Judgment :- Arijit Pasayat, CJ. Petitioner sought a decree for dissolution of her marriage with respondent on alleged ground of cruelty and desertion by moving a petition under S.10 of Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (in short, 'the Act'). 2. Factual position, as stated by petitioner in a nutshell, is as follows: Petitioner and respondent are Syrian Christians. Their marriage was solemnised on 30.9.1985 according to custom of community. A sum of Rs. 41,000/- was given to respondent as "Sthreedhan" by petitioner's parents. A property was purchased in their joint names by sale deed dated 27.11.1987. Amount given by way of Sthreedhan was utilised towards sale consideration. Every now and then, respondent physically assaulted petitioner and she had to take refuge in her parental house in order to escape from cruel behaviour of respondent. Respondent's mental condition was abnormal and had to undergo treatment for mental disorder before and after marriage. On these occasions, physical and mental harassments were more aggressive. Petitioner gave birth to a male child. On 18.10.1990, as it became impossible for her to live with her husband, she, along with the child, was forced to leave the company of respondent, only to save her own as well as the life of her child. On intervention of mediators, property purchased on 27.11.1987, was partitioned and a deed was executed on 14.2.1991. Petitioner sold her share in the property. After 18.10.1990, they never lived together and respondent never cared to maintain her and the child. Petition under S.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, "the Code') was filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kanjirappally for getting maintenance. Respondent did not contest the petition and maintenance was granted to petitioner and the child. Even after passing of the order in the petition under S.125 of the Code, respondent did not pay any amount. On few occasions, respondent came to the house of petitioner only to create further troubles and ugly scenes. Therefore, complaints were filed before police. It was the stand o: petitioner that respondent wilfully deserted her from 18.10.1990, without any reasonable excuse or cause. 3. A detailed objection was filed by respondent. His stand was that petition has been filed without any bonafides making false allegations. Entire consideration for joint property purchased was paid by him. Therefore, complaints were filed before police. It was the stand o: petitioner that respondent wilfully deserted her from 18.10.1990, without any reasonable excuse or cause. 3. A detailed objection was filed by respondent. His stand was that petition has been filed without any bonafides making false allegations. Entire consideration for joint property purchased was paid by him. According to him, name of petitioner was included as a result of the pressure tactics adopted by petitioner's father. Respondent was often harassed by petitioner's father physically and mentally. Such acts resulted in mental agony to respondent, which resulted in derangement of his mental balance. He was admitted in Mandiram Hospital for treatment. He was not suffering from any mental ailment before marriage. Allegation of cruelty was also denied. It was his stand that petitioner had left his company on her own without any valid reason. It was his allegation that many valuable articles were taken away by petitioner at that time which were really owned by respondent. This was done while he was undergoing treatment in the hospital. He was not aware of any proceedings under S.125 of the Code. He had requested petitioner to come back to his house. There was no positive response. On the contrary, he was brutally manhandled by his father-in-law and his relatives. It was submitted that there was no ground for petitioner to seek a decree for dissolution of the marriage. 4. Petitioner was examined as PW1 while respondent was examined as CPW 1. 5. Learned trial judge, on consideration of materials on record, held that there was desertion as well as cruelty and, therefore, in the absence of any material to prove collusion between the parties, decree for dissolution of marriage was granted. As required under S.17 of the Act reference has been made to this Court. 6. Dissolution of marriage is dealt with in S.10 of Chapter III of the Act. Cruelty is a ground for dissolution of marriage. Relief can be sought if cruelty is of such a character as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger. Apex Court in Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. Cruelty is a ground for dissolution of marriage. Relief can be sought if cruelty is of such a character as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger. Apex Court in Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane (AIR 1975 SC 1534) held that it is not necessary, as under the English law, that cruelty must be of such a character as to cause 'danger' to life, limb or health as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. Therefore, what the Courts must determine is not whether petitioner has proved the charge of cruelty having regard to principles of English law, but whether petitioner proves that respondent has treated him/her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his/her mind that it will be harmful or injurious for him/her to live with the respondent. Question of cruelty is to be judged on the basis of evidence on record and circumstances of the case. Whether a spouse is guilty of cruelty is essentially a question of fact and the Court must consider the aforesaid matters in view of physical condition, custom and manners of the parties. Conduct should be grave so as to make a marriage virtually unendurable. It must be more serious than the ordinarily wear and tear of marriage. It has no esoteric or artificial meaning SgeLe brocq v. lebrocq, (1964) 1 WLR 1085). Cruelty need not be physical. It has to be legitimately and reasonably drawn that treatment by the spouse caused apprehension in the mind of other spouse that the conduct amounts to cruelty. Temperament is not cruelty. "The legal conception of cruelty, which is not defined by statute, is generally described as conduct of such a character as to have caused danger to life, limb or health (bodily or mental) or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger" (Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 12, page 514). Sometimes the temperament of the parties may not be conducive of each other, which may result in petty quarrels and troubles. Such quarrels may result in temporary marital differences. But that cannot be a ground for divorce (See J.L. Nanda v. Veena Nanda, AIR 1988 SC 407). To constitute cruelty, physical violence is not absolutely necessary. Inflicting mental agony is also cruelty. Such quarrels may result in temporary marital differences. But that cannot be a ground for divorce (See J.L. Nanda v. Veena Nanda, AIR 1988 SC 407). To constitute cruelty, physical violence is not absolutely necessary. Inflicting mental agony is also cruelty. Mental cruelty can consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy, abusive language leading to constant marital discord. It may cause even more serious injury than physical harm, as Lord Hobhouse said in (Earl) Russel v. (Countess) Russell (1897 AC 395). Cruelty in matrimonial law may be of infinite variety. It can be subtle or brutal. Cruelty is a form of torture. 7. Importance of affirmed rights of every human being which are inherent in and essential to the structure of society need no emphasis. To deter breaches thereof, therefore, becomes a sacred duty of society. Enjoyment of basic human rights are the entitlement of every citizen, and their protection, the obligation of every civilised State. The word 'torture', which poses a challenge for medical, legal and other professions, today has become synonymous with the darker side of human civilisation. "Torture is a wound in the soul so painful that sometimes you can almost touch it, but it is also so intangible that there is no way to heal it. Torture is anguish squeezing in your chest, cold as ice and heavy as a stone paralysing as sleep and dark as the abyss. Torture is despair and fear and rage and hate. It is a desire to kill and destroy including yourself (per Adriana P. bartow ). Torture is the very negation of human dignity and cuts at the root of the culture of human rights. World Medical Association, in its Tokyo Declaration 1975, defined 'torture' as "the deliberate, systematic or wanton infliction of physical or mental suffering by one or more persons, acting alone or on the orders of any authority to force another person to yield information, to make a confession or for any other reason". 8. Desertion must be continued for a period of two years before commencement of proceeding for divorce. Desertion is the deliberate withdrawal from cohabitation and abandonment of one's spouse without reason. 8. Desertion must be continued for a period of two years before commencement of proceeding for divorce. Desertion is the deliberate withdrawal from cohabitation and abandonment of one's spouse without reason. For the act of desertion, there must be the factum of physical separation and the animus deserendi or the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (see Lachman Ulamchand Kirpalani v. Meena alias Mota, AIR 1964 SC 40, and Bipin Chandra v. Prabhavali, AIR 1957 SC 176). Both the essential ingredients should continue during the entire statutory period. There must be clear evidence of the intention on the part of the spouse to break up the matrimonial relation with the other. Question of desertion is a matter of inference drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case and those facts are to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. For separation, deserting party should have the active and wilful intention to end an existing marriage. The expression' against the wish' must be construed as meaning contrary to an actively expressed wish of the person charging abandonment, and notwithstanding the resistance or opposition of such person. A person who seeks to prove desertion must give evidence of conduct on his or her part showing that such desertion was without consent of the party alleging desertion; either direct or indirect; and against such party's express wishes. 9. Halstmry's Laws of England, Vol. 12 (3rd Edn.) defines desertion as: "In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without the other's consent and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place, but from a state of things. Person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party". In the case of Bipin Chandra (supra) above passage was quoted and it was observed as follows: "(a) in every case of desertion there must co-exist: (i) the factum of separation and (ii) animus deserendi, i.e., an intention on the part of the guilty spouse of forsaking the aggrieved spouse. In the case of Bipin Chandra (supra) above passage was quoted and it was observed as follows: "(a) in every case of desertion there must co-exist: (i) the factum of separation and (ii) animus deserendi, i.e., an intention on the part of the guilty spouse of forsaking the aggrieved spouse. (b) the two elements (i.e., defacto separation and animus deserendi, need not commence at the same time and one can follow the other; and (c) the two elements as stated above, must subsist during the whole of the statutory duration. S.3(9) of the Act states that "desertion implies an abandonment against the wish of the person charging it". In the background of the aforesaid legal position, when evidence on record is analysed, inevitable conclusion is that allegations have been fully established and, therefore, learned trial judge was justified in this conclusion that both cruelty and desertion have been proved. Accordingly, we confirm the decree and accept the reference.