JUDGMENT 1. The prayer in this Original Petition which is said to have been filed in public interest is for the issuance of a declaration that all leases, licences and grants given by the 1st respondent/State of Kerala in respect of any forest land stood automatically expired on the commencement of Central Act 69 of 1980 [The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980] (for short 'the Acts') and for the issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing Exts. P1 and P-2 orders granting leases/licences of forest land to various persons after the commencement of the Act as illegal and void ab inicio if they are ordered without the prior approval of the 7th respondent/Union of India and to forbear by a writ of mandamus respondents 1 to 6 from issuing such licences or leases envisaged in Ext. P-1 and like orders, and collect the rent at the revised rate as provided for in the Kerala Grants and Leases (Modification and Rights) Act, 1980 and rules made thereunder for all licences, leases and grams existing prior to the commencement of Act 69 of 1980 and for other reliefs. 2. There are several plantations in Nelliampathy High Range in Palakkad District leased out by the erstwhile Government of Cochin to different persons.The portions of forests leased out were separately enclosed and came to be known as enclosures within the reserved forest. Since the leases were granted at different times the conditions of the lease also varied from case to case. In most cases leases have been given in perpetuity while in some cases leases have been granted for fixed lease periods. The holders of the various estates in Nelliampathy have submitted a representation to the 1st respondent/State of Kerala containing the following demands: "(i) To declare these plantations as deserved as the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in O.P. No. 6566/88 had held that the plantation enclosures within Reserved Forests were not Reserved Forests. (ii) To convert the fixed lease periods as perpetual leasest and the lessees who have already been dispossessed of the lease holdings be restored possession of their plantations. (iii) To allow transfer of leasehold right in whole or in par and to ratify the transfers already made. (iv) To permit planting of all varieties of plantation crops and to permit to cultivate firewood species. (iii) To allow transfer of leasehold right in whole or in par and to ratify the transfers already made. (iv) To permit planting of all varieties of plantation crops and to permit to cultivate firewood species. (v) Any enhancement in the rate of lease rent be only after considering the amount paid by the planters by way of premium and various taxes every year." The 1st respondent after examining the various demands made by the Planters' Association in detail passed Ext. P1 order extending the lease period for a period of 20 years at a time from the date of expiry of each lease and regularising all transfers which had already taken place and validating future transfers only if prior sanction of the Government is obtained. In Ext. P-1 a condition is inserted to the effect that the lease amount will be fixed as Rs. 250 per hectare during 'current financial year' and necessary amendment will be made in the Kerala Grants and Leases (Modification and Rights) Act, 1980 and Rules accordingly so as to enable the Government to revise the rate of rent periodically. Ext. P-2 is the copy of the Government letter addressed to the Chief Conservator of Forests, Thiruvananthapuram, the 3rd respondent in this O.P. directing him to hand over possession of the Rosery Estate, Nenmara Division, Nelliyampathy Range to the 8th respondent herein and to renew the lease period for a further period of 20 years with effect from 3rd February 1995 as directed in Ext. P1, Government Order. The challenge in this O.P. is directed against Ext. P-1 and P-2. 3. In the counter affidavit filed by the Government it is admitted that the Rosery Estate has been fully converted into a plantation in the year 1961. The counter affidavit specifically states that no prior sanction of the Central Government is necessary for lease of lands that had been converted as plantations much before the coming into force of the Act. Para.5 of the counter affidavit shows that in the light of Ext. R-8 (aa), the Government thought it fair to extend the lease periods of the plantations in Nelliyampathy area as well. Para.5 of the counter affidavit shows that in the light of Ext. R-8 (aa), the Government thought it fair to extend the lease periods of the plantations in Nelliyampathy area as well. In Para.6 of the counter affidavit it is stated that no "fresh breaking up" of forest land is allowed and that even though there were no forest trees of natural growth in the Rosery Estate as all those trees were clear-felled as early as on 5th December 1956, further natural growth of trees or trees planted by the lessee are the property of the Government. Para.8 of the counter affidavit contains a description of the Estate. It is stated in Para.8 that the Rosery Estate comprises of 242 acres of which 100 acres is coffee interspersed with rubber, 100 acres of coffee with silver oak and 35 acres of coffee with arecanut. According to the Government "all those plantation crops give green cover to the area." Therefore, renewal of lease of such a plantation will not lead to further breaking up of forest area or cutting of forest trees unlike in the case of mining leases. In the case of mining leases it is fresh forest areas that would have to be'broken up' for extraction of minerals. In the case of the plantation like the present one green cover is provided for more than 40 per cent of the area to shield the planta-tion from, sunlight, Forests are categorised as dense forest or open forest (degraded forest) depending upon the crown coverage of the trees. If the coverage is more than 40 per cent it is dense forest. In the case of plantations the green cover obtained is invariably more than 40 per cent from sunlight. Therefore, it is stated that plantations are a form of afforestation and will not lead to further deforestation of already 'broken up' forest area, The Government took the stand that the mere fact that the 8th respondent had been evicted does not necessarily prevent the State from permitting her to be in possession of the land for a further period if it is in public interest. 4. From the counter affidavit filed by the 8th respondent the following factual scenerio will emerge. 4. From the counter affidavit filed by the 8th respondent the following factual scenerio will emerge. Pursuant to a notification dated 13th January 1953 published in the Travancore - Cochin gazette two estates by name East Pullala and West Pullala were notified for sale by auction, which in turn was bid in auction by late P. D. Paul (husband of the 8th respondent). The auction was confirmed by the Government by order dated 15th April 1953. The area of 139-29 acres comprised as West Pullala was found to be not available for lease since the same was outstanding on lease with others. By Ext. R-8 (d) dated 9th August 1954., the State Government granted sanction for the lease of forest land measuring 139.29 acres in substitution of the West Pullala Plantation which had been sold in auction thereby making up the deficiency in extend. The possession of the said area was handed over to late P.D. Paul on 2nd February 1955 pursuant to Ext. R-8 (e) direction dated 29th January 1955. By Ext. R-8 (f) order dated 5th December 1956 sanction for sale of the tree growth in the 247.07 acres of land leased out to the aforesaid Paul was granted. A sum of Rs. 59,914-78, being the value of the tree growth .over the 247.07 acres of land leased out was paid by Paul on 1st February 1957. On the same date, Paul was issued a memo by the Divisional Forest Officer, Trichur, informing him that the Range Officer has been instructed to allow him to clear the tree growth for developing the area into a plantation. P. D. Paul clear-felled the area and developed the entire area of 247.07 acrcs into a coffee plantation. The entire forest lands were 'broken up' by the year 1959 and the area remains as a plantation even now and there are wo forest trees at all in the entire area, which is evident from Para.2 of Ext. R-8 (a) dated 24th August 1977 and R-8 (a) dated 20th February 1961 granting coffee registration for the entire extent of Rosery Estate, Ext. R-8 (w) revision of plantation tax assessment and Clause.6 anil 9 of the draft lease deed, Ext. R-8 (j) and Ext. R-5 (y) which is the report of the Advocate Commissioner produced along with a petition in C.M.P. No. 33171. R-8 (w) revision of plantation tax assessment and Clause.6 anil 9 of the draft lease deed, Ext. R-8 (j) and Ext. R-5 (y) which is the report of the Advocate Commissioner produced along with a petition in C.M.P. No. 33171. of 1993 in O.P. No. 18250 of 1995 filed on 10th January 1996. The aforesaid O.P. 18250 of 1995 is filed by a public spirited environmentalist challenging Ext. P-1 G.O. dated 7th November 1995 as violative of S.2 of the Act, and as one passed without proper application of mind and unmindful of the waste and loss to the exchequer. The execution of the lease deed got delayed since the Government did not finalise the draft lease deed as borne out by Exts. R-8 (g), R-8 (n), R-8 (o) and R-8 (r). Till the death of Paul on 17th September 1971 the Government had not finalised the draft lease deed. Thereafter, the matter was taken up by the legal representatives of the deceased, Paul.. Ext. P-8 (t) letter dated 3rd January 1976 shows that the orders of the Government are awaited for the execution of the lease deed. Even in Ext. R-8 (u) dated 24th August 1977. sanctioning lease in favour of the 8th, respondent; it is stated that the draft lease deed will be forwarded to the Chief Conservator of Forests. However, this was never done. Nor was any approved draft lease deed forwarded to the 8th respondent to enable execution of the lease deed. The 8th respondent took objection to the period of lease of 40 years shown in Ext. R.-8 (a) and the condition that rubber should not be grown in the area. A final decision on the objections of the 8th respondent was communicated by the Secretary to Government on 17th October 1986 and as per the said communication, the request for cultivation of rubber was rejected. It is also stated that the lease period cannot be 99 years. On 5th June 1987, the 8th respondent filed O.P. No. 2071 of 1987 challenging the order dated 17th October 1986. This court by Judgment dated 5th June 1987 dismissed the petition holding that there is no ground for interference under Art.226 and declining to adjudicate on the points raised in the petition. On 5th June 1987, the 8th respondent filed O.P. No. 2071 of 1987 challenging the order dated 17th October 1986. This court by Judgment dated 5th June 1987 dismissed the petition holding that there is no ground for interference under Art.226 and declining to adjudicate on the points raised in the petition. By the order in Writ Appeal 195 of 1988 filed against the Judgment in O.P. No. 2071 of 1987, the 8th respondent was permitted to withdraw the O.P. It was also stated in the order that the Judgment of the learned Single Judge stands set aside. On 11th May 1988, the 8th respondent filed O.S. No. 136 of 1988, to compel the Government to execute a lease deed incorporating all the terms and conditions of the draft lease deed, except the condition regarding the period of lease, which had to be changed to 99 years instead of 40 years. The Government contested the suit saying that the lease can only be for 40 years. A commission was taken out in the suit and a report was filed by the Advocate Commissioner on 20th November 1991 The object of the commission was to note whether the shade trees in the estate were spontaneous growth or planted by the lessee, viz. the 8th respondent herein. The Commissioner has in her report Ext. R-5 (y) produced in O.P. No. 18250 of 1995 along with C.M.P. No. 33171 of 1995 found that all the shade trees are planted ones and that there were no forest trees at all since the entire area had been, cleared by 1959 and pucca plantations raised. The suit was dismissed by the Sub Court, Palakkad, against which the 8th respondent filed A. S. No. 74 of 1993. During the pendency of the above appeal, the 8th respondent was threatened with forcible eviction from the (state upon which O.S. No. 23 of 1993 was filed by the 8th respondent for injunction restraining the 1st respondent from interfering with the peaceful possession by the 8th respondent. In O.S. No. 23 of 1993 the Government Pleader undertook to maintain the status quo. When steps were taken in violation of the undertaking recorded by the Sub Court in the above suit the 8th respondent filed O.P. No. 13855 of 1993 before this court. In O.S. No. 23 of 1993 the Government Pleader undertook to maintain the status quo. When steps were taken in violation of the undertaking recorded by the Sub Court in the above suit the 8th respondent filed O.P. No. 13855 of 1993 before this court. By then, the State Government officials closed down the office building in the estate in violation of the undertaking. When the matter came up for hearing before this court, the Govern-ment took a stand that the 8th respondent has already been dispossessed. This Court allowed the Original Petition (O.P. No. 13855 of1993) and directed the Government to restore possession to the 8th respondent. The State Govern-ment filed W.A.No. 1670 of 1993 against the Judgment of the learned Single Judge which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 31st January 1994. S.L.P. (C) No.. 3599 of1994 filed by the State Government before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was also dismissed by order dated 5th September 1995. By the above three decisions, this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the 8th respondent was in legal possession of the Rosery Estate. The 8th respondent initiated contempt of court proceedings before this court when possession was not restored and as per orders issued by this court possession was restored on llth October 1994, Thereafter, the contempt case was closed on 12th October 1994. On the same day, the State Government once again issued a notice to the 8th respondent asking her to show cause why she shall not be evicted. The 8th respondent challenged the show cause notice dated 12th October 1994 before this Court in O. P. No. 14721 of 1994. The O. P. was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court finding that since the 8th respondent has not executed a formal lease deed, she is not a lessee and is liable to be evicted under the provisions of the Kerala Forest Act. The Court also found that the 8th respondent was liable to be evicted since the O. P. challenging a show cause notice is premature and since the term of lease of 40 years expired on 2nd February 1995 itself. Pursuant to the Judgment in O. P. 14721 of 1994, the 8th respondent was put out of possession of the estate on 12th April 1995. Exts. Pursuant to the Judgment in O. P. 14721 of 1994, the 8th respondent was put out of possession of the estate on 12th April 1995. Exts. R-8 (y) and R-8 (z) representations dated 27th December 1994 and 9th January 1995 filed by the 8th respondent were pending before the Government. The Nelliyampathy Planters Association also filed a representation through the local M.L.A. before the Government. The Government considered the representation of the Planters Association at the cabinet level and decided to extend the leases in Nelliyampathy area for a period of 20 years. The above decision of the Government reflected in Ext. P-1 and P-2 orders are challenged in this writ petition styled as public interest litigation as already noticed. 5. This Original Petition was posted along with O. P. No. 18250 Of 1995 for final hearing on 16th February 1999. The counsel for the petitioners in both the Original Petitions and senior counsel Mr. V. R. Reddy who appeared on behalf of the 8th respondent were heard in detail. The Government Pleader sought for time till 22nd February 1999 fur healing the Advocate General on behalf of the State. The request was granted. On 22nd February 1999 the Government Pleader requested that the case may be posted to 1st March 1999 since the Advocate General had some inconvenience during the subsequent dates which request was also granted. On 1st March 1999 it was represented by the learned Advocate General that an additional counter affidavit has been filed producing G. O. (Ms.) No. 15/99/F and WLD dated and 26th February 1999 where by Ext. P1 Order dated 7th November 1995 was cancelled. The counsel for the petitioner in this O. P. filed a petition seeking permission of the court to withdraw the Original Petition. A similar prayer was made by the counsel for the petitioner in O. P. No. 18250 of 1995. 6. The main question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the prior approval of the Central Government is a sine-qua-non before renewing/extending leases of plantations which had been broken up and used for the non forest purposes of plantation activity even before the coming into force of the Act. In this connection, it has to be noted that the question has to be answered . with reference to the type of activity carried on in the land. In this connection, it has to be noted that the question has to be answered . with reference to the type of activity carried on in the land. Admittedly, the land in question is a plantation and in order to continue the plantation activity in the estate no further 'breaking up'of the area is required, whereas, all that is required is only periodical "shade tree lopping" which is not an activity prevented by any law in force. The plantation activity will not result in further deforestation. These facts are admitted in Para.6 of the counter affidavit filed by the State Government on 21st February 1996. Admittedly, plantation activity can be called a form of afforestation as plantations provide more than 40 percent green cover, as in the case of a dense forest. The case of plantation is different from the case of mining leases in forest land where for every mining activity, breaking up of the forest is involved. In State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram Modi and others ( AIR 1985 SC 814 ) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has after referring to S.2 (ii) and the Explanation to the said section in the Act held as follows: "Reading them together, these two parts of the section mean that after the commencement of the Act no fresh breaking up cf the forest land or no fresh clearing of the forest on any such land can be permitted by any State Government or any authority without the prior approval of the Central Government. But if such permission has been accorded before the coming into force of the Act and the forest land is broken up or cleared then obviously the section cannot apply." (Vide Para.10 of the Judgment) The Supreme Court considered Banshi Ram Modi's case( AIR 1985 SC 814 ) in a subsequent decision in Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat ( 1987 (1) SCC 213 ) There, the Supreme Court ruled that after coming into force of the Act, renewal of pre-existing mining leases in forest areas can be granted only if requirements of S.2 of the Act are satisfied. However, there is nothing in Ambica Quarry Works's case ( 1987 (1) SCC 213 ) to indicate that the Supreme Court has given a go-by to the propositions of law laid down by it in Banshi Ram Modi's case ( AIR 1985 SC 814 ) In fact what the apex court did was to distinguish Banshi Ram Modi on facts as can be seen from the observations in Para.19 of the Judgment in Ambica Quarry Works ( 1987 1 SCC 213 ) "The appellants are asking for a renewal of the quarry leases. It will lead to further deforestation. It will not help reclaiming back the areas where deforestations have taken place. In that view of the the ratio of the said decision cannot be made applicable to support the appellants' demands in these cases because the facts are entirely different here." Again in Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. (1993 (3) SCC 499) the Supreme Court was concerned with mining ; leases which was found to result in serious environmental and ecological problems. In the aforesaid decision the Judgment in Banshi Ram Modi ( AIR 1985 SC 814 ) supra was referred to and the ratio of the said decision was at any rate not dissented from. However, on facts, the apex court applied the ratio of the decision in Ambica Quarry Works noted supra [vide ( 1987 (1) SCC 213 ] of course; the learned Advocate General invited our attention to the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in V. R. Thirumalaiswamy Gounder and others v. Chief Conservator of Forests ( AIR 1996 Ker. 213 ) for the proposition that in the case of renewal of leases after 1980, the requirements of S.2 of the Act has to be fulfilled. It was further contended that in the case of the 8th respondent there is no subsisting lease in 1980. We are afraid that the decision can be of no assistance to the State. In the aforesaid decision this Court specifically found on facts that there was no breaking up of forest land prior to the .coming into force of the Act. This Court also found that there is no pleading on behalf of the firm that the forest was cleared for the purpose of planting cardamom. In the aforesaid decision this Court specifically found on facts that there was no breaking up of forest land prior to the .coming into force of the Act. This Court also found that there is no pleading on behalf of the firm that the forest was cleared for the purpose of planting cardamom. On the basis of the above facts, this court held that the Judgment in Ambica Quarry Works case reported in ( 1987 (1) SCC 213 ) applies to the renewal of the lease. At any rate, in Thirumalaiswamy Gounder this Court was not concerned with a situation in which land had been broken up, clear-felled and converted into a plantation prior to the coming into force of the Act as in the present case. Our attention was also invited to the decision cf the apex court in T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India ( AIR 1997 SC 1228 ) wherein the Supreme Court issued a number of directions of great significance in the interest of protection and conservation of forest throughout the country. The court held that for the purpose of S.2 (1) of the Act, 'forest land' would mean not only forest as understood in the dictionary sense but also any area recorded as forest in the Government record irrespective of the ownership. However, the Supreme Court did not hold that the ratio of the decision in Banshi Ram Modi's case was not good law. On the other hand all that the apex, court observed was that the decision in Banshi Ram Modi has to be understood in the light of the subsequent decisions. The aforesaid decision in Godavarman Thirumulpad does not at any rate warrant a conclusion that for the purpose of grant of lease or renewal or extension of lease of areas which were permitted to be clearfelled and were actually clearfelled and were put to non forest purposes prior to the coming into force of the Act, prior permission of the Central Government should be obtained. In paragraph IV of the decision in Godavarman Thirumulpad the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the complete ban on felling of trees in all "forest areas" will not apply to areas which had been cleared for any reason. In paragraph IV of the decision in Godavarman Thirumulpad the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the complete ban on felling of trees in all "forest areas" will not apply to areas which had been cleared for any reason. It was further held that in case of plantations, felling of shade trees could be done in accordance with the recommendations of the statutory committee to be constituted by the State Government. There is a further direction in respect of the State of Tamil Nadu to ascertain and identify those areas of the plantations which are a "Forest" and are not In active use as a plantation and that there will be no further extension of plantations in a manner so as to involve encroachment upon forest. It can thus be seen from the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it was aware of existing plantations which were earlier forests and had dealt with those areas in a manner different from the areas which were forests. It can thus be found that the court was actually concerned with further deforestation. At any rate, the judgment in Godavarman Thirumulpad does not have the effect of nullifying the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Banshi Ram Modi's case. In Jai Raj v. The Chief Conservator of Forests (ILR 1996 (2) Ker. 270 (D.B)) this Courts was concerned with the construction of. a forest lodge in the buffer zone of the Parambikulam Wildlife Sanctuary. That is a case where clearing of forest land was involved for the construction of a forest lodge for which previous permission of the Central Government was held to be mandatory under S.2 of the Act. The decision is clearly distinguishable on facts. In the light of the aforesaid decisions the conclusion is inevitable that the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Banshi Ram Modi still holds good as far as forest areas which were converted into plantations much prior to the coming into force of the Act are concerned. 7. Certain admitted facts throw considerable light on the controversy involved in this petition. It is not denied that the Rosery Estate had been converted into a pucca plantation by 1961. Exts. R-8 (d), R-8 (e) and R-8 (f) deal with grant of lease in favour of late Paul and sanction for removal of tree growth in the entire area. 7. Certain admitted facts throw considerable light on the controversy involved in this petition. It is not denied that the Rosery Estate had been converted into a pucca plantation by 1961. Exts. R-8 (d), R-8 (e) and R-8 (f) deal with grant of lease in favour of late Paul and sanction for removal of tree growth in the entire area. It is not disputed that the value of tree growth was paid by late Paul and the area was clearfelled by 1957. Admittedly, there is no forest growth in the estate. The entire area was developed into a coffee plantation with rubber trees and silver oak as shade trees which is evident from Ext. R-8 (v) coffee registration.. Ext. R-8 (j) letter dated 22nd May 1968 from Secretary (Agriculture) to Chief Conservator of Forests admits handing over of the possession of forest land to late Paul. Ext. R-8 (u) order granting lease in favour of the 8th respondent issued on 24th August 1977 refers to the fact that the lessee had raised a pucca plantation. Ext. R-8(j) draft lease deed sent along with the letter dated 15th November 1962 by the Divisional Forest Officer to late Paul in clause (6) permits the lessee to raise coffee, tea, cardamom and rubber in the area. Clause (9) of the deed specifically says that the lessee having paid the value of the tree growth is entitled to remove the forest growth from the leasehold during the period of the lease. Admittedly, late Paul and later the 8th respondent, his wife have been paying the lease rent. The estate was. assessed for plantation tax is borne out by Ext. R-8 (b) and R-8 (w) and the counter affidavit of the 8th respondent. None of the above facts are disputed in the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent/State of Kerala. The undisputed facts will clearly show that the entire area has been clearfelled and converted into a plantation as early as in 1961, much before the Act came into force and also that the area continued to be a coffee plantation during the 19 years after the coming into force of the Act, which fact is admitted in Para.1 of the counter affidavit filed by the State. The Advocate General placed considerable reliance on notificition dated 8th May 1909 declaring the areas in Nelliyamapathy range' as 'Reserved Forests'. The Advocate General placed considerable reliance on notificition dated 8th May 1909 declaring the areas in Nelliyamapathy range' as 'Reserved Forests'. But then, it can be seen from page 3 of the notification that the then existing coffee estates measuring 9491 acres and 20 cents were specifically treated as 'enclosures within the State reserves' as different from reserved forests. West Pullala and East Pullala estates which had been sold in auction to late Paul are included as Estate Nos. 9 and 14 in the list of enclosures. In the counter affidavit filed by the 8th respondent in Para.30 it has been specifically stated that at the time of leasing out Rosery Estate to the 8th respondent's husband, more than 14,500 acres out of a total forest area of 85000 acres in the Nelliyampathy Hills were plantations. It is also specifically stated that even after the grant of lease to Rosery Estate the Government has granted subsequent leases. Therefore, it can be seen that after identifying the extent of 9491 acres and 20 cents as coffee estates within the reserved forests, a further area of about 5000 acres have been developed into coffee plantations, much prior to the coming into force of the Act. Out of these 5000 acres the area comprised as Rosery Estate is only 247 acres. Considering the above factual position, the State cannot now contend that the areas that were developed as coffee plantations after 1909, will be still treated as forests. This Court in its Judgment dated 12th November 1991 in O.P. No. 6566 of 1988 held that the Act will not apply to the areas termed as 'enclosures' in the 1909 notification. The State has in fact, supported the contentions of the 8th respondent in their counter affidavit. In the light of the above, it cannot be held that the decision of the Cabinet reflected in Exts. P1 and P-2 orders extending the time expired leases in Nelliyampathy and granting lease in favour of the 8th respondent are wrong in law. 8. Now the further question to be considered is whether the action of the State Government in cancelling Exts. P-1 and P-2 can be legally sustained. The orders of cancellation dated 26th February 1999 and 27th February 1999 were issued admittedly without any notice whatsoever to the affected persons like the 8th respondent and the Nelliyampathy Planters Association on whose application Ext. P-1 and P-2 can be legally sustained. The orders of cancellation dated 26th February 1999 and 27th February 1999 were issued admittedly without any notice whatsoever to the affected persons like the 8th respondent and the Nelliyampathy Planters Association on whose application Ext. P-1 order was issued. No reasons are stated in the order dated 26th February 1999 for cancelling Ext. P-1. Reasons sought to be supplied in the additional counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent are that the order is issued in view of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Godavarman Thirumulpad's case ( AIR 1997 SC 1228 ) and a subsequent opinion received from the Attorney General stating that renewal of lease Required prior permission from the Central Government. However, the 8th respondent has filed a counter affidavit to the additional affidavit filed by the 1st respondent/State stating that there is no opinion from the Attorney General as stated in the additional affidavit of the State. The opinion of the Attorney General dated 15th January 1997 given 2 years prior to the order dated 26th February 1999 has been produced as Ext. R-8 (ae) from which it can be seen that the Attorney General had opined that permission under the Act is required for any lease granted or renewed after 25th October 1980, if the Act otherwise applies. It is further stated in the opinion that if any activity is undertaken which does not involve breaking up or clearing of any forest land, permission under the Act is not required. No other opinion of the Attorney General other than the above opinion has been brought to the notice of this Court. The materials that were before the Cabinet when it took Ext. P-1, decision dated 7th November 1995 and the order dated 26th February 1999, though called for, were never placed before this Court from which it is clear that the materials called for if produced will go in favour of the 8th respondent. 9. Learned Advocate General, however, sought to support the order dated 26th February 1999 on the basis of certain decisions which say that the Government can effect a change in its policy. However, we are of opinion that the decisions relied on by the Advocate General relating to the right of the Government to change policy cannot be relied upon to sustain the order cancelling the lease. However, we are of opinion that the decisions relied on by the Advocate General relating to the right of the Government to change policy cannot be relied upon to sustain the order cancelling the lease. The order dated 26th February 1999 does not say that it is issued on account of a change in policy. So also, the additional counter affidavit wherein the 1st respondent had sought to justify the issuance of the order dated 26th February 1999, does not say that the decision was taken on the basis of a change in policy. On the contrary the reason stated is that the view of the Government has changed on the basis of the decision in Godavarman Thirumulpad's case supra and the opinion of the Attorney General. However, neither the decision nor the opinion of the Attorney General cannot be said to constitute a change in policy. Moreover, the State has filed a counter affidavit on 26th July 1997 in O. P. No. 10352 of 1997 which had been posted for hearing along with the above Original Petition, wherein also it is staled that no prior permission is required for renewal of plantation leases. The State Government in the above affidavit has sought to support the extension of the leases in Idukki region. The State cannot be justified in taking diametrically opposite positions in relation to different regions within the State, on a common issue like the extension of time expired leases of plantations. Further, even in the case of change in policy the right of the Government is not absolute. Inconsistency of policy can amount to abuse of discretion, particularly when undertaking or statements of intent are disregarded unfairly or contrary to citizen's legitimate expectation. Public authority has duty to act with fairness and consistency in its dealings with the the public and that if it makes inconsistent decisions unfairly or unjustly, it misuses its powers..................Courts now expect Government Departments to honour their statement of policy or intention (vide Administrative Law by H. W. R. Wade, 1th Edition at Page 418 under the heading "Inconsistency and unfairness. Legitimate expectation."] That apart, the apex court has also held in a catena of decisions that governmental policy is subject to judicial review. Legitimate expectation."] That apart, the apex court has also held in a catena of decisions that governmental policy is subject to judicial review. In Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation ( 1990 (3) SCC 752 ), the apex court held that when public authority is involved in commercial transactions, their action, should be reasonable, just and fair and before abruptly going back on promises and taking adverse action, they should take the affected party into confidence. In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation ( 1993 (3) SCC 499), the Court held that the change of Government policy can be judicially reviewed on the grounds of unfairness and unreasonableness. It was also held that the principle of Legitimate Expectation applies in matters of this nature which can be overlooked only if an overriding public interest exists In the action of the Government in changing the policy. In P. T. R. Exports (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India ( 1996 (5) SCC 268 ), the court held that policy decisions can be Reviewed on the grounds of mala fides and abuse of power. It further held that it would bind the Government to its previous policy by invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation of the applicant on being satisfied that the change in policy is vitiated by mala fides and abuse of power. In this connection we cannot lose sight of the fact that the alleged change of policy is put forward at a time when the legal question involved was being heard by this Court. The effect of the order dated 25th February 1999 is really an attempt to prevent this Court from pronouncing a Judgment on the question of law posed for decision. After the question of law was in seisin before this Court it is not open to the State Government to say that they have now understood the position of law to be different and hence this Court need not go into the question any further in the pending proceedings before the court. The action of the State Government in issuing the order dated 26th February 1999 is not only unfair to the affected parties but also to the court and is an action of serious impropriety. The State Government has no legal authority to issue administrative instructions or orders with respect to matters which are subjudice. 10. The action of the State Government in issuing the order dated 26th February 1999 is not only unfair to the affected parties but also to the court and is an action of serious impropriety. The State Government has no legal authority to issue administrative instructions or orders with respect to matters which are subjudice. 10. The further contention set up by the State is that the Judgment in O. P. No. 14721 of 1994 operates as a bar to any lease being granted in favour of the 8th respondent. We are not persuaded to accept this contention. The aforesaid Judgment does not consider the effect of the Judgment in O. P. No. 13855 of 1993 wherein this Court found that the 8th respondent was in legal possession of the plantation and the appeal preferred by the State against the said Judgment as Writ Appeal No. 1670 of 1993 was dismissed which dismissal was confirmed by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. L. P. (C) No. 3599 of 1994 upholding the Judgment in O. P. No. 13855 of!993. The Judgment in O. P. No. 14721 of 1994 does not also consider the effect of the Government Order Ext. R-8(u) thereby the 8th respondent was granted lease by the Government, and the fact that the approved draft lease deed was never sent to the 8th respondent for execution of the lease deed. On a perusal of all the Judgments interparties, it can be seen that the effect of Judgment in O. P. No. 14721 of 1994 is only that the 8th respondent was not entitled to remain in possession since the lease deed had not been executed. Besides, the correctness of the Judgments in O. P. No. 13855 of 1993 and W. A. No. 1670 of 1993 was also not gone into by this Court in the Judgment in O. P. No. 14721 of 1994. This Court in O. P. No. 14721 of 1994 has found that the 8th respondent was not entitled to remain in possession since the period of 40 years contemplated in Ext. R-8(a) Government order expired on 2nd February 1995. The Original Petition was dismissed also on the ground that it is premature since the challenge is only to a show cause notice. R-8(a) Government order expired on 2nd February 1995. The Original Petition was dismissed also on the ground that it is premature since the challenge is only to a show cause notice. That apart, this Court while passing the Judgment in O. P. No. 14721 of 1994 did not interdict the State Government from granting a lease in favour of the 8th respondent in future. The aforesaid position finds support in Para.15 of the counter affidavit filed by the State Government. 11. Towards the conclusion of the argument the petitioner in O. P. No. 18378 of 1995 filed a petition seeking permission to withdraw the Original Petition followed by a similar request by the counsel for the petitioner in O.P. No. 18250 of 1995. We are not prepared to accede to the aforesaid request. Admittedly, the Original Petitions have been filed probono publico allegedly in public interest. As already noticed the question raised is whether the permission of the Central Government is required for grant of leases or renewal of leases of forest land. In the present O.P., viz. O.P. No. 18378 of 1995, there are additional prayers made for declaration that all leases, licences and grants given by the 1st respondent in respect of any forest stood automatically expired on the commencement of the Act. The petitioner also seeks for quashing all orders similar to Exts. P1 and P-2 issued by the Government. Hence the petitioner's request for permission to withdraw the petition solely for the reason that the State Government had cancelled Exts. P1 and P-2 cannot be easily comprehended. Similar orders issued with respect to Idukki region produced as Ext. R-8(aa) has not been cancelled by the Government. The leases that were granted subsequent to 1980 had also not been cancelled by the Government. The very fact that the petition for withdrawing the O.P. giving up several relelifs prayed for, suggests that there is no public interest involved in the litigation. In fact, in the case of Idukki region, the .plantations are cardamom plantations in which case there can never be any breaking up of forests involved as in the case of coffee plantations. The areas under cardamom plantations will be virtually dense forests. Both the petitioners in the Original Petitions as well as the Government have chosen to ignore the leases granted on the basis of Ext. R-8 (aa) order issued with respect to Idukki region. The areas under cardamom plantations will be virtually dense forests. Both the petitioners in the Original Petitions as well as the Government have chosen to ignore the leases granted on the basis of Ext. R-8 (aa) order issued with respect to Idukki region. Therefore, we are of opinion that the petitioners are apparently interested only in the lease granted to the 8th respondent herein which cannot in any way be termed as a public interest. The public interest in cases of the above nature can only be to the extent of challenging the power of the Government to grant the leases without the permission of the Central Government or challenging the policy of the Government to allow the plantations within forest areas to remain as forest areas. At any rate, there cannot be any public interest involved in challenging the grant of a lease to a particular individual. Adverting to this aspect the Supreme Court in Sheela Bane v. Union of India ( 1988 (4) SCC 226 ) held that the petitioner is not entitled to withdraw the petition but can be allowed only to withdraw from the proceedings. The apes court further held that the litigant in such cases does not have the status of a 'dominis litis' and is not entitled to determine the course or destination of the proceedings. The status of 'dominis litis' cannot be conferred on a person who brings a public interest litigation, as that would render the proceedings in public interest litigations vulnerable to and susceptible of a new dimension which might, in conceivable cases, be used by persons for personal ends resulting in prejudice to the public weal. In S. P. Anand v. Desa Gowda and others ( 1996 (6) SCC 734 ) it was held that the -petitioner in a public interest litigation is not entitled to withdraw his petition at his sweet will unless the court sees reason to permit him to withdraw. Such permission is to be granted after considering the public interest and ensuring that it does not result in abuse of the process of law. The apex court cautioned the courts to be guarded against possibilities of such litigants settling the matters out of court to their advantage and then seeking withdrawal of the case. 12. In the light of the aforesaid discussion we are of opinion that the Original Petition challenging Exts. The apex court cautioned the courts to be guarded against possibilities of such litigants settling the matters out of court to their advantage and then seeking withdrawal of the case. 12. In the light of the aforesaid discussion we are of opinion that the Original Petition challenging Exts. P-1 and P-2 orders are liable to be dismissed and consequently the orders of the State Government cancelling Exts. P-1 and P-2 issued during the pendency of the hearing of this O.P. are liable to be quashed in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India the purpose of doing complete justice in the case. Accordingly, we dismiss this O.P. and quash the orders passed by the State Government cancelling Exts. P-1 and P-2 issued during the pendency of the hearing of the O.P. 13. Pursuant to interim directions issued in the case the 8th respondent had been permitted to take the ustifru-ctus by furnishing bank guarantee for the value of the usufructus after deducting the amounts actually spent by the Government for collection of the usufructus in terms of the interim directions. The amounts actually spent By the State had been directed to be deposited by the 8th respondent as a condition for removal of the usufiuctus. Since the 8th respondent is entitled to the lease from the expiry of the term of the earlier lease and also entitled to the usufructus from the plantation which had been raised by her and her predecessor, we direct the State Government to release the bank guarantee furnished by the 8th respondent forthwith.