B. A. KHAN, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER, claiming to be a constitutionalist and a public spirited person, has filed this petition in public interest for quashing grant and payment of pension to Members of Parliament. He has also challenged legislative competence of the Parliament to enact Sec. 8-A of The Salary, Allowances and Pension of Members of Parliament Act, 1954, being ultra vires Articles 14, 21 and 106 of the Constitution and has prayed for its quashment. ( 2 ) PETITIONER's short case is that Constitution did not provide for grant and payment of pension to MPs as was evident from the provisions of Art. 106 of the Constitution which contemplated only payment of salaries and allowances to such members, to be determined by Parliament. Therefore, Parliament was competent only to enact a legislation, related to salary and allowances of the Members of Parliament and 'not the pension' because wherever Constitution makers had intended to provide for such grant and payment of pension, it was so specified, as in the case of Supreme Court and High Court Judges (Art. 125 and 221) and Members of Public Service Commission (Art. 322 ). This also finds support from the other relevant provisions of the Constitution which significantly omitted to make any provision for grant of pension to President, Prime Minister, Union Ministers, Governors, Chief Ministers or State Ministers. In other words it was projected that Art. 106 operated as implied bar/prohibition against any other payment to the MPs except their salary and allowances for which Parliament could legislate and enact a law. ( 3 ) SHRI Vyas, AAG, repelled this and submitted that Art. 106 provided for payment of salaries and allowances to the existing Members of the Parliament and not to the Ex-Members. As such, it was not attracted to any grant or payment to be made to the Ex or "past Members". Nor could any prohibition or restriction be read in its provisions coming in the way of Parliament to make a law for grant and payment of pension to the Past Members of the Parliament which was covered by Entry 71 of Union List of 7th Schedule. ( 4 ) FIRST a word about the connotation of word "pension". Ordinarily it is generally understood to include a payment made by the Government Employer to its employees to compensate for the past services rendered by them. ( 4 ) FIRST a word about the connotation of word "pension". Ordinarily it is generally understood to include a payment made by the Government Employer to its employees to compensate for the past services rendered by them. But it has wider meaning and even according to its dictionary definition it includes a payment, a charge, a price paid or received, and expenditure etc. and it implies any periodical payment made by the government to any person, as would be deducible from the definition word 'pension' in Art. 366 (17) of the Constitution which refers to "pension of any kind whatsoever payable to any person". Thus, pension could be of various type and could not be restricted only to the payment made to an employee by the Government in lien of his past service. ( 5 ) THERE are well established tests laid for determining the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament or State Legislature. When any challenge is thrown to any such enactment, all that was required to be examined whether the legislation fell within the relevant lists attached to the 7th Schedule and whether it was violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Chapter 3rd whether it violated any provision of Constitution or law which was restrictive of the legislative power. The motive behind the legislation and the merits and demerits of any policy incorporated therein would not constitute a relevant consideration for testing its validity. Viewed thus, all that remained to be examined was whether Sec. 8-A of the Act was within the legislative competence of Parliament and whether it was hit by provisions of Articles 14,21 or 106 of the Constitution and whether there was any other provision/entry in the Union List which empowered the Parliament to enact such legislation. ( 6 ) IT is true that Art. 106 only provides for payment of salaries and allowances to the Members of the Parliament to be determined by the Parliament and that word "pension" was not contained therein. It appears to us on a simple logic that this Article only provided for payment of salary and allowances to the existing members of the Parliament and naturally could not have contemplated any payment to the Ex-members. It appears to us on a simple logic that this Article only provided for payment of salary and allowances to the existing members of the Parliament and naturally could not have contemplated any payment to the Ex-members. Therefore, it could not be said to be applicable to any grant or payment made to the Ex-Members, if such action was otherwise competent and permissible under any other provision of the Constitution. Nor could it be said to be any restriction implied or express on the power of Parliament to make any law for such grant or payment to "past Members of Parliament". ( 7 ) IT cannot be denied that Parliament had the preliminary exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated even in the Union list of 7th Schedule and also in respect of any matters in List III (concurrent list ). This power was only subject to restrictions imposed on its exercise by various other provisions of the Constitution. ( 8 ) ENTRY 71 of the Union List provided for 'union Pensions'. It reads thus:"union Pensions, that is to say, pensions payable by the Government of India or out of the Consolidated Fund of India". This Entry was to be construed broadly and not in restricted or narrow sense. This stands well settled in number of judgments right from Atika Begum's case AIR 1941 FC 16 to Supreme Court Judgment in Raymon Company's case AIR 1963 SC90 , holding as under : (at p. 95 AIR)"the Rule of construction is undoubtedly well established that the entries in the Lists should be construed broadly and not in a narrow or pedantic sense". Therefore, word "pension" in Entry 71 was to be interpreted in its widest sense and not only envisaging payment made by the Government to its employees as compensation for past services, but also a periodical payment made by the Union to Ex-members of the Parliament for the services rendered by them during their term. ( 9 ) IT is also not understandable how the impugned enactment could be said to be violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution which guaranteed equality before law and equal protection under law and also a right of life to all citizens. ( 9 ) IT is also not understandable how the impugned enactment could be said to be violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution which guaranteed equality before law and equal protection under law and also a right of life to all citizens. Petitioner's case is that grant or payment of pension to Ex-Members of Parliament was unreasonable, irrational and discriminatory in nature and that it affected right of life of every one. It is idealistic to contend that since people in general were not receiving basic necessities of life and, therefore, it was unreasonable and unjust to grant pension to the members of the Parliament. By that logic all other things would have to wait till enforcement of directive principles contained in the Constitution. ( 10 ) WE accordingly hold that omission of word 'pension' in Art. 106 of the Constitution could not be read as any bar, prohibition or restriction, express or implied in the way of the Parliament to make an appropriate law for grant and payment of pension to Ex-Members of Parliament which it was otherwise empowered to do under Article 246 read with Entry 71 of the Constitution of India. ( 11 ) FOR the reasons given we find no merit in this Writ Petition which is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed. .