JUDGMENT D. RAJU, C.J.— The above appeal has been filed against the order of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated 14.10.1997 in OMPs No. 461 and 462 of 1996 in Execution Petition No. 10 of 1992 whereunder the learned Single Judge came to dismiss the application filed under Order 21, Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure, objecting to the execution of the decree obtained against Gulab Singh, judgment debtor No. 2 in the suit, who is the husband of appellant No. 1 and the father of appellants No. 2 and 3. 2. The 1st respondent-Bank obtained a decree for Rs. 2,14,016.70 with costs and future interest at the rate of 12.5% per annum from the date of decree, which was passed on 10.3.1987 in Civil Suit No. 32 of 1986. The said decree appears to have been modified on further appeal in R.F.A. No. 90 of 1987, which came to be decided on 30.6.1997 wherein interest was said to have been allowed from the date of suit in addition to allowing a further sum of Rs. 22,424/ -. In execution of the said decree, proceedings appear to have been initiated by filing the Execution Petition and it is seen further that the judgment debtors have been moving one application or the other by taking objections to stall the execution of the decree, under some pretext or the other. It appears that on 29.7.1994, an order has been made by the Judge dealing with the Execution Petition that the property of judgment debtor No. 2, who is the husband of appellant No. 1 and the father of appellants No. 2 and 3 be attached and sold. It is also seen from the materials on record that judgment debtor No. 1 Kamal Sharma has borrowed certain amounts from the Bank, for which judgment debtor No. 2 stood as surety. It is also seen from the materials on record that judgment debtor No. 1 Kamal Sharma has borrowed certain amounts from the Bank, for which judgment debtor No. 2 stood as surety. In the application filed in OMP No. 461 of 1996, the objection raised by the objectors/ appellants, as noticed above, is that the properties which have been ordered to be attached and sold are in fact Joint Hindu Family ancestral property of the objectors and Gulab Singh, who was only the Karta and that the objectors owned l/16th undivided share and that the property came into the hands of Karta Gulab Singh itself, by rule of survivorship from his ancestors and though in the revenue records Gulab Singh is recorded as owner in possession of l/4th share yet he held the said share only as Karta of the Joint Hindu Family consisting of his wife and two minor sons, each of whom according to the appellants had an undivided 1/ 16th share. The further objection seems to have been that the action of Gulab Singh in having stood surety and guaranteed the due payment of the sum borrowed by judgment debtor No. 1 from the Decree Holder-Bank is not either in the interest or for the benefit of Joint Hindu Family nor could the same be said to be for the legal necessity and, therefore, the debt as well as decree is not binding on them and consequently their share in the property could not, at any rate, be sold in the execution of the decree obtained against judgment debtor No. 2. The other objection seems to be that it is the only residential house of the objectors and the same is not, therefore, liable for attachment and sale. The objectors appear to have placed on record the pedigree table delineating the names of their ancestors/predecessor-in-interest and also the extracts of Jamabandis to support their claim. 3. So far as the Decree Holder-Bank is concerned, it opposed the claim of the appellants raised in the form of the objections by contending that though the objectors were well aware of the pendency of the Execution Petition for considerably a long time, they have not chosen to come to the Court at the earliest and have been making such belated objections in order to indefinitely drag on the proceedings and stall the realisation of the amount due under the decree. After considering the materials on record, the learned Single Judge over ruled the objections raised to the sale of the properties in question and ordered the dismissal of the objection petition, namely, OMP No. 461 of 1996 and the stay application filed in OMP No. 462 of 1996. In overruling the objections, the learned Single Judge held that even the judgment debtor No. 2 filed the objections initially contending that the property is agricultural land and is being wrongly attached and sold in the execution of the decree and that the family being that of agriculturist, the same cannot be deprived of the only source of their income and livelihood from the land. Likewise, an objection appears to have been raised also on the ground that it is the only residential house of the judgment debtors, which is absolutely necessary for living and enjoyment of the members of the family. Those objections, which were raised in OMP No. 393/ 94 came to be dealt with and finally rejected by the learned Single Judge by an order dated 26.10.1994 and it is only thereafter, the property was sought to be attached and sold. The learned Single Judge also held that inasmuch as the objections of the predecessor-in-interest have already been considered and rejected, it is too late and futile for the objectors to file such objections again, particularly, when judgment debtor No. 2 projected himself as the owner in possession of the property to the extent of l/4th share in the agricultural land in question and no inspiration or help could be drawn by the appellants from the copies of Jamabandis placed on record by them. Hence, the objectors have filed the appeal, aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge. 4. Mr. Ajay Kumar Sood, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that in the teeth of overwhelming and indisputable materials produced on record in the form of pedigree/ genealogical table of the family and the revenue records in the form of relevant Jamabandis extracts, the claim of the appellants that the properties in question, particularly, the l/4th share belong to the ancestral Joint Hindu Family consisting of the appellants and judgment debtor No. 2 and the learned Single Judge has failed to properly record any finding on the same and this omission as well as the irregularity seriously vitiates the order of the learned Single Judge. Argued the learned Counsel for the appellants further that the learned Single Judge has mis-read and mis-construed the materials on record and, therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge stood vitiated by serious illegalities, irregularities and improprieties. According to the learned Counsel for the appellants, the share of the objectors in the ancestral undivided Joint Hindu Family property could not be either attached or sold in the execution of the decree in question. 5. Per contra, Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the 1st respondent -Bank streneously contended that the appellants share, if any, be it in the joint family property is also liable to be proceeded against for the debts or money due from the Karta of the undivided Hindu Joint Family, who happens to be the husband of the 1st appellant and the father of appellants No. 2 and 3, so long as the debt cannot be said to be an avyavaharika one and not also contracted for any immoral purposes. The liability of the sons apart from the binding nature of the debt and the liability of the property of the Joint Family also to be proceeded against for the recovery of the same becomes lawful and enforceable also on the principles or doctrine of pious obligation of the sons to discharge the debts of the father from the family properties and, therefore, no exception could be taken to the order passed by the learned Single Judge in this case order the attachment and sale of the property in execution of the decree obtained by the 1st respondent-Bank. 6. Both the learned Counsel appearing on either side invited our attention to volumes of case law on the subject from the early days and we consider it irrelevant as well as inappropriate to flood this judgment with all such decisions when more than one decision of the Apex Court itself has directly and clinchingly answered the issue, in unmistakable terms. 7. 7. In Chippagiri Nagireddi v. Venkadari Somappa, AIR 1943 Madras 1, a Full Bench consisting of nine Judges of the Madras High Court held that where the manager of a Joint Hindu Family who does not happen to be the father also is sued on a negotiable instrument such as a promissory note executed by him in his personal capacity and the decree contains no direction that it shall be executed out of family property, the manager alone is liable to satisfy the decree. The learned Judges also specifically clarified that they are not concerned with the application of the pious obligation rule in such execution proceedings, because the manager of the family in that case was not the father and that they were concerned only with a case in which the manager of a Joint Hindu Family and not the father is sued and that too on a negotiable instrument executed by him in his personal capacity. In S.M. Jakati and another v. S.M Borkar and others, AIR 1959 SC 282, it was held that unless the Hindu son in a Mitakshara coparcenary family succeeds in proving that a decree obtained against his father was based on a debt, which was for an immoral or illegal purpose, the creditors right of seizing in execution of his decree the whole coparcenary property including the sons share remained unaffected because except where the debt is for an illegal of immoral purpose, it is open to the execution creditor to sell the whole estate in satisfaction of the judgment obtained against the father alone. It was further emphasised therein that as between the sons right to take a vested interest jointly with their father in their ancestral estate and the remedy of fathers creditors to seize the whole of the estate for payment of his debt not contracted for immoral or illegal purpose, the latter will prevail and the sons are precluded from setting up their right and that this will apply even to the divided property, which under the doctrine of pious obligation continues to be liable for the debts of the father. 8. 8. In Anthonyswamy v. M.R. Chinaswamy Koundan (Died) by LRs and others, AIR 1970 SC 223, the Apex Court held that the doctrine of pious obligation is not a religious character or is inextricably connected with Hindu religious belief but has passed in to the realm of law and the same is necessary and logical corollary to the doctrine of the right of the son by birth to a share of the ancestral property and that both these conceptions are correlated. By way of further emphasis, it was added that the liability imposed on the son to pay the debt of his father is not a gratuitous obligation thrust on him by Hindu Law but is a salutary counterbalance to the principle that the son from the moment of his birth acquires along with his father an interest in joint family property. In Kanisetti Audilaxamana Rao v. Attipalli Raghurami Reddi (died), Attipalli Nallareddi and others, AIR 1970 Andhra Pradesh 158, a Full Bench of the said High Court held, following a Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court reported in Thangathammal v. Arunachalam Chettiar, (1919) ILR 41 Madras 1071, that where a Hindu father executed his surety bond saying that he would make good payment due under a promissory note, if the debtor defaults in payment of the same to the creditor, the suretyship is one for payment and for that matter the suretys sons are also bound to pay. In Hindustan Commercial Bank Limited v. Sohanlal Gagu Mai and another, AIR 1970 Punjab and Haryana 67, a Full Bench of that High Court held that the surety bond under their consideration created a personal liability on the father to pay the third persons debt and that debt being neither illegal nor immoral, the joint family estate in the hands of the sons was also liable for the payment of the same in view of the doctrine of pious obligation of the sons to pay their fathers debts. In Prasanjit Mahtha v. The United Commercial Bank Limited, AIR 1979 Patna 151, a Division Bench of Patna High Court has held that a surety bond creates a personal liability to pay the debt and comes within the meaning of the term "vyavaharika" and the joint family estate in the hands of the son is liable for the payment of the same in view of his pious obligation to pay his fathers debt. 9. In Prasad and others v. V. Govindaswami Mudaliar and others, AIR 1982 SC 84, we find that the Court was not really concerned with the liability of the sons under the principle of pious obligation to discharge the debts of the father but the said case dealt more with the binding nature of a debt and the right of the father in a joint family to sell or mortgage the joint family property including the sons interest to discharge the debts created by him for his own benefit. In Sarartgapaniv. K. V. Parthiban and others, AIR 1992 Madras 203, Srinivasan, J. as the learned Judge then was, dealt with a case which concerned merely with the binding nature of the debts incurred or alienation made by the father manager on the one hand and the brother manager on the other and it was even in that context pointed out that in the case of the father manager even if the debts are not for the benefit of the family, they are binding on the members of the family if they are antecedent debts which are not tainted by any illegality or immorality. In Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Lucknow v. Raja Vishwanath Pratap Singh, (1996) 8 SCC 122, the Apex Court observed that the sons liability to pay his fathers debts was restricted to the properties, which he had inherited from his father. The decision in Faqir Chand v. Sardarni Harnam Kaur (dead) represented by her LRs and others, AIR 1967 SC 727, held that a father, as manager can incur debt by creating a mortgage of a joint family property for discharging his debt and his son is under pious obligation to pay the mortgage debt, which his father is personally liable to pay, provided that it is not incurred for immoral purposes and that the sons liability cannot be confined only to money decree against his father. While pointing out that the distinction in the procedure for execution does not affect the pious obligation of a Hindu son to pay his fathers debt, it was also observed therein that the son has no right to interfere with the execution of a decree or with the sale of the property in execution proceedings unless he can show that the debt for which the property is sold is either non-existent in the sense that there is no debt which his father is personally liable to pay or that the same is tainted with immorality or illegality. While over-ruling the decision of a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court reported in Faqir Chand v. Sardarni Harnam Kaur and another, AIR 1961 Punjab 138, it was also held that a son is entitled to impeach mortgage even after the mortgagee has obtained preliminary or final decree against his father on a mortgage, if the mortgage was not for legal necessity or payment of any antecedent debt. 10. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side in the light of the principles laid down in the above decisions. In Mettikulam Venkatachala Reddiar v. Mettikulam Kumar a Venkatachala Reddiar and others, 1905 ILR 28 Madras 377; Tukaramhhat v. Gangaram Mulchand Gujar, (1898) ILR 23 Bombay 454 and Rasik Lai Mandal v. Singheswar Rai, ILR Vol XXXIX Calcutta 843, it has been held that the ancestral property in the hands of the son is equally liable for a surety debt due by his father for his having given security for payment of a debt, unless the debts can be shown to have been incurred for immoral or illegal purposes. So far as the facts and circumstances of the case are concerned, there is no controversy or dispute that the decree obtained by the 1st respondent-Bank against Gulab Singh, the husband of the 1st appellant and the father of appellants No. 2 and 3 was on the basis of and on account of his having stood as surety securing the repayment of the debt advanced by the bank in favour of the 1st defendant, who borrowed the said sum from the bank for purchasing a truck. The objections raised by the appellants were more on the basis that their shares in the joint family property could not be proceeded against for the decree passed against the 2nd judgment debtor Gulab Singh and that the family property being agricultural property and also the only residential house of the appellants and the judgment debtor, the same cannot be proceeded against. The objections based on the property being agricultural land or that the house being the only residential house and the immunity claimed from those properties being brought to sale in execution of a decree has not been pursued seriously in the light of an earlier decision of the Division Bench of this Court, which had the approval of the Apex Court apart from the said issue having earlier been also rejected in this case. In such context, the only objection that was seriously pressed and argued at length in the course of arguments was only about the non-liability of the shares of the appellants, as claimed by them in the joint family property, for being proceeded against in realisation of a decree for money obtained personally against the father, Gulab Singh. Of course to some extent, the grievance of the appellants that the learned Single Judge has not chosen to decide the character of the property, and as to whether it is the personal and individual property of judgment debtor No. 2 or that it is the joint family property consisting of judgment debtor No. 2 and his sons, cannot be brushed aside though there is hardly any scope for justification to consider the 1st appellant-wife to be also a member of the joint family even when her husband, the father and head of the family is alive. The materials on record produced in the form of jamabandi record from 1949-50 onwards would go to show that the l/4th share said to have been entered in the name of the 2nd judgment debtor is indisputably the ancestral property belonging to the Joint Hindu Family consisting of judgment debtor No. 2 Gulab Singh and his two minor sons and there is no material produced on behalf of the Bank to the contra, to take a different view. Be that as it may, the decree being one based on a debt, which could not be said to be one for an illegal or immoral purpose, and the judgment debtor No. 2, the father and head of the Joint Hindu Undivided Family having stood as surety and guarantor for the payment of the debt undertaking to pay the debt in case of default by the original debtor borrower and the Civil Court having passed a money decree rendering the father and head of the family also to be personally liable to pay the sum, the properties of the joint family including the sons interest therein become liable to be proceeded against in satisfaction of the decree passed against the father by the application of the pious obligation rule and, therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge overruling the objections and directing the execution proceedings to be pursued further against the joint family properties, as a whole, cannot be said to suffer any infirmity in law or on facts. The conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge though does not purport to give detailed or sufficient reasons, on objective consideration of all the relevant principles adverted to by us, yet in the light of the unmistakable declaration of law in this regard of the liability of the share or interest of the sons also in the joint family property to be proceeded against in execution of a decree passed against the father, in the absence of proof of the debt itself being an Aryavaharika one no exception could be taken to the ultimate order passed by the learned Single Judge. 11. For all the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit whatsoever in the appeal, which, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs. Interim order stands vacated. Appeal dismissed.