Judgment Gurusharan Sharma, J. 1. Gendia Keotin, the original plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 8 of 1975 against defendants for declaration of title and recovery of possession over the suit land, detailed in Schedules A and B to the plaint, which was decreed. Title Appeal Nos. 31 and 39 of 1977 were filed by two sets of defendants. Title Appeal No. 31 of 1977 filed by defendants 1 and 2 was allowed, whereas Title Appeal No, 39 of 1977 was dismissed, but its dismissal had no effect on result of suit, which was dismissed. 2. According to plaintiff, both Bishu Keot and Ambhu Keot were full brothers. Ambhu Keot was issueless, so in the year 1936 he adopted his nephew, Baijnath Keot, son of Bishu Keot as his son. Baijnath Keot died in the year 1958, leaving behind his widow, Gendia Keotin. 3. Defendants 1 and 2 contested the suit. According to them neither Ambhu Keot was brother of Bishu Keot nor he (Ambhu Keot) had adopted Baijnath Keot as his son. Ambhu Keot died issueless leaving behind his widow Lalmani Keotin. 4. It is said that on 4-6-1952, Lalmani Keotin executed a registered will (Ext. 2) in favour of Baijnath Keot, but it was never probated. 5. On the basis of evidence on record, first appellate Court recorded a finding of fact that plaintiffs husband Baijnath Keot was never adopted by Ambhu Keot and Lahnani Keot in as their son. Baijnath Keot did not inherit properties of Ambhu Keot. 6. At the time of admission of this appeal No. 22-12-1987, following substantial question of law was framed: Even if the will executed in favour of the appellant fails, whether the appellant will be entitled to 1 / 3rd share in the suit property ? 7. Undisputedly, plaintiffs suit was for declaration of title and recovery of possession over Schedules A and B lands, solely on the basis that her husband was adopted son of Ambhu Keot and after his death she inherited the suit property. There was absolutely no case of partition of 1 /3rd share in the suit property. Therefore, I find that aforesaid substantial question of law does not arise in this Second Appeal. 8. By Amendment Act, 104 of 1976, vital change was introduced by legislature in Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There was absolutely no case of partition of 1 /3rd share in the suit property. Therefore, I find that aforesaid substantial question of law does not arise in this Second Appeal. 8. By Amendment Act, 104 of 1976, vital change was introduced by legislature in Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sec. 100(5) of the Code provided that appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at hearing of appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involved such question: Provided that nothing in this Sub-sec. shall be deemed to take away or abridge power of Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. The proviso presupposes that Court shall indicate in its order substantial question of law, which it proposes to decide even if such substantial question of law was not earlier formulated by it. The existence of a substantial question of law is thus since-quo-non for exercise of jurisdiction under amended provisions of Sec. 100. 9 Confronted with this situation, Counsel for the appellant alternatively submitted that another substantial question of law involved in this appeal is as to whether finding of first appellate Court that plaintiffs husband was not adopted son of Ambhu Keot stands vitiated on erroneous consideration of Ext. 2 as well as oral evidence and persuaded that the appeal be decided accordingly. 10. Both, the trial Court and lower appellate Court decided the case only on questions of fact, on the basis of pleadings and evidence led by the parties before trial Court. On consideration of Ext. 2 in detail and oral evidence of P.Ws. 5,6 and 9 and of other plaintiffs witnesses, two Courts below recorded concurrent findings of fact that plaintiffs husband was never adopted as son of Ambhu Keot in the year 1936. 11. The aforesaid question of adoption is neither a pure question of law nor even a mixed question of law and fact. Under proviso, the Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law and not a mere question of law. Reason for permitting substantial question of law to be raised, should be recorded by the Court. The aforesaid question of adoption is neither a pure question of law nor even a mixed question of law and fact. Under proviso, the Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law and not a mere question of law. Reason for permitting substantial question of law to be raised, should be recorded by the Court. It is implicit therefrom, that on compliance of the above, opposite parties should be afforded a fair and proper opportunity to meet the same. The aforesaid question is not even a legal plea that could be raised at the stage of Second Appeal, whereas it should be a substantial question of law and the reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded. 12. This second Appeal is concluded by findings of fact. It is, accordingly, dismissed, but without costs.