JUDGMENT 1. THIS second appeal is at the instance of a tenant/defendant in a suit for eviction and is directed against the judgment and decree dated May 13, 1997 passed by the learned additional District Judge. 5th Court, Alipore, District-South 24 Paraganas in Title Appeal No. 25 of 1995 thereby affirming those dated November 23, 1994 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, 3rd Court, alipore, District 24 Paraganas (South) in Title Suit No. 50 of 1979. 2. THE predecessor-in-interest of the present respondents no. 1 to 3 along with respondent no. 4 filed the aforesaid Title Suit No. 50 of 1979 for eviction of the appellant on the ground of efflux of time mentioned in a registered deed of lease dated November 21, 1955 which was for a period of 16 years and the case made out by the plaintiffs was as follows :- (a) The suit property along with other properties originally belonged to a partnership firm carrying on business under the name and style of M/s. Partabmull Rameswar. The said partnership firm had five partners including the original plaintiff no. 1 and one dhanraj Bagaria, the husband of respondent no. 4. (b) By a registered indenture of partition and mutual conveyance dated March 26, 1963. all the partners of the said firm mutually and amicably partitioned the properties of the partnership including the suit property among the partners and in accordance with the said partition, the suit property along with some other properties fell in the share of plaintiff no. 1, the father of the plaintiff no. 1 and one Dhanraj Bagaria, the husband of plaintiff no. 2 jointly and thus all three of them became joint owners of the property with effect from the date of the said partition i. e. the March 26, 1963. (c) Thereafter on the death of the father of the plaintiff no. 1 and in view of partition by virtue of a decree passed in Suit No. 263 of 1972 of this High Court, the plaintiffs became the joint owners of the suit property. (d) Defendant having defaulted in payment of rent including enhanced Municipal rates and taxes in terms of the lease deed, the plaintiff no. 1, his father and Dhanraj Bagaria, the husband of plaintiff no. (d) Defendant having defaulted in payment of rent including enhanced Municipal rates and taxes in terms of the lease deed, the plaintiff no. 1, his father and Dhanraj Bagaria, the husband of plaintiff no. 2, as the then joint owners and lessors in terms of the said lease, filed application for winding up proceeding of defendant company under the provisions of Companies Act. However, this court disposed of the said petition by ordering permanent stay of the winding up proceeding on the defendants paying the entire amount of admitted arrears of rent with increased Municipal rates and taxes for the period from March 1967 to October 1967 and January 1970. In the said winding up proceeding the defendant acknowledged and admitted the petitioners therein as owners-lessors of the suit property and their right as such owners-lessors and acted accordingly by paying them the admitted arrears. (e) After the expiry of the said lease by efflux of time on April 30, 1972 although the defendant was bound to vacate the property, it filed a suit being Title Suit No. 88 of 1973 thereby praying for a decree for specific performance of an alleged agreement of renewal of the said lease against the then owners-lessors viz. plaintiff no. 1, his mother, Smt. Rani Debi Bagaria and Dhanraj Bagaria by treating them as lessors under the said lease. The said suit however abated for non-substitution of one of the defendants viz. Rani Debi Bagaria. (f) Thus, on the expiry of the said lease, the defendant was liable to be evicted. The appellant contested the aforesaid suit by filing written statement thereby denying the material allegations made in the plaint and its defence was, inter alia, as follows : (a) The partnership firm M/s. Partabmull Rameswar was the owner of property in suit and the suit not having been filed by the said firm, the defendant company was not bound to give up possession to the plaintiffs. (b) The partnership firm M/s. Partabmull Rameswar was admittedly the owner of the suit property and the said firm executed lease in favour of the appellant as lessor and under the terms of the lease possession of the leasehold property could only be lawfully demanded by the said lessor. (b) The partnership firm M/s. Partabmull Rameswar was admittedly the owner of the suit property and the said firm executed lease in favour of the appellant as lessor and under the terms of the lease possession of the leasehold property could only be lawfully demanded by the said lessor. The firm not having been dissolved, mere arrangement between) certain persons to enjoy the benefit of the property in the suit does not entitle them to lawfully demand possession from the defendant. (c) The payment of rent to Rangalal Bagaria, Deokinandan Bagaria and Dhanraj Bagaria was made on account of their misrepresentation about the ownership of the suit property. (d) The suit for specific performance of contract initiated by the appellant had not been finally decided. Moreover, the suit was instituted on the basis of wrong claim of separate ownership of the suit property by plaintiffs and when the real position became known, the appellant did not proceed further and the suit stood abated. 3. THE learned Trial Judge on consideration of the materials on record held that by virtue of the deed of partition and dissolution of the partnership, the plaintiffs have become owner of the suit property and the defendant was a tenant in terms off the lease deed dated November 21, 1955 and as such on the expiry of 16 years period the defendant was liable to be evicted. 4. BEING dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, the appellant preferred an appeal being Title appeal No. 15 of 1995 and the learned Additional District Judge by the judgment and decree impugned in the instant appeal has affirmed those passed by the learned Trial Judge. Mr. Dasgupta, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has raised some pure questions of law before this court. 5. THE first point taken by Mr. Dasgupta is that the concept of partition is absent in the domain of laws of partnership. Accordingly he contends that a partnership firm, so long it continues to function, cannot make partition of its assets and as such by virtue of the alleged deed of partition dated March 26, 1963 the suit property cannot devolve either upon the predecessors of the plaintiff or subsequently upon the plaintiffs. Therefore. Mr. Accordingly he contends that a partnership firm, so long it continues to function, cannot make partition of its assets and as such by virtue of the alleged deed of partition dated March 26, 1963 the suit property cannot devolve either upon the predecessors of the plaintiff or subsequently upon the plaintiffs. Therefore. Mr. Dasgupta contends that the suit at the instance of some of the partners of the firm and/or their legal heirs is not maintainable. 6. THE second point canvassed by Mr. Dasgupta is that an order passed in a winding up proceeding does not create any right in favour of the respondents and as such by virtue of the said order the respondents cannot claim to be lawful transferee of the lessor of the lease deed dated November 21, 1955. The third submission of Mr. Dasgupta is that abatement of the previous suit filed by his client for specific performance of contract does not preclude his client from taking an inconsistent defence in view of the fact that the said suit was not disposed of on merit but abated. In view of false claim made by some of the partners of the firm his client filed the aforesaid suit but after coming to know the real position they decided not to proceed with the same. 7. LASTLY Mr. Dasgupta contends that even by payment of rent and acceptance thereof by the plaintiffs, the old lease of 1955 was not continuing but a new tenancy was created. Thus, Mr. Dasgupta submits, although it can be said that his client was estopped from disputing the title of the plaintiffs in the suit property for acknowledging them as landlord but by such acknowledgement a new tenancy having been created, the plaintiffs must file a suit for eviction on any of the grounds referred to in Section 13 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. At any rate, Mr. Dasgupta continues, the plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefit of the terms of the old lease of 1955. 8. MR. At any rate, Mr. Dasgupta continues, the plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefit of the terms of the old lease of 1955. 8. MR. Mukherjee, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents has on the other hand supported the judgments and decrees passed by the learned courts below and has contended that he was not disputing the proposition of law that during the subsistence of a partnership, a single partner or some of the partners cannot transfer the property of the firm but there is no bar of transferring the assets of a partnership by all the partners jointly even before dissolution. Mr. Mukherjee contends that in the instant case it appears from the deed of partition that all the partners decided to transfer the joint assets of the firm separately to different partners. Therefore, according to Mr. Mukherjee by virtue of the said deed, the plaintiffs have become lawful owners of the suit property even if it is established that there was no dissolution of the firm. Mr. Mukherjee further contends that the defendant/appellant having admitted the plaintiffs as landlord and having further filed a suit for specific performance of contract for renewal of the terms of the lease dated November 21, 1955 is estopped from disputing that by virtue of the partition deed, the leasehold interest in the suit property has devolved upon the plaintiffs. 9. MR. Mukherjee further contends that in view of devolution of interest from the partnership firm to the plaintiffs, the old lease of 1955 was continuing and as such there is no force in the submission of Mr. Dasgupta that a new tenancy under the provision of West Bengal Premises Tenancy act has been created. 10. AS regards the first point of Mr. Dasgupta that during subsistence of a partnership business one or some of the partners cannot deal with the assets, there is no dispute about aforesaid proposition. But, in my opinion, the decision of the Apek Court in the case of Addanki narayanappa and Anr. vs. Bhaskara Krishnappa reported in AIR 1966 sc 1300 , cited by Mr. Dasgupta, does not lay down the proposition of law that even all the partners of a firm jointly cannot transfer the assets of the property during its subsistence. But, in my opinion, the decision of the Apek Court in the case of Addanki narayanappa and Anr. vs. Bhaskara Krishnappa reported in AIR 1966 sc 1300 , cited by Mr. Dasgupta, does not lay down the proposition of law that even all the partners of a firm jointly cannot transfer the assets of the property during its subsistence. The provisions contained in sections 14 and 15 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 are always "subject to the contract between the partners" as it appears from the opening phrase of the aforesaid two sections of the Act. Therefore, in my opinion, even during the subsistence of a partnership business, all the partners of the firm, if they agree, can transfer immovable assets of the firm, either to any third party or to any of the partners in accordance with law. After all, the immovable property of the firm is, in the eye of law, owned by all the partners jointly. In the instant case as it appears from the partition deed that all the partners by the said registered deed decided to transfer different immovable properties of the firm to its partners in the way laid down therein. Thus, the said deed conferred exclusive title to the persons in whose favour the suit property was transferred and therefore the present respondents being the successors of those persons, acquired right, title and interest over the suit property. In view of section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, the plaintiffs are therefore entitled to realise rent and evict the appellant in accordance with the lease deed dated November 21, 1955 being the transferees of the original lessors. 11. I do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. Dasgupta that by virtue of payment of rent by the appellant to the respondents a new tenancy has been created. Mr. Dasgupta tried to impress upon this court that if an attornment is preceded by a valid transfer in accordance with law, in such a case old tenancy continues but on the other hand, if an attornment is not preceded by a lawful transfer in such a case although the tenant cannot dispute the title of the new landlord in view of section 116 of the Evidence Act, such attornment creates a new tenancy. 12. 12. SINCE I have held that by virtue of the partition deed, title has passed in favour of the respondents, and the appellant subsequently having paid rent to the respondents and/or their predecessors this is a clear case of continuation of the old tenancy. Therefore, even if there are some indications available from the partition deed that the business was continuing, by virtue of the said deed of partition, title has no doubt passed in favour of the plaintiffs. 13. IN view of my aforesaid finding, the other question raised by Mr. Dasgupta as to whether a new tenancy is created by virtue of an attornment if such attornment is not preceded by a valid transfer of title in favour of new landlord need not be answered in this second appeal. 14. THUS, in my opinion, both the courts below rightly found that on the expiry of the lease deed of 16 years, the plaintiffs being the lawful transferees from the original lessor were entitled to evict the defendants inasmuch as such lease is beyond the purview of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act. Therefore, there is no merit in the instant second appeal and the same is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances there will, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.