ORDER C.K. Prasad, J. 1. By this writ petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner prays for quashing of the order dated 22-4-1995 whereby respondents have declined to accept the joining report of the petitioner. Further prayer made by the petitioner is to direct the respondents to release his G.P.F. amount. 2. Facts necessary for the decision of the present writ petition are that a departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner for two charges. One of the charge levelled against the petitioner was that he has misappropriated an amount of Rs. 14611.18 from the amount of revenue collection made by him on 20-2-1981. Second charge against the petitioner was that he is habitual in misappropriating the Board's revenue collection by making less deposit from the amount of revenue collection. In regard to the second charge five instances were cited. The Enquiry Officer after the departmental enquiry held the petitioner guilty of both the charges. A show cause notice was issued to him and ultimately by order dated 5-2-1982 the Disciplinary Authority passed the order of dismissal of the petitioner from service. 3. It is relevant here to state that in relation to the first charge, i.e., misappropriation of an amount of Rs. 14,611.18 petitioner was also prosecuted in Criminal Case No. 1746/92 by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Durg. Learned Magistrate by order dated 15-2-1995 acquitted the petitioner from the charge of defalcation of the aforesaid amount. After the acquittal, petitioner filed an application on 20-4-1995 requesting the respondents to allow him to resume his duty. Petitioner by order dated 22-4-1995 (Annexure P-3) was informed that as he was already been dismissed from service by order dated 5-2-1982 he cannot be allowed to join. This order of the respondents is being impugned in the present writ petition. 4. Mr. Jaiswal appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that when the criminal Court has acquitted the petitioner by judgment dated 15-2-1995, refusal of the respondents to allow the petitioner to join his duty on the basis of the findings in the departmental enquiry and the punishment based on that shall amount to over-riding the findings of the criminal Court, which is not permissible. In support of his submission Shri Jaiswal has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar v. State of Maharashtra, 1997 AIR SCW 1563. In support of his submission Shri Jaiswal has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar v. State of Maharashtra, 1997 AIR SCW 1563. My attention has been drawn to the following passage from paragraph 4 of the aforesaid judgment:-- "If the conduct alleged is the foundation for prosecution, though it may and in acquittal on appreciation or lack of sufficient evidence, the question emerges : whether the government servant prosecuted for commission of defalcation of public funds and fabrication of the records though culminated into acquittal, is entitled to be reinstated with consequential benefit ? In our considered view, this grant of consequential benefits with all back wages etc. cannot be as a matter of course. We think that it would be deleterious to the maintenance of the discipline if a person suspended on valid considerations is given full back wages as a matter of course, on his acquittal. Two courses are open to the disciplinary authority, viz., it may enquire into misconduct unless, the self same conduct was subject of charge and on trial the acquittal was recorded on a positive finding that the accused did not commit the offence at all; but acquittal is not on benefit of doubt given. Appropriate action may be taken thereon. Even otherwise, the authority may, on reinstatement, after following the principle of natural justice, pass appropriate order including treating suspension period as period of not on duty." Yet another decision on which Mr. Jaiswal has placed reliance is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sulekhchand and Salekchand v. Commissioner of Police and Ors., 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 674; and my attention has been drawn to the following passage from paragraph 2 of the judgment:-- "The judgment acquitting the appellant of the charge under Section 5(2) became final and it clearly indicates that it was on merits. Therefore, once the acquittal was on merits the necessary consequence would be that the delinquent is entitled to reinstatement as if there is no blot on his service and the need for the departmental enquiry is obviated. It is settled law that though the delinquent official may get an acquittal on technical grounds, the authorities are entitled to conduct departmental enquiry on the selfsame allegations and take appropriate disciplinary action." 5. Mr. It is settled law that though the delinquent official may get an acquittal on technical grounds, the authorities are entitled to conduct departmental enquiry on the selfsame allegations and take appropriate disciplinary action." 5. Mr. Menon appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that in the departmental enquiry allegation against the petitioner was of defalcation of a sum of Rs. 14,611.18 as also his habit of defalcating the revenue collection. He submits that the criminal prosecution of the petitioner was in relation to the first charge and not in relation to the second charge. In that view of the matter his submission is that the respondents have not committed any illegality in not reinstating the petitioner after his acquittal in the first charge. Mr. Menon further submits that more acquittal of the person in criminal charge shall not ipso-facto lead to his reinstatement, as the standard of proof in a criminal case and that of the departmental enquiry is entirely different. He submits that in the criminal case charges have to be proved beyond all reasonable doubts, but the same standard of proof shall not apply in the case of a departmental enquiry. 6. Having appreciated the rival submissions, I am of the opinion that the prayer made by the petitioner for reinstatement after his acquittal in the criminal case cannot be granted. In the present case petitioner was proceeded against for two charges. Criminal Court has acquitted him in one of the charges. Further the criminal Court has nowhere held that the defalcation has not taken place. What the criminal Court has held is that on the basis of the material placed before it, charges have not been proved. 7. In the case of Krishnakant (supra) a person was placed under suspension on the ground of institution of criminal case and when the person was acquitted in the criminal case, the Supreme Court held that after acquittal the employee is not entitled for consequential benefits as a matter of cause. In the case of Sulekhchand (supra) Supreme Court was considering the question of reinstatement of an employee put under suspension on account of institutions of criminal case. Here in the present case petitioner has been dismissed from service after a departmental enquiry. In that view of the matter, the authorities relied on are clearly distinguishable. In the case of Sulekhchand (supra) Supreme Court was considering the question of reinstatement of an employee put under suspension on account of institutions of criminal case. Here in the present case petitioner has been dismissed from service after a departmental enquiry. In that view of the matter, the authorities relied on are clearly distinguishable. In fact in the case of Govind Das v. State of Bihar and Ors., (1999) 11 SCC 361, the Supreme Court has clearly held as follows :-- ‘"The only ground which has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of this appeal is that since the appellant has been acquitted in the criminal case, the order of termination of his services should have been set-aside. The learned counsel has placed before us a copy of the judgment of the criminal Court whereby the appellant was acquitted. We have gone through the said judgment. We find that the acquittal of the appellant is based on the view that the charges are not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Since the standard of proof is required to prove a charge of misconduct in departmental proceeding is not the same as that required to prove a criminal charge, the acquittal of the appellant in the criminal case in these circumstances, could not, in our opinion, be made the basis for setting aside the order for termination of the services of the appellant passed in the disciplinary proceedings on the basis of evidence adduced in the departmental enquiry conducted in the charges levelled against the appellant. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost." Further the view which I have taken finds support from the judgment in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Anr., 1999 (2) L.L.N. 640. 8. There is yet another impediment in the way of the petitioner. After the acquittal of the petitioner by judgment dated 15-2-1995, he filed an application for resumption of his duty on 20-2-1995, said request of the petitioner was turned down by the impugned order dated 22-4-1995. This writ petition has been filed on 14-1-1999. There is no explanation at all as to why the petitioner has filed this writ petition after such a long time. Mr. This writ petition has been filed on 14-1-1999. There is no explanation at all as to why the petitioner has filed this writ petition after such a long time. Mr. Menon appearing on behalf of the respondents states that if any dues admissible to the petitioner have not been paid, same shall be paid within three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 9. In the result, I do not find any merit in this writ petition and it is dismissed accordingly with the aforesaid observation.