JUDGMENT 1. - The accused-petitioner was charged for commission of offence under Sections 28(l) and (2) read with Section 17 of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 for short "the Act" on the grounds inter alia that he was not holding the requisite licence for the purposes of sale of agricultural prod ice as on the date of offence i.e. 13.2.1993 and the charge was read over and denied by the accused. Hence, any such sale in absence of a licence was invalid being hit by the aforesaid provisions of the Act. Accordingly the Trial Court took cognizance against the accused-petitioner for commission of the aforesaid offence vide its order dated 28.7.1993 on the basis of the presentation of a complaint filed before it by the Secretary, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Tonk. The trial commenced against the petitioner rune.'. 28.7.1993 and concluded on 18.1.1997. The Trial Court held the petitioner guilty of aforesaid offences for having sold the commodity in question i.e. ground nut, wheat and other items of human consumption without having the requisite licence. The prosecution proved the case on merits and, thereafter, on the basis of the evidence led on the record, the Trial Court accordingly found the petitioner guilty and convicted him of the aforesaid offences and awarded him sentence of three months' simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, further 1 month's simple imprisonment was awarded to the petitioner. Co-accused Raichand was also convicted. Being aggrieved with the conviction and sentence, the petitioner as well as the co-accused Raichand preferred an appeal before learned Sessions Judge, Tonk which was transferred to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Court (Communal Riots), Tonk who vide its judgment and order dated 5.5.1999 partly allowed the appeal while the conviction and sentence of co-accused Raichand was set aside, conviction of petitioner under Section 17 of the Act was also set aside, however his conviction under Section 28(1) of the Act was maintained and sentence was reduced from 3 months' S.I. to one month's S.I. and maintained the fine of Rs. 1,000/-, hence this revision petition. 2. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner at length and perused the impugned order (if the Appellate Court dated 5.5.1999 as well as the order of the Trial Court dated 18.1.1997. 3. 1,000/-, hence this revision petition. 2. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner at length and perused the impugned order (if the Appellate Court dated 5.5.1999 as well as the order of the Trial Court dated 18.1.1997. 3. Prima facie, I am of the view that right to speedy trial as guaranteed to the citizens of India including the petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been seriously jeopardised on account of the delay in trial and the petitioner has suffered the agony of protracted trial inasmuch as the proceedings were initiated against the accused for the offence as aforesaid in the year 1993 and the trial which should have normally be concluded within 4-6 months, went on upto 18.1.1997 when the Trial Court held the petitioner guilty of the aforesaid offences and convicted him in the manner as aforesaid. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Tonk who had modified the order of the Trial Court by partly allowing the appeal in the manner as aforesaid vide the impugned order dated 5.5.1999, and thereafter the present revision petition on 6.5.1999 which is now being finally decided by this order. 4. It does not appeal to the reason that for an offence which is punishable with maximum sentence of 3 months' S.I. and fine upto Rs. 2,000,1- as per the provisions of Section 28(1) of the Act, the trial should have continued unabated and the accused could not get the benefit of judgment till his conviction on 18.1.1997 and thereafter in appeal the Appellate Court while maintaining the conviction of the petitioner for the aforesaid offences, modified the order of the Trial Court on the point of sentence reducing the period of sentence from 3 months' S.I. to I month's S.I. which appears to be grossly unjust and not sustainable in law. If the delay was deliberate and intentional on the part of the accused then, the position would have been different but this is not a case where the delay has been attributed to the conduct of the accused nor any finding has been recorded by the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court as to what were those sparing reasons for having continued the trial unabated till 18.1.1997. As a matter of fact, it is the bounden duty of the Trial Court to be cautious of the fact having regard to the nature of offences as aforesaid that once the trial is commenced after cognizance of the offence is taken, it is expected that the trial should conclude at the earliest possible opportunity and where it is not possible to conclude the trial within the reasonable span of time then the reasons why the trial could not conclude must be explained and there has got to he plausible justification for the inordinate delay. This is not a case where the petitioner has intentionally evaded the payment of market tee payable under Section 17 of the Act even though, the presumption to the contrary may be drawn, there has got to he bona fide reason as to why he Should have been dealt with in accordance with law. It is expected of a person who is in the business of sale of market produce who is having the licence, to pay the market fee as per the requirement of the Act. I do not subscribe to the view that a person has got a right to sell the market produce without the licence and also can evade the market fee at his discretion which the law does not permit while at the same time, we have to be cautions of this fact that law also does not give any undue opportunity to the prosecuting agency to continue with the protracted trial specially in summons cases as per the provisions of Section 251, Cr.P.C. which envisages, as under: "CHAPTER XX Trial of Summons Cases by Magistrates- Substance of accusation to be stated. 251. When in a summons case the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make, but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge." 5. This is basically a case in which procedure of summary trial which has been defined under Chapter XXI. Sections 260 to 265, Cr.P.C. should have been adopted. Section 262, Cr.P.C. dealing with procedure for summary trials envisages as under: "Procedure for summary trials 262. This is basically a case in which procedure of summary trial which has been defined under Chapter XXI. Sections 260 to 265, Cr.P.C. should have been adopted. Section 262, Cr.P.C. dealing with procedure for summary trials envisages as under: "Procedure for summary trials 262. (1) In trials under this Chapter, the procedure specified in this Code for the trial of summons case shall be followed except as hereinafter mentioned. (2) No sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding three months shall be passed in the case of any conviction under this Chapter." 6. Hence, the Trial Court notwithstanding having followed the procedure as envisaged in Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 yet has not taken note of the fact that undue delay has been caused as a result of protracted trial jeopardising the defence of the accused, since the offence if proved under Sections 17 and 28 of the Act of 1961 is punishable for a term not exceeding three months' simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/-. There appears to be little or no justification for allowing the prosecution to proceed in the matter with slowness on its part in the manner as has been done in the instant case by taking cognizance in July, 1993 and, thereafter, continuing with the trial till January, 1997 when the accused was convicted thus affecting entitlement of accused to speedy trial. 7. I am fortified in my observations from the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, AIR 1998 SC 3281 = VIII (1998) SLT 194 = IV (1998) CCR 11 (SC) , wherein the accused was charged for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. He had filed the application for quashing of the prosecution proceedings including the FIR on the ground that more than 13 years had lapsed since the institution of the FIR. The Apex Court while allowing the appeal and setting aside the conviction of the accused observed that ever since the institution of the FIR, the accused has suffered agony of 13 years of protracted trial, rejection of the aforesaid application moved by the accused merely for the reason that there was only one Special Court of CBI functioning in the concerned District and large number of cases were pending before it was not a ground which should go to the benefit of prosecution. It was accordingly held that the entitlement of the accused to speedy trial has been affected and the Apex Court while highlighting its earlier decision in the matter of Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81 as well as AIR 1979 SC 1360 wherein, the Apex Court while dealing with the cases of under trials who had suffered long incarceration held that a procedure which keeps such large number of people behind bar without trial so long cannot possibly be regarded as reasonable, just or fair so as to be in conformity with the requirement of Article 21. The Court laid stress upon the need for enactment of law to ensure reasonable, just and fair procedure which has creative connotation after Maneka Gandhi's case, (19/8) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 in the matter of criminal trials. 8. Following the aforesaid ratio of the Apex Court as well as the law laid down in the judgments referred to above, I am of the view that time has come when we must give our serious thought to such matters in which the liberty of an individual has been seriously jeopardised consequent upon the agony of the protracted trial such as in the instant case which should not be lightly brushed aside. This has become necessary and guidelines are required to be laid down for the Trial Court to follow specially in view of large pendency of cases in the Subordinate Courts in Rajasthan. 9. Hence, I am of the view that ends of justice will be met if the sentence of I month's SI as awarded by the Appellate Court on modifying the order of the Trial Court is further modified by reducing the same to the period of sentence already undergone by the petitioner while the fine of Rs. 1,000/- should be maintained. Asa result of above discussion, this revision petition is partly allowed. The impugned judgments/ orders of the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court dated 18.1.1997 as well as 5.5.1999, respectively are quashed and set aside. The sentence of 1 month's SI as awarded to the accused-petitioner, is modified to the period of sentence.a I ready undergone by the petitioner and he be released forthwith. However, the fine of Rs. 1,000/- as imposed by the Trial Court and as upheld by the First Appellate Court is maintained. The sentence of 1 month's SI as awarded to the accused-petitioner, is modified to the period of sentence.a I ready undergone by the petitioner and he be released forthwith. However, the fine of Rs. 1,000/- as imposed by the Trial Court and as upheld by the First Appellate Court is maintained. Revision Petition partly allowed. *******