A. K. GOHLL, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition under Article 227 of the constitution of India the petitioner is seeking quashment of order dated March 22, 1999 passed by the Labour Judge, Ratlam in Case no. 12/pw Act/98/civil and also order of review dated May 18, 1999 in Case No. 1/pw act/99/review, on the ground that the order passed by the authority under the Payment of wages Act is illegal and without jurisdiction on the following grounds: (i) As per agreement dated October 20, 1990, the petitioner is merely to run a Sajjan mills and, therefore, the petitioner company is not an employer as defined under Section 3 of the Payment of Wages act, 1936, and in view of the above, the provisions of Payment of Wages Act are not applicable. Therefore, the order passed by the Authority under the Payment of Wages act is illegal and without jurisdiction. (ii) Under Sections 22 (1) and 22 (3) of the sick Industrial Companies (Special provisions) Act, 1985, no such prior approval was sought by Respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 from BIFR and the order dated March 22, 1999 passed by the Authority without prior approval under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, is illegal and also without jurisdiction. ( 2 ) IN reply the submission of the learned counsel for the Respondents is that there is a relationship of employer and employee between the parties, therefore, the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act is having jurisdiction to decide the matter. The order dated March 22, 1999 passed by the learned labour Court-cum-Authority under the payment of Wages Act is within jurisdiction and more so the provisions of Sections 22 (1)and 22 (3) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 are not applicable on the wages payable to the employees, and in reply the Respondents have also raised preliminary objections about the maintainability of the petition on the ground that under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages act, 1936, the impugned order under challenge is appealable and the Industrial Court in the state of Madhya Pradesh is the Appellate authority. The petitioner can file appeal and avail the statutory remedy. Since the petitioner is having an alternative and efficacious remedy, therefore, this writ petition is not maintainable. The petitioner can file appeal and avail the statutory remedy. Since the petitioner is having an alternative and efficacious remedy, therefore, this writ petition is not maintainable. It is also the submission of the Respondents that there is also a provision under Section 17 (4) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 that the Court referred in sub-section (1) may, if thinks fit submit any question of law for the decision of the High Court. ( 3 ) SHRI Vivek Dalai, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on decision of the Supreme court in case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, air 1999 SC 22 , on the ground that the jurisdiction of the High Court entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution inspite of the alternative statutory remedy is not effected specially where the authority against whom the writ is filed, is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had persuaded to usurp the jurisdiction without any legal foundation. That being so, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition at the initial stage, without examining the contention that a show-cause notice issued to the appellant was wholly without jurisdiction. ( 4 ) IN reply the submission of the learned counsel for Respondents is that the provisions of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 shall not be applicable on the wages payable to the employees. He cited a decision of this Court in case of Allwyn (A Unit of Voltas Ltd.), hyderabad and others v. Deputy Labour commissioner, Indore and others, 1999 (1)mplj 195, in which it has been held by the learned single Judge as under:"the language of Sections 22 (1) and (3) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special provisions) Act does not create any bar against initiation of proceedings under section 33-C (1) of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947, by workman for realisation of dues. The process of amalgamation of two companies would not disentitle the workman to receive his dues and he cannot suffer for no fault of his. The petitioner-company, after dissolution of the earlier company, was under obligation to make good the award as had been determined by the competent authority of the Labour Court. The process of amalgamation of two companies would not disentitle the workman to receive his dues and he cannot suffer for no fault of his. The petitioner-company, after dissolution of the earlier company, was under obligation to make good the award as had been determined by the competent authority of the Labour Court. The recovery of the amount as land revenue by the Collector as ordered by the Deputy Commissioner of labour was in the circumstances not open to challenge. " ( 5 ) THE other case is of National Textile corporation v. The Collector, Rajnandgaon and others, 1988 MPLSR 469, in which the learned single Judge of this High Court after considering the various decisions has held as under:"in view of this matter it is manifest that the language of Section 22 (1) of the Act of 1985 though apparently wide, was not designed to override Section 14 of the Act. Therefore, recovery certificates issued under Section 8 of the Act are not hit by section 22 (1) of the Act of 1985. Section 22 (1) of the Act of 1985 is purposely addressed to those proceedings of 'distress and the like' which are likely to affect and aggravate the sickness of the industrial company. It could not have been within the contemplation of Legislature to stay the legitimate dues of the workers who remained with the sick company in its bad days and tried to help it out of the mess all around. It may be noted that in such matters capital and management are more responsible because the ultimate decision lies in their hands. " ( 6 ) IN case of Baburao P. Tawade and others v. HES Limited and another, (1997-III-LLJ (Suppl) 265) (Bom), the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court has held that the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 does not create any bar on the application under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for recovery of earned dues by workmen and consent of BIFR for such application is not necessary. In this decision it has been held as under at pp. 274-275:"14. In this decision it has been held as under at pp. 274-275:"14. Having considered the position in law as canvassed at the Bar, on the strength of the judgment referred to by me, I am of the view that, even if the application had been made by the workmen under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for recovery of the monies due to them, after the reference under SICA made to the BIFR, such application could not have attracted the bar under Section 22 (1) of SICA; much less can the writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India pending before this Court to challenge the adverse order in the application under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, be held to attract the bar under Section 33-C (2)of the Industrial Disputes Act, be held to attract the bar under Section 22 (1) of the sica. In my view the bar under Section 22 (1) of SICA would not apply to the present writ petition, which cannot be dismissed on the ground that no consent had been obtained from the BIFR for the continuation of the present proceedings. " ( 7 ) A Division Bench of the High Court of bombay has also taken the similar view in case of APS Star Industries Ltd. and others v. Star textile Engineering Employees Union and others, (1997-I-LLJ-1059), in which it has been held that the bar of Section 22 (1) of the Sick industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 must be held to apply only to such proceedings which are not required for the day to day running of the sick industrial company even under a sanctioned scheme or otherwise. Any other interpretation would lead to a ludicrous and unintended result. The Division bench has also placed reliance to the case of modi Industries Ltd. v. Additional Labour commissioner, Ghaziabad and others, (1994-I-LLJ-482) (A11) in which the learned. single Judge of Allahabad High Court has held as under at p. 487:"15. In my opinion, the aforesaid reasoning adopted by Hon'ble Supreme court applies with full force to the facts of the present case also. single Judge of Allahabad High Court has held as under at p. 487:"15. In my opinion, the aforesaid reasoning adopted by Hon'ble Supreme court applies with full force to the facts of the present case also. The Parliament while putting Section 22 of the Act, 1985 could never have intended that the industrial unit under the garb of sickness or for any like difficulty may be allowed to shirk its liability to pay the wages to its workers for the work they have done. Thus proceeding under Section 3 of the u. P. Act of 1978 will not be affected by section 22 of Act of 1985. " ( 8 ) IN this case the preliminary objection of the Respondents is that an alternative remedy under Section 17 of the Payment of wages Act is available to the petitioner against the order passed by the Labour Court. Therefore, the writ Court has no jurisdiction, even the appellate Court if desires can refer any question of law for the decision to the high Court. ( 9 ) AT the time of the arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the appeal becomes barred by time as 30 days period is prescribed and he is also required to deposit the amount payable under the directions appealed against and the petitioner being a government company will face difficulty in doing so. ( 10 ) ). Looking to the provisions of appeal under the Payment of Wages Act, 1948 and availability of alternative effective forum, it will not be proper for this Court to interfere in the writ jurisdiction at this stage, particularly in a case where the appellate Court can decide all the legal questions. In view of the legal position that petitioner can file appeal under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, the petitioner can also raise all the grounds before the appellate Court including the jurisdiction, prior approval and relationship of employer and employee and also the question of applicability of the Payment of Wages Act. In view of the legal position that petitioner can file appeal under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, the petitioner can also raise all the grounds before the appellate Court including the jurisdiction, prior approval and relationship of employer and employee and also the question of applicability of the Payment of Wages Act. ( 11 ) THEREFORE, in view of the above, the petition is hereby dismissed with a liberty that the petitioner may file an appeal within 30 days from today and the same shall not be dismissed on the ground of limitation and the petitioner can also make an appropriate application before the appellate Court for grant of exemption and the same shall be considered by the appellate court in accordance with law. ( 12 ) WITH the aforesaid direction, this petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. .