Judgment :- V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. Petitioner herein challenges the detention order passed against him by first respondent dated 26-3-1996 under the provisions of S. 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter called as "COFEPOSA Act") whereby the petitioner was ordered to be detained with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods in future. In fact, this petition has become infructuous in so far as the detention is concerned. However, since the petitioner is likely to face action under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Properly) Act, 1976 for confiscation of the currencies, the petitioner is interested in challenging the legality of the order. 2. Following facts would help in understanding the controversy :- The Department of Revenue Intelligence had some secret information and in pursuance of that two passengers viz., Nallaian Pargunam alias Joseph and his wife Pakavathi, who were passengers bound for Singapore by Flight No. 10-555 on 10-3-1996 from Anna International Airport, Madras, were intercepted at the International Passengers' Check-in area when the aforementioned Nallaian Pargunam alias Joseph was pushing the trolley while another person was pushing another trolley from the car parking area to the Security Scanner. The said Nallaian Pargunam alias Joseph had Indian Passport, while his wife Pakavathi held a Singapore Passport. When questioned, the said Nallaian Pargunam alias Joseph admitted that Pakavathi was his wife and another person who was pushing the trolley was a Police personnel himself who was identified as R. Rajendran, Grade-I Police Constable. When asked whether he had foreign/Indian currency kept in the said baggages, the said Pargunam alias Joseph admitted that in one suitcase which was Antler Zipper, there was some foreign currency and the same was handed over to him by the petitioner-detenu Sickander of Triplicane, Madras for taking it to Singapore. He also identified the said suitcase. He also admitted that he and his wife had travelled from Triplicane in a Car bearing Registration No. TMI-504 arranged by none-else but the detenu and it was at his instance that the said Police Constable Rajendran had come to assist him in checking-in the baggages. He also identified the said suitcase. He also admitted that he and his wife had travelled from Triplicane in a Car bearing Registration No. TMI-504 arranged by none-else but the detenu and it was at his instance that the said Police Constable Rajendran had come to assist him in checking-in the baggages. When Rajendran was questioned, he admitted that he had gone to the car parking area to help the said two passengers on instructions of one Vicrama Singh, Inspector of Police and he only off-loaded five baggages from the car TMI 504 and kept in two trolleys and he himself was pushing one trolley from the car to the International Passengers' Check-in area. The baggages were opened. However, the said baggages did not contain any contraband/ objectionable goods. The Antler Zipper suit case, which was found locked, could not be opened as the said Pargunam informed the officers that he did not have the key of the suitcase and hence, the said suit case was ripped open, The said suitcase was found to contain 41 paper packets with markings bearing 1 to 41 for the purpose of identification. When the said paper packets were opened one by one, they were found to contain assorted foreign currencies of different countries in various denominations, travellers cheques and Indian currency. The said couple admitted that they did not have any valid permit or documents for the legal acquisition of the said foreign currencies, travellers cheques and Indian currency and to export the same out of India. The said Nallaian Pargunam alias Joseph admitted that he wanted to carry the currencies without the knowledge of the Customs by putting the Antler Zipper suitcase as checked in baggage along with other normal baggages, as normally there was no Customs examination for the export baggages. He also admitted that his wife Pakavathi did not have any knowledge about the currency handed over to him. The said person also admitted that the said baggage was handed over to him by none-else than the petitioner-detenu Sickander. The value of the currency which was being carried in the baggage was Rs. 3,53,79.061. In all, three persons came to the airport to see off the said couple, they being A. Jabarullah, Shaikh Abdullah and Abdul Shukor along with the driver R. Muthuvel, who drove the said car TMI 504. The value of the currency which was being carried in the baggage was Rs. 3,53,79.061. In all, three persons came to the airport to see off the said couple, they being A. Jabarullah, Shaikh Abdullah and Abdul Shukor along with the driver R. Muthuvel, who drove the said car TMI 504. A personal search of the aforesaid persons was conducted and nothing incriminating was noticed. It was also established that it was Rajendran the Police Constable who had presented the said suitcase for screening to X-ray. 3. In his recorded statement, the said Nallaian Pargunam alias Joseph admitted that he was living in Singapore as a temporary citizen for the past 15 years and he along with his second wife had come to India in January, 1996 to celebrate the marriage of his daughter and on 8-3-1996 they both met Shaikh Abdullah, who was known to him earlier, at his residence and had requested him to help them in getting confirmed air tickets to Singapore. Accordingly, the said Shaikh Abdullah had informed him on 9-3-1996 that he had arranged for confirmed air tickets through the detenu Sickander who was known to the said Shaikh Abdullah and it was only he who had borne the cost of the air tickets. He was also informed that in return for it he had to carry a suit-case given by the detenu-petitioner to Singapore for handing it over to a person at Singapore. The said Nallaian Pargunam alias Joseph agreed and without telling this to his wife, he went to the residence of the detenu on 10-3-1996 where he was told that a suitcase would be sent through Shukoor in a car and the car would arrive near the Big Masjid at Triplicane at 8-30 p.m. He was also asked to wait there and when he enquired as to what was the contents of the suitcase, the detenu had informed him that there were some silver articles and ready made garments in the said suitcase. It was also assured to him that Customs Officers were already contacted and his clearance to the Airport would be without any problems. He was also told that there were some foreign currency in the said suitcase. It was also assured to him that Customs Officers were already contacted and his clearance to the Airport would be without any problems. He was also told that there were some foreign currency in the said suitcase. It was also accepted by the said Nallaian Pargunam alias Joseph that thereafter he and his wife came near be Big Masjid at Triplicane at 8-30 p.m. and when they were waiting there, Shukoor came in an Ambassador car and all the suitcases were loaded in that car along with the suitcase given by the petitioner-detenu. Then Shaikh Abdullah was left behind and both of them along with Shukoor reached Madras International Airport in the said car and after reaching the Airport both Shukoor and the driver got down and went back to the car and then a person wearing safari dress came to him and asked them to alight from the car. The said person took out the baggages from the dickey and loaded their suitcases in the trolleys including the suitcase containing the currency, which was given by the detenu Sickander and while scanning the suitcases, some suspicious things were noted and they were asked to open the suit-case. At that time, the person, clad in Safari went away from that place and brought a person having a big moustache to whom the scanning officer told that some suspicious goods were in the said suitcase and the suitcase was asked to be kept separately. This was the same suit case which was given, by Sickander, the detenu, for being taken to Singapore. It was at that time that they were all intercepted, and the concerned suitcase was opened and in the said suitcase, there were lots of currencies in 41 packets. The said Nallaian Pargunam alias Joseph had further stated in his statement that he had visited India five times during 1995-96 and in 1994 when he visited India, he brought 42 gold biscuits as requested by Aziz of Sarangon Road, Singapore cleared the same by paying duty and the said biscuits were handed over to the person who was identified by Aziz. The said Abdul Shukoor was identified by Nallaian Pargunam alias Joseph as the person who had come in the car to see him off. The said Abdul Shukoor was identified by Nallaian Pargunam alias Joseph as the person who had come in the car to see him off. He also identified Muthuvel and Shaikh Abdullah as persons staying in Triplicane who was known to him and who had arranged for the tickets to Singapore and who had told him to carry the suitcase belonging to the detenu Sickander to Singapore. The wife's statement corroborated the statement of her husband Pargunam. 4. The residential premises of the detenu Sickander were searched by the officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence on 11-3-1996. However, no contraband or incriminating documents was recovered. The statement of the detenu was also recorded wherein it was owned up by him that he was the owner of Samrat Rent House at No. 10, Yusuf Lebbal Street, Madras-5 and that he used to visit Singapore about 6 years back for bringing foreign goods and for selling them at Burma Bazaar. He also admitted that in January, 1996 he met Jafarullah, a Singapore citizen, who belonged to Ammapet, Tanjore and that the said Jafarullah put forth a plan for doing hundi business in large scale, i.e. Jafarullah would arrange huge amounts in Indian rupees to be delivered to the detenu through persons known to him, which after converting into foreign currencies, was to be smuggled out to Singapore or to the said Jafarullah and to be paid to the said Jafarullah, in this, he admitted that commission was to be paid to the said detenu. It was also owned up that the said Jafarullah returned to Singapore on 16/17th January, 1996 and told him that he had made arrangements with certain hundi operators for money. He telephoned the detenu again on 18-1-1996 at his residence (No. 840483) and got confirmed that the detenu was ready to receive the hundi amounts already arranged by him. The detenu was told that he would be paid an amount to the tune of Rs. 5 lakhs to Rs. 50 lakhs and from that day onwards, various amounts in packets bearing markings such as 'A', 'N', 'W' were paid to the detenu, who changed them into foreign currencies and made them into bundles and marked them with the same markings and informed the said details to Jafarullah through Fax and also confirmed the said Fax by a subsequent phone call. It is also owned up by the detenu that the said Jafarullah rang him up and informed that one husband and wife who were Singapore citizens came to Madras and would be returning to Singapore in about 10 days' time and that the detenu could send the foreign currencies accumulated by him through this couple. It was owned up that Jafarullah had given the telephone number of the detenu and asked them to contact the detenu and on that day they actually contacted the detenu at the detenu's lodge and asked the detenu to arrange for air tickets and other arrangements. He owned up that accordingly he arranged for the air tickets of the couple and had sent along with them the box containing foreign currencies worth about 2.5 crores and the box was given by the detenu's trusted person Shukoor to the said couple and ultimately the same had reached Jafarullah, who confirmed the same on phone. The detenu also accepted that again Jafarullah rang him up and told him that he made arrangements for handing over large hundi amounts and he was asked to convert them into foreign currencies as was done earlier and the said foreign currencies were to be sent through air passengers in about a month's time and accordingly the detenu on 7-3-1996 had obtained from various brokers and operators amounts and kept them ready in bundles as he had done on the last occasion. However, this time, the said Jafarullah had not made arrangements for air passengers and therefore, the detenu took it upon himself to arrange the same and approached his relative Shaikh Abdullah of Chepauk, Madras, who informed him that Shaikh Abdullah's friend Pargunam had come with his wife from Singapore and they were to leave for Singapore on 8-3-1996 and that is how the deal came to be struck with the said Pargunam and his wife who agreed to carry the suitcase to Singapore. The detenu also accepted that it was he who booked the Ambassador car from Om Sakthi travels and kept the box containing the foreign currencies and Indian currency in the dickey of the said car. He also accepted that he went to the Airport on 9-3-1996 and met one Santhanavannan, a Customs Officer, who was known to him and had fairly charged duties on the goods brought by him earlier. He also accepted that he went to the Airport on 9-3-1996 and met one Santhanavannan, a Customs Officer, who was known to him and had fairly charged duties on the goods brought by him earlier. He sought the help of the said Santhanavannan in the clearance of the passengers whom he told were carrying costly silk sarees, silver jewelleries and some foreign currencies for which Santhanavannan agreed and Santhanavannan asked him not to send the passengers directly inside and it would be sufficient if he gave the car number to Santhanavannan so that Santhanavannan would take them inside by sending a person near the said car. Accordingly, the detenu gave the number of the Car being TMI 504 to Santhanavannan and that is how the said Car was sent by the detenu with Shukoor and with the couple viz., Nallaian Pargunam alias Joseph and his wife, who were collected from the residence of Shaikh Abdullah at Masjid Street. The detenu also owned up that thereafter he came to know only through the Officers about the interception of the said couple Nallaian Pargunam alias Joseph and his wife. He owned up that he did not know the names of the persons and remembered only a few of such names and addresses who have sold the foreign currency to him through the brokers. He also owned up that he identified Shukoor Bhai, Shaikh Abdullah, Jabarullah, Muthuvel, the taxi driver and Manoharan, auto driver, who had taken the earlier mentioned two persons to the Airport. Shaikh Abdullah's residential premises was also searched, but nothing was found and Shaikh Abdullah in his statement dated 11-3-1996 had admitted that he used to procure foreign goods for his friends and customers and he came into contact with one Kader and the said Kader had asked him to meet Pargunam who he met at his residence and Pargunam also came to be known to him. He had also known the detenu Sickander and through Sickander he also came into contact with Jabarullah and that he also knew Pargunam, Jabarullah and that the detenu were known to each other. Further, he told in his statement that the detenu had informed him that whenever Pargunam and his wife came to Madras, they both used to stay in Samrat Lodge and that they had sought his help in getting confirmed air tickets for their journey back to Singapore. Further, he told in his statement that the detenu had informed him that whenever Pargunam and his wife came to Madras, they both used to stay in Samrat Lodge and that they had sought his help in getting confirmed air tickets for their journey back to Singapore. On that account, he met the detenu and told him about the proposed departure of the couple to the detenu Sickander who said that he would arrange for the tickets and pay the cost himself. However, in return for that, the couple had to carry a suitcase given by the detenu to Singapore and that the detenu accordingly informed him at that he arranged for confirmed tickets for the flight at 11-00 p.m. on 10-3-1996 and that the couple were to wait near the Big Masjid at around 8-00 p.m. and he would send the goods through Jabarullah in a car and in the said car, the couple could reach the Airport. 5. Statement of Abdul Shukoor was also recorded and he also owned up his part played in the whole affair at the instance of the detenu. So also the statement of Jabarullah was also recorded. He also accepted the part attributed to him by the detenu in his statement. Similar is the story about Rajendran, the Police Constable, who also owned up that he was told by Inspector of Police Vicrama Singh to help the couple in checking-in by giving the Ambassador Car from which the couple would be coming to the Airport. He owned up that he located the car and helped the couple in checking-in and when that was being done, one suitcase was asked to be rescanned by the Security Officer and ultimately he was intercepted. The statements of Muthuvel, Manoharan, who were the car and auto drivers respectively, were also recorded and so also the statement of Vicrama Singh, Inspector of Police who confirmed this story regarding the role played by Santhanavannan, the Customs Officer, who had told him that he knew those persons to be helped in checking in. He owned up that it was he who instructed the said Police Constable Rajendran to facilitate the passengers Car No. TMI 504 and he was told by Rajendran that out of the two big suitcases, one was cleared and the other was held up by the IA Security, Shri Sai. He owned up that it was he who instructed the said Police Constable Rajendran to facilitate the passengers Car No. TMI 504 and he was told by Rajendran that out of the two big suitcases, one was cleared and the other was held up by the IA Security, Shri Sai. He himself saw on the T.V. screen and suspected that the suitcase might contain some currencies or sheet of explosives or some other items. It was, therefore, no sticker was pasted on that suitcase. The statement of Santhanavannan was also recorded, which suggested that the detenu had asked him to facilitate the checking-in of a passenger and his wife bound for Singapore and he had, therefore, instructed Vicrama Singh, Inspector of Police to facilitate the checking-in and he did not know the identity of the passengers and he informed the car No. TMI 504 to Vicrama Singh which was told to him by the detenu. He claimed that the facilitation was only to avoid the queue at the scanning and security counters and when he returned after dinner, he came to know that the passengers for whom detenu requested for facilitation were intercepted and foreign currencies were found in the suitcase. He owned up that he knew the detenu Sickander as he used to give him information about smuggling out of foreign currencies by way of concealment in persons and in baggage and that he knew the detenu for the past three Years. He, however, claimed that he did not meet Sickander on 9-3-1996 at the Airport, but had received a telephone call from the detenu on 10-3-1996 and the detenu Sickander had told hint about the said couple who would be coming by the car bearing No. TMI 504. 6. It was on the basis of these materials, the impugned order came to be passed against the present petitioner-detenu. 7. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. Habibullah Badsha assailed this order mainly on the ground that there has been a complete non-application of mind on the part of the authority to pass the impugned order. To buttress his argument, the learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to the order of detention itself which suggests that the said order was passed with a view to preventing him in future from "smuggling goods". To buttress his argument, the learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to the order of detention itself which suggests that the said order was passed with a view to preventing him in future from "smuggling goods". He also pointed out a sentence in paragraph 29 of the grounds to the following effect : "These activities on the part of Shri. Nallaian Pargunam alias Joseph and on your part amount to smuggling as per S. 2(39) of the Customs Act, 1962 read with S. 2(e) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (as amended) and thus, the foreign currencies, travellers cheques and Indian currency so attempted to be smuggled out of India without valid permit of Reserve Bank of India for possession and export are liable for confiscation under Section 113(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 read with Ss. 13 and 67 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973." The learned Senior Counsel also invites our attention at para 30 where it is stated that "I have no hesitation in arriving at the subjective satisfaction that you have engaged yourself in smuggling of goods." 8. On the basis of these statements, the learned Senior Counsel argues that the factual panorama shows that the act of smuggling was being done in fact by Pargunam and not by the petitioner-detenu. According to the learned Senior Counsel, it may be said at the most that the petitioner was abetting the act of smuggling, but if he was not physically smuggling and had not smuggled any goods, then the inference drawn by the detaining authority that he was smuggling goods was obviously without an basis and as such it is clear that the authority in drawing the inference had acted without application of mind. The learned Senior Counsel points out that it is on account of the so called smuggling activity of the detenu that he has been detained and when no smuggling has been attributed to him in the facts of the case, it was obvious that no direct smuggling was attributed to him. The learned Senior Counsel further in his arguments stated that under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act, the power of detention is to be utilised for preventing as many as five acts wherein the smuggling of goods is covered by clause (i), while clause (ii) covers abetting the smuggling of goods. The learned Senior Counsel further in his arguments stated that under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act, the power of detention is to be utilised for preventing as many as five acts wherein the smuggling of goods is covered by clause (i), while clause (ii) covers abetting the smuggling of goods. The learned Senior Counsel points out that though in this case the petitioner cannot be said to have smuggled the goods and can at the most be said to have abetted smuggling of the goods, the authority in describing the activity on the part of the detenu as a smuggling activity has clearly displayed non-application of mind. The learned Senior Counsel points out that the authority at the most should have stated that the detenu had abetted the smuggling of goods particularly when the detenu admittedly had not directly tried to smuggle the currency out of India nor was he caught in the act of directly smuggling the currency out of India. 9. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor, however, opposed this argument and pointed out that there was enough material on record to show that the petitioner-detenu had engaged himself not only in the abetment of smuggling but the smuggling itself. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, such restrictive meaning could not be given to the term "smuggling" and the term could not be interpreted with the narrow exactitude as is being tried to be done by the petitioner-detenu. 10. Considering the rival submissions, it will have to be, therefore, seen as to whether the detaining authority has displayed non-application of mind in describing the activities of the detenu as smuggling and in passing the detention order to prevent the detenu in future from smuggling. There is no doubt that in the detention order, the authority has used the term "smuggling" and has recorded its satisfaction that it would be necessary to pass the detention order to prevent the detenu from smuggling goods. Again, the phraseology used in paragraphs 29 and 30 of the detention order does bring out a position that the activities on the basis of which the order came to be passed were the smuggling activities for the prevention of which the passing of the detention order was felt necessary. Again, the phraseology used in paragraphs 29 and 30 of the detention order does bring out a position that the activities on the basis of which the order came to be passed were the smuggling activities for the prevention of which the passing of the detention order was felt necessary. The learned Counsel, therefore, strongly argues that in describing the past activities of the petitioner as smuggling activity and in drawing inference on the basis thereof that the detenu would in future engage his smuggling activities, the authority has clearly displayed lack of application of mind. In short, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel is that there was no material available to infer that the petitioner had engaged in smuggling and, therefore, there was no basis for the further inference that in future also, he would engage in smuggling. Again, the learned Senior Counsel forcefully argues that the activity of the petitioner should have been described as the abetment of smuggling in contradistinction with smuggling itself and the petitioner should have been detained for preventing him from abetting the smuggling in contradistinction with the smuggling itself. 11. We have deliberately described the facts in detail to see the whole conspectus of the activities on the part of the petitioner in view of the above quoted argument of the learned Senior Counsel. 12. In the first place, we may observe that it is a trite principle of preventive detention law that the preventive detention is not punitive. A person may have engaged in smuggling earlier and yet, if there is no material to hold that he is likely to repeat his activities, no detention can be ordered merely because he had engaged himself in the smuggling. On seeing the language of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act, this position becomes all 'the more clear that a person is detained for "preventing" the various activities described vide S. 3(i) to (v). Again, a person may not have done anything or may not have engaged himself in any of the activities described in S. 3(i) to (v) and yet, if there is material available that in future he is likely to engage in those activities, a valid order of detention can still be passed. Again, a person may not have done anything or may not have engaged himself in any of the activities described in S. 3(i) to (v) and yet, if there is material available that in future he is likely to engage in those activities, a valid order of detention can still be passed. More often than not, past criminal activities of a person do provide a basis for the authority to infer that even in future, the person may engage in such criminal activities, but such past activities cannot be said to be the only basis to infer that the person may engage in such activities in future. It is, therefore, not necessary in all the cases and as a general rule that a person must have committed the criminal activities shown in Section 3(i) to 3(v) of the COFEPOSA Act in order to pass the detention order. Thus, it cannot be said that as a general rule that there is always an essential nexus between the past criminal activities and the likelihood on the part of the person to commit those activities. A person, who has never smuggled the goods, therefore, could still be detained for preventing him from smuggling goods in future if the detaining authority has independent material to suggest that he may in future smuggle the goods. By the same logic, it cannot be said as a general rule that a person, who has engaged himself in "smuggling" the goods, could be detained for preventing him from "smuggling" the goods only. A person may have a background of the activity of "smuggling goods" and yet, he could be detained for preventing him from engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, if the material is available with the detaining authority that in future that such a person is likely to engage in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. In short, in order to prevent a person from doing any activity under Ss. 3(i) to 3(v) of the COFEPOSA Act, it is not necessary that he should have committed the same kind of activity in past or for that matter any other activity in past. The factum of a person having committed a criminal activity and the likelihood of his committing any activity covered by Ss. 3(i) to 3(v) of the COFEPOSA Act, it is not necessary that he should have committed the same kind of activity in past or for that matter any other activity in past. The factum of a person having committed a criminal activity and the likelihood of his committing any activity covered by Ss. 3(i) to 3(v) are two independent factors and the detaining authority would be essentially concerned with the latter factor only as to whether the concerned person is likely to engage himself in any of the criminal activity in future and whether it is necessary to prevent him from doing that activity in future. That is the essence of the Preventive Detention Law. Once this position is obtained, the past criminal activity of the detenu cannot be said to 'always' provide a basis for the detention. There may be a past activity or there may not be a past activity, yet, the detention order can be passed if there is enough material with the authority to hold that such person is likely to engage himself in such activity in future. Similarly, there may be a past activity of one nature and yet, the detention order can be passed for preventing that person from committing an activity of different nature as described in Ss. 3(i) to 3(v) of the COFEPOSA Act. 13. It is on this backdrop that the argument of the learned Senior Counsel will have to be tested. All that would be required to be seen would be whether there was material on record to suggest that the detenu would engage himself in future in smuggling as covered by S. 3(i). In order to prevent the detenu from smuggling in future, it is not necessary that he should have in past done the acts of "smuggling" alone. He might have committed any acts other than smuggling and yet if there is material available that in future, he might engage himself in smuggling, he can still be validly detained for preventing him from smuggling the goods. 14. However, the argument of the learned Senior Counsel does not stop here. The learned Senior Counsel suggests that the past activity of the petitioner has been misdescribed as smuggling covered by S. 3(i), though it could have at the most been stated that the petitioner had engaged in abetment of smuggling which is covered by S. 3(ii). 14. However, the argument of the learned Senior Counsel does not stop here. The learned Senior Counsel suggests that the past activity of the petitioner has been misdescribed as smuggling covered by S. 3(i), though it could have at the most been stated that the petitioner had engaged in abetment of smuggling which is covered by S. 3(ii). The learned Senior Counsel, therefore, suggests that the detaining authority had not been alive to the fine distinction made by classification of the activities in S. 3. The learned Senior Counsel, therefore, invited our attention to S. 2(39) of the Customs Act, 1962 which defines smuggling as under : "smuggling", in relation to any goods means any act or omission which will render such goods liable to confiscation under S. 111 or S. 113." The learned Senior Counsel then argues that the activity could be described to be covered by S. 113(d) which is asunder :- "113. The following export goods shall be liable to confiscation : "(d). any goods attempted to be exported or brought within the limits of any customs area for the purpose of being exported contrary to any prohibition imposed by or under this Act or any other law for the time being in force." The learned Senior Counsel takes his arguments further by suggesting that the petitioner had never attempted to export any goods or to bring them within the limits of any customs area for the purpose of being exported contrary to the prohibition imposed by law, because it was not he who was travelling and it was in fact Pargunam who had physically tried to export the goods and/or brought them within the limits of customs area. It is suggested that the petitioner not having engaged himself in the act covered by S. 113(d) could not be said to have engaged in smuggling the goods as is described in the reasons. The argument goes further to suggest that when S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act treats abetting the smuggling of the goods independently and when it was clear that the petitioner had merely abetted the smuggling of the goods at best, then his activities should have been described not as "smuggling," but as "abetment of smuggling" and he could have been detained not for preventing the smuggling, but for preventing the abetting of smuggling. This not having been done, the authority concerned had not applied its mind. At the first blush, the argument is undoubtedly attractive. However once we see the order, all the doubts are dispelled. The activities on the part of the detenu described in the order leave no manner of doubt that he had attempted to export the goods or to bring them within the limits of the Customs area for the purpose of being exported contrary to any prohibition imposed by the Act. We have deliberately described the facts in detail. The facts suggest that the petitioner was undoubtedly engaging himself in smuggling the goods. It will be seen that merely because the petitioner was not physically caught while trying to cross the customs barrier, he was the one who was the owner of the goods, he was the one who had master minded the whole plan of sending the currencies out of India by firstly actively collecting the foreign exchange on the basis of the monies supplied to him by his contacts in Singapore and had taken every step to contact the concerned couple to convince them to carry the suitcase which was containing contraband currencies. He had also borne their travel expenses in lieu of their agreeing to carry the suitcase and had also seen to it that the couple reaches the Airport in time by arranging a transport for them and last but not the least, he had, tried to facilitate their checking-in, taking the help of a constable as also a Customs Official. The argument of the learned counsel that the smuggling would be restricted only to the checking-in of the suitcase by the couple and thus, the offence of smuggling could be alleged only against the said couple is obviously incorrect as that is only an ultimate part of the whole plan which was hatched earlier and the activity of the detenu being part and parcel of that carefully hatched plan, the petitioner's activities can be safely covered under S. 113(d) which would amount to an attempt on the part of the petitioner to smuggle the currency out of India. The basic argument, therefore, that the activity of the petitioner was misdescribed has also to fail. The basic argument, therefore, that the activity of the petitioner was misdescribed has also to fail. There was no misdescription in the activity of the petitioner nor could it be said that the petitioner was detained incorrectly for preventing him from engaging into smuggling in contradistinction with abetment of smuggling. 15. We have already shown that the argument that there was a misdescription and, therefore, there was non-application of mind is not a correct argument at all. In addition, we are holding that in fact there was no misdescription at all and the activity of the petitioner was correctly described as smuggling. We cannot again ignore the fact that in the order, adequate care is taken to describe the smuggling activity not only in terms of S. 2(39) of the Customs Act, but also in terms of S. 2(e) of the COFEPOSA Act thereby the activity of smuggling will have to be understood with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions. The attempt on the part of the detenu in hatching a plan and his active participation in carrying it out could aptly be described as a smuggling activity. The term "smuggling" could not be given a narrow and restricted meaning on the backdrop of this case and it cannot be slapped only against the couple viz., Nallaian Pargunam alias Joseph and his wife Pakavathi, but would also engulf the petitioner. We are supported in this inference regarding the interpretation of the term "smuggling" which is no more res integra. In the decision in N. K. Bapna v. Union of India, 1992 SCC (Crl) 683, the Apex Court in paragraph 6 holds, "Shri Ashoke Sen contends that the Division Bench of the High Court having accepted the petitioner's contention that his activities do not constitute 'smuggling' ought to have straightway quashed the detention order. He points out that the goods in question had been assessed to customs duty by the authorities and an order for their clearance from the customs area had been made on the execution of a bond for the due payment of the duty. Referring to the definitions of 'smuggling' in various dictionaries and decisions, he contends that it is ridiculous to suggest that the petitioner is guilty of 'smuggling' or the abetment thereof. Referring to the definitions of 'smuggling' in various dictionaries and decisions, he contends that it is ridiculous to suggest that the petitioner is guilty of 'smuggling' or the abetment thereof. Prima facie, one would agree that there is considerable force in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there cannot be any smuggling of goods which have been openly imported, declared to the customs authorities and cleared by them after being assessed to duty. However, we cannot go by the dictionary meaning of the word as the Act has a definition clause which adopts, for the word, the same meaning which it has in S. 2(39) of the Customs Act." After quoting the definition of the term 'smuggling' and after considering S. 2(45) of the Customs Act, the Apex Court further holds, "It is clear even from the facts disclosed in the petition that the case of the authorities may be that the petitioner has abetted the removal of the imported goods from the bonded warehouse without the permission of the proper officer. Of course, there can be no smuggling if the goods had been removed from the warehouse not by the petitioner but by the customs authorities or somebody else as suggested by the petitioner. But that will be a question of fact and one has to assume, for the purposes of the present argument, that the goods are alleged to have been removed by the petitioner or the company from the warehouse without the permission of the proper officer. In such a situation, a simple reading of the relevant sections is sufficient to say prima facie that, in the present case, there has been smuggling by the company, and an abetment of smuggling by the petitioner. It is difficult to say on the broad conspectus of facts and the special definition clauses in the relevant statutes that the proposed detention in this case is totally outside the provisions of the statute. It is difficult to say on the broad conspectus of facts and the special definition clauses in the relevant statutes that the proposed detention in this case is totally outside the provisions of the statute. If there is prima facie, smuggling or abetment of smuggling, it is open to the competent authorities to issue a detention order which may be challenged later on the merits on any grounds that may be available but it cannot be said that the action is flagrantly in violation of the statute or that the order is one not made under the provisions of the statute under which it has been purportedly issued." This will suggest that the Supreme Court refused to take a restricted meaning of the term "smuggling" and chose to interpret it broadly. Further in paragraph 10, the Apex Court has explained the general concept of smuggling. In that case, the Apex Court was concerned with S. 111, particularly because that was the case of import of the goods, which were cleared and kept in the' warehouse and which were tried to be clandestinely removed and even this act was dubbed as smuggling. Here also, the goods were being tried to be exported in total contravention of the rules by hatching a careful plan for the same and that act has to be dubbed as smuggling in the circumstances of the case. 16. The learned senior counsel relied on a reported decision of the Bombay High Court in Shashikala v. Union of India, 1987 Cri LJ 1787 where, while issuing an order of detention, the word "engaged" was not mentioned, even when an order was passed under S. 3(1)(ii) and (iii). The Bombay High Court has taken a view in this case that a user of the word "engaged" was must as the import of the word was to convey that the person was habitually occupied or employed in transporting or concealing or keeping the smuggled goods. This case was relied on by the learned senior counsel for suggesting that the activity of engaging in keeping the smuggled goods was a separate and distinct criminal activity for which there was a provision made in S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act and if the detention was for stopping the further activity covered under the provision, the user of the language in that provision was a must. From this, the learned counsel wanted to differentiate between smuggling and abetment of smuggling which activities are covered by S. 3(1)(i) and (ii) respectively. We are afraid, the factual situation in Shashikala's case, cited supra, was entirely different from the present case. We have already shown that the activities of the petitioner-detenu which have been relied upon could legitimately be dubbed as smuggling because of the peculiar definition of S. 113 read with S. 114. Again, we cannot ignore the definition of the term "smuggling" in COFEPOSA Act which has to be understood with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, though in the light of S. 2(39) of the Customs Act. We have, in earlier part of our judgment already shown as to how the activities of the petitioner-detenu could be conveniently dubbed as "smuggling." 17. The learned counsel also relied on the decisions in Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Kerala, 1985 SCC (Cri) 332 : (1986 Cri LJ 786) and Madan Lal Anand v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 176 : (1990 Cri LJ 659) to buttress his argument that COFEPOSA Act treats the criminal acts described under S. 3 distinctly and separately. There can be no dispute with the propositions laid down in both these cases. However, we are of 'the clear opinion that the activities would at least amount to an attempt for exporting the goods or for bringing them within the customs area for the purposes of export and that activity would clearly be covered under S. 113 of the Customs Act. 18. For all these reasons, we are of the considered opinion that there are no merits in the petition and it must be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.