Khadeeja v. Siddique — 1999 DIGILAW 632 (KER)

Judgment :- G. Sivarajan, J. The question that arises for consideration in this case is as to whether the State Election Commission while dealing with a petition under S.4 of the Kerala Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act) has got the power to restore the petition which is dismissed for default. 2. The first respondent in O.P. 48/97 which is a petition filed under S.4 of the Act before the State Election Commission is the petitioner. She is a member of Karulai Grama Panchayat, the second respondent herein. The first respondent herein, who is another member of the second respondent panchayat, has filed the said petition before the State Election Commission seeKing for disqualifying the petitioner herein from the membership of the second respondent Panchayat for the reason of defection. The election petition is dated 18.9.1997. The petitioner herein filed written statement on 23.1.1998. The State Election Commission examined witnesses on the side of the first respondent and the case was posted for evidence of the petitioner. On 2.1.1999 ie., the date of posting of the petition for evidence, the petitioner herein raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the election petition. The Election Commission decided to enquire into the issue of maintainability and the case was posted to 6.1.1999. On that day, neither the first respondent nor his counsel appeared before the Commission. The election petition was accordingly dismissed for default. The first respondent coming to Know of the said dismissal filed a petition supported by an affidavit of the counsel on 3.2.1999 praying to restore the election petition to be heard and decided on merits. The said petition was posted for hearing on 16.2.1999. The petitioner herein then filed a very detailed objection to the said restoration application on 24.2.1999. The Election Commission allowed the restoration application. The petitioner challenges the said decision in this proceedings. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the State Election Commission, while considering application under S.4 of the Act, has no power to restore an application which is dismissed for default. He submitted that the powers of the State Election Commission are specified in S.5 of the Act which do not include the power to restore an application which is dismissed for default. He submitted that the powers of the State Election Commission are specified in S.5 of the Act which do not include the power to restore an application which is dismissed for default. He also submitted that it is only the procedure as applicable while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 that is made applicable and not the entire provisions of the CPC. Learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the State Election Commission while dealing with an application under S.4 of the Act has no power to dismiss the same for default. He tooK me to the provisions of S.4 of the Act in support of the above. He then submitted that in the absence of any specific provision for dismissal of an application for default, when the State Election Commission had exercised such a power, in order to correct the mistake committed by the Commission and in the interest of justice, necessarily it has to be held that the Election Commission has got the power to restore the application which is dismissed for default. Learned counsel appearing for the State Election Commission also submitted that though there is no specific provision to dismiss an application for default and/or to restore an application which is dismissed for default, such a power exists in all judicial tribunals to meet the ends of justice. The counsel also submitted that the provisions of S.5 of the Act itself contemplates the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to restoration of applications dismissed for default. 4. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Before adverting to the relevant provisions, it is advantageous to bear in mind the scope of the Act. Chapter VII of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 deals with the qualifications and disqualifications of the member of a Panchayat. S.34 deals with the disqualification of candidates and S.35 deals with disqualification of members. Defection by a member from a political party he or she represents in the Panchayat was not one of the grounds of disqualification until the enactment of the Kerala Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Ordinance as replaced by the said Act. S.34 deals with the disqualification of candidates and S.35 deals with disqualification of members. Defection by a member from a political party he or she represents in the Panchayat was not one of the grounds of disqualification until the enactment of the Kerala Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Ordinance as replaced by the said Act. Under S.3 of the said Act, if a member of a local authority belonging to any political party voluntarily gives up his membership of such political party, or if such member, contrary to any direction in writing issued by the political party to which he belongs or by a person or authority authorised by it in this behalf in the manner prescribed, votes or abstains from voting in a meeting of a Panchayat, in an election of its President, Vice President, a member of a Standing Committee or the Chairman of the Standing Committee; or in a voting on a no-confidence motion against any one of them except a member of a Standing Committee; or if an independent member belonging to any coalition withdraws from such coalition or joins any political party or any other coalition, or if such a member, contrary to any direction in writing issued by a person or authority authorised by the coalition in this behalf in the manner prescribed, votes or abstains from voting, in a meeting of a Panchayat in an election of its President, Vice President, a member of a Standing Committee or the Chairman of the Standing Committee; or if an independent member not belonging to any coalition, joins any political party or coalition; he shall be disqualified for being a member of that local authority. Consequent on this provision, the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 was amended and this was included as a new ground of disqualification by incorporating in S.34(1) of the said Act clause (k k) and consequential amendment to S.35 by incorporating clause (n). Other consequential amendments are also made in the said Act. S.36(1) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 which provides for determination of disqualification of a member, was also amended. In sub-s.(1) of the S.36, for the words and figures "or S.35", the words, figures, letter and brackets "or S.35, except clause (n)" were substituted. Other consequential amendments are also made in the said Act. S.36(1) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 which provides for determination of disqualification of a member, was also amended. In sub-s.(1) of the S.36, for the words and figures "or S.35", the words, figures, letter and brackets "or S.35, except clause (n)" were substituted. Here it must be noted that under S.36 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, whenever a question arises as to whether a member has become disqualified under S.30 or S.35 after having been elected as a member, any member of the Panchayat concerned or any other person entitled to vote at the election in which the member was elected, may file a petition before the State Election Commission, for decision. But, by the amendment made to the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 by Act 13/94 consequent on the enactment of the Act, the power to decide the question regarding disqualification of defection was excluded from the provisions of S.36 of the Panchayat Raj Act. So, after the enactment of the Kerala Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1999 and the consequent amendment to the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 by Act 13/94, the disqualification of defection had to be decided by the State Election Commission in accordance with the provisions of the said Act only and not in accordance with the provisions of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. 5. Now I will deal with the provisions of the Act regarding disqualification and the powers of the State Election Commission in the regard. S.2(xv) of the Act defines State Election Commission as the State Election Commissioner appointed by the Governor under Art.243K of the Constitution. I have already referred to the provisions of S.3 which provides for disqualification on ground of defection. S.4, which provides for decision on question as to disqualification on ground of defection, reads as follows: "4. Decision on question as to disqualification on ground of defection. (1) If any question arises as to whether a member of a local authority has become subject to disqualification under the provisions of this Act a member of that local authority or the political party concerned or a person authorised by it in this behalf may file a petition before the State Election Commission for decision. (1) If any question arises as to whether a member of a local authority has become subject to disqualification under the provisions of this Act a member of that local authority or the political party concerned or a person authorised by it in this behalf may file a petition before the State Election Commission for decision. (2) The State Election Commission shall, after making such enquiry as it deems necessary, decide whether such member has become subject to such disqualification or not and its decision thereon shall be final. (3) Where the State Election Commission decides that a member has become subject to disqualification under sub-s.(2), he shall cease to be a member from the date of such decision and shall be disqualified for contesting as a candidate in an election to any local authority for six years from that date." S.5, which specifies the powers of the State Election Commission, reads as follows: "5. Powers of the State Election Commission. (1) Every petition under sub-s.(1) of S.4 shall be disposed of by the State Election Commission in accordance with the procedure as applicable while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908). (2) The State Election Commission shall, while trying petition under sub-s.(1), have the powers of a Civil Court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document or other materials that may be produced as evidence; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office; (e) issuing commission for taking evidence from witnesses or documents. (3) The State Election Commission shall be deemed to be a Civil Court and every proceeding before the Commission shall be deemed to be judicial proceeding within the meaning of S.193 and S.228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Central Act 45 of I860)." Under S.4(1) of the Act, if any question arises as to whether a member of a local authority has become subject to disqualification under the provisions of the Act a member of that local authority or the political party concerned or a person authorised by it in this behalf may file a petition before the State Election Commission for decision. Sub-s.(2) provides that the State Election Commission shall, after making such enquiry as it deems necessary, decide whether such member has become subject to such disqualification or not and its decision thereon shall be final. Sub-s.(3) provides that where the State Election Commission decides that a member has become subject to disqualification under sub-s.(2), he shall cease to be a member from the date of such decision and shall be disqualified for contesting as a candidate in an election to any local authority for six years from that date. It is clear from the provisions of sub-s.(2) of S.4 of the Act that a petition filed under sub-s.(1) has to be disposed of by the State Election Commission on merits and not otherwise. In other words, the State Election Commission is bound to determine the question whether the member has become subject to disqualification under the provisions of the Act. From a reading of all the provisions of sub-sections of S.4 of the Act, it is manifest that the legislature intended that an application filed under S.4(1) of the Act has to be decided by the State Election Commission on merits. It is also relevant to note that there is no provision for dismissal of an application for default or for restoration of an application which is dismissed for default. In the light of the provisions of S.4 of the Act discussed above, it follows that the action of the State Election Commission in dismissing the petition for default is without jurisdiction and nonest in law. 6. In this context, it must be noted that S.5 extracted above specifies the powers of the State Election Commission. In the light of the provisions of S.4 of the Act discussed above, it follows that the action of the State Election Commission in dismissing the petition for default is without jurisdiction and nonest in law. 6. In this context, it must be noted that S.5 extracted above specifies the powers of the State Election Commission. Sub-s.(1) thereof provides that every petition under sub-s.(1) of S.4 shall be disposed of by the State Election Commission in accordance with the procedure as applicable while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Sub-s.(2) of S.5 provides that the State Election Commission shall, while trying petition under sub-s.(1), have the powers of a Civil Court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of the matters specified therein. Sub-s.(3) provides that the State Election Commission shall be deemed to be a Civil Court and every proceeding before the commission shall be deemed to be judicial proceeding within the meaning of S.193 and S.228 of the Indian Penal Code. The contention of the petitioner herein is that it is not all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure that is made applicable under sub-s.(1) of S.5 but only the procedural parts as applicable while trying a suit under the C.P.C. and that the said position is made clear from the provisions of sub-s.(2) thereof which limits the powers to the matters specified therein. According to the counsel for the petitioner, if all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable, there was no need for specifying the powers of the State Election Commission. On the other hand, the contention of the first respondent is that the procedural provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure that are applicable while trying a suit will take in the provisions of O. IX of the C.P.C. which enables the State Election Commission to dismiss an application for default and to restore the application which is dismissed for default. 7. The question whether the Land Tribunal constituted under the Kerala Land Reforms Act had the power to restore an application which is dismissed for default, came up for consideration before this Court in Annamma Chacko v. Mathew (1967 KLT 95) where a learned single judge held that the Land Tribunal has no jurisdiction to restore an application dismissed for default. The question whether the Land Tribunal constituted under the Kerala Land Reforms Act had the power to restore an application which is dismissed for default, came up for consideration before this Court in Annamma Chacko v. Mathew (1967 KLT 95) where a learned single judge held that the Land Tribunal has no jurisdiction to restore an application dismissed for default. A similar view was taken by another learned Judge (Mathew, J. as His Lordship then was) in Ammad Haji v. Kelu (1966 KLT 819). The said question came up for consideration before a Full Bench in Kalyani Amma Bhargavi Amma v. Ouesph Varkey (AIR 1967 Ker. 287). In that case, an application under the Kerala Land Reforms Act for the determination of fair rent was dismissed by the Land Tribunal for default of prosecution. The Full Bench considered the question whether the Land Tribunal has got the power to restore the same. S.101 of the Land Reforms Act provided that the Land Board and the Land Tribunal constituted under the Act shall have all the powers of a Civil Court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of the following matters, namely: a) Summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or for local investigation; and (e) any other matter which may be prescribed. S.129 of the Act dealing with rule-making power, sub-s.(2)(e) thereof provided that in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for the procedure to be followed by the Land Tribunal and the Land Board. The Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, 1964, framed under the Act, Rule 99 thereof provided that in all proceedings before the Land Tribunal and the Land Board, the procedure prescribed as regards applications in the Code of Civil Procedure or the rules made thereunder shall, as far as can be made applicable, be followed except to the extent otherwise provided in the Act or in these rules. The Full Bench considered a contention that while S.101 of the Land Reforms Act confers specified powers on the Land Board, a power of restoration is not one of them and that Rule 99 prescribes only procedure, but confers no power and observed that the argument makes a compartmental distinction between powers and procedure, and overlooks that even procedure may involve the exercise of powers. The Full Bench took the view that Rule 99 may well be supported as a prescription under Clause (e) of S.101 and that there is little force in the contention that this power might well have been provided for specifically in S.101. In that context, the Full Bench further held as follows: "If we hold, that there is no jurisdiction for the Land Tribunal to restore, logically it must also be held, that it has no jurisdiction to dismiss for default either, and that such dismissal is void and must be treated as non est. It is not however necessary to rest the decision on this ground, as in our view, Rule 99 confers such jurisdiction. Of course, on this interpretation of Rule 99, the Land Tribunal has jurisdiction to pass orders ex parte, to dismiss for default, and to set aside ex parte orders and orders of dismissal for default. That, we enture to think is, as it should be." 8. The very same question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Gopalan Bhavani v. Raghavan Aravindakshan (1989 (2) KLT 118). The Division Bench very elaborately considered the question with reference to the earlier decisions of this Court including the Full Bench decision mentioned above and in paragraph 23 of the said judgment, observed as follows: "23. It is difficult for us to hold that the Land Tribunal under the K.L.R. Act has jurisdiction to dismiss an application for default; and has no jurisdiction to restore such an application, which has been dismissed for default. We say so because the statute does not give the power to dismiss an application or to restore the application dismissed for default, but for the effective implementation of the provisions contained in the statute, both these powers are necessary and the power to dispose of an application under S.75(2) read with S.77(2) grants the ancillary power to dismiss the application for default and also grants the power to restore such an application. Both can be treated as incidental and ancillary to the main power granted to the Tribunal to dispose of the application under S.75(2) read with S.77(2) of the K.L.R. Act. In this view we hold that the Tribunal has got the power to restore an application dismissed for default, if appropriate and valid reasons are stated within reasonable time." It must be noted that the Division Bench has reached the aforesaid conclusion after due consideration of the principles laid down in the English decisions and the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court in that regard. 9. Another learned single judge had occasion to consider the question while considering a Writ Petition challenging an order restoring an election petition which is dismissed for default, in Gopalakrishnan Nair v. Munsiff (1989 (2) KLT 706). In that case, the contention taken was that the Munsiff has no jurisdiction to restore to file an election petition filed under S.22 of the Kerala Panchayats Act, 1960 which has been dismissed for default. Sub-s.5 of the S.22 of the said Act provides that subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules, the enquiry on such a petition shall be held by the Munsiff in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit. The Rules mentioned are those contained in the Kerala Panchayats (decision of Election Disputes) Rules, 1963. Rule 11 provides that, subject to the provisions of the Act and of any Rules, every election petition shall be tried by the Munsiff as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the CPC to the trial of suits. It was contended that Rule 11 requires only that the trial shall be, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure for the trial of suits under the CPC, and that, in the absence of any express provision authorising restoration of a petition dismissed for default, it cannot be restored to file. The Court noted that there is no specific provision in the Act or in the Rules for restoration of a petition dismissed for default. It was also noted that there is no specific provision enabling the Munsiff to dismiss a petition for default. It was then observed with reference to the decision of the Full Bench (AIR 1967 Ker. The Court noted that there is no specific provision in the Act or in the Rules for restoration of a petition dismissed for default. It was also noted that there is no specific provision enabling the Munsiff to dismiss a petition for default. It was then observed with reference to the decision of the Full Bench (AIR 1967 Ker. 287) that if the petitioner's contention be correct, it must logically follow that the Munsiff has also no jurisdiction to dismiss an election petition for default. The contention of the petitioner that the provisions of O. IX CPC could not be invoked by reference to the provisions of Rule 11 as the dismissal was at the pre-trial stage, was also dealt with. The learned judge referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. P. Nalla Thampi Them v. Shcmkar (AIR 1984 SC 135), where one of the questions raised was whether an election petition could be dismissed for default. The contention raised by the petitioner therein was that when once an election petition is filed, it concerns the entire constituency and as election petition could not be permitted to be dismissed for default as that would lead to situations brought about by manipulation, undue influence, fraud or winning over of the election petitioner. The Supreme Court did not agree with the above and held that an election petition was liable to be dismissed for default in situations covered by O.IX or O.XVII of the CPC, and an application under O. IX Rule 9 will be maintainable for its restoration. In that decision, the Supreme Court, inter alia, took note of the observations of Hidayatullah, CJ. in Sunderlal Manalal v. Nandamdas Dwarkadas (AIR 1958 MP 260), where it was observed that no court or Tribunal was supposed to continue a proceeding before it when the party who has moved it had not appeared or cared to remain present. The dismissal for default was an exercise of an inherent power which every Tribunal possessed. in Sunderlal Manalal v. Nandamdas Dwarkadas (AIR 1958 MP 260), where it was observed that no court or Tribunal was supposed to continue a proceeding before it when the party who has moved it had not appeared or cared to remain present. The dismissal for default was an exercise of an inherent power which every Tribunal possessed. The learned single judge also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. Commissioner of Income-tax (106 ITR 653) where the High Court declined to answer a reference under S.66(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, on account of default of appearance of the applicant-assessee, and subsequently refused the asessee's prayer for rehearing on the ground that it had become functus officio. With reference to the aforesaid decisions, the learned single judge held that it is thus evident that courts possess the power to recall orders passed by them in the interests of justice or to prevent abuse of process of the court, in the absence of any express or implied prohibition. It is further held that if the Munsiff could dismiss for default, equally the power to undo the injustice on sufficient cause being shown should also be found to exist. This is part of the inherent powers of the Munsiff. Therefore, and even assuming that O. IX of the CPC was not liable to be invoked, the Munsiff possessed the inherent power to set aside the dismissal for default. The negation of such power will lead to injustice in given cases. 10. In this context, it is apposite to refer to the decision of a learned single judge of this Court in Abdulla v. Rent Controller (1984 KLT 865), where a contention Was taken that the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction or power to allow an amendment of the petition for eviction filed by the landlord. S.23(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 provides that subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the Accommodation Controller, the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority shall have the powers which are vested in the Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit in respect of the matters enumerated therein. Neither the Act nor the Rules framed under S.31 of the Act specifically confers any power on the Rent Controller to allow amendment of pleadings. Neither the Act nor the Rules framed under S.31 of the Act specifically confers any power on the Rent Controller to allow amendment of pleadings. In that context, it was observed: "It is true that courts have always taken the view that statutory tribunals which are creatures of statutes have only those powers conferred on them specifically by statutes. But the role of such tribunals as decision-making bodies in the field of administration of justice is being recognised more and more. There is a line of thinking that in regard to such statutory tribunals, this approach to their power should be understood with caution and the application of these principles be limited to the exercise of substantive powers as distinguished from matters which are procedural. These tribunals which are playing a more and more important roles in the field of administration of justice are exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions inherent in the State. Many a time, it is difficult to distinguish the powers exercised by tribunals from those exercised by courts. Functions of Tribunals are vital in the life of the people as functions of courts. It is therefore increasingly being recognised that such tribunals must be treated as possessing inherent power for the performance of their duties and for the purpose of doing justice between the parties." 11. Another learned single judge of this Court, in Paul v. Asst. Registrar (1998 (2) KLT 449), had occasion to consider a question as to whether the Registrar, while settling a dispute under Rule 67 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969, has power to set aside an ex-parte order passed by him in the proceeding. Clause(a ) of Sub-rule (4) of Rule 67 provided that the Registrar or the person or the arbitrator deciding the dispute shall record a brief note in English or in the vernacular of the evidence of the parties to the dispute and witnesses who attend, and upon the evidence so recorded and after consideration of any documentary evidence produced by the parties a decision or award, as the case may be, shall be given in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience and further that such decision or award shall be reduced to writing and pronounced at once or on some future date of which due notice shall be given to the parties. Clause (b) thereof provided that in the absence of any party to the dispute duly summoned to attend, the dispute may be decided ex-parte. It was observed that when the statute specifically prescribed that a decision or award shall be given in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience, this Court cannot deny the existence of certain amount of inherent powers in dealing with the different situations by the Registrar which necessarily means the Registrar has inherent power to set aside an order passed by him ex-parte if he is satisfied that justice, equity and good conscience demands such a course of action. The learned judge, in that context, referred to the decision of Chandrasekhara Menon, J. in Dy. Conservator v. Sarojini (1981 KLN 28) where it has been held that inherent jurisdiction is there even with tribunals of limited jurisdiction, and the decision of M.P. Menon, J. in Cheru Ouseph v. Kunjipathwnma(9% 1 KLT 495), where the powers of the Tribunals in administration of justice while dealing with a case coming under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 were exhaustively dealt with. The following observation contained in the said judgment is useful in this context: "What, after all, is the inherent power saved by S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure? A court is constituted for doing justice and must be deemed to possess all powers as may be necessary to do the right and undo wrongs in the course of administration of justice. Of course, the court must have jurisdiction over the proceedings before it can exercise the inherent power; but when that is granted, its power to advance the cause of justice by relying on unenumerated powers-on inherent or residuary power, as it is often called - cannot be denied to it. And therefore, where a tribunal exercises the same kind of power i.e., part of the judicial power of the State, as the Supreme Court has observed, why should it be denied similar inherent or residuary powers?" Referring to the above, the learned judge in Paul's case held that the principle emerged from the above decision is that the Tribunal engaged in administration of justice has inherent power to do whatever is required in the promotion of administration of justice. A Division Bench of this Court in Thankam R. Filial v. Arbitrator (1996 (1) KLT 225) while dealing with the power of an arbitrator to implead the legal representatives of a deceased petitioner in a proceeding arising under S.70 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, also held that all powers which are not specifically denied by the statute or the statutory rules should be vouchsafed to a Tribunal so that it may effectively exercise its judicial function. 12. Now reverting back to the present case, as I already held, the State Election Commission, while dealing with a petition filed under sub-s.(1) of S.4 of the Act, is bound to decide the question raised before it in the petition on merits. There is no provision in the Act either for dismissal of an application for default or for restoration of an application which is dismissed for default. On a strict construction of the provisions of S.4, there is no room for doubt that the State Election Commission has no power to dismiss an application for default. However, the Division Bench of this Court in Gopalan Bhavani v. Raghavan Aravindakshan (1989 (2) KLT 118) has observed that the power to dismiss an application for default and for restoration of the same on proper cause being shown is needed for the effective implementation of the provisions of the statute which is incidental and ancillary to the main power granted to the Tribunal to dispose of the applications filed under the provisions of the K.L.R. Act. This Court in the other decisions discussed above have also taken the view that the Tribunals of limited jurisdictions must also be treated as possessing inherent power for the performance of their duties and for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The Supreme Court in the decision discussed above has approved the said view. 13. This Court in the other decisions discussed above have also taken the view that the Tribunals of limited jurisdictions must also be treated as possessing inherent power for the performance of their duties and for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The Supreme Court in the decision discussed above has approved the said view. 13. Considering the matter in the light of the decisions referred to above, I am of the view that though the Act did not provide for dismissal of an application for default or for restoration of the application dismissed for default and though it mandates that an application filed under S.4(1) of the Act has to be decided on merits, the power to dismiss an application for default and the power to restore such an application which is dismissed for default must be held to be a power incidental and ancillary to the power to decide the application under S.4 of the Act inherent in the State Election Commission. I accordingly hold that the State Election Commission was perfectly justified in entertaining the application for restoration of the petition which is dismissed for default. 14. Of course, the petitioner herein has taken a contention that though she had raised very serious objections to the restoration application, the petitioner was not heard, nor the objections considered. The State Election Commission in the Statement filed has clearly stated that the petition for restoration was heard on 23.2.1999 and the counsel for the petitioner and the first respondent were present and their objections were also considered. It is also stated that the application for restoration was allowed in the presence of the counsel for the petitioner and the first respondent and the same was recorded in the case records. There is no reason to doubt the genuineness of the said statement. Since there is no challenge to the order restoring the application on its merits, I am of the view that the State Election Commission was perfectly justified in restoring the application which is dismissed for default. There is no merit in this O.P. The Original Petition is accordingly dismissed.