JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava, J. The appellant, who had not been impleaded as a party-respondent in Writ Petition No. 2277 of 1997, has come up in this Letters Patent Appeal feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge whereunder allowing the writ petition filed by Himmatsingh Kaurav, the respondent No. 1, which was directed against the order dated 5-10-1996 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer whereby the resolution passed by the Gram Panchayat dated 28-11-1995 in regard to the appointment of the aforesaid respondent had been set aside with a direction to re-advertise the post inviting applications for appointment and filling the vacancy in the post of Panchayat-Karmi in accordance with law. 1A. The learned single Judge vide the impugned order while quashing the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 5-10-1996 had directed the Janpad Panchayat to consider in the light of the directions contained in the final order disposing of writ petition No. 200/96 as to whether any other person could be posted at Gram Panchayat, Lahar, when Himmatsingh Kaurav had already been appointed as a Panchayat-Karmi. The appellant has prayed for the setting aside or modifying the order passed by the learned single Judge claiming that he was also the prospective applicant for the post in question and has been seriously prejudiced on account of he being deprived of the opportunity for being considered for the appointment on the post of Panchayat-Karmi. The order of the learned single Judge, which is impugned in the appeal had been passed on 15-7-1997. The present appeal had been presented on 27-8-1997 beyond the prescribed period of limitation. I.A. No. 6166/97 had been filed praying for the leave to file appeal and I.A. No. 6167/97 had been filed seeking condonation of delay in the presentation of the appeal. This appeal was admitted for final hearing vide the order of this Court dated 14-10-1997. On 6-1-1998 the Division Bench had passed an order for listing the appeal for hearing along with the records of Writ Petition No. 11/96 decided on 10-1-1996 and Writ Petition No. 200/96 decided on 23-1-1996. This application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal was objected to vide the reply dated 5-9-1997 filed by Himmatsingh. Although, the application I.A. No. 6167/97 had duly supported by an affidavit of the appellant no counter affidavit denying or controverting the allegations made therein had been filed. This application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal was objected to vide the reply dated 5-9-1997 filed by Himmatsingh. Although, the application I.A. No. 6167/97 had duly supported by an affidavit of the appellant no counter affidavit denying or controverting the allegations made therein had been filed. Even the reply filed by Himmatsing dated 5-9-1997 is not supported by an affidavit. It may further be noticed that no counter-affidavit in opposition to I.A. No. 6166/97 seeking leave to file the appeal had been filed by the contesting respondents. The delay in filing the appeal is reported to be 14 days only. In spite of the notice having been issued vide the order dated 2-9-1997 no effort was made by the contesting respondent to file counter-affidavit in opposition to I.As. No. 6166/97 and 6167/97. The appeal was admitted for hearing vide the order dated 14-10-1997. Even at that stage no objection to either the grant of leave or for condoning the delay in filing the appeal appears to have been urged or pressed. Hearing of this appeal had been expedited on 6-1-1998 and the State had been directed to produce record of the proceedings in which the impugned order has been passed. The hearing of the appeal, as noticed in the order dated 4-5-1999 had been expedited at the instance of the contesting respondent. Even on 29-7-1999 when the appeal was finally heard no objection had been raised to the aforesaid applications. Considering the facts and circumstances brought on record the leave for filing the appeal is granted and the delay in filing the appeal is condoned. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants as well as the learned counsel representing the contesting respondents on merits and have also carefully perused the records. The facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for disposal of this appeal lie in a narrow compass. Writ Petition No. 11 of 1996 had been filed on 13-1-1996 by six persons including Lakhansingh Kaurav, the present appellant, who was the petitioner No. 2 in that case. The facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for disposal of this appeal lie in a narrow compass. Writ Petition No. 11 of 1996 had been filed on 13-1-1996 by six persons including Lakhansingh Kaurav, the present appellant, who was the petitioner No. 2 in that case. The petitioners had prayed for a direction to the respondents, which included Adhyaksha, Jila Panchayat Avam Gramin Vikas Vibhag, Jila Bhind, and Adhyaksh, Janpad Panchayat Avam Gramin Viikas, Jila Bhind, requiring them to ensure that no person other than the petitioners should be appointed on the post of Panchayat Sachiv in any of the Gram Panchayats functioning under their supervision. The aforesaid writ petition was disposed of vide the order dated 10-1-1996 with a direction that the names of the petitioners be also considered for the post of Panchayat Karmi subject to the condition that they file applications in this regard. Subsequently, writ petition No. 200 of 1996 was filed on 23-1-1996 by Himmatsingh Kaurav, the respondent No. 1 in the present appeal, impleading the State of Madhya Pradesh, through the Secretary Panchayats and Social Welfare Department, Bhopal; The Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Lahar, district Bhind, and the Deputy Director, Panchayats and Social Welfare, Bhind, district Bhind, praying for a direction for quashing that part of the order dated 27-12-1995 passed by Mukhya Karyapalan Adhikari, Janpad Panchayat, Lahar, whereunder the charge of Gram-Sahayak of Gram Panchayat, Muraoli was directed to be handed over to Shri Dularelal Gram-Sahayak of Gram-Panchayats Dharampura, Bisanpura and Parechha with a further direction to the respondents not to disturb the discharge of duties by the petitioner as Gram-Sahayak, Gram Panchayat Muraoli, Tehsil Lahar. A perusal of the order dated 27-12-1995, which had been impugned in the aforesaid writ petition, indicates that taking into account the retirement of Shri Brijlal Verma, Gram Sahayak w.e.f. 31-12-1995 the Sanyukta Sanchalak, Panchayat and Samaj Seva Sambhag, Gwalior, had passed an order dated 28-12-1994 directing that the charge held by the aforesaid Brijlal Verma relating to Panchayats Muraoli, Bijpur, Kurthar, Marpura and Gendhari was to be handed over to Shri Durga Prasad Kushwaha, Shri Dularelal, Shri Ramkumar Savita and Shri Hakimsingh Kaurav. Shri Durgaprasad Kushwaha, Gram-Sahayak, was to be handed over the additional charge of Gram Panchayats Gendhari and Marpura; Shri Dularelal, Gram-Sahayak was to be handed over the additional charge of Muraoli Gram Panchayat, Shri Ramkumar Savita, Panchayat-Karmi was to be handed over the charge of Gram Panchayat Bijpur and Himmatsingh Kaurav, Panchayat Karmi, was to be handed over charge of Gram-Panchayat Kurdhar. The relief claimed in the above writ petition No. 200 of 1996 was only against that part of the order which related to the handing over of the charge of Gram-Sahayak and Gram-Panchayat Muraoli to Shri Dularelal, Gram-Sahayak of Dharampura, Bisanpura and Parechha. The petitioner in that writ petition i.e. Himmatsingh Kaurav, the present respondent, claimed to be a duly appointed Gram Sahayak of Gram Panchayat Muraoli and in this view of the matter he had prayed for an additional direction requiring the respondents not to disturb in his discharging duties of Gram-sahayak of Gram Panchayat Muraoli by handing over the charge to Dularelal of Gram Panchayats of Dharampura, Bisanpura and Parechha. The aforesaid writ petition was disposed of vide the judgment and order dated 23-1-1996 by the same learned Single Judge, who had disposed of Writ Petition No. 11/96 vide the order dated 10-1-1996. A perusal of the order dated 23-1-1996 indicates that Himmatsingh Kaurav, the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 200/96, had come forward with the claim that he had been appointed as Panchayat Karmi by a valid order passed by the Gram Panchayat vide the resolution dated 28-11-1995. He also claimed that he had joined the post and had been drawing his salary as well. His grievance was that on account of the order dated 27-12-1995 which was consequential to the order passed by the Sanyukta Sanchalak, Panchayat Avam Samaj Seva Sambhag, Gwalior dated 28-12-1994 another official Dularelal was being handed over the charge held by him. The learned Single Judge had observed in the aforesaid order disposing of the writ petition that prima facie the appointment of the petitioner appeared to be in order. The learned Single Judge had observed in the aforesaid order disposing of the writ petition that prima facie the appointment of the petitioner appeared to be in order. However, it was further directed that in any case the respondent No. 2 i.e. the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Lahar, district Bhind, was required to look into the grievance of the petitioner taking notice of the resolution and other documents placed on the record of the writ petition and examine as to whether the order, Annexure P/8 had been properly passed or not. The learned Single Judge had further directed that the petitioner may also be afforded an opportunity of hearing. The decision be taken as early as possible preferably within a period of one month. It was thereafter that Anuvibhagiya Adhikari, Lahar, passed an order dated 5-10-1996 after examining the matter. In the proceedings before him Lakhansingh Kaurav, the present appellant, had also moved an application bringing to the notice of the Anuvibhagiya Adhikari the order dated 10-1-1996 disposing of Writ Petition No. 11 of 1996. It was also brought to the notice of Anuvibhagiya Adhikari that Himmatsingh Kaurav was the nephew of the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Muraoli and had been surreptitiously appointed on the post in question and pointing out to several irregularities going to the root of the matter he had prayed that the setting aside of the order appointing Himmat Singh Kaurav on the post of Panchayat-Karmi. The Sub-Divisional Officer called for the record relating to the resolution/appointment in question and taking into account the directions issued by the State Government in exercise of its jurisdiction envisaged u/s 70 read with section 69 of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 contained in Circular dated 12-9-1995 in regard to Panchayat Karmi Yojna came to the conclusion that the entire proceedings relating to inviting of the applications seeking appointments on the post in question, the procedure for advertising the vacancy and the fact that the eligible candidates were deprived of the opportunity to submit their applications and further that the Sarpanch had participated in the proceedings relating to selection even though his own nephew was an applicant for the post and had selected him in preference to a better qualified and meritorious person wrongly proceeding on the assumption that he had secured the highest percentage of marks on a strained reasoning only to accommodate his nephew in flagrant disregard of the directions having statutory force quashed the resolution dated 28-11-1995 with the direction for re-advertising the post for being filled up in accordance with law. The Sub-Divisional Officer had further found that Himmatsingh had succeeded in getting appointment in collusion with the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat and produced a forged copy of the resolution before this Court which did not tally with the original resolution. The present respondent, thereafter challenged the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer by means of writ petition No. 2277/96 which has given rise to this appeal. The writ petition was filed on the ground that the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer was without jurisdiction and the resolution of the Panchayat could not be set aside by the Sub-Divisional Officer under any of the powers conferred under the Panchayat Act. The further ground taken was that the Commissioner alone on a revision having been filed against the resolution of the Panchayat could if at all interfere therein. The petitioner also asserted that the principles of natural justice were violated by the Sub-Divisional Officer as no opportunity had been given to the petitioner to substantiate his case vis-a-vis the appointment in question, or its irregularities. The writ petition was contested by the respondents, the Secretary to the Government, Panchayat and Welfare Department, Bhopal and Secretary, Gram Panchayat, Murawali and Sub-Divisional Officer, Lehar, who filed a joint return/counter affidavit denying the petitioner's claim. The writ petition was contested by the respondents, the Secretary to the Government, Panchayat and Welfare Department, Bhopal and Secretary, Gram Panchayat, Murawali and Sub-Divisional Officer, Lehar, who filed a joint return/counter affidavit denying the petitioner's claim. It may be noticed that no rejoinder affidavit denying or controverting the assertions made in the aforesaid counter-affidavit/return has been filed by the petitioner. The learned Single Judge vide the impugned order came to the conclusion that section 91 of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam provided for an appeal and a revision against the order or proceeding of the Panchayat and Madhya Pradesh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995, the resolution of Panchayat is not appealable but only revisable. The Sub-Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute in an appeal. In the aforesaid view of the matter the learned Single Judge held that the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer was without jurisdiction and further that the said officer had wrongly assumed the jurisdiction on the strength of the direction contained in the order of this Court disposing of Writ Petition No. 11 of 1996 which required for examining the matter relating to the posting of Dularelal when the petitioner had been appointed. The learned Single Judge quashed the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer holding that he had no jurisdiction to interfere with the resolution passed by the Gram Panchayat. However, the learned Single Judge issued a direction requiring the Janpad Panchayat to consider, taking into account the order passed in the writ petition No. 200 of 1996 as to whether any other person could be posted at Gram Panchayat Lahar when the petitioner was already appointed as Panchayat-Karmi. The learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that taking into consideration the findings returned against the contesting respondent and the facts which had come on record no interference in the said order and the consequent result was called for in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent has however tried to support the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge on the reasonings contained therein and has further asserted that he had not been heard by the Sub-Divisional Officer and therefore the order passed by the learned Single Judge is liable to be sustained. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent has however tried to support the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge on the reasonings contained therein and has further asserted that he had not been heard by the Sub-Divisional Officer and therefore the order passed by the learned Single Judge is liable to be sustained. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. There can be no manner of doubt in regard to the position in law that in a situation where while proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India such facts and circumstances are brought on record which unmistakably indicate that the quashing of an illegal order will result in the revival of another manifestly illegal order the discretionary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not be exercised, provided substantial justice is found to have been done. Further, the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not be utilised for the purpose of obtaining restoration of an ex facie illegal order to avoid perpetuation of the illegality. The exercise of writ jurisdiction has to be exercised only to secure the ends of justice and not to provide an unfair advantage. In the present case what we find is that on the facts found established on record and the fatal irregularities going to the root of the matter and the fabrication of the proceedings to accommodate Himmatsingh Kaurav giving a go-by to the established procedure require to be followed before granting an appointment filling up a vacancy in the post of a Panchayat-Karmi which have been noticed by the Sub-Divisional Officer in the impugned order passed by him dated 5-10-1996, there could be no occasion for the exercise of the extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of Constitution of India. We further find that Himmatsingh Kaurav was a party in Writ Petition No. 200 of 1996. We further find that Himmatsingh Kaurav was a party in Writ Petition No. 200 of 1996. The learned Single Judge while disposing of the writ petition No. 200 of 1996 had observed that prima facie the appointment of Himmatsingh Kaurav appeared to be in order but the respondent No. 2, the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Lahar, whose jurisdiction is exercised by the Sub-Divisional Officer, had been directed to look into the grievance of the petitioner taking notice of the resolution and other documents taken on record and examine whether the resolution of the Panchayat had been properly passed or not. Obviously, therefore, Himmatsingh Kaurav, had himself invited an inquiry into the illegality and propriety of the resolution dated 28-11-1995. It was at his instance that the Sub-Divisional Officer had held the inquiry and had come to the conclusions after going through the relevant record to which a reference has already been made hereinabove. There is nothing in the writ petition filed by Himmatsingh which may in any manner indicate the alleged prejudice which was said to have been caused to him in defending the resolution whereunder he claimed to have been appointed. The petitioner, Himmatsingh Kaurav, had not challenged in the writ petition the correctness of the observations made by the Sub-Divisional Officer which demonstrated manifest illegalities going to the root of the matter clearly indicating that the alleged resolution sought to be relied upon by Himmatsingh was liable to be ignored and could not be taken to have resulted in vesting the petitioner with any right to hold the post. In such a situation, when a direction had been issued for holding a fresh election for filling up the vacancy in question complying with the directions issued by this Court while disposing of Writ Petition No. 11 of 1996 we are of the considered opinion that any interference in the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer would have resulted in reviving another manifestly illegal order which had to be avoided in order to prevent the manifest miscarriage of justice. It may be noticed further that the order dated 27-12-1995 passed by the Chief Executive Officer was a consequential order. The main order passed by the Sanyukt Sanchalak, Panchayat Avam Samaj Seva Sambhag, Gwalior, dated 28-12-1994 which was sought to be implemented by issuing the order dated 27-12-1995 had never been challenged. It may be noticed further that the order dated 27-12-1995 passed by the Chief Executive Officer was a consequential order. The main order passed by the Sanyukt Sanchalak, Panchayat Avam Samaj Seva Sambhag, Gwalior, dated 28-12-1994 which was sought to be implemented by issuing the order dated 27-12-1995 had never been challenged. As observed by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice specially when the striking down of the order is to result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the other party in violation of principles of natural justice or otherwise not in accordance with the law. The Apex Court had taken into consideration its earlier decision in the case of S.L. Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan and Others, , and had further observed that if on the undisputed and admitted factual position only one conclusion is possible and permissible the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of principles of natural justice. In the writ petition filed by the respondent-petitioner the correctness of the recital of the facts on which the Sub-Divisional Officer had proceeded to hold the resolution as illegal had not been challenged. In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent-authorities it has been asserted that fair and equitable opportunity had been afforded to Lakhansingh and the order had been passed complying with the directions issued by this Court. It has been further asserted that no prejudice had been caused and the petitioner himself had moved an application which had been considered on merits. Ample time and opportunity had been provided to the petitioner to justify his appointment and to rebut the objections raised by Lakhansingh. No rejoinder affidavit denying or controverting the clear and categorical assertions made in the counter-affidavit/return had been filed. Ample time and opportunity had been provided to the petitioner to justify his appointment and to rebut the objections raised by Lakhansingh. No rejoinder affidavit denying or controverting the clear and categorical assertions made in the counter-affidavit/return had been filed. Taking into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances as brought on record we are of the considered opinion that no justifiable ground could be said to have been made out warranting an interference in the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and for quashing of the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 5-10-1996. The present one was not a case fit for the intervention of equity. In the result, this appeal succeeds. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside with a direction that the proceedings in regard to the filling up of the vacancy in question be carried out and concluded in accordance with law within a period not later than two months from the date of production of a copy of this order before the respondents Nos. 3 and 4. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.