ORDER A.K. Gohil, J. 1. By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioners are seeking direction by issue of appropriate writ for quashing Annexures F and H which are the decisions of the Labour Court, Indore dated February 17, 1990 and the Industrial Court M.P. Indore dated November 23, 1990. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent No. 3 was appointed in the petitioner Board as office Assistant Grade III (training) on probation. At the time of entering into the service, the respondent No. 3 had entered into an agreement with the petitioner Board. 3. In compliance of the appointment order, the respondent No. 3 joined his duties on December 22, 1984. After completion of 6 months probationary period, the Board had taken an appraisal test. The respondent No. 3 could not qualify in the aforesaid test and his probationary period was extended for a further period of 6 months. Again an appraisal test was organised by the Board and in the subsequent test too the respondent No. 3 could not qualify and hence by the order dated March 10, 1986 his services had come to an end on the basis of the condition stipulated in the appointment order. Against this order, the respondent No. 3 filed an application under Section 31(1) of the M.P.I.R. Act before the Labour Court contending inter alia that he had served the petitioner for more than a period of 240 days and hence his termination is a retrenchment under the provisions of Section 25F and the provisions of Section 25G of the Act were not complied. The relief of reinstatement with back wages was claimed. By order dated February 17, 1990, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Indore allowed the application. An order of reinstatement was passed with back wages. Against this order, an appeal was preferred by the Board before the Industrial Court and by order dated November 13, 1990 the Industrial Court dismissed the appeal and the judgment of the Labour Court was upheld, against which the petitioner Board has filed this petition. An order of reinstatement was passed with back wages. Against this order, an appeal was preferred by the Board before the Industrial Court and by order dated November 13, 1990 the Industrial Court dismissed the appeal and the judgment of the Labour Court was upheld, against which the petitioner Board has filed this petition. The submission of the petitioner in this written petition is that the orders of the Courts below are contrary to the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, in view of the aforesaid provisions, the decision of both the Courts below are contrary to law, void ab initio and without jurisdiction. 4. In reply the submission of the respondent No. 3 employee is that in the appointment letter nowhere incorporated any term or condition on the basis of which the services of the respondent could be terminated. It is nowhere stated in the agreement that on failure in the appraisal test the appointment shall come to an end. His further submission is that though the respondent No. 3 is designated as trainee in Annexure B but in reality the respondent No. 3 worked like a regular employee and held independent charge for the period commencing from November 28, 1984 i.e. the date of appointment till March 10, 1986, the date of termination. This period is of more than 240 days as per Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act. The respondent No. 3 was holding the charge of bill collection and ledger postings and there is no dispute that respondent No. 3 was working as an employee. The Apprentice Act does not apply to M.P. Electricity Board because it is not a scheduled Industry. The submission of the respondent No. 3 is that his services were terminated in the colourable exercise of power, without disclosing any reason whatsoever for termination. No retrenchment compensation was paid nor any notice was given. Therefore, it was illegal retrenchment and the termination is void ab initio for non-compliance of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) are not applicable in the respondent's case because the agreement does not contain any negative provision regarding termination of employee on failure to pass appraisal test. Therefore, it was illegal retrenchment and the termination is void ab initio for non-compliance of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) are not applicable in the respondent's case because the agreement does not contain any negative provision regarding termination of employee on failure to pass appraisal test. The further submission of the respondent is that the agreement Annexure A is also void as the same was executed after the order of appointment and the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) cannot be interpreted to construe to give an arbitrary power to the employer because it presupposes with the work for the purpose of which the employee was given employment and cannot come to an end by efflux of service tenure. The work is continuing and services are terminated under the garb of non-renewal of the terms of agreement. During the course of arguments, it was further submitted by the counsel for respondent No. 3 that the services of the respondent No. 3 are reinstated and the petitioner has also paid all arrears of back wages. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for respondent No. 3 is that when there is an order for reinstatement by two Courts below and in compliance of that order the services of the respondent No. 3 were reinstated and he was paid all back wages, nothing remains for consideration in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited and there is no illegality in the orders passed by the Courts below, 5. I have heard the learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 6. The short submission of the learned counsel for petitioner is that the order of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court, Indore and upheld by the Industrial Court is contrary to the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb). For appreciating the submission made by the learned counsel for petitioner, the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) are quoted below: "(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or" 7. To appreciate the argument of the learned counsel for petitioner, it became necessary to see the terms of the agreement. Admittedly the order of appointment was issued on November 28, 1984 and the agreement was signed on December 17, 1984. The order of appointment dated November 18, 1984 which is Annexure B only states that the following candidates are hereby appointed as Office Asstt. Grade III (trainee) for job training on a fixed stipend of Rs. 475 (Rs. Four Hundred Seventy five only) per month for a period of six months. The condition No. 4 of this appointment letter states that the trainee should also execute an agreement bond, security bond and solvency certificate in the prescribed proforma (Annexure II enclosed) and submit the same duly completed in all respects before joining. There is nothing in this appointment letter about the termination of the service. 8. The agreement executed between the parties on December 17, 1984 is Annexure A filed by the petitioner. The agreement stipulates that, 'Whereas the candidate has agreed to undergo 6 months training as per terms of his appointment and then to serve the employer for a period of atleast two years after the successful completion of such training on the terms and conditions mentioned as under: 1. The employer shall appoint a candidate initially as Office Assistant Grade III trainee for giving him training for period of six months provided that the employer may in his discretion extend the period of training for giving him in-service training for such further period not exceeding one year as it may deem fit. 2. The employer may terminate this agreement at any time without notice and without assigning any reason. 3. The candidate shall diligently pursue the course of his training and abide by the rules for the time being in force relating to the conduct of trainee and pass the prescribed examination and tests. 4. At any time during the course of his training or on satisfactory completion of his training and on passing the examination and tests, if any, the candidate shall if so required by the employer serve the Board for a period of not less than two years, as Office Assistant Grade III, or any other equivalent post under the Board and he shall be governed by the Employees' Service Regulations. 9. 9. As per condition No. 1 of the agreement only provision for extension of period of training is provided which may be extended upto one year and in the term No. 4 of the agreement it is stated that on satisfactory completion of his training and on passing the appraisal examination and test, if any, the candidate shall if so required by the employer serve the Board for the period of not less than 2 years. From the terms and conditions of the aforesaid agreement, it is clear that in the agreement, nowhere it is stated that on failure to pass the Board test, the services of the respondent No. 3 shall be liable to be terminated or he is appointed on training on probation period for 2 years. Therefore, there is nothing in the agreement as well as in the appointment order about any stipulation for termination of service. 10. Shri G.S. Patwardhan, learned counsel for the petitioner cited the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court is Mukhtyar Singh v. Food Corporation of India and Ors., 1994-II-LLJ-488 (MP-DB) which has been held by Hon. R.C. lAHOTI, J (as he then was) speaking for the Bench that: "Sub Clause (bb) consists of two parts. The first part speaks of a contract which is not of renewable character while the second part speaks of contract of any character. Our conclusion is that if the service of a workman is allowed to get terminated by non-renewal of the contract of service with him, it falls within the first part of (bb) and the services of the workman is terminated acting under stipulation in that behalf contained in the contract, it falls within the second part of (bb), and both the cases falling within the excepted category are not retrenchment." But this case is not applicable to the facts of the case in hand for want of specific stipulation in the agreement and letter of appointment. The other case cited by the learned counsel for petitioner is Chief General Manager, State Bank of India v. Shri Bijoy Kumar Mishra, 1988-I-LLJ-580 (SC). But this case relates to the question of deemed confirmation and the facts of this case are not identical to the present case in hand as the present case is not about the deemed confirmation. The other case cited by the learned counsel for petitioner is Chief General Manager, State Bank of India v. Shri Bijoy Kumar Mishra, 1988-I-LLJ-580 (SC). But this case relates to the question of deemed confirmation and the facts of this case are not identical to the present case in hand as the present case is not about the deemed confirmation. Another case cited by the learned counsel for petitioner is of Escorts Ltd. v. Presiding Officer and Anr., 1997 (II) SCC 521. In this case the workman was given temporary appointment for a period of 2 months and in the said letter it was stated that temporary service can be terminated, at any stage by other side without assigning any reason and without any notice and payment of compensation in lieu of notice and, therefore, on the basis of the aforesaid stipulation in the order of appointment under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it did not amount to retrenchment. The next case cited by the learned counsel for petitioner is of Birla VXL Ltd. v. State of Punjab and Ors., 1998 (5) SCC 632 : 1999-I-LLJ-220. In this case also the third respondent was appointed on January 1, 1983 subject to the following conditions, 'This is a purely temporary appointment for a period of two years upto December 31, 1984. During or on the expiry of this period if your work or conduct is not found satisfactory or your services are no longer required by the company that would be terminated as per clause 8 above/and in view of the aforesaid clear terms in his appointment order the judgment and order of the High Court for reinstatement with full back wages was set aside. The facts of this case are also not identical. Therefore, this decision is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. The facts of this case are also not identical. Therefore, this decision is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. Petitioner cited another judgment LIC of India v. Raghvendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 (8) SCC 461 : 1998-II-LLJ-1161 in which it has been held that where a clause in the letter of appointment of the employee on probation clearly stipulated that he could be discharged from his service at any time during the period of probation without any notice or without assigning any cause, and he was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation, 1960, such termination could not be held to be bad on ground of failure of Corporation to give opportunity of hearing to probationer. Such termination also would not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, it could not be said that since the requirement of Section 25F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. Since in this case no clear term of termination was provided in the letter of appointment or in the agreement of the employment, the facts of this case are not identical and, therefore, the case cited is not helpful to the petitioner. 11. In reply Shri S.C. Bagdia, learned senior Advocate appearing for respondent No. 3 cited the decision rendered by the M.P. High Court in case of Ram Krishan v. S.A. Tech Institute, 1995-I-LLJ-944 (MP) in which it has been held by the learned single Judge as under at p. 949: "27. Even with the intermittent breaks, once an employee completes 240 days of employment and if his last letter of appointment or renewal contains the automatic clause, stipulating the termination of his service, the right accrued to the employee cannot be taken away by employing the exemption clause of (bb). It would still be retrenchment. To retrench is to cut down. You cannot retrench without trenching or cutting. Any other view would result in shrinkage rather in swallowing the principal clause of Section 2(oo) itself which the parliament would never have contemplated in view of the scheme of the Act. This cannot be the function of an exception. It would still be retrenchment. To retrench is to cut down. You cannot retrench without trenching or cutting. Any other view would result in shrinkage rather in swallowing the principal clause of Section 2(oo) itself which the parliament would never have contemplated in view of the scheme of the Act. This cannot be the function of an exception. An employer cannot steal away the employee's umbrella provided by Sections 2(oo), 25B read with 25F of the Act, by serving an employee the last letter of his appointment or the renewal with the stipulation of termination of service under the Contract, so as to bring the termination within the excepted category and to snatch it out of the purview of retrenchment." 12. In this case the sole question is whether the case of the petitioner is covered within the mischief of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. I am of the view that the provisions in Section 2(oo)(bb) can only be invoked when there is specific stipulation in the letter of appointment or agreement. When there is no such stipulation in the agreement or letter of appointment about the termination of service it cannot be said that such contract can be terminated under stipulation in that behalf contained therein. In this case neither such a stipulation is stated in the letter of appointment nor in the agreement executed between the parties. Therefore, in the absence of any document on record about specific stipulation regarding termination of service of the workman, the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) cannot be invoked. During the course of arguments also learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out any document on record containing stipulation regarding termination. Therefore, in view of the discussions made above I do not find any merit in the case and no interference is warranted under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 13. In the result, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Security amount if any, be refunded to the petitioner after due verification.