S. R. BANNURMATH, J. ( 1 ) THOUGH this matter is posted for admission today, as the respondent is served and represented by counsel, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the same is taken up for final hearing. ( 2 ) THE petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 29-10-1998 passed by the Ist Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) and Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ist Court, Gadag, (the Authority under S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (for short the 'act') allowing the petition filed by the respondent for recovery of the amount due has filed this revision petition. ( 3 ) THE brief facts of the case are as follows : The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and the respondent was an employee. Certain disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the respondent and he was placed under suspension. After an enquiry the respondent was dismissed from service. The respondent filed an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for computation of the amounts due to him and the Labour Court, after considering the same, allowed the application in part and directed the respondent to recover Rs. 21,360/- being subsistence allowance and Rs. 890/- being arrears of salary. Thereafter, the respondent filed an application under Section 15 of the Act before the Authority claiming the amount. The same was allowed by the impugned order. Hence, the present revision petition. ( 4 ) AT the outset, it is to be noted that the learned counsel for the respondent/employee raised a question of law regarding main-tainability of the revision petition. According to him, the learned Magistrate who passed the impugned order was not acting as a Magistrate, but as an "authority" under the Act under Section 15 and as such he was a persona designata and no revision under Section 397 or 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code is maintainable. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that taking into consideration the words of Section 15 (1) of the Act especially "other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court" the same would show that the person being appointed as Authority should not be a Civil Judge but (should) be having experience of such judge and as such the Magistrate cannot be appointed as the Authority. It is to be noted that there are no officers other than the Civil Judges themselves who would be having the experience as such. It is also not disputed that present authority in the case is the Magistrate is also a Civil Judge and as such having such experience. As observed by this Court in the case of U. S. Paraeker v. Karnataka Mining Co. (P) Ltd. , 1965 (1) Mys LJ 742, Section 15 of the Act does not confer any power on a Magistrate/civil Judge to decide the case under the Act in that capacity but only as the "authority. " The reference to a Judge of a Civil Court or stipendiary Magistrate under Section 15 of the Act merely defines the qualification of the officer to be appointed as Authority. Similarly, in respect of a case under the Minimum Wages Act which is almost similar and akin to Section 15 of the Act, viz. , Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, this Court in the case of Basavaraj Chenna Naik v. General Manager, ILR 1982 (2) Kant 2172 has observed to the same effect. In both these decisions, this Court has held that the Magistrate/civil Judge functioning as Authority under the Act as "persona Designata" will not fall within the classification of an inferior Criminal Court while discharging the functions under the Act. Necessarily, it follows, the order and the directions given under the Act by the said Authority are not amenable for correction by this Court in exercise of its revisional power under the Code of Criminal Procedure. As such, this revision petition is not maintainable. ( 6 ) IN view of the same, this revision petition fails and the same is dismissed as not maintainable. However, it is open for the petitioner if aggrieved by the order can approach the appropriate authority under the Act, if permissible under law. Petition dismissed. --- *** --- .