JUDGMENT 1. - On the application of the petitioner, under Section 8/20 of the Arbitration Act, the learned court of Additional District Judge No. 2, Kota vide the order dated 24.3.98, appointed Shri R.K. Bakharu, Ex-Chief Engineer, CPWD, as the arbitrator, and directed the disputes/claims, mentioned in para 6 of the application, to be referred to the said arbitrator, within three months. In pursuance of this order, the non-petitioner-contemner, Shri D.R Goyal, Chief Engineer, CPWD (North Zone-Ill), Jaipur, was required to refer the disputes/claims, to the arbitrator, appointed by the court, within three months from the date of the order. But, he flouted the orders of the court and did not refer the disputes/claims, to the arbitrator, appointed by the court, within the period set up in the order of the court. Accordingly, the petitioner has preferred this contempt petition, against the non-petitioner. 2. The non-petitioner, in his reply, has stated that the order dated 24.3.98, was illegal, perverse & without jurisdiction and, therefore, he preferred a revision petition (No. 1190/98), in the High Court, there against. He has further averred that the "appropriate directions to the earlier arbitrator were, therefore, required, which were not issued by the learned court below, in the absence of which, the non-petitioner felt unable to act". However, after the time-limit, set up by the learned court below, vide the communication dated 2.11.98, the matter was referred to the arbitrator, appointed by the court. 3. I have heard the arguments of both the sides. 4. Admittedly, the non-petitioner did not refer the disputes/claims, to the arbitrator, appointed by the court, within three months, as directed by the order dated 24.3.98, of the learned court below. Even if the reference was made vide the communication dated 2.11.98, it was done after the time-limit, set up by the court. The question, therefore, arises as to whether there was any justification for withholding the compliance of the order, within the time-limit, set up by the court. 5. From the file of the Civil Revision Petition No. 1190/98, it is evident that it has not yet been admitted for consideration. On 11.9.98, it was dismissed, as none came present on behalf of the revision petitioner. However, the revision petition was restored to its original number, vide the order dated 8.1.99. The revision petition is still pending at admission-stage. From the file of the Civil Revision Petition No. 1190/98, it is evident that it has not yet been admitted for consideration. On 11.9.98, it was dismissed, as none came present on behalf of the revision petitioner. However, the revision petition was restored to its original number, vide the order dated 8.1.99. The revision petition is still pending at admission-stage. Both the sides have admitted at Bar, before me that no stay order has been passed in the said revision petition. 6. In the case of Om Prakash Kumawat v. N.K. Bairwa & another 1991 (2) RLR 139 , a Division Bench of this Court has held as under- "The other point, which has been raised by Shri M.l. Khan, is that the Government had decided to file a special leave petition and the matter was processed for obtaining sanction for filing special leave petition i and this has caused delay in compliance of the Court's order. We would not hesitate for a moment in saying that the Government has a constitutional right to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing special leave petition against the order passed by the High Court or by the Tribunal. It has also a right to make a prayer for grant of stay against implementation of the order passed by the High Court or the Tribunal. However, we would also not hesitate for a moment in observing that mere filing of special leave petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court does not and cannot operate as a stay on the order of the High Court and that cannot afford a ground to delay the implementation of the order of the High Court. This plea has been repelled by the Supreme Court as early as in 1972 in Barat Ram Mishra's case (supra). The Supreme Court had rejected the plea that filing of special leave petition would permit non-compliance of the order passed by the High Court.^ ..." 7. Thus, mere filing of a revision petition cannot operate as a stay order of the order dated 24.3.98, of the learned court below, and as such, it does not & cannot afford a ground to delay the implementation of the order dated 24.3.98, of the learned court below. Thus, mere filing of a revision petition cannot operate as a stay order of the order dated 24.3.98, of the learned court below, and as such, it does not & cannot afford a ground to delay the implementation of the order dated 24.3.98, of the learned court below. As admitted by both the sides at Bar that there is stay in the revision petition, therefore, it was obligatory on the non-petitioner to have complied with the directions, contained in the order dated 24.3.98, within the time-limit, set up in the order. The Division Bench, in the case of Om Prakash Kumawat (supra), has observed that "we must emphasise that wherever the court sets up a time limit for implementation of its order, the order must be given effect to within that time, unless it is extended by the court or the order of the court is stayed in appeal. 8. Thus, in the instant case in hand, there was, absolutely, no justification for withholding the compliance of the order dated 24.3.98, within the time-limit of three months, set up by the court below. The non-petitioner was admittedly, aware of the order dated 24.3.98, of the learned court below. Yet, he did not refer the matter to the arbitrator, issued by the court, within the time-limit, set up by the court. As according to him, the appropriate directions were not issued by the court, to the earlier arbitrator, he (non-petitioner), therefore, 'felt unable to act', and in his view, the order of the court is "illegal, perverse & without jurisdiction." 9. In the case of Om Prakash Kumawat (supra), the Division Bench of this Court, has held as under- "....., it is reasonable to derive that term 'wilful disobedience' used in Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, cannot be construed to mean that an act must in all cases be designed and deliberate to be held as civil contempt. If a party who is fully in know of the order of the Court or is conscious and aware of the consequences and implications of the court's order, ignores it or acts in violation of the court's order, it must be held that disobedience is wilful." Since the non-petitioner, in the present case in hand was fully in know of the order dated 24.3.98, of the learned court below and he has ignored it & withheld the compliance within the time-limit, set up by the court, it must be held that the disobedience of the court's order, on the part of the non-petitioner, is wilful, within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act. 10. In the case of Aligarh Municipal Board & others v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union & others AIR 1970 SC 1767 , Hon'ble The Supreme Court has held as under- " Contempt proceeding against a person who has failed to comply with the court's order serves a dual purpose : (1) vindication of the public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct and (2) coercion to compel the contemner to do what the law requires of him 11. In the case of Advocate General, State of Bihar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries & another (1980) 3 SCC 311 , Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed as under- "..... it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and effects the interest of the* public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of court, not in order to protect the dignity of the court against insult of injury as the expression 'contempt of court' may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. "It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage." "The law should not be seen to sit by limly, while those who delay it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope." 12. In the case of Om Prakash Kumawat (supra), the Division Bench of this Court, has held as under- "These authorities clearly show that everyone, how high so ever he may be, is bound to carry out the court's order. The order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction is binding on all concerned and those who defy or disobey or fail to comply with the court's order do at their own peril. No one can think himself above the law and the court is under a duty to see that confidence of the public in the institution of courts, is not shaken by the executive authorities by their disregard to the orders of the court. 13. Thus, it is unqualified & plain obligation of everyone, against whom or in respect whom, an order is made by the court, to obey it, unless & until, the order is discharged. The un-compromised nature of this obligation is evident from the fact that it extends to cases, where the person affected by the order, believes it to be irregular or even void. Therefore, in the instant case in hand, the non-petitioner was under un-compromised & unqualified obligation to comply with the order of the learned court below, dated 24.3.98, within the time-limit, set up therein, even though, he believed the order to be irregular or void. In my opinion, the non-petitioner has wilfully disobeyed the order dated 24.3.98. of the learned court below, and as such, he is held guilty of having committed contempt of court, under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 14. On the last date of hearing, i.e., 26.3.99, an oral apology has been tendered by the non-petitioner. 15. In the case of Lakshmi Narayan Dutta v. Mira Rani Dey & others 1984 Cri. LJ 1033 , the Calcutta High Court has observed as under- "It seems that the trend of today is more to disregard the orders of court than to comply with the same with the belief that apologies tendered at the time of hearing will condone all acts of the contemner. LJ 1033 , the Calcutta High Court has observed as under- "It seems that the trend of today is more to disregard the orders of court than to comply with the same with the belief that apologies tendered at the time of hearing will condone all acts of the contemner. The time has come when it must be made clear to the litigant public and all, that when a direction is given and orders are made, the courts' orders are required to be carried out to their fullest extent and any wilful disregard to the same will not be tolerated by a court of law and severe consequence will follow if orders are found to be have been violated." 16. In the case of Mulkh Raj v. State of Punjab AIR 1972 SC 1197 , Hon'ble The Supreme Court has observed as under- "Apology is an act of contrition. Unless apology is offered at the earliest opportunity and in good grace apology is shorn of penitence. If apology is offered at a time when the contemner finds that the court is going to impose punishment, it ceases to be an apology and it becomes to be an apology and it becomes an act of a cringing coward. The High Court was right in not taking any notice of the appellant's expression of apology "without any further word". The High Court correctly said that acceptance of apology in the case would amount to allow the offender to go away with impunity after having committed gross contempt." 17. In my opinion, in the instant case in hand, the oral apology has not been tendered at the earliest opportunity, but has been tendered at the last moment, to avoid the consequences of disobedience of the court's order. Therefore, the oral apology, tendered by the non-petitioner, cannot be accepted. 18. Now, the question arises as to what punishment should be awarded to the non-petitioner. Having regard to the overall facts & circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the ends of justice would be met, if a penalty of fine is imposed on the non-petitioner. A fine of Rs.1500/- would be reasonable & adequate in this case. 19. Accordingly, the contempt petition is allowed and the non-petitioner, Shri D.P Goyal, Chief Engineer, CPWD (North Zone-ill), Jaipur, is held guilty of contempt of Court, for which, a penalty of Rs. A fine of Rs.1500/- would be reasonable & adequate in this case. 19. Accordingly, the contempt petition is allowed and the non-petitioner, Shri D.P Goyal, Chief Engineer, CPWD (North Zone-ill), Jaipur, is held guilty of contempt of Court, for which, a penalty of Rs. 1500/- is imposed on him. In default of payment of the fine, he shall undergo a simple imprisonment for three weeks. Out of the fine realised, a sum of Rs. 1000/- shall be paid to the petitioner, by way of damages.Contempt Petition Allowed-Out of Fine Imposed Rs.1000/- To Be Paid To Petitioner. *******