JUDGMENT D. RAJU, C. J.—The above Revision Petition has been filed against the decision of the Additional District Judge, Mandi, dated 17.8.1996 disposing of an application said to have been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the appellant-State alongwith an appeal filed before the first Appellate Court, whereunder the Court below has chosen to decline to condone the delay and in rejecting the said application under Section 5 ordered that the records be tagged with the main file. The appellant-State has chosen to file initially the present proceedings in the form of a Regular Second Appeal apparently guided and carried away by the fact that in the order under challenge in this proceeding, the proceeding that has been given a disposal is shown to be a Civil Appeal No. 36/1989. There can be no controversy over the position that not a word has been said about the merits of the case or any decision has been rendered on the merits of the suit claim which is the subject matter of the main appeal itself and that the disposal was only of the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. When the matter came up before Court on 23.5.1997, Khurana, J. ordered that prima facie, since the impugned order has been passed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act dismissing the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal before the first Appellate Court, the second appeal is not maintainable and placing on record the prayer of the learned Assistant Advocate General, then appearing before Court, that the appeal may be treated as a Civil Revision, a direction came to be issued by the learned Single Judge to register the appeal filed in this Court as Civil Revision and thereupon place the matter for orders. When the matter next came before the learned Single Judge on 12.6.1997 the learned Single Judge ordered the revision to be admitted and directed issue of notice to the respondent. 2. When the matter next came before the learned Single Judge on 12.6.1997 the learned Single Judge ordered the revision to be admitted and directed issue of notice to the respondent. 2. Before adverting to the merits of the claim of the appellant-State as also of the respondent about the legality, propriety or desirability or otherwise of the need to condone the lapse or considering the question of the legality or otherwise of the order of the Court below declining to condone the delay in filing the appeal before the said Court, it become necessary to consider the question of the maintainability or otherwise of the revision as such, in the teeth of the conflicting stands taken by the learned Counsel appearing on either side. Though Mr. M.L. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General would contend that the order directing the proceedings to be registered as a revision only is in accordance with law since the order under challenge is one pertaining to the condonation of delay in filing the first appeal before the first Appellate Court, Mr. Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent with equal force and vehemence contended that no revision lies against the order under challenge in as much as a result thereof the appeal before the Court below itself stood dismissed and therefore, the revision is not maintainable. In elaborating this aspect of the plea raised for the respondent, it has been contended that inasmuch as the effect of declining to condone the delay in filing the appeal involves the disposal of the appeal itself and the termination of the proceedings filed as an appeal before the first Appellate Court, it was considered to be a disposal of that appeal itself, whatever be the reasons be it on the merits of the case or summarily on any other ground. Several decisions have been brought to my attention by both the learned Counsel appearing on either side and it is proper to advert to sum of them to deal with this question which is of a recurring nature to clarify the position of law that has to be applied not only for the purpose of this case, but to be observed in future also. 3. Reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on AIR 1976 Cal. 3. Reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on AIR 1976 Cal. 415 (Mamuda Khateen v. Beniyan Bibi) wherein a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that an order rejecting the memorandum of appeal following the rejection of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal is not a decree but an incidental order against which an application in revision under Section 115 of the Code may lie but no appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code can be preferred. In AIR 1984 Ori. 230 (Ainthu Charan Parida v. Sitaram Jayanarayan Firm), a Full Bench of the Orissa High Court, after exhaustive analysis of the relevant case law on the subject, held that an order rejecting a memorandum of appeal or dismissing an appeal following the rejection of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in preferring an appeal is not a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and it is only an order against which an application in revision under Section 115 of the Code may lie but no appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code can be preferred. In AIR 1986 P&H 3 (Des Raj v. Om Prakash) a. Division Bench of the said High Court has held that an order dismissing an appeal after dismissal of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the appeal is not a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code. It does not amount to confirment of the decree of the trial Court and, therefore, cannot be held to be a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code. An appeal filed in that case also seems to have been treated as a revision petition and dealt with. It does not amount to confirment of the decree of the trial Court and, therefore, cannot be held to be a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code. An appeal filed in that case also seems to have been treated as a revision petition and dealt with. In coming to such a conclusion the learned Judges of the Division Bench after adverting to the provisions noticed in Order 41, Rule 3-A, which obliged an appellant at the time of filing of appeal which is barred by limitation to file an application giving the reasons that he had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation observed that it was incumbent also upon the Court to decide the application before it proceeds to decide the appeal on merits. It was observed further therein that the Court can dismiss the application without issuing notice or after issuing notice to the respondent and in case the Court accepts the application only then it can proceed under Order 41, Rules 11 and 13 to dispose of the appeal and if for any reason the application for condoning the delay is dismissed, the question of registration of the appeal under Rule 9 and its consideration under Rule 11 does not arise. In AIR 1987 MP 120 (Bal Krishan and others v. Tulsa Bai and another), 3l learned Single Judge of the said High Court held that when an appeal alongwith an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed and an order is passed dismissing it as time barred, it does not amount to a decree and, therefore, a second appeal against such an order is not maintainable even if the lower Court treats it as a decree and the same is drawn up as such. In coming to such a conclusion in addition to adverting to the other decisions earlier noticed above, reliance has been placed by the learned Single Judge on the principles laid down in the decisions reported in AIR 1954 SC 73 (Raja Kulkarni v. State of Bombay) and AIR 1976 SC 1503 (Diwan Bros. In coming to such a conclusion in addition to adverting to the other decisions earlier noticed above, reliance has been placed by the learned Single Judge on the principles laid down in the decisions reported in AIR 1954 SC 73 (Raja Kulkarni v. State of Bombay) and AIR 1976 SC 1503 (Diwan Bros. v. Central Bank of India) that where a statutory entitlement is non-existent no act of any Court embodying any order in the form of a decree by itself can make a final order of any Court appealable if the order was really, in fact and law, not a decree. In AIR 1989 MP 302 (Ajit Singh v. Bhagwanlal) a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, while placing strong reliance upon the insertion of Rule 3-A of Order 41, Civil Procedure Code, held that if Rule 3-A (2) of Order 41 mandates that Courts of appeal shall not proceed to deal with the appeal under Rule 11 or 13 without finally deciding the question of limitation that would constitute an express bar on the appellate Court to hear the appeal under Section 96 and, therefore, when the lower appellate Court exercises its jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal as time barred under new Rule 3-A of Order 41 it merely decides the question as to whether the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the period prescribed by the law of limitation and that question evidently would be a pure question of fact and the fact that the Court below has drawn up any decree as though it is an appeal, is wholly immaterial in adjudicating the maintainability or otherwise of a further appeal against such an order. 4. The decisions relied upon for the contra stand may now be noticed. In AIR 1988 Ker. 48 (Thambi v. Mathew and another) a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court had an occasion to deal with the question in the context of a second appeal filed by the plaintiff against the dismissal of his appeal by the first Appellate Court consequent upon the dismissal of an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of three days in filing the first appeal before the Court below. The learned Judges of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court were of the view that an appeal presented out of time is also an appeal and an order dismissing it as time barred is to be taken as the one passed in appeal. It was also observed that the dismissal of an appeal on the ground of limitation would tantamount to even confirment of the decree of the trial Court on the merits of the appeal and the decision of the Appellate Court would constitute res judicata on the basis of title raised in the appeal. Finally the learned Judges of the Kerala High Court were of the view that it was difficult to accept the proposition that there was no decree when the appeal was dismissed in limine and such a dismissal is of no consequence. This decision, in our view over looks the relevant provisions in the Code which regulates the filing and disposal of appeals and as to when only an appeal either under Section 96 or 100 or 104 and Order 43 or for that matter any other provisions are envisaged and permissible. With respect, I am unable to subscribe to the said view and on the other hand the other decisions taking a different view and the ratio of the decision of the Madras High Court in AIR 1941 Mad. 836 (FB) (In re N. Kayambu Pillai), to which a reference will be made hereinafter, commends themselves for my acceptance to be more relevant and correct. In AIR 1914 Mad. 149 (1) (Thandayuthapani Sethuram v. Chinnathal and others) a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court held that an order of a subordinate Court refusing to excuse the delay in presentation of an appeal is not open to revision under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code even for the purpose of showing that the appeal was presented in time. Though it is held therein that the Judges order in such cases is not open to revision it is not very clear as to whether the issue came to be considered by the learned Single Judge in the context of maintainability of the revision petition or the desirability of interfering with the order of the Court below declining to condone the delay in exercise of its discretion. In AIR 1921 Calcutta 415 (Promotho Nath v. W.A. Lee) a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has held that an order dismissing an appeal as barred by limitation and refusing to extend time under the Limitation Act is one passed on the appeal itself. The said view has been recorded by the learned Judges in the said case by construing the words "passed on appeal within the meaning of Clause (a) of Section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided for appeals to the Supreme Court from orders of the High Court. In AIR 1941 Pat. 108 (Gajadhar Bhagatv. Moti Chand Bhagat), a learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court held that the rejection of memorandum of appeal as being out of time does amount to a decree and is appealable. In AIR 1967 Mad. 403 (Gopalaswami v. G. Navalgarid) a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court held, while dealing with a matter arising under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, that an application for excusing delay in filing application for compensation under Section 110-A (3) of the said Act constituted an award for the purpose of filing an appeal against such decision. In AIR 1987 Guj. 205 (Naran Anappa Shethi v. Jayantilal Chunilal Shah) a learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court held Order 41, Rule 3-A to be not a mandatory but really a directory procedural law and it should be interpreted in such a way as not to take away the rights of the parties. The observation of the learned Single Judge in that case was in the particular and peculiar facts of the case wherein it was noticed that the lower Appellate Court was found to have not given an opportunity to the petitioner to explain as to how the appeal was within time and when the Court without doing so summarily rejected the appeal on the ground that it has been presented beyond the period of limitation. It is obvious from the facts of the said case that the learned Single Judge also held that the object of inserting Rule 3-A in Order 41 was to put ,an end to the practice of admitting the appeal subject to the decision on the question of limitation and this practice was said to have been disapproved by the Privy Council and it stressed for the expediency of adopting a procedure under which the final determination of the question as to limitation would be possible before admission of the appeal itself. In AIR 1956 SC 367 (Messrs. Mela Ram and Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab), their Lordships of the Apex Court while dealing with a matter arising under the Income Tax Act, J 922 observed that rules of limitation pertain to the domain of adjectival law and that they operate only to bar the remedy but not to extinguish the right and an appeal preferred in accordance with Section 30(1) of the said Act would be an appeal in the eye of law, though having been presented beyond the period of limitation mentioned in Section 30 (2) inspite of the same being rendering it liable to be dismissed in limine. Section 33 of the said Act which conferred a right of appeal against all orders passed under Section 31, was so construed by their Lordships to enable the filing of an appeal under the said provisions against such orders also. The learned Counsel for the respondent also invited my attention to the decision in 1997 (2) Shim. L.C. 304 (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Badri), a decision rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court and 1998 (2) Shim. L.C. 505 (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Om Prakash Sahani), a decision rendered by me wherein this Court in such circumstances seems to have registered as a matter of routine the proceedings in this Court, as a regular second appeal, and in the absence of any objection as to the maintainability of the appeal, as such, the same without demur, came to be dealt with and dismissed as an appeal only. It is to be noticed that since the question about the maintainability was not either in issue or decided by this Court in the two decisions of this Court noticed above they cannot be considered to be of any assistance in arriving at a conclusion on the question raised in the present case with reference to the maintainability viz., whether it has to be by way of an appeal or only as a revision. 5. In AIR 1941 Mad. 836 a Full Bench of the Madras High Court had an occasion to deal with the nature of an order passed dismissing an appeal for non-payment of Court fee and failure to furnish security under Order 41, Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code. The learned Judges of the Full Bench held that such an order is not a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side. Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure defines, for the purpose of the said Code, the word decree to mean: "the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Section 144, but shall not include : (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default." 7. Both in keeping into account the essential elements envisaged to constitute a proceeding or an order to be a decree within the meaning of the said definition contained in the Code, as also the relevant appellate provisions governing the filing of appeals there must be an adjudication and that such adjudication also should be in a duly or properly instituted proceeding that the Court below must have determined the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the proceeding and further not only such determination must be a conclusive determination but there must be a formal expression of adjudication too. The definition of the word decree found in the Code also excludes any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, meaning thereby the appeals provided in the Code under any specific provision contained in Section 104 and Order 43 or other provisions of the Code or the rules contained therein. If an adjudication which satisfies the definition of decree is made appealable under Section 96 or 100, and an adjudication or decision though not falling within the scope of the definition of the word decree are rendered specifically appealable under some or the other provisions of the Code, alone such as Section 104 or other provisions contained in the various orders in the Code for which no specific provision is made, in a case where there is no scope for an appeal under Sections 96 and 100 or under Section 104 or any other provision of the Code, inevitably the power of this Court to call for the record of any other case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to this Court and in which no appeal lies thereto in anyone of the cases on circumstances warranting such exercise by invoking revisional jurisdiction of this Court cannot be denied either to the Court or a litigant concerned in case where even the provisions contained in the Code are found to be inadequate to meet a particular situation or contingency and where this Court is also of the view that miscarriage of justice has resulted or grave injustice or gross illegality has been committed, the powers of this Court to intervene is equally conserved under Article 227 of the Constitution of India also. Consequently, if a particular order or a decision made by a Court subordinate to the High Court is found to be not an appealable one either under Sections 96 and 100 or under Section 104 read with or independently under other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the powers of revision would be necessarily available, of course, subject to the very limitation, if any, prescribed in Section 115 itself. It is one thing to state that in a given case, having regard to the limitation engrafted in Section 115 itself, this Court will not ought not to interfere, but another thing to say that no revision is maintainable at all against an order or a decision taken or rendered by the Court subordinate to this Court, which really and substantially affects the rights of the parties. As observed in some of the decisions noticed supra, the real test to find out as to whether a given order or a decision is appealable or not, is by adverting to the fact as to whether such a decision or order answers the description of a decree or the order against which specifically an appeal is provided for under the other provisions of the Code itself and not what cloak or cover the Court below has adopted to couch its order or decision and by what name it proposes to ascribe to such an order or decision. Viewed in that context, I am of the view that the order declining to condone the delay in an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is an order against which only a revision will lie and not a decree from which an appeal could be maintained either under Sections 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure or an order which could be said to be appealable under Section 104 read with Order 43 or any other provisions of the Code. Consequently, the objection raised on behalf of the respondent about the maintainability of the revision is overruled and the view taken by the learned Single Judge while directing to Registry to register the proceeding as a revision is upheld, to be the correct position of law to be followed. 8. The next question that remains for consideration in view of the decision taken by me on the maintainability of the revision, is as to whether the Court below was justified in coming to the conclusion that there was no sufficient cause substantiated by the petitioner in this case and the appellant before the Court below to have an order, for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. Whereas the learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the decisions reported in AIR 1996 SC 1623 (State of Haryana v. Chandra Mam), AIR 1996 SC 2750 (Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K. V. Auisurnma) and JT 1998 (6) SC 242, the learned Counsel for the respondent placed strong reliance upon the decision reported in AIR 1998 SC 2276 (P.K. Ramchandran v. State of Kerala and another) in support of their respective stands. In the decision reported in AIR 1996 SC 1623 (supra) three of their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that in appreciating or considering the claim for condonation of delay in filing an appeal at the instance of the State or any authority of the State or a public undertaking, the fact that the Government or such bodies are impersonal machineries and that the transaction of business of the Government or such bodies is invariably carried out by officers having no personal interest at different levels, also has to be kept into mind. The decision in AIR 1998 SC 2276 (supra) was rendered in the peculiar facts and context of a cryptic reason assigned therein that the Advocate Generals office was fed up with so many administrative maters equally important to the case, which reason made their Lordships of the Apex Court in the said case to come to the conclusion that there was no reasonable or satisfactory explanation. In JT 1998 (6) 242 (supra) it was held that condonation of delay is a matter of not only the discretion of the Court but the length of delay is no matter or the criteria in undertaking such consideration and instead the acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion and so long as the explanation is found to be sufficient, the length of the delay alone cannot be an impediment, in condoning the delay. So far as the case on hand is concerned, the reason that was assigned was that the appeal papers were sent to the office of the District Attorney, that those papers were lost in his office and after intensive inquiry against all those concerned, the lapse came to be noticed and inspite of all such efforts, since the papers could not be traced out, papers were again got prepared and appeal was said to have been filed. In order to substantiate the said serious lapse which occurred in the office of the District Attorney and due to which only the delay was occasioned, several witnesses, almost amounting to seven have been examined and if these facts alleged and substantiated do not constitute sufficient reasons for condonation of delay in this case, I fail to see or envisage a better case for the Court to exercise its discretion in order to prevent miscarriage of justice being allowed to happen. As a matter of fact, it is this method of handling matters by the officers of the Government and Public bodies that necessitated their Lordships of the Apex Court to take a lenient view of the matter in the matter of condonation of the delay in such case to avert miscarriage of justice due to any manipulations or indifference of those managing the affairs of such public bodies or authorities. 9. For all the reasons stated above, I am of the view that the learned Judge in the Court below has not properly applied his mind to the various principles laid down which should weigh with the Court considering the question of condonation of delay in filing an appeal or any other proceeding and judging the issue concerning the sufficiency or otherwise of the cause so pleaded in support of or justification of the claim for condonation. The case on hand involves substantial rights to property and that too public property and adjudication on merits of the claim atleast by one appellate Court cannot be allowed to be defeated by taking a harsh or too technical view of the matter in appreciating the genuineness as well as sufficiency of the cause shown in this case. The reasons assigned by the learned Judge in the Court below for rejecting the application, therefore, cannot have the approval of this Court. Consequently the order of the learned Judge in the Court below is set aside. The revision will stand allowed and the learned District Judge, Mandi is directed to restore the appeal filed by the appellant State against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Sub-Judge 1st Class Joginder Nagar dated 15.1.1988 in Civil Suit No. 45 of 1987 and dispose of the same on merits in accordance with law after giving due and sufficient opportunity to both the parties as envisaged in law. Since the suit is of the year 1987, the learned Additional District Judge, Mandi will ensure the disposal of the appeal within six months from this date without fail and send a report to the Registry of this Court of having done so. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Additional District Judge, Mandi on 28.6.1999 either themselves or through Counsel for further orders. Revision allowed.