MALAY KUMAR BASU, J. ( 1 ) THIS application under Section 482 has been filed by one Santimoy Chatterjee against the State of West Bengal for quashing the proceedings of Balurghat P. S. Case No. 359/94 dated 6-10-1994 under Section 409, I. P. C. (State of West Bengal v. Santimoy Chatterjee) now pending before the Court of Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Balurghat. The case of the petitioner is as follows. The petitioner was posted as Administrative Officer, District Family Welfare Bureau, Dakshin Dinajpur under the Department of Health, Government of West Bengal in 1994. The abovementioned police case was instituted against him with the allegation that he in the said capacity as an administrative officer had drawn a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand) from the State Bank of India, Balurghat Branch out of the total deposit of Rs. 69,727/- (Rupees sixty-nine thousand seven hundred and twenty seven) standing in the Current Account in the name of the District Family Welfare Bureau on 27th July, 1994. But he deposited that amount to the chasier of the District Family Welfare Bureau on 13th August, 1994 and thus he kept the money with him without showing it in the official record and handled the cash irregularly for about 15 days. He also remained absent from office during that period. The matter was brought to the knowledge of the Chief Medical Officer of Health, Dakshin Dinajpur, Sabhadhipati Zilla Parisad and the District Magistrate, Dakshin Dinajpur and thereafter a departmental investigation was started by the Inspector of Account, Malda and Dakshin Dinajpur Zone and during this period he was taken into custody on 6-9-1994 in connection with the said Balurghat P. S. Case No. 359/94 dated 5-9-1994. ( 2 ) THE contention of the petitioner is that the said FIR does not disclose the ingredients of the offences under S. 409, I. P. C. as alleged and there has been no misappropriation of any money as alleged by the petitioner and no offence has been committed by him as alleged and hence the initiation of the Criminal proceedings in question is bad in law and liable to be quashed. ( 3 ) THE other part of the petitioner's case is that he was arrested by police in connection with this case on 6th October, 1994, but no chargesheet was filed by Investigating Agency within 3 years from the date of arrest and thereby the mandatory provisions of Section 167 (5), Cr. P. C. have been violated and as a result the impugned proceedings which are still continuing became illegal and invalid on the date on which the period of 3 years from the date of his arrest expired and accordingly the criminal proceeding becomes liable to be quashed on that score also. ( 4 ) THE guiding principle to be applied when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed has been settled by the Apex Court in a number of rulings. In the State of U. P. v. O. P. Sharma reported in, 1996 AIR SCW 1229 : (1996 Cri LJ 1878) a three Judge Bench of that court reiterated its earlier decision pronounced in the State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawal, 1996 AIR (SCW) 591 : (1996 Cri LJ 1372) as follows. "it has been held by this court in several cases that the inherent power of the court u/s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be very sparingly and cautiously used only when the court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice of there would be abuse of the process of the court, if such power is not exercised. So far as the order of cognizance passed by a Magistrate is concerned, the inherent power could be exercised when the allegation in the First Information Report or the complaint together with the other materials collected during investigation taken at their face value, do not constitute the offence alleged. At this stage, it is not open for the court either to sift the evidence or appreciate the evidence and come to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made out. At this stage, it is not open for the court either to sift the evidence or appreciate the evidence and come to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made out. " ( 5 ) IN another subsequent decision (vide Madhav Rao Scindia reported in AIR 1988 SC 709 over and above according approval to the same principles the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. ( 6 ) IN the present case the allegations against the petitioner as per the FIR were that he in his official capacity as an administrative officer of the District Family Welfare Bureau, Dakshin Dinajpur had drawn a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand) from the State Bank of India, Balurghat Branch, but without depositing that amount with the cashier of the said Bureau and even without entering it into the official record he kept the Government money with him and "handled it irregularly" for a period of about 15 (fifteen) days. From the materials on record, it is further disclosed that during investigation it has been revealed that when the accused got the scent that a departmental enquiry was going to be held against him, he deposited the money. The question is whether applying the aforementioned test to the facts of the present case it can be said that the story in the FIR coupled with the prima facie materials gathered during the investigation by police does or does not constitute prima facie the ingredients of the offence alleged, namely, offence under Section 409, I. P. C. The ingredients of the offence of criminal breach of trust as defined u/s. 405 are:- (1) that the accused was entrusted with property or with the dominion over it; (2) that the accused misappropriated it or converted to its own use or used it or disposed of it; (3) that the accused did so in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust was to be discharged or of any legal contract express or implied which the accused had made touching the discharge of such trust and; (4) that the accused did so dishonestly. ( 7 ) IN the instant case, as it has been shown above, the accused allegedly in his capacity as a public servant withdrew from a Current Account in the name of the Family Welfare Bureau with the State Bank of India, Balurghat Branch a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand), but he did not deposit this money with the cash-section of the Bureau, nor he noted this receipt in the official records or rendered any account of the same and kept it with himself for a period of about 15 (fifteen) days after which having got a scent that a departmental enquiry was going to be started against him for that act, he deposited the amount with the office. It appears that all the elements of the said offence are prima facie made out. That he is a public servant is undisputed. As soon as he withdrew the money, being public money, from the bank, he acquired a dominion over it. That he kept the money with him for about a fortnight continuously without keeping it in the Government custody, or paying it to the treasuary prima facie indicates that he used the same to satisfy his personal need. Receipt of the government money by a public servant in official capacity does create an obligation on his part either to render account of the money so received or to deposit the same with the government treasuary forthwith. The accused allegedly did neither. This is to be taken prima facie as an act of violation on his part of the direction of the rules prescribing the mode in which the property is to be dealt with. Lastly, dishonest intention on the part of the accused in so retaining the money is to be prima facie brought home from the attending circumstances, viz. , his alleged omission to enter the fact of his drawal of the money from the bank in the official records of the Department concerned, although the withdrawal was in his official capacity; his absence from the office for the said period just after such withdrawal and his sudden deposit of the money with the cashier of the Bureau when allegedly he got scent of the proposed departmental enquiry to commence. In this connection the true meaning and significance of the words "dishonest intention" should not be missed. In this connection the true meaning and significance of the words "dishonest intention" should not be missed. The word "dishonestly" has been defined under Section 24 of the I. P. C. According to this definition, whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person is said to do that thing dishonestly. If such a big sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) is kept in the personal possession of a public servant for a continuous period without being deposited in the appropriate custody of the office, then there can be sufficient ground to presume "wrongful gain" on the part of the accused person or wrongful loss on the part of the Government. ( 8 ) THUS clearly all the ingredients of the offence under Section 409, I. P. C. are prima facie made out from the uncontroverted allegations of the FIR and the inital materials collected during the investigation of the case. It cannot be said at this initial stage that the chance of an ultimate conviction of the accused are bleak or that no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing the criminal prosecution to continue or that the court will thereby be utilized for any oblique purpose. Hence I am unable to accept the contention of the Ld. Advocate for the petitioner that the impugned criminal proceeding is liable to be quashed. ( 9 ) THE next contention of the petitioner is that the impugned criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed on the further ground that the investigation of the case could not be completed by the investigating Agency within the statutory period of three years from the date of arrest of the accused petitioner inasmuch as the accused was arrested on 6-10-1994, but the investigation could not be completed within 6-10-1997, nor any special ground could be made out by the Investigating Officer for getting the extension of the period of investigation and, therefore, in view of the provisions of Section 167 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code the accused ought to have been discharged by the court below due to such failure on the part of the Investigating Agency, but the Ld. Magistrate having not passed any such order and having allowed the investigation to continue beyond that period the entire proceeding became invalid and illegal and hence is now liable to be quashed by this Court. Under Section 167 (5) Cr. P. C. (West Bengal Amendment) it is provided that if in any case exclusively triable by a Sessions Court or a case under Chapter XVIII of the I. P. C. the investigation is not concluded within the period of three years from the date of arrest of the accused, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence and shall discharge the accused unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice, the continuation of the investigation beyond the period mentioned in the sub-section is necessary. The Ld. Advocate for the petitioner refers to the decision reported in 1999 Cri LJ 493 (Raj) wherein it has been held that due to the failure on the part of the Magistrate to stop investigation without assigning any reason in a case where investigation could not be completed within the statutory period the accused will be entilted to be discharged. ( 10 ) THE law on this question, however, has now been settled by the Apex Court by means of a number of recently pronounced judgments. In Durgesh Chandra Shah v. B. C. Saha reported in 1996 Cal Cri LR (SC) 203 : (1996 Cri LJ 1137) it has been held that the above provisions of Section 167 (5) Cr. P. C. would be applicable in a case where the investigation is still pending and not where it has been completed. In the present case from the petition of the Investigating Officer made before the Ld. S. D. J. M. dated 31-10-1997 it is found that he reported that the investigation had been completed but he was not being able to submit the report in final form for the technical reason that the sanction order required for the starting of the prosecution against the accused, a Public servant, from the Government was being awaited by him. In substance, therefore, the investigation has been made complete. Hence, strictely viewed, having regard to the spirit underlying the above decision of the Supreme Court the provisions of this section should not be made applicable to the facts of the present case. In substance, therefore, the investigation has been made complete. Hence, strictely viewed, having regard to the spirit underlying the above decision of the Supreme Court the provisions of this section should not be made applicable to the facts of the present case. ( 11 ) BUT, the Apex Court has lately pronounced a more radical interpretation of the language of this section in a Division Bench Judgment reported in 1998 Cal. CRLR (SC) 216 : (1998 Cri LJ 3282 ). It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court therein that the order stopping further investigation into the offence and the consequential order of discharge are not intended to be automatic sequel to the failure to complete investigation within the period fixed in the Sub-section. It is further held that the succeeding words in the sub-section confer power on the Court to refrain from stopping such Investigation, if Investigating Officer satisfies the Magistrate of the fusion of two premises namley, (i) that in the interest of justice it is necessary to proceed with the investigation beyond the period shown in the sub-section and (ii) that there are special reasons to do so. The Apex Court took the view that the time schedule shown in Section 167 (5) of the Court was not to be treated with rigidity and it was not mandatory that on the expiry of the period indicated therein the Magistrate should necessarily pass the order on the accused. On the other hand, before passing an order of stoppage of investigation the Magistrate shall consider whether on the facts of that case further investigation would be necessary to foster interest of criminal justice. Magistrate at that stage must look into the record of investigation to ascertain the progress of investigation so far registered and if substantial part of investigation was by then over, the Magistrate should seriously ponder over the question whether it would be conducive to the interest of justice to stop further investigation and discharge the accused. ( 12 ) IN our instant case, apart from the fact that the substantial part of investigation of the case had been completed far before this Revision Petition was filed (vide the petition of the Investigating Officer dated 31-10-1997 made before the Ld. ( 12 ) IN our instant case, apart from the fact that the substantial part of investigation of the case had been completed far before this Revision Petition was filed (vide the petition of the Investigating Officer dated 31-10-1997 made before the Ld. S. D. J. M. , Balurghat praying for further time on the ground that the order of sanction of the Government for starting the prosecution against the accused a public servant, was yet to be received by him, the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment will create a bar against discharging the accused on the ground that the investigation could not be completed within the prescribed period. From the lower court records it is found that the Investigating Officer submitted petitions before the Court of SDJM, Balurghat regularly before the expiry of the prescribed period praying for extension of the time on the ground that the sanction order from the Government of West Bengal, Department of Health and Family Welfare, was not being received by him inspite of the reminders (vide. I. O's petitions dated 9-3-1997, 31-10-1997, 23-2-1998, 23-3-1998 and 19-5-1998 ). It appears that due to some circumstnaces over which he had no control the Investigating Officer was unable to submit the report in final form within the statutory period or even within the time as extended by the Ld. Magistrate. The criterion is to ascertain whether the Ld. Magistrate was governed by any anxiety to ensure that further extension of time would be conducive to the interest of justice. As I have discussed above, the petitions of the I. O. filed before the Magistrate dated 31-10-1997 and onwards gave sufficient impression that practically the investigation had been over and only due to some technical reason, namely, non-availability of the sanction order of the Government, the report in final form could not be submitted. Being satisfied that it was a special ground and the I. O. should be granted further time for fulfilling such requirement the Ld. Magistrate extended the time. In my opinion, thereby the Ld. Magistrate did not commit any wrong. Rather, he was quite justified in extending the time in view of the predicament faced by the I. O. in such a serious case. Therefore, the second contention of the petitioner also appears to be without any merit. Magistrate extended the time. In my opinion, thereby the Ld. Magistrate did not commit any wrong. Rather, he was quite justified in extending the time in view of the predicament faced by the I. O. in such a serious case. Therefore, the second contention of the petitioner also appears to be without any merit. ( 13 ) IN the result, I am not prepared to accept the contention that the continuance of the impugned criminal proceedings will be an abuse of the process of court on that they are liable to be quashed. The petitions fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.