RAJENDRA KISHORE KANUNGO AND SMT. SUCHETA KANUNGO v. STATE OF ORISSA
1999-02-16
P.K.MISRA
body1999
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : P.K. Misra, J. - This application u/s 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, the "Code of Criminal Procedure") is a sequel to the earlier application filed u/s 438, Code of Criminal Procedure, by the present Petitioners. The Petitioners are respectively the father-in-law and mother-in-law of deceased Monalisha who had married Rajesh Kanungo, son of the Petitioners, in the year 1994. The informant, father of deceased Monalisha, has lodged F.I.R. in Laxmisagar Police Station on the basis of which Laxmisagar P.S. Case No. 195/98 has been registered. It is alleged that offences under- Sections498-A, 304-B and 306, read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code (in short, the "I.P.C.") have been committed. The two Petitioners had earlier filed Criminal Misc. Case No. 5106 of 1998 u/s 438, Code of Criminal Procedure. In the said case, at the time of entertaining the application, interim order was passed by the then Chief Justice not to arrest the two Petitioners till the next date of hearing. On 1.12.1998, however, an interim order was passed that the case shall be taken up on 8.12.1998 and the Petitioners, if arrested in connection with the case should be released on bail of Rs. 10,000/?with one surety for the like amount to the satisfaction of the arresting officer. It is not disputed that pursuant to the said order, the two Petitioners were released on interim bail by the arresting officer. Ultimately, the application u/s 438, Code of Criminal Procedure was disposed of by judgment date 18.12.1998, reported in (1999)16 OCR 125 (Rajendra Kishore Kanungo and Anr. v. State of Orissa). After referring to the various decisions on the point and the circumstances of the case, it was observed: 11. For the foregoing reasons, I am not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the Petitioners till the end of the trial. However, to enable them to approach the appropriate Court, I direct that the protection granted to them by order dated 27.11.1998 shall continue to operate for a period of two weeks from today. Since a time-limit has been fixed, they may approach the appropriate Court as early as possible so that the Court would get sufficient time to hear the parties and pass orders in accordance with law within that period. In case bail is rejected, the Petitioners may move the higher Court, which shall dispose of their petition during the aforesaid time.
Since a time-limit has been fixed, they may approach the appropriate Court as early as possible so that the Court would get sufficient time to hear the parties and pass orders in accordance with law within that period. In case bail is rejected, the Petitioners may move the higher Court, which shall dispose of their petition during the aforesaid time. It is made clear that while considering the bail petition of the Petitioners, the Court(s) below shall not be in any way influenced by the observations made by this Court or by the fact that this Court has granted interim protection. Thereafter, the Petitioners appeared before the concerned S.D.J.M. and moved application u/s 437, Code of Criminal Procedure, which having been rejected by the S.D.J.M., application u/s 439, Code of Criminal Procedure was filed before the Sessions Judge. The Additional Sessions Judge who dealt with the matter rejected the application thus necessitating the present application by the Petitioners. 2. In the present case, the interim protection granted earlier by Hon'ble Chief Justice by order dated 1.12.1998 has been extended from time to time by different Benches. 3. Before the matter is considered on merit, a preliminary objection raised by learned Additional Government Advocate is required to be disposed of. It has been contended by him that the interim protection finally granted by the High Court in the earlier application u/s 438, Code of Criminal Procedure was for a period of two weeks from the date of disposal of the earlier case, that is to say, from 18.12.1998. He has submitted that the application u/s 439, Code of Criminal Procedure having been rejected by the Sessions Judge on 26.12.1998, the interim protection granted by the High Court earlier lapsed with the rejection of the application by the Sessions Judge, or, at any rate, the interim protection automatically lapsed after expiry of two weeks from 18.12.1998 and the subsequent orders passed by the High Court either in the disposed of application u/s 438, or in the present application were of No. consequence. He, therefore, submitted that since the Petitioners are not in custody and since their interim protection had lapsed, the present application u/s 439, Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court is not maintainable.
He, therefore, submitted that since the Petitioners are not in custody and since their interim protection had lapsed, the present application u/s 439, Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court is not maintainable. He has further submitted that in view of the Division Bench decision of this Court, there was No. jurisdiction to stay the arrest of the Petitioners after the lapse of the period of interim bail and, at any rate, there was No. jurisdiction, nor any justification, to extend the interim protection. 4. There is No. doubt that in view of the Division Bench decision of this Court any order passed in an application u/s 438, Code of Criminal Procedure not to arrest an accused person is inappropriate. However, though No. such order preventing the police from arresting an accused person ought to be passed, there is No. dispute that while considering an application u/s 438, the Court in appropriate cases can direct release of an accused person on interim bail pending consideration of the application u/s 438, Code of Criminal Procedure, of course, depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In the present case, while disposing of the earlier application u/s 438, Hon'ble Chief Justice had expressly continued the interim protection dated 27.11.1998 which meant that the (accused persons were not to be arrested. By order, dated 22.12.1998 the final order date 18.12.1998 was subsequently clarified to mean that the interim bail granted on 1.12.1998 was to continue. At the same when the Sessions Judge rejected the application u/s 439, Code of Criminal Procedure, such application was definitely maintainable, as it must be taken that the Petitioners were deemed to be in judicial custody. It is not necessary to refer to various decisions on this point in view of the decision reported in Shri Indrajeet Roy Vs. Republic of India. Thus the application u/s 439, Code of Criminal Procedure before the Sessions Judge was maintainable at that stage. At the time when it was rejected, the Petitioners were still under the umbrella of interim protection and before the said interim protection expired, the learned Vacation Judge extended the interim protection which was subsequently extended by different Benches on different occasions. The justification for such extension of the interim protection at different stages is not available to be raised before this Court.
The justification for such extension of the interim protection at different stages is not available to be raised before this Court. Since the Petitioners still continue to be in deemed judicial custody, the contention of the learned Add1. Government Advocate that the application u/s 439, Code of Criminal Procedure is not maintainable, has No. merit and is hereby rejected. 5. Coming to the prayer for bail, the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners has submitted that death of the deceased was suicide and there is No. justification in the suspicion raised by the informant relating to alleged homidical nature of the death. In this connection, he has referred to the two post-mortem reports. It would not be advisable to go into such matter at this stage and the matter should be examined on the footing that the death was suicidal. 6. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners then submitted that thee are ample materials in the case diary to indicate that the suicide was on account of the misunderstanding between the deceased and her husband due to alleged love affair of the husband with another lady and the two Petitioners cannot be blamed for such unfortunate incident. In this connection, he has also submitted that the materials on record including the statements of many relatives of the deceased indicate that there was No. demand of dowry at the time when marriage was fixed or subsequently. The learned Counsel appearing for the State as well as the learned Counsel appearing for the informant, on the other hand, submitted that there are sufficient materials on record, particularly that of the parents and a cousin of the deceased, indicating that there had been demand of dowry. As observed by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Niranjan Singh and Another Vs. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and Others it is not advisable to undertake a detailed examination of the materials at the stage of finding out about the prima facie case while considering the bail application, as such detailed discussion is likely to prejudice either party. Whether some of the statements made by some of the persons examined can be accepted at the time of trial in view of other statements made by other witnesses, is a matter best left to the trial Court to consider after recording of evidence. At this stage, it would not be proper to delve into this matter.
Whether some of the statements made by some of the persons examined can be accepted at the time of trial in view of other statements made by other witnesses, is a matter best left to the trial Court to consider after recording of evidence. At this stage, it would not be proper to delve into this matter. After going through the case diaries upto 1st week of January, 1999 which have been produced by the learned Additional Government Advocate, it cannot be said at this stage that there is No. prima facie case against the Petitioners relating to commission of offence u/s 498-A, Indian Penal Code, 1860. Similarly, I am not in a position to accept the submission made by the counsel for the Petitioners that the suicide by the deceased cannot be attributed to any torture. In other words, it cannot be said at this stage that No. prima facie case u/s 498-A or Section 304-B or Section 306, I.P.C. had been made out against the two Petitioners. 7. The learned Sessions Judge has observed that there is No. possibility of the Petitioners absconding or tampering with the materials on record. So far as the first aspect is concerned, it cannot be doubted that possibility of absconding by any of the Petitioners is very remote keeping in view the fact that Petitioner No. 1 is a highly placed Government official and Petitioner No. 2 is his wife and both have their permanent abode in this place. Though the Sessions Judge has also observed that there is No. possibility of tampering, it is better not to give any opinion on this aspect at this stage. 8. The question is as to whether this is a fit case where bail should be granted. While considering this aspect, the petition of Petitioner No,2, mother-in-law, can be considered separately, So far as Petitioner No. 1 is concerned, it would not be advisable to re lease him on bail at this stage keeping in view the nature of the offences alleged, the facts and circumstances appearing in the case, and the impact of such release on the society as well as on the investigation which is still going on. The fact that another co-accused, the husband of the deceased, is yet to be apprehended, cannot be lost sight of at this stage.
The fact that another co-accused, the husband of the deceased, is yet to be apprehended, cannot be lost sight of at this stage. Accordingly, the application for bail of Petitioner No. 1 is rejected with observation that it would be open to him to move for' bail afresh after progress in investigation is made. 9. So far as Petitioner No. 2 is concerned, it stands on a different footing. In spite of the popular sentiment in such matters generally blaming the mother-in-law and the sister-in-law, one cannot lose sight of the provision contained in Section 437( 1), first/proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is to the following effect: 437. When bail may be taken in cases of non-bailable offence. 1 When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer-in-charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court other than the High Court or Court of Session, he may be released on a bail, but- (i) such person shall not be so released if, there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life; (ii) such person shall not be so released if- such offence is a cognizable offence and he had been previously convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more, or he had been previously convicted on two or more occasions of a non-bailable and cognizable offence: Provided that the Court may direct that a person referred to in C1.(i) or C1.(ij) be released on bail if such person is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm: As is well-known, Section 437, Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable to consideration of bail by a Magistrate who is injuncted from granting bail in a case where there is reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It is also well-known that such embargo upon the powers of the Magistrate is not applicable to consideration of bail by the Sessions Judge or the High Court u/s 439, Code of Criminal Procedure.
It is also well-known that such embargo upon the powers of the Magistrate is not applicable to consideration of bail by the Sessions Judge or the High Court u/s 439, Code of Criminal Procedure. Though the discretion to be exercised u/s 439, Code of Criminal Procedure by the Sessions Judge or the High Court is unfettered, the discretion is not unbridled and certain well recognised principles are followed. The Magistrate has, however, No. such discretion when he finds that the accused has prima facie committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The Proviso, however, carves out an important exception to such restrictive clause and it gives a discretion to the Magistrate to grant bail to an accused person in spite of the fact that such accused person has prima facie committed offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, when the accused is under the age of sixteen years, or is a woman, or is sick or infirm person. It is, of course, true that such proviso is only directory and the Magistrate is not bound to release an accused person under the proviso in each and every case. However, the very fact that such an exception has been provided, is itself indicative of the fact that such exception is to be liberally construed. In the present case, Petitioner No. 2 is a lady aged about 52 years. As already indicated, possibility of her absconding is minimal. It cannot be visualised that by herself she will be in a position to gain over or influence witnesses or the investigation. Having regard to these aspects, I am inclined to release Petitioner No. 2 on a bail of Rs. 20,000/- with two sureties each for the like amount to the satisfaction of the S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar, in G.R. Case No. 3357/98, arising out of Laxmisagar Police Station Case No. 195/98. It is made clear that any attempt by Petitioner No. 2 to interfere with the investigation or tamper with prosecution witnesses would entail cancellation of the bail order. She should fully cooperate in the matter of investigation and should not leave the jurisdiction of the S.D.J.M. without prior permission of the Court. 10. Since the bail application of Petitioner No. 1 is rejected, he must surrender by tomorrow as earlier directed.
She should fully cooperate in the matter of investigation and should not leave the jurisdiction of the S.D.J.M. without prior permission of the Court. 10. Since the bail application of Petitioner No. 1 is rejected, he must surrender by tomorrow as earlier directed. Similarly, since the interim bail of Petitioner No. 2 is expiring tomorrow, fresh bail bond should be furnished as per the present order by tomorrow. 11. The Criminal Misc. Case is accordingly disposed of. Copy of this order be handed over to learned Additional Government Advocate. Urgent certified copy of the order may be granted to Petitioners on proper application.