JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner Sri Kulwant Singh is an ex-naval personnel and after serving the Navy as a Gunner took employment in Reliance Petrochemicals, Ltd., respondent I herein, as a security-Cum-administrative officer with effect from 14 July 1989. On 9 November 1990 the petitioner was confirmed by respondent 1 on satisfactory completion of probation period and he continued to render services in that post till his services were terminated on 28 June 1991 The termination of services led to an industrial dispute being raised, and ultimately the Deputy Commissioner, Labour Court (Administration), Bombay, made a reference to the Fifth Labour Court at Bombay for adjudication upon the industrial dispute involving the question of the validity and legality of the order of termination of service of the petitioner The reference also required the Labour Court to enquire whether the petitioner is to be reinstated in service with full back-wages and continuity in service with effect from 29 June 1991. 1A. Before the Labour Court a preliminary objection was raised by the respondent-company as to the maintainability or the said reference by contending that the petitioner was not a workman within the definition of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as he being an administrative officer he had been discharging the managerial, administrative and supervisory functions The petitioner was drawing salary of more than Rs. 1,600 per month hence he could not be held to be a workman under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act Accordingly the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner was not entitled to get any relief from the Labour Court. 2. The Labour Court after considering the evidence led by the parties held inter alia that the petitioner was employed mainly in the administrative capacity and any work which can be termed as work of clerical nature done by him was only incidental to his employment in the administrative capacity and therefore, the petitioner clearly falls within the excluded category of definition of “workman” as appearing in S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of the findings recorded on the preliminary issue the Labour Court rejected the reference on 10 May 1996. The legality and correctness of the award of the Labour Court is sought to be challenged in this petition. 3. In view of the findings recorded on the preliminary issue the Labour Court rejected the reference on 10 May 1996. The legality and correctness of the award of the Labour Court is sought to be challenged in this petition. 3. Sri Kuldeep Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the designation of the petitioner as security-cum-administrative officer was of little consequence. He submitted that the law is well settled that it is not the designation but the true nature of duties being performed by an employee is the determining factor as to whether or not the concerned employee is a workman under S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. He submitted that the petitioner was only a workman doing mainly clerical job although on occasions he had to do even manual work. He had no independent power to appoint and dismiss an employee and to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. He had no authority under the terms and conditions of service to take independent decision for the company and although he was designated as security-cum-administrative officer, he was mainly doing the work of clerical nature. He contended that the Labour Court committed serious error in placing reliance on the duty list which was not even proved by the company. Sri Singh contended that the Labour Court has dealt with the evidence in a cavalier manner and the findings that the petitioner is not a workman is totally perverse. He contended drat the question as to whether or not an employee is a workman, being a jurisdictional question this Court in its writ jurisdiction is competent to re-examine the findings of the Labour Court on merits and arrive at an independent finding. Sri Singh referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra [ 1983 (2) L.L.N. 637 ], and Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India (Private), Ltd. [ 1984 (2) L.L.N. 27 ]. Sri Singh referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra [ 1983 (2) L.L.N. 637 ], and Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India (Private), Ltd. [ 1984 (2) L.L.N. 27 ]. He also drew my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of National Engineering Industries, Ltd. v. Shri Kishan Bhageria [ 1988 (1) L.L.N. 675 ], and other decisions referred to in the said decision wherein the Apex Court has laid down that the principal duties which are performed by the employee are to be considered for the purpose of determining as to me real status of the employee, i.e. whether such an employee had been discharging the administrative, managerial or supervisory work. It has been held in the said decision that even if at times managerial, supervisory or administrative works were required to be performed by me employee such occasional duties by itself does not determine the real status of the employee but it is the principal or major duties performed by the employee which determine me employee's real status. 4. Sri C.U. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-company, however, opposed the contentions of Sri Kuldeep Singh. He has submitted that the Labour Court after referring to the terms and conditions of service of the petitioner and the actual duties performed by him clearly came to the conclusion mat the principal job of the petitioner was administrative in nature. Such a finding cannot be interfered with by this Court by reappreciating the evidence on record and substitute its own view point. Sri Singh also contended mat although the designation of the employee by itself is not determining factor about the true nature of the duties being performed by such an employee, such a designation is not altogether irrelevant but designation often give clue as to the true nature of duties being performed by the concerned employee Sri Singh took me through the application for employment made by the petitioner as well as fetter of appointment in order to show that the petitioner was appointed to administrative post although occasionally he was performing some supervisory functions. Sri Singh has submitted that for discharging managerial or administrative work it is not necessary that the officer will have the power to dismiss other employees or suspend such employees, such a power may be exercised by another set of the managerial or administrative officer Sri Singh contended mat admittedly the petitioner was looking after the various sections of the company like transit accommodation, hotel and taxi as also looking after the house keeping and office equipments. The nature of duties performed by him actually indicate mat he was administratively managing the office work relating to me company. Sri Singh referred to the decision or the Apex Court in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India v. Burmah Shell Management Staff Association [ (1970) 3 SCC 378 : A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 922]. He submitted that whether or not a particular employee has been discharging the managerial, administrative or supervisory, principally and essentially the question of facts must be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case. Sri Singh also referred to the decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in H.R. Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India), Ltd. [ 1994 (2) L.L.N. 1017 ], wherein the Supreme Court held, in Para. 24, at page 1027, that: “… a person to be qualified to be a workman must be doing the work which falls in any of the four categories, viz., manual, clerical, supervisory or technical. It is not enough that he is not covered by either of the four exceptions to the definition ….” He also pointed out that the Constitution Bench categorically held that the decisions in S.K. Verma [ 1983 (2) L.L.N. 637 ] (vide supra) and Ved Prakash Gupta cases [ 1984 (2) L.L.N. 27 ] (vide supra), should be confined to the facts of those cases. 5. After giving my careful thought to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that it is not possible to sustain the order of the Labour Court. 5. After giving my careful thought to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that it is not possible to sustain the order of the Labour Court. It is now well settled that mere nomenclature of the post is not of much consequence and what is to be seen is the nature of the duties performed by the employee concerned, so as to arrive at a correct conclusion as to whether he was a workman within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Act. The crucial test which will have to be applied is as to whether the duties performed by the concerned employee were or substantial part thereof was of such a nature as may fall within the aforesaid definition of workman. Thus what is to be seen is the nature of the substantial part of the work which the employee concerned had to perform. When an employee is employed to do certain types of work enumerated in the decision of H.R. Adyanthaya [ 1994 (2) L.L.N. 1017 ] (vide supra) there is hardly any difficulty in treating him as a workman for the classification in conformity of industry or mill or establishment qua such employee but when such employee is even required to do more than one kind of work in such a case it becomes necessary to determine under which classification the employee will fall for the purpose of deciding whether he comes within the definition of workman or goes out of it. 6. A perusal of the decision of the Labour Court shows that the Labour Court was clearly swayed away by the nomenclature of the post. The Labour Court observed: “He has never objected to the designation as security-cum- administrative officer given by the company. 6. A perusal of the decision of the Labour Court shows that the Labour Court was clearly swayed away by the nomenclature of the post. The Labour Court observed: “He has never objected to the designation as security-cum- administrative officer given by the company. Therefore, minute scrutiny of the evidence of second party itself made it crystal clear that he is not a workman within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act,…” The Labour Court further observed: “We must take into account the duties attached to the office and not only the duties actually performed by the second party….” As regards the duty lists which were produced by the management the Labour Court observed in Para 16 as under: “There is a dispute between the parties for issuance of duty list to the second party workmen. On the contrary, the witness examined for the first party himself categorically admitted in the evidence that no specific duty list was issued to the second party. However, that is not decisive factor alone. That has to be taken into consideration while deciding the issue as to whether the second party is a workman or not the first party filed duty list along with the list of Exhibit C3 The said duty list is very much disputed by the second party. It is contended by the second party the said duty list was never issued to him. May it with be, it is unworthy to take into account that the said duty list may not be in relation to second party workman herein. We must take into account the duties attached to the office and not only duties actually performed by the second party. As per the said duty list the said duty list is reproduced as under.” The Labour Court in the same paragraph further observed: “There is another duty list of the second party workman as duties and job representative officer. The said list is dated 3 July 1992 Admittedly the said duty list is not issued to the second party nor there is any evidence on the record to indicate that the said duty list was actually given to the second party. However, considering duties attached to the office of the administrative officer there is no room left for any doubt that those duties are of administrative and supervisory in nature. However, considering duties attached to the office of the administrative officer there is no room left for any doubt that those duties are of administrative and supervisory in nature. The said duty list is reproduced as under.” 7. In my opinion apart from the fact that the duty list Exhibit C3 was not proved by the management, the Labour Court obviously was in error in giving undue weightage to the duty list produced by the management. The other duty list which was relied upon by the Labour Court is not even part of the record Sri C.U. Singh fairly conceded that this list was produced by the company in the conciliation proceedings and it was not meant to be produced in evidence Again in Para. 6 of the award the Labour Court has observed as under: “The witness categorically admitted mat in Cl. (7) of the said appointment letter his duties and responsibility are incorporated. The witness further admitted that he had accepted the terms and condition of his appointment as appearing in the appointment letter and he has also acknowledged the same by putting endorsement to that effect.” The above observations made by the Labour Court are totally unwarranted and are not borne out by the evidence on record. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties I have carefully gone through the same including the appointment letter and it is clearly seen mat the letter of appointment does not lay down the duties of the petitioner. 8. It is not disputed before me that the petitioner had no power either to appoint or terminate services of any employee nor he has the power to suspend any employee of the company. There is a vague statement made by the witness of the management mat ¾ employees were working under the petitioner but it is denied by the petitioner in his evidence and there is absolutely not an iota of evidence to show that there were certain subordinate employees working under the petitioner. In the above background let us examine the nature of duties actually performed by the petitioner. In the written statement the company has not indicated the duties and responsibilities of the petitioner at ail and apart from contending that the petitioner does not fall within the four comers of S. 2(s) of the Act, no particulars were disclosed. In the above background let us examine the nature of duties actually performed by the petitioner. In the written statement the company has not indicated the duties and responsibilities of the petitioner at ail and apart from contending that the petitioner does not fall within the four comers of S. 2(s) of the Act, no particulars were disclosed. It was stated by the management witness Sri Venkatesh mat the petitioner was empowered to allot quarters to the officers. In the cross-examination the witness however, accepted that the power of allotment is vested with the committee and the petitioner had no such power. Then it was stated that the petitioner used to allot transit accommodation but not a single instance of this nature was brought before the Court. In fact the evidence indicated mat the petitioner used to take back the possession of the premises after the concerned employee has vacated the quarters. He was required to see whether the quarters were properly cleaned or not etc. Surely this type of work does not indicate mat the petitioner was discharging the administrative functions. It seems mat the company has selected 4/5 hotels in the locality for me purpose of accommodating the visitors and the petitioner's job was to refer the concerned visitor to one of these hotels. Again this cannot be described as managerial or administrative function. Much is tried to be made of the fact mat the petitioner used to certify bills from different parties who had supplied material to the residential quarters, etc. I have carefully gone through the oral evidence as well a documentary evidence and I do not find that the petitioner has got power to accept the bills. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted and in my opinion rightly that the job of the petitioner was to just check the bills and not to sanction them. The other work done by the petitioner according to the management was to send cars for repairs to the garage on the approved list and to pay to MTNL bills, etc. According to the petitioner, he was looking after the distribution of salary slips, stationery, mail etc. He was also looking after the repairs of vehicles, delivery/payments of electricity and telephone bills. Merely because the petitioner certified few bills, it is not possible to hold that he was discharging administrative or managerial functions. According to the petitioner, he was looking after the distribution of salary slips, stationery, mail etc. He was also looking after the repairs of vehicles, delivery/payments of electricity and telephone bills. Merely because the petitioner certified few bills, it is not possible to hold that he was discharging administrative or managerial functions. A perusal of the evidence shows mat substantial part of the work of the petitioner consist of clerical and occasionally of administrative nature. It must be also remembered that the petitioner could never appoint or dismiss any workman or order any enquiry against any workman. Under the circumstances, I hold that the substantial duty of the petitioner was neither managerial nor administrative in nature in the sense in which those terms are understood in the industrial law. Similarly there is absolutely no material to show that the petitioner was doing work of supervisory nature in the sense of supervising the work of other employees. In the light of the evidence and the legal position referred to above, I am of the opinion mat the finding of the Labour Court mat the petitioner is not a workman within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Act is perverse and could not be supported. On the evidence available on record I hold that the petitioner clearly falls within the definition of workman under S. 2(s) of the Act and that reference of the dispute under S. 10(1)(d) of the Act is valid in law. 9. In the result, petition succeeds. The impugned order, dated 10 May 1996, passed by the Labour Court is set aside. The preliminary issue raised by the Labour Court is endorsed in favour of the petitioner. The matter is remanded back to the Labour Court to consider the other issues raised in the dispute in accordance with law. Considering the fact that the dispute is pending since 1992, the Labour Court is directed to dispose of the reference as expeditiously as possible and preferably within six months.