Judgment :- M.R. Hariharan Nair, J. The revision petitioner is the plaintiff in O.S. No. 150 of 1998 of the Sub Court, Ernakulam. The challenge is with regard to the order of the said Court passed in LA. No. 3206 of 1999 which was a petition for setting aside the exparte order against the 1 st defendant. Notwithstanding stiff opposition from the plaintiff, the petition was allowed as per the following order: "Allowed on condition that the petitioner will pay Rs. 500/- towards cost to the plaintiff on or before 7.10.99, failing which the application will be dismissed. For payment of cost 7.10.99". 2. The suit was for recovery of Rs. 13 lakhs based on dissolution of a firm. When the suit came up for return of summons on 1.6.1998 it was represented that both the defendants were entering appearance; and the case was adjourned to 30.1.1999. But even by that day the respondent herein, who was the first defendant, had not filed vakalath. On 19.2.1999 the plaintiff, as per directions from the Court, paid a sum of Rs. 79,815/- as balance court fees. On 22.2.1999 when the case came up next there was no representation for the first defendant and consequently she was declared ex parte. On 4.3.1999 the second defendant filed written statement and after postings to 8.3.1999, 16.6.1999 and 23.6.1999 the case was listed for trial to 9.8.1999. On 7.8.1999 the first defendant filed LA.' No. 3206 of 1999 aforementioned seeking to set aside the ex parte order. A statement was also filed before the Court adopting the contentions in the written statement of the second defendant. On 10.8.1999 she also filed LA. No. 3241 of 1999 seeking reference of the dispute to arbitration. 3. Mr. R.D. Shenoi, who appeared for the revision petitioner submitted that the application filed by the first defendant is without bona fides; that she has not shown good cause for the non-appearance on the posting dates and that the consequence of allowing the petition will be to give an opportunity to the first defendant to seek reference of the dispute to arbitration and that this will seriously prejudice the plaintiff in so far as consequent on the silence on the part of the first defendant the plaintiff was forced to pay a sum of Rs. 79,815/- as court fees which could have been avoided if only the written statement and request for arbitration were filed in time. It is also pointed out in this regard that the first defendant has failed to raise the question of arbitration at the earliest opportunity and also that without producing the original arbitration agreement the request of the first defendant cannot be considered. 4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submits that sufficient reasons have been shown for the inability to file the vakalath and written statement in due time and that along with the first effective statement the request for arbitration has been presented. It is also pointed out that the relevant arbitration agreement was before the Court as on the date when 1 A. 3206/99 was filed. Yet another contention raised by the respondent is that even in document No. 24 produced along with the plaint, the plaintiff had conceded that this was a dispute worthy of reference to arbitrator. The counsel submits that the plaintiff will not be put to any undue hardship in consequence of allowing the petition. 5. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the reasons urged for non-appearance on the date fixed by the Court for appearance and the lapse in the matter of filing the written statement on the appointed date can be justified. In the affidavit supporting the petition which resulted in the impugned order the respondent herein had stated that on 22.2.1999 she could not file the written statement as she was away at Bombay with her daughter who was very sick. The daughter required full care and attention of the mother. She could not, therefore, keep up the assurance given to her advocate that she would reach Cochin in due time and file the written statement on the appointed date. However, the Vakalath has been filed on 5.3.1999, and the lapse involved is not wilful or deliberate. 6. Even though the provision quoted in the petition filed by the respondent was 0.9 R.13 this is actually a case where it is only 0.9 R.7 that applies in so far as the suit had not been decreed as on that day due to the contest made by the co-defendant. The distinction between the provisions in 0.9 R.7 and 0.9 R.13 may be noted. The distinction between the provisions in 0.9 R.7 and 0.9 R.13 may be noted. Even though both the provisions contemplate a situation where the defendant had been absent on the posting date and suit had proceeded in the absence of the defendant, R.7 applies when the suit had not been disposed of by the Court whereas R.13 applies in a case where the suit has already been disposed of. 0.9 R.7 contemplates "good cause" being shown by the defendant as a condition precedent to be heard in answer to the suit whereas "sufficient cause" has to be shown to enable the defendant to get the ex parte decree set aside under 0.9 R.13. 7. What exactly is the difference between'good cause' and sufficient cause? Establishment of good cause requires only proof of lesser degree when compared to 'sufficient cause' for purposes of 0.9 R.13. Sufficient cause itself is an elastic expression and requires to be applied in a meaningful manner aimed at meeting the ends of justice. The following guidelines are well established by judicial precedents. A liberal approach is necessary and Courts have wide discretion in deciding the question of 'sufficient cause'. The broad principles of natural justice demands that a litigant should not be deprived of a hearing unless there has been something equivalent to misconduct or gross negligence on his part. The Court has to bear in mind the wholesome principle that the right of a party to be heard should be negatived only if there is gross negligence or gross carelessness. If some steps have been taken and application filed with some diligence and some evidence is adduced making out a 'sufficient cause' for absence, the application has to be allowed albeit subject to the common curative of costs. The Court has to take a broad view of the matter well informed by the principles of natural justice. Courts seldom decide a dispute without affording a reasonable opportunity to the otherwise to present its case. A Judge has to act independently in the matter so that ends of justice will be met through exercise of broad discretion with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. 8. 'Good cause' for application of 0.9 R.7 requires even a more liberal construction. 'Good cause' is more elastic than sufficient cause. A Judge has to act independently in the matter so that ends of justice will be met through exercise of broad discretion with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. 8. 'Good cause' for application of 0.9 R.7 requires even a more liberal construction. 'Good cause' is more elastic than sufficient cause. The anxiety of the Court must be to extend an opportunity to the party, who, by some reason could not be present when the case was taken up for hearing and not to shut out evidence by closing the door before the defendant who might arrive with his contentions a bit late. 9. In the instant case the first defendant who is a woman claims that she was held up at Bombay in connection with the ailment of her daughter. If that is correct, that is certainly a 'good cause' justifying an opportunity to contest the case on the merits. What the Court below has done is to compensate the plaintiff for the laches, if at all there was any, by award of suitable costs. I am not satisfied that the court below has committed any irregularity or impropriety in the matter. 10. The learned counsel appearing for the Revision Petitioner submitted that in the nature of the case it will be sufficient if the first defendant is allowed to contest the suit from the stage at which the matter stood as on the date of filing the application under 0.9 R.7 and that she should not be allowed to reverse the clock taking the case back to the position where it stood posted for appearance of the parties. In Om Prakash v. Amerjith Singh, 1988 (2) KLT SN 64 Page 44 the Supreme Court has drawn the distinction between the grant of petition under 0.9 R.7 and the consequence of its dismissal. It would not be necessary for a party to get rid of an order placing him ex parte if he wishes to participate in the proceedings only from the stage when he walks in. It is only if he wants to be relegated to the position he would have occupied if he had appeared at the earlier hearing or hearings and seeks to set back the hands of the clock that he has to make out 'good cause'. It is only if he wants to be relegated to the position he would have occupied if he had appeared at the earlier hearing or hearings and seeks to set back the hands of the clock that he has to make out 'good cause'. In the present case this makes a lot of difference because the attempt of the first defendant is to invoke the arbitration clause allegedly available in her favour applying S.8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Under S.8, this can be done only at the time of submitting the first statement on the substance of the dispute. In other words the said opportunity will not be available to the first defendant herein unless she is allowed to file a written statement which is accepted by the Court and acted upon. She has filed a statement on 7.8.1999 adopting the written statement of the second defendant and it was only three days later on 10.8.1999 that the request for arbitration is made. I am not satisfied that this delay is enough to deny the first defendant an opportunity to contest the case invoking the arbitration clause. The limit of "first statement on the substance of the dispute' appears to be only directory and not mandatory. 11. The argument of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the failure to produce the original agreement relating to arbitration is material also does not appeal to me. Along with the plaint the revision petitioner himself had produced a copy of the notice issued by the present respondent (see document with SI. No. 24) wherein he had himself mentioned about the option of arbitration and enquired whether the respondent would be willing to settle the dispute through arbitration. Merely because there was no timely response from the respondent it cannot be stated that the contention cannot be raised in the subsequent suit. Of course, she has to act with diligence and this has been done by filing the present petition immediately after filing a statement adopting the written statement of the second defendant on the merits. There is no need to produce any agreement in support of the contention because the revision petitioner himself had produced the partnership deed in question before the court as document No.1 and it is not disputed that it contains an arbitration clause with regard to possible disputes relating to goodwill and the like. There is no need to produce any agreement in support of the contention because the revision petitioner himself had produced the partnership deed in question before the court as document No.1 and it is not disputed that it contains an arbitration clause with regard to possible disputes relating to goodwill and the like. Of course, the suit filed is based on the disputes that arose at the time of dissolution of the partnership; but the dissolution involves disputes based on right of goodwill as well and hence the deed of partnership has also importance in the matter. That document was already before the Court when the request for arbitration was made and hence the prayer of the respondent for opportunity to raise the question through a written statement cannot be turned down as unjust and un maintainable. 12. It is true that in consequence of failure to raise the question of arbitration before 19.2.1999 the plaintiff had to pay a sum of Rs. 79,815/- as court fees. That does not mean that the respondent has to be burdened with this amount as costs. It was open to the revision petitioner himself to avoid the proceedings in court and to proceed with the option of arbitration invoking S.11(5) of the Act as proposed by him earlier. Had this been done as suggested in Document No. 24 (Qotice dated 26.11.1997 issued by the revision petitioner to the defendants), the necessity of paying court fees could have been avoided. After failing to do so the revision petitioner cannot be heard to put the burden on the respondent. On a consideration of all the relevant aspects, I am satisfied that the Court below has rightly allowed an opportunity to the respondent to contest the case on the merits and in allowing the application filed under 0.9 R.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The impugned order does not suffer from any material defect. The revision is accordingly found to be without merit and dismissed.