JUDGMENT Arijit Pasayat, C.J. 1. Questioning correctness of appointment given to third respondent on re-employment basis, petitioner, who was working as Personal Assistant in State Planning Board (in short, the Board), had filed O.P. No. 15914 of 1996. Learned Single Judge found that there was nothing illegal in the appointment made and dismissed the petition. 2. In this Writ Appeal filed under S.5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1959 (in short, the Act), petitioner urged that third respondent, who retired on 30th June 1996, has been given re-employment in clear violation of all norms in an apparent act of favouritism and nepotism. Such employment is not in public interest and totally opposed to R.60 (a) of Part I of Kerala Service Rules, 1959 (in short, the Rules). 3. Factual position, as highlighted by parties, is as follows: Third respondent retired on 30th June 1996 on superannuation. Vice Chairman of the Board desired that sanction may be accorded for continuance of the post of Personal Secretary to Vice Chairman co-terminus with his term of appointment. Such proposal was accepted and 3rd respondent was re-employed for a period of one year from 1st July 1996. Subsequently, term has been extended. It was done at the request of Vice Chairman. He clearly indicated that period of extension was to be co-terminus with his term of office and appointment. Request was again accepted. According to appellant, practice was to give promotion to seniormost Personal Assistant and to appoint him as Personal Secretary of Vice Chairman. Though re-appointment has been done giving it the colour of temporary appointment, yet it is, in effect, a permanent post. Reference in this contest is made to the letter of Secretary of the Board to Commissioner for Economic Development and Planning vide Ext. P-6 to the effect that post of Vice Chairman was a permanent one and the post of Personal Secretary to Vice Chairman had become permanent in view of G.O. (P) No. 465/78/Fin., dated 20th May 1978 (Ext. P-3). ln Clause.2 (i), it has been stated as follows: "The posts which have been continuously in cxistence for snore than five years will be treated as permanent on the date of completion of five years without any farther orders of confirmation by Heads of Departments except in the case of temporary posts created for specific purposes." 4. In counter affidavit filed by respondents 1. In counter affidavit filed by respondents 1. and 2, it has been clearly indicated that the post is not a permanent one. Reference is made to appointment order (Ext, P-8 to Original Petition). In Ext. R-l (a), it has been stated that post of Personal Secretary to Vice Chairman need not be included in the list of posts to be made permanent. It has also been stated that post of Personal Secretary to Vice Chairman was not an addition to the cadre of employees in the Board. No special rules exist for the post of Personal Secretary to Vice Chairman. It is also stated that according to R.4 (g) of Kerala Public Service Commission (Consultation) Regulation, 1957 (in short, the Regulation), re-employment after retirement is outside the purview of Public Service Commission. In 1996, post of a Higher Grade Personal Assistant in the scale of Rs. 2375-3500 was created as temporary addition to the cadre of Personal Assistant in the Board. Appellant being the scniormost lower grade Personal Assistant in the Board was promoted to that post. Post of Personal Secretary was not an addition to the cadre and Vice Chairman had the option to select a Personal Secretary of his choice. Post of Personal Secretary to Vice Chairman was created not as a regular post, but as a temporary one. Personal Secretary was contemplated as personal staff of Vice Chairman and accordingly, post was created. In the absence of special rules, proposal to appoint third respondent on temporary basis was accepted pending framing of special rules for the post. 5. Is is fairly accepted by counsel for appellant that post of Personal Secretary is not an avenue for promotion so far as Personal Assistant/Confidential Assistants are concerned. Post was not created as a permanent addition to the cadre of the department. R.99 and 100 of Part III of the Rules have some relevance to the dispute. R.99 deals with the case of superannuation pension or retiring pension. Pay of re-employed pensioner is dealt with in R.100 and in the case at hand, it has been stated that payment is being made to third respondent in terms of R.100 of part III. Re-employment or continuance of. employment is prohibited except in 'public interest'. R.99 deals with the case of superannuation pension or retiring pension. Pay of re-employed pensioner is dealt with in R.100 and in the case at hand, it has been stated that payment is being made to third respondent in terms of R.100 of part III. Re-employment or continuance of. employment is prohibited except in 'public interest'. It is stated by learned counsel for appellant that provisions of R.60 (a) Part I is also applicable and except in very special circumstances, re-employment cannot be made. As indicated above, post in question, is not of permanent nature. In fact, re-employment given to third respondent has been clearly spelt out to be co-terminus with offici-ation of Vice Chairman. So far as public interest/special circumstances aspect is concerned, position needs to be analysed elaborately. 6. Scope for interference in administrative decisions is very limited. In recent times, distinction between administrative orders and judicial or quasi judicial orders has practically ceased to exist in view of primacy of the rule of law. Point that falls for determination is the scope for judicial interference in matters of administrative decisions. Administrative action is stated to be referable to broad area of governmental activities in which the repositories of power may exercise every class of statutory function of executive, quasi legislative and quasi judicial nature. It is trite law thai exercise of power, whether legislative/administrative, will be set aside if there is manifest error in exercise of such power or exercise of power , is manifestly arbitrary [See State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power (70.(i)]. At one time, traditional view in England was thatexecutive was not answerable where its action was attribu-table to exercise of prerogative power. Prof. De Smith,' in his classical work ' Judicial Review of Administrative Action', 4th Edition, at pages 285-287, states the legal position in his own terse language that relevant principles formulated by courts may be broadly summarised as follows: The authority in which a, discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter' before it; it must not act under the dictates of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter' before it; it must not act under the dictates of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion, it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to ail relevant conside-rations and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. There several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: (i) failure to exercise discretions; and: (ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discre-tion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body in acts ultra vires. 7. Present trend of judicial opinion is to restrict the doctrine of immunity from judicial review to those class of cases which relate to deployment of troops, entering into international treaties, etc. Distinctive features of these recent cases signify the willingness of courts to assert their power to scrutinise the factual cases upon which discre-tionary powers have been exercised. Judicial review has developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which development has come about. One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. First ground is 'illegality', second 'irrationality" and third 'procedural impropriety'. Those principles were highlighted by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service(2). If power has been exercised on a non consideration or non application of mind to relevant factors, exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous. If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated [see C.I.T. v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd, (3)]. If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated [see C.I.T. v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd, (3)]. Effect of several decisions on the question of jurisdiction have been summed up by Grahame Alodous and John Alder, in their book "Applications for Judicial Review, Law and Practice", thus: "There is a general presumption against ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, so that statutory provisions which purport to exclude judicial review are construed restrictively. There are, however, certain areas of governmental activity, national security being the paradigm.) which the courts regard themselves as incompetent to investigate beyond an initial decision as to whether the government's claim is bona fide. In this kind of non justiciable area judicial review is not entirely excluded, but very limited. It has also been said that powers conferred by the Royal Prerogative arc inherently unreview-able but since the speeches of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1984 (3) All. E.R.. 985 (HL)] this is doubtful. Lords Diplock, Scorman and Roskill appeared to agree that there is no general distinction between powers based upon whether their source is statutory or prerogative but that judicial review can be limited by the subject matter of a particular power, in. that case national security. Many prerogative powers arc in fact concerned with sensitive, non justiciable areas, for example foreign affairs, but some arc reviewable in principle, including the prerogatives relating to the civil service where natural security is not involved. Another non justiciable power is the Attorney General's prerogative to decide whether to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the public interest [see Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food: LR (1968) AC 997]. 8. Word 'public' pertains to the people, State or community. It includes in its ordinary acceptation, any section of the public (sec Sri Venkataraman Devaru v. State of Mysore(4). As pointed out in Corpus Juris Secundum, the word 'public' is ordinarily used with reference to a joint body of citizens. It means that it is shared in or participated in or enjoyed by people at large. Otherwise, it is common to all people. Expression 'public interest' means, the act beneficial to general public. It means, action necessarily taken for public purpose. It means that it is shared in or participated in or enjoyed by people at large. Otherwise, it is common to all people. Expression 'public interest' means, the act beneficial to general public. It means, action necessarily taken for public purpose. Requirements of public interest vary from case to case, 'public ground' though not defined statutorily obviously means grounds for the benefit of people concerning the public good and public interest. 'Public policy' has been described as an unruly horse. Mr. Justice Durrough in Richarason v. Nellish(5) described 'public policy' as very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you, It is a vague and perhaps unsatisfactory term. Rules of public policy do not belong to a fixed or customary law; they are capable on proper occasions of expansion and modification. Public policy is a principle of judicial legislation or interpretation founded on the current needs of the community. Interest of the whole public must be taken into account. Public policy is always an unsafe and treachorous ground for legal decision. Expression 'public purpose', as pointed out by Mahajan, J. in State of Bihar v. Sir Kameskwar Singh(8) is not capable of precise definition and has not a rigid meaning. It can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. Whatever furthers the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the individuals must be regarded as a public purpose. This test, is by its very nature elastic and it is well that it should be so. So diverse and varied can be the activities, engagements and operations which may rebound to the general benefit of the public and in which the general interest of the public can be said to be really involved. It is impossible to expect a definition exclusive or inclusive which will aptly meet every particular objective within the matrix of public purpose and yet not fall in some circumstances. But the basic concept underlying the expression 'public purpose' is the general interest of the community. With reference to the view of Lord Durrough that public policy is a very unruly horse, Lord Denning in Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. Football Associated Ltd.(7) observed that with a good man in the saddle, unruly horse can be kept in control; it can jump over an obstacle. 9. With reference to the view of Lord Durrough that public policy is a very unruly horse, Lord Denning in Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. Football Associated Ltd.(7) observed that with a good man in the saddle, unruly horse can be kept in control; it can jump over an obstacle. 9. It is not the personal whim, wish, view or opinion or the ipso dixit of the concerned authority, dehors the material but a legitimate inference drawn from the material placed before it which is relevant for the purpose. Many of the parameters of judicial review developed in the field of administrative law are not anti thetical to the field of constitutional law and they can equally apply to the domain covered by the constitutional law. Material, reason or the satisfaction of the concerned authority granting extension is justiciable. It would be open to challenge on the ground of mala fides or being based wholly on extraneous and / or irrelevant grounds. Even if some of the materials on which the action is taken is found to be irrelevant, Court would still not interfere so long as there is some relevant material sustaining the action. Truth or correctness of the material cannot be questioned by the Court nor will it go into the adequacy of material and it will also not substitute its opinion for that of concerned authority. Ground of mala fides taken in, inter alia ,situations would be where it is found that there is a clear case of abuse of power or what is sometimes called fraud on power. Court will not lightly account abuse or misuse of power and will make allowance for the fact that concerned authorities are the best Judge of the situation. These aspects were highlighted by apex Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board(8) though in some what different contest. 10. Since re-employment can be done for 'public interest,' in the background of what has been stated above, public interest and public reasons must exist for extending the benefit. Though the order granting extension/giving re-employment need not contain the reasons, records must contain them. The discretion must be exercised judiciously. It must be exercised honestly and in the spirit of the statute. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular; to be exercised not capriciously but on judicial grounds and for substantial reasons. Though the order granting extension/giving re-employment need not contain the reasons, records must contain them. The discretion must be exercised judiciously. It must be exercised honestly and in the spirit of the statute. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular; to be exercised not capriciously but on judicial grounds and for substantial reasons. It must be governed by rule not by rumour. It must not degenerate into arbitrariness and result in discrimination which is the negation and anti thesis of the ideal of equality before law, and thereby violate Art.14 of the Constitution. It has a mandatory import when facts for its exercise are present, and is not unconfirmed and vagrant. It is canalised within banks that keep it from overflowing per Cardozo, J. in Panama Refining Co. v. Hyan Hot Oil Case(9).Giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration, as observed by Lord Denning in Green v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (10). Requirement of furnishing reasons is a shackle on acting arbitrarily and whimsically. The reasons disclose the processes of ratiocination, the way and in the manner adjudicatory or administrative process travelled. Reasons indicate that administrative authority has acted bona fide or otherwise. Reasons if given substitute objectivity for subjectivity. Reasons are links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. 11. Reasons recorded refer to the fact that third respondent was having long years of experience and has extra capability in handling work efficiently. It has also been recorded that for some time there was tremendous amount of unprecedented work in the Board, which she handled ably. It has also been noted in the files produced pursuant to our direction that continuance of third respondent does not affect promotional prospects of any other staff in the Board. 12. Considering aforesaid aspect, we find nothing/ illicit in the re-employment of third respondent. But, at the same time, it is to be made clear that continuance is not on permanent basis as the post itself is not permanent and is co-terminus with term of Vice Chairman. 12. Considering aforesaid aspect, we find nothing/ illicit in the re-employment of third respondent. But, at the same time, it is to be made clear that continuance is not on permanent basis as the post itself is not permanent and is co-terminus with term of Vice Chairman. This position is fairly accepted by learned Advocate General, Fact that appointment of third respondent is co-terminus with the term of appointment of Vice Chairman itself is indicative of the fact that post is not of a permanent nature and third respondent cannot claim any continuance after the term of Vice Chairman. Learned counsel for appellant stated that if the successor Vice Chairman wants appellant to be his Personal Secretary, that should be accepted by Government. If that contingency arises, certainly Government shall consider the matter in proper perspective and in accordance with law. Writ appeal fails and is dismissed.