Judgment :- Arijit Pasayat, C.J. Heard. 2. Though there is no serious dispute as to the requirement to implement directions given in the impugned judgment in O.P. No. 2000 of 1991, certain observations made by learned Single Judge as regards the binding nature of the recommendations made has brought the respondents in the Original Petition, ie., the Administrator, Union Territory of Lakshadweep, Kavaratti, the Union of India, represented by Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and the Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of justice), before this Court in this Writ Appeal under S.5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 (in short 'the Act'). 3. Factual position is almost undisputed. Respondent. No.1 was working as Sheristadar in Sub Court¬cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Kavaratti, in the service of the Administrator. Said Sub Court is a court subordinate to the High Court of Kerala. This Court was moved for a direction to the present appellants to revise the employee's scale of pay in conformity with the suggestions given by this Court. Approach was made first to the Central Administrative Tribunal (in short the Tribunal') seeking self-same relief. But that was turned down, as, under S.2(c)of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 as amended by Act 51 of 1987 (in short 'the Tribunals Act'), the provisions of the Act do not apply to officers or servants of a court subordinate to High Court. Therefore, this Court was moved. 4. Learned Single Judge while directing the Union of India to consider the suggestions made by the Registry of this Court, made further observations regarding applicability of Art.235 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short 'the Constitution') and the binding nature thereof. 5. Learned counsel for appellants submitted that the conditions of service as spelt out from Art.235 of the Constitution have to be read in the background of rules made in various statutory provisions including Art.309 of the Constitution and executive instructions, if any, issued in that regard. The expression 'control' in Art.235 of the Constitution would not extend so far as to include application of the rules as aforesaid and/or the executive instructions. Learned counsel for the employee submitted that observations made by learned Single Judge cannot be faulted because of the supervisory control of the High Court over the employees and their conditions of service. 6. The expression 'control' in Art.235 of the Constitution would not extend so far as to include application of the rules as aforesaid and/or the executive instructions. Learned counsel for the employee submitted that observations made by learned Single Judge cannot be faulted because of the supervisory control of the High Court over the employees and their conditions of service. 6. The scope of Art.235 of the Constitution has been examined in various cases and the true ambit and scope of the expression'control' as appearing in the said Article has been elaborately dealt with in B.S. Yadav v. State of Haryana (AIR 1981 SC 561) and Dayaram Asanand v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1984 SC 850). Paragraphs 40 and 41 in B.S. Yadav's case reads as follows: "40. On a plain reading of Arts.235 and 309 of the Constitution, it is clear that the power to frame rules regarding seniority of officers in the judicial service of the State is vested in the Governor and not in the High Court. The first part of Art.235 vests the control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto in the High Court. But the second part of that Article says that nothing in the article shall be construed as taking away from any person belonging to the judicial service of the Stats any right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law. Thus, Art.235 itself defines the outer limits of the High Court's power of control over the District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto. In the first place, in the exercise of its control over the District Courts and Subordiante Courts, it is not open to the High Court to deny to a member of the subordinate judicial service of the State the right of appeal given to him by the law which regulates the conditions of his service. Secondly, the High Court cannot, in the exercise of its power of control, deal with such person otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service which are prescribed by such law. 41. Who has the power to pass such a law? Secondly, the High Court cannot, in the exercise of its power of control, deal with such person otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service which are prescribed by such law. 41. Who has the power to pass such a law? Obviously not the High Court because, there is no power in the High Court to pass a law, though rules made by the High Court in the exercise of power conferred upon it in that behalf may have the force of law. There is a distinction between the power to pass a law and the power to make rules, which by law, have the force of law. Besides, "law" which the second part of Art.235 speaks of, is law made by the legislature because, if it were not so, there was.no purpose in saying that the High Court's power of control will not be construed as taking away certain rights of certain persons under a law regulating their conditions of service. It could not have been possibly intended to be provided that the High Court's power of control will be subject to the conditions of service prescribed by it. The clear meaning, therefore, of the second part of Art.235 is that the power of control vested in the High Court by the first part will not deprive a judicial officer of the rights conferred upon him by a law made by the legislature regulating his conditions of service." Paragraph 17 of the judgment in Dayaram Asanand's case (supra) reads as follows: "17. When it is held that the selection grade District Judges do not constitute a separate cadre, the High Court cannot in exercise of its general powers of control under Art.235 of the Constitution withhold the increment beyond Rupees 1800/- in the selection grade pay scale unless there is a rule or an executive instruction which authorises it to do so. As mentioned earlier, the selection grade post is not a post to which promotion has to be made nor is there any efficiency bar rule attached to it. As mentioned earlier, the selection grade post is not a post to which promotion has to be made nor is there any efficiency bar rule attached to it. Further it is not shown that the Governor had issued any executive instructions as it had been done m Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan ((1968) 1 SCR 111; AIR 1967 SC 1910) and in Lalit Mohan v. Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 995 enabling the High Court to withhold increments in the extended pay scale which is in this case called as selection grade pay scale. The pay scale to which a judicial officer is entitled is a condition of service which can be regulated by a statute or rules made under the proviso to Art.309 or by executive instructions issued under Art.162 of the Constitution. It cannot come within the range of the expression 'control' in Art.235 of the Constitution. (See B.S. Yadav v. State of Haryana (1981) 1 SCR 1024: (AIR 1981 SC 561)). It is only where there is such a law, rule or executive instruction, the High Court may act under Art.235 of the Constitution to sanction it or to refuse to sanction it. We are of the view that in the present case the mere nomenclature given to the extended pay scale as the selection grade pay scale does not lead to the inference that there is an element of selection involved in sanctioning it. In the circumstances it should be treated as just an extended pay scale which forms part of the pay scale of Rs. 900-1800 as clarified in the two Government Orders sanctioning the selection grade posts. In view of the foregoing while the question whether the appellant can be posted as an Inspecting District Judge is within the discretion of the High Court, the refusal on the part of the High Court to sanction the selection grade pay scale to the appellant when it became due automatically on the ground that he was not found fit to be sanctioned that scale of pay is erroneous. In view of what has been stated above, we need not go into the other points raised by the appellant regarding the above question." 7. In view of the aforesaid position as is culled out from the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court, directions given by learned Single Judge vis-a-vis Art.235 cannot be maintained. In view of what has been stated above, we need not go into the other points raised by the appellant regarding the above question." 7. In view of the aforesaid position as is culled out from the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court, directions given by learned Single Judge vis-a-vis Art.235 cannot be maintained. So far as the other directions are concerned, it would be appropriate if they are duly taken note of by the present appellants. Writ Appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.