G. Nageshwararao v. Veerapandi S. Ammugham — 1999 DIGILAW 652 (MAD)

Judgment : This is a suit for specific performance to direct the defendants to execute the sale deed with regard to the suit property in favour of the plaintiff, failing which, to direct an officer of this Court to execute the sale deed and for costs. 2. The suit property was the self-acquired property of one late Ramanujalu Naidu, the father of defendants 3 to 7. The said Ramanujalu Naidu died intestate in the year 1984, leaving his wife Rukmani Animal, who died in the year 1996, and also defendants 3 to 7. The plaintiff is residing in the suit property as a tenant for the past 30 years. Defendants 1 and 2 entered into a sale agreement on 29.3.1994 in respect of half of the suit property with Renuka and Thilothumai in their own right and Thilothummai as the power agent of late Rukmani Ammal. Defendants 1 and 2 assigned the above sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff on 1.11.1994 and received an advance of Rs. 1,00,000/-. Defendants 1 and 2 have also taken possession of the upstairs and the out-house of the suit property, which represent half share of defendants 3 to 5. Such possession of the above said half share was given to defendants 1 and 2 by defendants 3 to 5 as a condition precedent for sale of the other half share. The sale consideration agreed to for the suit property was Rs. 52,50,000/-. The plaintiff informed defendants 1 and 2 about his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. But defendants 1 and 2 did not execute the sale deed with regard to the suit property. Defendants 1 and 2 demanded Rs. 50,00,000/-for half of the schedule mentioned property. Defendants 3 to 7 were impleaded as parties to the suit for the purpose of specific performance of the above said agreement. It is under the said circumstances, the plaintiff has come forward with this suit for the relief of specific performance. 3. Defendants 1 and 2 resisted the suit claim on the following grounds:— Defendants 3 to 7 are the owners of the suit property and defendants 1 and 2 had entered into an agreement on 29.3.1994 to purchase the suit property, with defendants 6 and 7 alone. The plaintiff, as chief tenant, was collecting rent for the out-house in the ground and first floor. The plaintiff, as chief tenant, was collecting rent for the out-house in the ground and first floor. The plaintiff was requested to vacate and hand over possession of the out-house in the ground floor and first floor, which were in the occupation of the tenants and for that, defendants 1 and 2 had given an authorisation letter and also handed over some signed blank non-judicial stamp paper and white papers to the plaintiff, as required by him for the purpose of vacating the tenants and for paying compensation to them for vacating the said premises. A sizable compensation money was also received by the plaintiff from defendants 1 and 2. Defendants 1 and 2 filed a suit for specific performance in C.S. No. 370 of 1996 on the file of the High Court, Madras, based on the agreement dated 29.3.1994 as defendants 3 to 5 were not inclined to sell the property in favour of defendants 1 and 2. Since the other co-owners of the suit property wanted to give the same to the 5th defendant for promoting the same, defendants 1 and 2 did not pursue the suit further and reported settlement to the Court for the suit being dismissed as settled, out of Court. Defendants 1 and 2 did not have any power of attorney from the real owners of the suit property to enter into an agreement for sale with the plaintiff with regard to the suit property at any time. Defendants 1 and 2 did not enter into an agreement with the plaintiff for sale of the suit property on 1.11.1994 for Rs. 52,50,000/-and had also not received an advance of Rs. 1,00,000/- from the plaintiff. If there is any agreement for sale, the parties to the alleged agreement should submit the same for necessary permission to the Income-tax Authorities (Appropriate Authority) and any failure will invalidate the alleged agreement. Since defendants 1 and 2 had not entered into any agreement as alleged by the plaintiff, the plaintiff is not justified in coming forward with this suit for specific performance, impleading defendants 3 to 7 also as parties to the suit. The present suit for specific performance has been filed by the plaintiff since he wants to squat on the suit property after an order of eviction obtained from the Rent Control Court by the owners. The alleged agreement for sale is a fabricated document. The present suit for specific performance has been filed by the plaintiff since he wants to squat on the suit property after an order of eviction obtained from the Rent Control Court by the owners. The alleged agreement for sale is a fabricated document. Defendants 1 and 2 did not take possession of the shares of defendants 3 to 5 as a condition precedent for sale of the other half of the suit property. The alleged readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract for sale dated 1.11.1994, even without issuing notice or letter expressing his readiness, is rediculous. The allegation of requesting defendants 1 and 2 to execute a sale deed after receiving the alleged balance consideration, is nothing but a figment of imagination. The agreement entered into by defendants 1 and 2 with defendants 6 and 7 was subsequently cancelled at the intervention of the well-wishers and in fact, there is no agreement between defendants 1 and 2 and defendants 3 to 5. The plaintiff has come forward with this suit after a lapse of 2-1/2 years for specific performance without even issuing notice to the defendants. There is no merit or bona fides in the claim of the plaintiff and, therefore, defendants 1 and 2 had sought for the dismissal of the suit with costs. 4. Defendants 3 to 7 resisted the suit claim on the following grounds:— The suit property was the absolute self-acquired property of A.V. Ramanujalu Naidu and on his death, defendants 3 to 7 and their mother Rukmani Ammal succeeded to the suit property. On the death of Rukmani Ammal, defendants 3 to 7 are entitled to 1/5th share each in the suit property. The agreement entered into with defendants 1 and 2 is illegal. On the protest made by the other defendants with regard to the abovesaid sale agreement, defendants 1 and 2 filed C.S. No. 370 of 1996 for specific performance. Since the sale could not be effected with regard to the 2/5th share belonging to defendants 6 and 7, defendants 1 and 2 withdrew the said suit after amicable settlement, as settled out of Court. The allegation of assigning the sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff by defendants 1 and 2 with regard to the shares belonging to defendants 6 and 7 on 1.11.1994, after receiving the alleged advance of Rs. The allegation of assigning the sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff by defendants 1 and 2 with regard to the shares belonging to defendants 6 and 7 on 1.11.1994, after receiving the alleged advance of Rs. 1,00,000/- from the plaintiff is mischievous and misleading. Possession of the property was not given by these defendants to anybody on the basis of the alleged agreement. The plaintiff, who is a statutory tenant in the suit property, had defaulted to pay rent after the death of Rukmani Ammal in the year 1994 and, therefore, eviction was sought for against the plaintiff in R.C.O.P. No. 2686 of 1994 on the file of the Rent Controller, Chennai on the ground of wilful default, own use and occupation and damage caused to the suit property and eviction was ordered. The matter is pending in appeal in R.C.A. No. 849 of 1994 before the Appellate Authority. Having come to know about the eviction, the plaintiff has come forward with this suit for specific performance with regard to the suit property. Defendants 1 and 2 have withdrawn the suit filed for specific performance based on the agreement obtained from defendants 6 and 7, after settling the matter out of Court. The plaintiff, who is claiming to have entered into an agreement for the sale of the suit property with defendants 1 and 2, had not filed any application for permission before the appropriate authority within the stipulated time and therefore, the alleged agreement cannot be enforced even if it is true. The plaintiff has not come forward with this suit for specific performance after issuing notice to defandants and it would disclose lack of bona fides on the part of the plaintiff. There is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendants 3 to 7 with regard to the suit property and the suit is bad for mis joinder of parties. It is under the said circumstances, defendants 3 to 7 had sought for dismissal of the suit. 5. After considering the above pleadings, the following issues were framed:— (1) Whether the suit agreement dated 1.11.1994 is valid and genuine? (2) Whether the suit agreement has become invalid in the absence of permission from Appropriate Authority? (3) Whether the defendants 1 and 2 who are not owners of the suit property competent to enter into an agreement? 5. After considering the above pleadings, the following issues were framed:— (1) Whether the suit agreement dated 1.11.1994 is valid and genuine? (2) Whether the suit agreement has become invalid in the absence of permission from Appropriate Authority? (3) Whether the defendants 1 and 2 who are not owners of the suit property competent to enter into an agreement? (4) Whether the suit is bad on the ground of misjoinder of unnecessary parties, namely defendants 3 to 7? (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to an equitable relief of specific performance based on Agreement of sale dated 1.11.1994 without issuing any notice to show his readiness and willingness at any point of time prior to the filing of the suit? (6) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim specific performance on the basis of a non-existent and illegal contract in a Court of law? (7) What relief are the parties entitled to in the above suit?. 6. Issues (1) to (6): The plaintiff Thiru G. Nageshwararao was examined as P.W.I, while defendants 2 and 5 were examined as D.Ws.1 and 2 respectively. The fact remains that the suit property was the self-acquired property of Ramanujalu Naidu, who died intestate in the year 1984. Admittedly Rukmani Ammal is the wife of late Ramanujalu Naidu and defendants 3 to 7 are their sons and daughters. On the death of late Ramanujalu Naidu, Rukmani Ammal and defendants 3 to 7 were entitled to 1/6th share each and on the death of Rukmani Ammal in the year 1996, defendants 3 to 7 became entitled to 1/5th share each in the suit property. The abovesaid position is not in dispute between both the parties. 7. Ex. A.3 dated 20.1.1994 is the xerox copy of the sale agreement between one Durai Mohan and the 6th defendant for herself and on behalf of Rukmani Ammal as power agent with regard to 2/6th share in the suit property for a sum of Rs. 8,00,000/-, out of which Rs. 5,00,000/- was paid as advance. Ex. A.4 dated 29.3.1994 is the xerox copy of the sale agreement between defendants 1 and 2 on the one hand and defendants 6 and 7 on the other hand with regard to 2/5th share in the suit property purchased by Ramanujalu Naidu on 6.4.1946. The agreement was for Rs. 8,00,000/-and a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- was paid as advance as seen from Ex. A.4. The agreement was for Rs. 8,00,000/-and a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- was paid as advance as seen from Ex. A.4. Ex. A.5 dated 29.6.1994 is the deed of assignment executed by the abovesaid Durai Mohan in favour of defendants 1 and 2 with regard to 2/6th share covered under Ex. A.3. A perusal of Exs. A.3 to A.5 would disclose that defendants 1 and 2 had entered into an agreement to purchase half of the suit property. It is also evident from the perusal of the above said documents that the agreement for sale was entered into with regard to the undivided shares of co-sharers and no specific property was agreed to be sold by the co-sharers referred to above either to Durai Mohan or to defendants 1 and 2. In the light of the above said documentary evidence and in the light of the evidence of D.W.2, it is evident that there was no partition between the co-sharers in respect of the suit property at any time before. P.W.I himself would admit during cross-examination that he does not know whether there was any partition between defendants 3 to 7 with regard to the suit property, even though he admits that he is the tenant of the suit property for the last 30 years. In view of the said position, it is clear that there could not have been any partition between defendants 3 to 7 or their mother Rukmani Ammal at any time after the death the Ramanujalu Naidu. Therefore, the agreement for sale executed or assigned in favour of defendants 1 and 2 should be only with regard to the undivided share mentioned in those documents out of the suit property and not for the entire suit property. 8. The plaintiff has come forward with a specific case in the pleadings in the plaint that the out-house in the ground floor and first floor were allotted to the shares of defendants 3 to 5, that the above said portions were vacated and handed over to defendants 1 and 2 as a condition precedent for selling their shares to defendants 1 and 2 and that therefore, defendants 1 and 2 had a right to purchase the entire suit property. Exs. Exs. A.6 and A.7 dated 14.7.1994 are deeds of agreement executed in favour of defendants 1 and 2 by A. Punna Rao and his wife A.P. Mallika and Jayaraman and his wife Shanthi for vacating and handing over possession of the first floor and out-house in the ground floor after receiving Rs. 1.25 lakhs and Rs. 25,000/-respectively as compensation to vacate the premises. They would disclose that the above said parties had agreed to vacate the above said premises on or before 1.10.1994 and hand over possession to defendants 1 and 2. A perusal of Exs. A.6 and A.7 would also disclose that the above said tenants were inducted by the plaintiff for the respective portions under their occupation. It is relevant to point out that Exs. A.6 and A.7 were produced by the plaintiff before this Court. If Exs. A.6 and A.7 are taken into consideration, the contention put forward by the defendants that the plaintiff is the chief tenant, that he has let out the first floor and out-house in the ground floor to the tenants referred to above and was collecting rent from them, cannot be disbelieved. If the recitals in Exs. A.6 and A.7 are taken into consideration, the contention put forward on behalf of defendants 1 and 2 that they had given a sizable amount to the plaintiff to vacate the above said tenants from the above said portions, along with signed blank stamp paper and signed blank papers, in order to enable the plaintiff to get the tenants evicted or vacated from the demised premises, cannot also be disbelieved. 9. According to the plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2 had agreed to sell the suit property to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 52,50,000/- and received an advance of Rs. 1,0,000/- with a condition to perform the part of the contract by both parties within a period of three months from the date of agreement. Ex. A.1 dated 1.11.1994 is the agreement said to have been executed by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiff with regard to the entire suit property. As per the said agreement, defendants 1 and 2 are entitled to half share of defendants 6 and 7 and that of Rukmani Ammal. Ex. A.1 dated 1.11.1994 is the agreement said to have been executed by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiff with regard to the entire suit property. As per the said agreement, defendants 1 and 2 are entitled to half share of defendants 6 and 7 and that of Rukmani Ammal. The power deed said to have been given by Rukmani Ammal in favour of the 6th defendant, to enter into an agreement to sell the share of Rukmani Ammal, has not been produced before Court by anybody. In view of the said position, the contention raised by defendants 3 to 7 that they are entitled to 1/5th share each after the death of Rukmani Ammal cannot be brushed aside. If the 6th defendant has no right to enter into an agreement with regard to the share of Rukmani Ammal, the agreement or assignment of agreement executed in favour of defendants 1 and 2, cannot convey any right to defendants 1 and 2 to ask for sale of half of the suit property, but only to 2/5th share in the suit property. Therefore, there is a conflicting claim and dispute with regard to the share to which defendants 1 and 2 are entitled to under the agreement or assignment of agreement in their favour. It is under the said circumstances, defendants 1 and 2 had issued a notice through counsel to defendants 6 and 7 with regard to the right of the defendants 1 and 2 in the suit property through defendants 6 and 7 and Rukmani Ammal as seen from Ex. A.8 dated 7.8.1995 and filed a suit for specific performance as seen from the xerox copy of the plaint Ex. A.2 against defendants 3 to 7 herein and the above said Durai Mohan in C.S. No. 370 of 19% on the file of High Court. A perusal of Ex. A.2 would disclose that defendants 1 and 2, as plaintiffs had sought for specific performance with regard to 2/Sth share of defendants 6 and 7 and 1/6th share of the mother of defendants 3 to 7 in the suit property. The claim of share in the suit for specific performance as mentioned above, itself is not in line with the succession to the properties of late Ramanujalu Naidu. 10. Ex. B.1. The claim of share in the suit for specific performance as mentioned above, itself is not in line with the succession to the properties of late Ramanujalu Naidu. 10. Ex. B.1. is the copy of the affidavit filed by the plaintiff herein for direction to produce copies of three sale agreements entered into between defendants” 1 and 2 on the one hand and Rukmani Ammal through power agent, the 6th defendant, 6th defendant and Renuka on the other hand. It would also disclose that the plaintiff has stated that defendants 1 and 2 had got right only to half of the suit property even though there is an agreement between the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 for sale of entire suit property. It is also averred that the plaintiff had entered into an agreement for purchase of the undivided share of Rukmani Ammal and defendants 6 and 7 through defendants 1 and 2. Here, the plaintiff has admitted that there was no division between the heirs of Ramanujalu Naidu with regard to the suit property, even though the plaintiff had attempted to project that there was a division between the abovesaid heirs and in that division, the out-house in the ground floor and first floor were allotted to defendants 3 to 5. A perusal of Exs. B.3 and B.4, copies of affidavits filed by the plaintiff in C.S. No. 370 of 1996 would disclose that the defendants 1 and 2 had right to purchase only half share in the suit property and not the entire suit property, that defendants 1 and 2 are attempting to compromise the matter with other defendants in the above said suit, that in the event of compromise, the plaintiff will be put to loss and that there will be multiplicity of proceedings with regard to the suit transaction. The above said admission made by plaintiff in the suit filed for specific performance by defendants 1 and 2 against defendants 3 to 7 and one Durai Mohan, would disclose that defendants 1 and 2 have no right to purchase the entire suit property, but only one half of the suit property (which cannot also be accepted) and that pursuing of the said transaction will lead to multiplicity of proceedings. It is after having come to know all these facts, the plaintiff has come forward with this suit for specific performance of the entire suit property by means of execution of sale deed by defendants 1 and 2 along with defendants 3 to 7 in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 52,50,000/-. 11. According to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has entered into an agreement for sale of the entire suit property with defendants 1 and 2 for Rs. 52,50,000/-and the sale transaction has to be completed within a period of three months from the date of agreement. The execution of the sale agreement Ex. A.1 is denied by defendants 1 and 2 and according to them, it is a fabricated document. The plaintiff claims to have entered into an agreement with defendants 1 and 2 for the purchase of the entire suit property for Rs. 52,50,000/-, knowing full well that defendants 1 and 2 have no right to purchase the entire suit property. As already pointed out, it is doubtful whether defendants 1 and 2 had right even to half of the suit property as claimed by the plaintiff at the time of the trial by making an endorsement on the plaint to the effect that the plaintiff is restricting his claim for specific performance with regard to half share in the suit property. To prove the genuineness of Ex. A.1, the plaintiff has examined P.W.2 Thiru M. Adiseshiah, who is carrying on business as Architect at Madras. P.W.2 would state that there was a dispute between the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 with regard to the sale of the suit property, that he compromised the matter between them, that defendants 1 and 2 had brought the agreement Ex. A.1 to his office and that he signed the above said agreement as one of the attestors. He also deposed that a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- was paid as advance by the plaintiff towards Ex. A.1 with regard to the correction in the deed Ex. A.1, P.W.2 states that all the parties to the agreement attested the said corrections. A verification of the said corrections would not disclose that all the parties had attested the said corrections. P.W.2 would admit during cross-examination that he was not able to read the contents of Ex. A.1. He would further admit that the recitals in Ex. A.1, P.W.2 states that all the parties to the agreement attested the said corrections. A verification of the said corrections would not disclose that all the parties had attested the said corrections. P.W.2 would admit during cross-examination that he was not able to read the contents of Ex. A.1. He would further admit that the recitals in Ex. A.1 would show that the payment of advance of Rs. 1,00,000/-was in the presence, of the witnesses mentioned in the document, but there is only one witness signed as attestor in Ex. A.1. Though P.W.2 claims that defendants 1 and 2 are the owners of the suit property, he would admit that he does not know as to who is the owner of the suit property and that he had not verified any document to find out the ownership to the suit property. He would admit during cross-examination by defendants 3 to 7 that at the time of execution of Ex. A.1, himself, the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant alone were present. It would go to show that it is contradictory to the entire part of his evidence in chief to the effect that defendants 1 and 2 had brought the agreement for sale to his office. It is admitted by P.W.2 that he is having close professional contacts as Architect with P.W.I, who is doing business in Vasthu for construction of buildings for the past 20 years, defendants 1 and 2 deny any connection with P.W.2 and there is no material evidence before Court to establish that P.W.2 knows the 1st defendant for the past seven years. In view of the said position, the contention raised by defendants 1 and 2 that P.W.2 has been brought to Court to depose in his favour only because of their professional contacts and friendship for about 20 years and that he does not know anything with regard to the alleged agreement Ex. A.1 cannot be brushed aside as unreasonable one. Therefore, it is unsafe to rely on the evidence of P.W.2 to come to the conclusion that Ex. A1 was executed by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiff as alleged by him. 12. P.W.I would admit during cross-examination that he is an income-tax assessee, but he had not shown the payment of Rs. 1 Lakh in his income-tax return for the year 1994-95. A1 was executed by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiff as alleged by him. 12. P.W.I would admit during cross-examination that he is an income-tax assessee, but he had not shown the payment of Rs. 1 Lakh in his income-tax return for the year 1994-95. Since P.W.I is an income tax assessee, he ought to have shown in the statement of account the payment of Rs. 1 Lakh to defendants 1 and 2 with regard to the alleged agreement for the sale of the suit property in his favour. In view of the said position, the contention raised by learned Counsel for defendants 1 and 2 that P.W.I would have entered in his income tax accounts the alleged payment of a sum Rs. 1 Lakh to defendants 1 and 2, if really he had paid the same and that the fact of not bringing the alleged payment in the said account will go to show that P.W.I would not have paid any amount as advance to the alleged agreement Ex. A.1, cannot also be brushed aside as unreasonable one. There is absolutely no acceptable evidence except the interested testimony of P.Ws.1 and 2 for the alleged payment of Rs. 1 Lakh towards the alleged sale agreement Ex. A.1 dated 1.11.1994. 13. It is relevant to point out, as already mentioned above that eviction proceeding was initiated by the 5th defendant against the plaintiff to evict him from the suit property on various grounds, including wilful default in payment of rent and eviction was ordered and thereafter, the plaintiff has come forward with this suit for specific performance not only against defendants 1 and 2, but also against defendants 3 to 7, as if the plaintiff is entitled to purchase the entire suit property. If the facts discussed above are taken into consideration, it is clear that defendants 1 and 2 had approached the plaintiff, who is the chief tenant of the suit property, to vacate the tenants in occupation of the out house in the ground floor and the first floor by making payment as compensation to them and at that time, they should have given to him blank signed stamp paper and blank signed papers for the purpose of vacating the tenants from the said premises or for avoiding anybody to be let in as tenants thereafter. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff ought to have created the agreement Ex. A.1 dated 1.11.1994 with regard to the suit property in his name from defendants 1 and 2, who are not the owners of the suit property, even though they have got a right of agreement for sale of a portion of the suit property. In view of the said position, Ex. A.1 dated 1.11.1994, cannot be sad to be a valid and genuine document in order to be enforced by the plaintiff against the defendants with regard to the entire suit property. 14. According to the plaintiff, the agreement Ex. A.1 was for the purchase of entire suit property from the defendants. But, subsequently, the plaintiff wants to restrict his claim with regard to an undivided half share in the suit property by making an endorsement on the plaint. In A. Shantha v. H. Madhava Rao and another (1995)-II-MLJ. 300 = 1995-2-L.W. 26) a Division Bench of this Court has held as follows, after taking into consideration of Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act, which reads that if the parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter it, the original contract need not be performed, and also the definition of the word “novation” in Scarf v. Jardine (1882) 7 A.C. 345 and (1881) 5 E.R. reprint, 651 by the House of Lords as that there being a contract in existence, some new contract is substituted for it either between the same parties (for that might be) or between different parties, the consideration mutually being the discharge of the old contract. Novation of a contract comprises two elements, the discharge of one debt or debtor and the substitution of a new debt or debtor. The discharge is governed by the proper law of the contract. A substituted contract should rescind or extinguish the previous contract: “In our opinion, the parties are certainly entitled to alter the terms at any time. The only thing is, there cannot be unilateral alteration or valuation on material aspects.” The decision referred to above would lead to conclude that there cannot be an unilateral decision in enforcing the contract even if it is true. The only thing is, there cannot be unilateral alteration or valuation on material aspects.” The decision referred to above would lead to conclude that there cannot be an unilateral decision in enforcing the contract even if it is true. In view of the said position, the plaintiff, who has come forward with a suit for specific performance to enforce the contract for entire suit property, cannot restrict his claim by making endorsement on the plaint unilaterally for half of the suit property. It has also been held in Lodd Balamukundas v. K. Kothandapani and others (84 L.W. 172) as follows:— “It is not open to a plaintiff who came to the Court with a specific case and with a specific ground of relief to go back on them and abandon the same and seek to claim the same relief on the facts alleged by the defendant.” This would also go to show that the plaintiff cannot unilaterally decide, to seek the relief of specific performance with regard to half of the suit property after considering the defence put forward by the defendants in the suit, contrary to the claim made in the plain. 15. Sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 269UC of the Income tax Act, 1961 read as follows: “(2) The agreement referred to in sub-section (1) shall be reduced to writing in the form of a statement by each of the parties to such transfer or by any of the parties to such transfer acting on behalf of himself and on behalf of the other parties. (3) Every statement referred to in sub-section (2) shall – (i) be in the prescribed form; (ii) set forth such particulars as may be prescribed; and (iii) beverified in the prescribed manner, and shall be furnished to the appropriate authority in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed, by each of the parties to such transaction or by any of the parties to such transaction acting on behalf of himself and on behalf of the other parties.” In this case, the alleged agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 with regard to the suit property was for Rs. 52,50,000/- and therefore, the parties to the alleged agreement should comply with the requirements of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 269UC of the Income-Tax Act, 1961. 52,50,000/- and therefore, the parties to the alleged agreement should comply with the requirements of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 269UC of the Income-Tax Act, 1961. In this case it is admitted by both the parties that the requirement of the above said section has not been complied with within the stipulated time. Learned counsel for the plaintiff relied on the decision in Government of India v. Jagadish A. Sadarangani (1996) 230. I.T.R. (Mad.) (D.B) and contended that the above said provisions need not be complied with if the agreement is earlier to 1.7.1995. The above said decision of this Court was taken in appeal to the Apex Court and the Apex Court in Jagdish A. Sadarangani v. Government of India (1998) 230 I.T.R. 422 (S.C.) held as follows, after reversing the decision of this Court:— “We agree that two alternatives are open under the scheme of the legislation - (i) the Un on of India through the appropriate authority could buy the property, or (ii) in the event of its decision not to buy, it has to issue a no objection certificate leaving it open to the parties to deal with the property. In that view of the matter the High Court was right in its conclusion The function of the appropriate authority is not merely confined to issuing No Objection Certificate, it is coupled with a du ty to make a decision as to pre-emptive purchase, if the real market value of the immovable property concerned in the proceeding demands it A statutory authority exercising statutory power cannot be compelled to ignore the basic defect in the agreement, which also disables the appropriate authority to make its decision as to pre-emptive purchase, on determining the real market value, which will be the basic for taking a decision regarding pre-emptive purchase. The decision of the Apex Court referred to above would go to show that the sale transactions with regard to the immovable properties exceeding the value limits have to be taken to the notice of the Appropriate Authority as mentioned above and permission has to be obtained for pursuing the sale transaction as per the sale agreement. Otherwise, the agreement will become void and unenforceable. If that be so, the agreement Ex. A.1 cannot be enforced by the plaintiff against the defendants 1 and 2 even if the said agreement is valid. 16. Otherwise, the agreement will become void and unenforceable. If that be so, the agreement Ex. A.1 cannot be enforced by the plaintiff against the defendants 1 and 2 even if the said agreement is valid. 16. According to learned counsel for defendants 1 and 2, the plaintiff who has come forward with this suit for specific performance, has to plead and prove that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract; otherwise he cannot enforce the alleged agreement for specific performance. A Division Bench of this Court in Viswanathan and others v. R. Lakshmi Ammal (Deed.) and others (1993) II MLJ 560 has held as follows: — “ it is necessary for the plaintiffs not only to prove the readiness and willingness at the time of the suit, but the readiness and willingness throughout the period from the date of the contract. In fact, the Supreme Court in Sandhya Rani v. Sudha Rani , AIR 1978 SC 537 ; (1978) 2 SCC 116 : (1978) 1 SCJ 464: (1978) 2 ACR 839 = 91 L.W. 51 S.N; has observed that it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to affirmatively establish that all throughout he or she, as the case may be, was willing to perform his or her part of the contract.” It has also been held by the Apex Court in Jugraj Singh v. Raj Singh ( AIR 1995 SC 945 ) as follows:— “Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the plaintiff must plead and prove that he has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the essential terms of the contract. The continuous readiness and willingness at all stages from the date of the agreement till the date of the hearing of the suit need to be proved. The substance of the matter and surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the plaintiff must be taken into consideration in adjudging readiness and willingness to perform the plaintiffs part of the contract.” In this case, the plaintiff has not approached the Appropriate Authority to get permission to enforce the contract and has not even issued a notice, calling upon the defendants 1 and 2 to perform their part of the contract from 1.11.1994 till the date of filing of the suit, viz., 21.4.1997. The conduct of the plaintiff in not even issuing a notice to defendants 1 and 2, intimating his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract from the date of agreement till the date of suit, with a request to perform their part of the contract, will go to show that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract throughout. The plaintiff himself has admitted in Exs. B.2 to B.4 that he has come forward with this suit to save limitation. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to ask for the relief of specific performance as prayed for in the suit even if the agreement Ex. A.1 is genuine and valid. 17. In the course of the discussion made above, it has been pointed out that the plaintiff, himself has admitted in the affidavits before Court that the transaction allegedly entered into between himself and defendants 1 and 2 will lead to multiplicity of proceedings. It has been held in Krishnaji Gopinath Rele v. Ramchandra Kashinath Mastakar (AIR 1932 Bombay 51) as follows:— “A Court of law will not ordinarily enforce a contract where there is reasonable find decent possibility that enforcing it would involve the purchase in litigation”. The ratio of this decision has also been followed by this Court in an unreported decision dated 13.7.1998 in A. Bibi v. S. Mohammed Ghouse (A.S. No. 791 of 1985). If the decision referred to above is taken into consideration in the light of the admission made by the plaintiff with regard to the multiplicity of proceedings and also in the light of the dismissal of the suit in C.S. No. 370/1996 as settled out of Court filed for specific performance by defendants 1 and 2 as plaintiff against defendants 3 to 7 herein and another with regard to the suit property based on the agreement for ‘sale dated 29.3.1994, this Court is of the opinion that the relief of Specific performance sought for on the disputed agreement Ex. A.1 cannot be granted, in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. 18. A.1 cannot be granted, in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. 18. In view of the discussion made above, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff on the decisions in Prem Sukh Gulgulia and another v. Habib Ullah and others (AIR (32) 1945 Calcutta 335) with regard to impleading of parties and enforcing of contract by virtue of purchase made subsequent to the execution of the agreement, Mokarala Pitchayya v. Boggavarapu Venkatakrishnayya and others (AIR (30) 1943 Madras 497), wherein it was held that an agreement to sell in favour of a person gives him a right as to or in relation to the property which is the subject of the agreement and Kartar Singh v. Harjinder Singh and others ( AIR 1990 SC 854 ) which holds that specific performance can be had with regard to the share of the vendor even though the other sharer is not willing to part with the property, will not in any way help and plaintiff to establish that he is entitled to specific performance in respect of the entire suit property or for half of the same as claimed at the time of the trial by making endorsement on the plaint. Therefore, this Court holds that the suit is bad for mis joinder of defendants 3 to 7, who have nothing to do with the alleged transaction between the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 who have no right to enter into an agreement for want of right over entire suit property. In view of the foregoing reasons, Issue Nos.(1) to (6) are answered against the plaintiff. 19. Issue No.(7):— In view of the above findings, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. 20. In the result, the suit is dismissed with costs.