Judgment S.K.Chattopadhyaya, J. 1. The point for determination in this case is as to whether once bail is granted by the Trial Court on considering the facts of the case, the same can be cancelled on the ground that the prayer for the bail was allowed on misconception of law. 2. On the basis of the First Information Report the petitioner was proceeded against under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The informant alleged that the marriage of his daughter was settled with the eldest son of the petitioner on 23-4-1997 and the Chhenka ceremony was performed. On the same day videography and photography had been taken and they promised in writing that tilak would be held on 14-4-1997 and the data of marriage was fixed on 20-5-1997. 3. However, subsequently the petitioner, it is alleged., demanded Rs. 51,000/- one Hero Honda motor-cycle, one Colour Television, one Fridge and 11 Bhar Gold besides the expenses of videography, etc. The petitioner informed that the marriage would be performed only after the fulfilment of the aforesaid demands. On 25-6-1997 the Informant along with relatives came to the house of the petitioner and requested him for the marriage but the petitioner denied. 4. The petitioner moved this Court for anticipatory bail along with other co-accused. Though, one of the co-accused, namely, Kanhai, Bhagat was granted anticipatory bail on 30-9-1997 but the prayer of the petitioner for bail was refused. The petitioner subsequently surrendered before the Court below and the learned Additional Sessions Judge by his order dated 8-1-1998 granted bail to the petitioner in Bail Petition No. 240/97. This order is Annexure-3 to this petition. However, immediately after his release the petitioner received notice for cancellation of his bail order. The petitioner showed his cause and after hearing the parties the learned Additional Sessions Judge cancelled the bail order dated 8-1-1998 on the ground that the same was granted on misconception of law. 5. From the impugned order it appears that while granting bail to the petitioner on 8-1-1998 the submission of learned Counsel of both parties was considered by the learned Court below as well as the fact that the petitioner was already in custody for more than a fortnight. 5. From the impugned order it appears that while granting bail to the petitioner on 8-1-1998 the submission of learned Counsel of both parties was considered by the learned Court below as well as the fact that the petitioner was already in custody for more than a fortnight. However, on 9-1-1998 the Court below realised that much after the Bihar Amendment of Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as it stood at the time of the said Amendment, Section 4 of the said Act was substituted by a Central Amendment, namely, Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act (Act No. 63 of 1984) and the substituted Section 4 made the offence concerned punishable with imprisonment which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to two years, the Court below recalled his order granting bail to the petitioner. 6. Though Mr. Pandey, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has raised several law points in respect of Amendment made in the Central Act vis-a-vis the Bihar Amendment Act but, in my view, without going into the same in this case, the cardinal principle for cancelling bail can be looked into. 7. In the case of Dolat Ram and Others V/s. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 , their Lordships while considering this point have held as follows : "Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail, broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are; interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice of evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the Court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused abscond-ing in yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoy-ing the concession of bail during the trial. These principles, it appear, were lost sight of by the High Court when it decided to cancel the bail, already granted. These principles, it appear, were lost sight of by the High Court when it decided to cancel the bail, already granted. The High Court it appears to us overlooked the distinction of the factors relevant for rejecting bail in a non-bailable case in the first instance and the cancellation of bail already granted." 8. Thus, it is clear that the Court below could have cancelled the bail after considering the aforesaid circumstances of interference or attempt of interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. In the instant case, only because the learned Court below subsequently found that the offence under Section 4 of the Central Amendment Act was for imprisonment with six months but could be extended upto two years, in my view, was not justified in cancelling the privilege of bail already granted to the petitioner by him. Even presuming that interpretation sought to be given by the learned Court below is correct but the same does not make any difference because the petitioner was only released on bail and his prayer was not for acquittal by that time. There is nothing on record to show that after release on bail the petitioner has either tried to evade the Court or tampered with any evidence. 9. Under these circumstances, in my view, the Court below was not justified in cancelling the bail of the petitioner merely on the ground that the offence was punishable with imprisonment which may extend to two years. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in Cr Misc. No. 2708 of 1994 in the case of Nanhak Singh alias Sorabh Kumar Singh and others V/s. The State of Bihar, holding that once a person is enlarged on bail the same can only be cancelled by the Court enlarging him after giving specific ground as to in what way he has misused the privilege of bail or otherwise. In the instant case, except the reasons of mis-conception of law by the Court itseif on other reason has been assigned by the learned Court below. 10. For the reasons stated above, in my view, the order impugned dated 4-2-1998 cannot be allowed to stand. In the result, this application is allowed and the order dated 4-2-1998 is quashed. 11. In the instant case, except the reasons of mis-conception of law by the Court itseif on other reason has been assigned by the learned Court below. 10. For the reasons stated above, in my view, the order impugned dated 4-2-1998 cannot be allowed to stand. In the result, this application is allowed and the order dated 4-2-1998 is quashed. 11. However, it is made clear that if in future it is found that the petitioner has misused privilege of bail by trying to evade the Court or is trying to tamper with the evidence appropriate order may be passed by the Court below after giving notice to the petitioner.