JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal has been filed against the judgment & decree of the District Judge, Sikar whereby he dismissed the first appeal of the defendant against the judgment & decree of the trial Court, which decreed the plaintiff's suit for eviction. 2. The facts relevant for deciding this appeal, briefly stated, are that the suit for recovery of arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 980/- for the period from 1.5.1978 to 30.4.1981 and ejectment of the defendant appellant was filed on 23.5.1981 by the respondent landlady (since deceased) who is being represented through her legal representatives namely Mahesh Kumar and & Others. The eviction of the tenant was sought on the grounds of' (I) default in payment of rent of the suit premises and (2) personal bona fide necessity of the landlady for the residence of her son Santosh Kumar. The suit was contested by the appellant who, however, admitted the tenancy and execution of the rent note in favour of the plaintiff landlady. The tenant appellant disputed the fact that he was defaulter. The tenant also disputed and contested the bona fide need of the landlady to occupy the suit premises. The tenant pleaded in written statement that since landlady sent him a notice dated 1.12.1979 through her advocate informing that the suit premises had been given to her son Santosh Kumar upon determination of his share in property in partition, this suit by landlady Smt. Mohini Devi was not maintainable and Santosh Kumar was a necessary party in the suit. 3. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues in vernacular, which are translated into English : (1) Whether the defendant has committed defaults in payment of rent by not paying the rent from May, 1978 ? (2) Whether the plaintiff requires the disputed premises reasonably and bona fide for the residence of her son Santosh Kumar's? (3) Whether which of the parties will be put to greater hardship in case of a decree for ejectment ? (4) Whether which of the parties will be put to greater hardship in case of a decree for ejectment in respect of part of the property ? (3) Whether which of the parties will be put to greater hardship in case of a decree for ejectment ? (4) Whether which of the parties will be put to greater hardship in case of a decree for ejectment in respect of part of the property ? (5) Whether Santosh Kumar is the owner of the property and necessary party on account of the property in dispute having come to his share and the plaintiff has no right to file the present suit ? (6) Relief ? 4. The defendant moved an application dated 3.9.1981 for determination of the rent, upon which the learned trial Court determined provisional rent under Section 13(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, (for short "the Act") on 15.10.1982. Though the tenant was required to pay directly to the landlady or to deposit arrears of rent in the Court as per statutory requirement of Section 13(3) of the Act, the appellant did not deposit any amount towards that and on the contrary, committed default in compliance of the order dated 15.10.1982 of the trial Court resulting in striking of his defence as per Section 13(5) of the Act on landlady's application filed on 6.10.1985 against eviction. The trial Court alter hearing the parties to the suit vide its order dated 3.9.1986 directing striking of defence, of the tenant against eviction. Against the order of striking of defence, the tenant preferred first (sic misc.?) appeal before the District Judge. Sikar which was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Sikar vide order dated 18.7.1987 confirming the order of the trial Court. The tenant appellant did not challenge the aforesaid orders of the appellate Court as well as trial Court by way of revision before this Court and consequently the order striking out the defence attained its finality. Thereafter the learned trial Court recorded the evidence of the parties and decided issue No. 5 against the plaintiff by recording its findings against the defendants (sic plaintiff ?) and dismissed the suit on 30.8.1989, against which the plaintiff filed an appeal which was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge Sikar, who remanded the case back to the learned trial Court with the direction that issue No. 5 be deleted. Against the aforesaid order of the remand the tenant filed appeal before this Court. Against the aforesaid order of the remand the tenant filed appeal before this Court. This Court upheld the order of the remand on 12.9.1991 and also directed that issue No. 5 be not deleted but it shall decided by the trial Court on merit according to law. Thereafter, the landlady expired and her son Santosh Kumar and others sons & daughters were brought on record as her legal representatives in the trial Court. The plaintiff then led his evidence. After closure of plaintiff's evidence, the tenant commenced to lead his evidence but at that time, the objection was raised by the plaintiff that since defence against eviction of the defendant has already been struck out, he was not entitled to lead evidence. On 17.3.1994 the trial Court allowed plaintiff's objection and did not allow the defendant tenant to lead evidence, in pursuance of the trial Court's order striking of the defence against eviction as required under Section 13(5) of the Act and consequently the trial Court's order, became final. 5. The civil revision was preferred against the aforesaid order before this Court which was partly allowed on 3.10.1994 and the defendant was permitted to lead evidence on issue No. 5, against which the defendant filed yet another revision petition and prayed that he may be allowed to lead evidence on all the issues. This Court vide its order dated 20.7.1995 rejected the revision petition and reiterated that since the defendant tenant was permitted to lead evidence on issue No. 5 only it was not open to him to lead evidence on other issues as well. Thereafter the defendant appeared in the witness box. He was shown rent note by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff which was admittedly duly signed by the tenant in token of affirmation thereof and he was bound by its terms. Since the plaintiff wanted to cross-examine the appellant, the rent note was duly executed and she was allowed to cross-examine the tenant. Against order dated 21.9.1995, the appellant/defendant preferred another revision petition, which was dismissed by this Court on 18.10.1995 as having become infructuous since in the meanwhile, the rent note the execution of which was earlier disputed by the tenant, duly executed between the parties was exhibited as a document upon its admission by the defendant in cross-examination. Against order dated 21.9.1995, the appellant/defendant preferred another revision petition, which was dismissed by this Court on 18.10.1995 as having become infructuous since in the meanwhile, the rent note the execution of which was earlier disputed by the tenant, duly executed between the parties was exhibited as a document upon its admission by the defendant in cross-examination. Thereafter the tenant closed his evidence and the learned trial Court after hearing the arguments as advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties, decreed the plaintiff's suit on both the grounds of default as well as bona fide necessity of the plaintiff. The said decree was confirmed in appeal by the first appellate Court as referred to above. Hence this second appeal. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties when the case was listed for hearing at admission stage. I have examined the findings recorded by both the Courts below as well as the rival contentions and legal position on the subject. 7. Mr. R.K. Mathur, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are not tenable and open to challenge since the defendant had not committed any default in payment of arrears of rent for the period in dispute nor the respondent landlady was in bona fide need to occupy the suit premises for the residence of her son Santosh Kumar on partition. It was contended that the tenant will be put to greater hardship in case a decree for ejectment in respect of part of the property is passed as against the appellant who would not suffer any hardship. As regards ownership of the landlady's son, it was contended that he was not owner of the property in question because his respective share as per entitlement in the suit premises along with other legal heirs of the landlady, namely Mahesh and Mahendra Kumar, had not been determined by way of partition. This contention is contrary to the plea specifically raised by the landlady in her plaint as well as in evidence that the property in dispute had been duly partitioned after the death of her husband Babulal and her son Santosh Kumar was entitled upon determination to the extent of his share. 8. This contention is contrary to the plea specifically raised by the landlady in her plaint as well as in evidence that the property in dispute had been duly partitioned after the death of her husband Babulal and her son Santosh Kumar was entitled upon determination to the extent of his share. 8. It was further contended on her behalf that the plaintiff through her Counsel had informed the defendant that the suit premises had already been partitioned and the relevant part thereof had come in allocation as against the respective share according to his entitlement in favour of her son Santosh Kumar and thereafter, the tenant tendered the rent to Santosh Kumar directly, which was not accepted by him resulting in striking of his defence. In the additional pleas asserted by the defendant, it was contended that no rent note was executed by him in favour of the plaintiff though the plaintiff has got signature of defendant on a blank rent note, which in my considered view, is contrary to his own admission regarding execution of the rent note, which is a duly exhibited document on record of the trial Court during cross-examination of the tenant and, therefore, it is not open to the appellant to raise such a plea in second appeal before this Court. 9. As per evidence on record and the findings arrived at by both the Courts below, admittedly the defendant has been held to be defaulter since he did not pay arrears of rent to Santosh Kumar after the demise of landlady. It is also established on record that after the determination of the rent including its arrears as per requirement of Section 13(3) of the Act which was done on defendant's application dated 3.9.1981 have admittedly not been paid. The tenant had committed default in payment of arrears of rent as per the findings of the Courts below and in my view, the defence has rightly been struck of as per Section 13(5) of the Act by order dated 3.9.1986 and the appeal preferred against that order had also been dismissed by the appellate Court on 18.7.1987. Therefore, since the aforesaid order striking out the defence of the tenant has attained the finality because no appeal or revision was preferred before this Court by the tenant, it is not open to challenge the same in this second appeal. 10. Therefore, since the aforesaid order striking out the defence of the tenant has attained the finality because no appeal or revision was preferred before this Court by the tenant, it is not open to challenge the same in this second appeal. 10. As regards issue No. 5, referred to above, the plaintiff landlady had already filed an appeal, which was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sikar on 16.1 1.1990 by which the case was remanded back to the trial Court deleting issue No. 5, which was again modified in appeal preferred before this Court, wherein it was directed that issue No. 5 be not deleted but the suit shall be decided by the trial Court on merits in accordance with law. Therefore, since the finding after hearing on merits has been recorded against the tenant on issue No. 5 which stands confirmed concurrently by the appellate Court, consequently it is now not open to the tenant to raise such issue afresh as no substantial question of law against it arises for consideration in this second appeal. It is noteworthy to mention that the findings of the learned trial Court on issue No. 5 have been upheld by the first appellate Court by way of concurrence whereby it has been held that the onus to prove issue No. 5 was on the defendant tenant as he in his written statement had taken specific plea that the plaintiff' through her Counsel had intimated that she had already effected the partition of the suit premises in which the share of her son Santosh Kumar had been determined, as a consequence of which the suit property had come to the share of Santosh Kumar, who had consequently become the landlord. It was further contended that Santosh Kumar was necessary party to the suit and since he had not been impleaded as proforma defendant, the suit was liable to be dismissed being not maintainable. Consequently the learned trial Court recorded finding on issue No. 5 against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff' which in my view is now not open to challenge. 11. Consequently the learned trial Court recorded finding on issue No. 5 against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff' which in my view is now not open to challenge. 11. On the question of default, the trial Court recorded positive finding that since the appellant had not deposited arrears of rent within stipulated time and, therefore, the tenant had committed default after determination of provisional rent as per Section 13(3) of the Act in violation of the order dated 15.10.1992 and, thereby his defence against eviction had already been struck off by order dated 3.9.1996. This finding having been confirmed by the first appellate Court is now not open to challenge in this second appeal. 12. Mr. B.L. Mandhana learned Counsel for the respondent had placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in Gopal Das v. Tej Singh, AIR 1996 Rajasthan 214, wherein it has been held by this Court, "it must be deemed to be settled principle of law that statements of fact recorded in a judgment or order should always be treated to be the last word on the subject." 13. As regards bona fide necessity, again the learned trial Court as well as the appellate Court both have concurrently held that the suit premises are required for use and occupation by landlady's son Santosh Kumar. This concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below are based on material and evidence on record. There are no convincing assertions or contentions on behalf of the tenant against the concurrent findings based on admissible evidence on record, which in my considered view, do not at all warrant any interference by invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 CPC, because no substantial question of law arises for consideration requiring admission to hearing and since I am satisfied that the case does not involve any substantial question of law, worth admitting this second appeal to hearing, there is no requirement to formulate question before deciding the same. Moreover, even if the findings of fact reached by the Courts below are against the weight of evidence or not, such is a question of fact because it will remain in the realm of appreciation of evidence and such a question does not project any question of law, much & less, any substantial question of law to upset such a finding of fact. The findings arrived at by both the Courts below on the questions of default and bona fide necessity, since, in my considered view, are well sustained on record, cannot be interfered with by this Court in second appeal, because of the reason also that it is not open for this Court to re-appreciate the evidence rendering conclusion of facts with a view to substitute its own independent conclusions and the substitution of conclusions by re-appreciation of evidence is patently erroneous in law and cannot be sustained. Thus viewed from this angle as well, I do not find any merit in any of the contentions of the appellant to invoke jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100, CPC. 14. As a result of the above discussion, this second appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs. The judgment & decree dated 20.11.1995 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (JD) Sikar, which has been confirmed by the District Judge Sikar vide his judgment & decree date 6.3.1999, both are upheld.Appeal dismissed *******