 8(2) of the IT Rules was enacted, the legislature thought that the assessee would be entitled to only one deduction i.e., in respect of expenditure incurred on the replacement cost of tea bushes. By virtue of various judicial pronouncements, the expression, "plant" was widened and some Benches of the Tribunal have taken the view that tea bushes should also be regarded as plant. Hence, to set at rest the controversy whether tea buses should be regarded as plant or not, s. 43(3) has been amended with retrospective effect so that there may not be any controversy in the claim for depreciation. Further, by virtue of the said amendment, the assessees would not be affected in a great manner as the power to reopen an assessment is regulated by other provisions of the Act and insofar as those cases which were pending on the basis of the decisions of the Tribunal, the assessments have not reached the stage of finality. Since the legislature have stepped in to rectify the defect as soon as some of the Tribunals have rendered decisions holding that tea bushes should also be regarded as plant, the retrospective effect given to the definition for the term "plant" excluding tea bushes cannot be said to be in any way unreasonable or arbitrary. I do not find any reason to accept the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner in this regard. 15. In the result, the writ petitioners are liable to be dismissed, and accordingly, they are dismissed. The respondents are entitled to costs of a sum of Rs. 1, 000 one set.