Judgment :- N.K. Jain, J. 1. This writ appeal has been filed against the order dated 24. 1999 in W.P. No. 4993 of 1999 passed by the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition seeking to quash order dated 12. 1999 on the ground of delay. 2. The necessary facts for the disposal of this writ appeal as alleged, are that the petitioner S.Rajendran is the proprietor of M/s.Sterling Exchange Corporation. He is also the Managing Director of M/s.Goodluck Forex (I) Ltd. A computer with data particulars and cash of Rs. 16 lakhs were seized on a search conducted in the office of the petitioner on 212. 1997. The petitioner was arrested on 22. 1998 and remanded to judicial custody. It is alleged that he filed W.P. No. 1909 of 1998, for quashing the proceedings dated 16. 1998 whereunder the time limit for retaining the documents seized, was extended. Another W.P. No. 1910 of 1999 was filed for the return of seized currency of Rs. 16 lakhs. It is also alleged that W.P. No. 6184 of 1999 was filed against the show cause notice issued as to why the seized money and amounts blocked in various accounts in a sum of Rs. 38 lakhs and odd should not be confiscated. The petitioner was ordered to be detained under COFEPOSA Act, 1974, vide order dated 12. 1999, against which this writ petition has been filed. 3. Respondents 1 and 2 have filed detailed counter denying the allegations, as alleged. It is submitted that before execution of the detention order, the petitioner cannot ask for copy of the detention order of the grounds, and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. The learned single Judge, by an elaborate order, holding that it cannot be said that there is delay in executing the order of detention on the part of the respondents, dismissed the writ petition. 5. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the order of detention has been passed without jurisdiction and it is based on vague and extraneous materials. As such, the same is liable to be set aside on the ground of delay. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied on (1) Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh. 5. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the order of detention has been passed without jurisdiction and it is based on vague and extraneous materials. As such, the same is liable to be set aside on the ground of delay. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied on (1) Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh. v. M.M.Mehta , Commissioner of Police, 1995 (3) SCC 237 ; (2) Ahamed Mohaideen Zabbar v. State of Tamil Nadu , 1999 (3) Scale 141 ; (3) Balwinder Singh, v. State of Punjab , 1996 Crl. L.J.1533; and (4) Anwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan , 1995 (2) Crimes 419 . 6. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents submits that the appellant has been evading detention since 12. 1999. He also submits that before execution of the detention order, the appellant cannot seek for copy of detention order or the grounds, counsel further submits that the search was made on 212. 1997. Appellant had obtained statutory bail, but did not appeal either before the Director or the concerned court. Rather, he absconded and went abroad. As such, bail order was cancelled. Order under Sec.3(1) was published directing him to appear within 7 days before the 5th respondent. Counsel further submits that the decisions relied on by the appellant are either habeas corpus petitions or petitions under under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. As such, they are not applicable to the facts of the given case. Therefore, no direction as prayed for can be granted. Counsel relied on (1) Addl. Secretary to Government v. Smt.Alka Subhash Gadia , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496; (2) Haja Mohaideen v. Union of India , 1991 (2) L.W. (Crl) 383; (3) Subhash Muljimal Gandhi v. L.Himingdeen , 1994 (3) Crimes 242 and (4) Secretary, Home Department v. Abdul Azeez 1995 (III) C.C.R 654. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record and the case law. Though it is not necessary to deal with each case cited, as the learned counsel argued vehemently, we discuss the case law cited by either party. 8. In Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh’s Case, 1995 (3) SCC 237 , the petitioner was detained on 18. 1994 alleging that he was found to be habitually indulging in criminal and anti-social activities. Though it is not necessary to deal with each case cited, as the learned counsel argued vehemently, we discuss the case law cited by either party. 8. In Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh’s Case, 1995 (3) SCC 237 , the petitioner was detained on 18. 1994 alleging that he was found to be habitually indulging in criminal and anti-social activities. Considering the provisions of Sec.2 (c) and 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985, their Lordships held that the power to detain a person must be exercised with restraint and great caution. The detaining Authority must satisfy that the detenu is a dangerous person within the meaning of Se c.2(c) of the Act. It was also observed that the incident occurred on 24. 1993, while the detention order was passed on 18. 1994 after a lapse of more than 16 months. The long lapse of time between the alleged prejudicial activity and the detention order loses its significance because the said prejudicial conduct was not proximate in point of time and had no rational connection with the conclusion that the detention was necessary for maintenance of public order. In Ahamed Mohaideen Zabbar’s case, 1999 (3) Scale 141 , the detenu was found to have smuggled 23 gold biscuits weighing 2679.5 grams into India on 12. 1997. Order of detention was passed on 211. 1998. The explanation of the Detaining Authority, in the facts of that case, was found to be not satisfactory. As such, the delay of 11 months was held to be fatal. The writ petition was allowed. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab , 1996 Crl. L.J.1533, the detenu was found to possess 35 gold biscuits with others on 2. 1993 and he made a statement on 3. 1993 admitting transpiration of smuggled gold from 1988 onwards. In March, 1993, he was apprehended. The detention order was passed on 112. 1993. There was a delay of 10 months. Considering the various aspects, a learned single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court found that the explanation of the detaining authority did not inspire confidence. Hence, he quashed the detention order. In Anwar Singh’s Case, 1995 (2) Crimes 419 , detention order was passed on 16. 1993 and the petitioner was detained on 23. 1994. Detention order was served on him on 24. 1994. Hence, he quashed the detention order. In Anwar Singh’s Case, 1995 (2) Crimes 419 , detention order was passed on 16. 1993 and the petitioner was detained on 23. 1994. Detention order was served on him on 24. 1994. A Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court held that no affidavit by the concerned officer in support of the plea that the petitioner was absconding was filed. Under the circumstances, considering the delay of one year and two months, the Bench observed that the unexplained delay of 10 months in executing the detention order s naps live and proximata link between grounds of detention and purpose of detention and thus it vitiates the detention order. 9. Now, considering the case law cited by counsel for the respondents, in Smt.Alka’s Case, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496, order of detention against the husband of 1st respondent was passed on 112. 1985. It is alleged that he was absconding. So, it could not be served on him. Declaration under Section 2(b) of Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976, was made and notice under Section 6(1) of that Act was issued. High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the wife and gave directions to the authorities. In the appeal filed by the Department, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, on an analysis of the entire case law on the subject held that if in every case, the detenu is permitted to challenge and seek the stay of operation of the detention order, before it is executed, the very purpose of the order and of the law under which it is made, will be frustrated, since such orders are in operation only for a limited period. However,their Lordships observed that only where the court is prima facie satisfied, inter alia, that it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds, it can interferes with such detention order. 10. Basing on the above decision, a Division Bench of this Court in Haja Mohideen’s case, 1991 (2) L.W.(Crl) 383 held that pre-detention writ seeking mandamus from arresting and detaining the petitioner on the plea of four months delay cannot be entertained in the facts of the case. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has followed the decision in Alka’s Case, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496, in Subhash Muljimal Gandhi’s case, 1994 (3) Crimes 242. 12. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has followed the decision in Alka’s Case, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496, in Subhash Muljimal Gandhi’s case, 1994 (3) Crimes 242. 12. A Division Bench of Kerala High Court has followed Alka’s Case, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496, in Secretary, Home Department v. Abdul Azeez , 1995 (III) C.C.R. 654. 13. Considering the case law, as discussed above, no doubt this Court has power to interfere with the detention order at pre-detention stage. But the discretion has to be exercised only as per the law enunciated in Alka’s case, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496, provided it is satisfied that any one of the conditions laid down in that case is attracted. At the same time, the discretion has to be exercised judicially in the facts of the given case. 14. In the case on hand, the search was made on 212. 1997. Appellate got statutory bail. But, he did not appear before the Director or the concerned Authority. Rather, he remained absconding. Bail was cancelled. Order under section 3 (ii) of the Act was passed directing the appellant to appear within 7 days before the 5th respondent. under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner can take advantage of any of the decisions cited by him and referred to above. We are of the view that in the facts of the given case, the detention order dated 12. 1999 cannot be held to be vitiated on the ground of delay or vagueness. it is also seen that the petitioner, only with a view to avoid arrest, now challenges the order of detention before its execution. We do not find any illegality or error in the order of the learned Single Judge so as to call for interference. No other point was urged or argued before us. The writ appeal is dismissed. No costs, Consequently, C.M.P. No. 7729 of 1999 is also dismissed.