( 1 ) HEARD the arguments of learned Counsels for both sides. ( 2 ) THIS petition is filed against the order dated 7-9-1996 of the Trial Court allowing LA. 8 filed under Order 6, Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the CPC by the respondent-defendant in O. S. No. 966 of 1994 on its file. ( 3 ) A few material facts leading to this revision may be stated as under: the said O. S. No. 966 of 1994 was instituted by the petitioner-company against respondents (defendants 1, 2 and 3) for recovery of Rs. 10,31,611-31 with interest on the basis of the Hire purchase Agreement dated 14-11-1992. The material averments made in the plaint are that, 1st respondent is a Private Limited Company. Defendants 2 and 3 are the Directors of respondent 1. On 19-12-1992 defendants entered into the said Hire Purchase Agreement with the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as 'plaintiff) and purchased certain machineries pertaining to computers relating to their business as detailed in Schedule 1 of the Hire Purchase Agreement. As per this agreement, defendants had to pay a sum of Rs. 2,37,239/- towards the first instalment of hire and a sum of Rs. 37,239/- per month as hire for the said machineries, commencing from 19-12-1992 as detailed in Schedule 2 to the agreement. These main averments pertaining to suit transaction were made in para 2 of the plaint. At para 5 therein it is further averred that: "the 1st defendant committed default in payment of hire instalments. Therefore, the Hire purchase Agreement was terminated by the plaintiff by its letter dated 14/21-9-1993. The same has been served upon the 1st defendant on 27-9-1993. The letter of termination as well as the postal acknowledgement are submitted herewith". Again in para 7 of the plaint it is averred: "the defendant in turn writes a letter to the plaintiff stating that they will clear dues and assures to pay that amount within February 1994. Even that they have not complied and therefore the plaintiff is put to necessity of filing this suit". It is also averred in para 6 of the plaint that the defendant was issued with a notice calling upon him to pay the amount due from them. But the same was not replied by the latter. Even that they have not complied and therefore the plaintiff is put to necessity of filing this suit". It is also averred in para 6 of the plaint that the defendant was issued with a notice calling upon him to pay the amount due from them. But the same was not replied by the latter. ( 4 ) IT is submitted at the Bar that after service of summons, the defendants failed to enter their appearance. They were placed ex parte and the suit was proceeded with by the Trial Court. After a delay of about one year, the defendants put in their appearance in the suit through their Counsel and got the said ex parte order against them set aside and then the written statement dated 26-6-1995 was filed contesting the plaintiff's suit. ( 5 ) THE material plaint averments referred to above were determined by them at para 1 of their written statement thus: "the averments made in para 2 of the plaint are true to the extent that the 1st defendant is a private Limited Company and secured certain machineries from the plaintiff on Hire Purchase agreement and the defendants have paid a sum of Rs. 2,37,239/- as the first instalment and subsequently seven instalments @ Rs. 37,239/- per month has been paid to the plaintiff starting from 19-12-1992. . . ". In para 4 of the written statement it is further admitted: "the averments made in para 5 of the plaint are hereby admitted and the default was only due to the above said reasons". It was further stated therein that the plaintiffs demand notice dated 5-1-1994 referred to in the plaint could not be replied as the defendant was bedridden and was under medical treatment. ( 6 ) THE further admitted case of the parties is that after the said Hire Purchase Agreement was terminated by the plaintiff, the machineries, except one item of machinery, which were subject of this agreement and were in possession of the defendants were all seized by the plaintiff by virtue of its power reserved under one of the terms of the agreement. After their said written statement, an application dated 18-8-1995 under Section 151 of the CPC was filed in the Trial Court seeking a direction to the plaintiff to return them the said seized machinery. After their said written statement, an application dated 18-8-1995 under Section 151 of the CPC was filed in the Trial Court seeking a direction to the plaintiff to return them the said seized machinery. An affidavit of 2nd defendant in support of this application was also filed swearing; "certain machineries, and equipments secured on Hire Purchase during the month of December 1992 from the plaintiff and have paid a sum of Rs. 2,37,239/- as the first instalment and subsequently I have paid seven instalments at the agreed amount of Rs. 37,239/- (Rupees Thirty seven thousand two hundred and thirty-nine only) per month and as on date I have paid a sum of rs. 4,97,912/- (Rupees Four lakhs ninety seven thousand nine hundred and twelve) to the plaintiff-company". It is further averred in that affidavit that since the 2nd defendant met with an accident and sustained severe injuries and had been hospitalised for quite a long time, the balance of instalments payable under the Hire Purchase Agreement could not be paid by him and that he was ready and willing to pay the hire amount to the plaintiff on monthly instalments by entering into an agreement on fresh terms and conditions. Since the seized machinery was necessary for the defendants' business, it was prayed that the same may be got redelivered to them from plaintiff. The aforesaid application of defendants was opposed by the plaintiff. Then an order dated 25-9-1995 was passed by the Trial Court rejecting their application on merits. The main reason assigned by the Trial Court in its order was that defendant has not disputed the Hire purchase Agreement and the default committed by him. Following the decision of this Court in shriram Transport Finance Company Limited, Bangalore v R. Khaishiulla Khan and Another, the said order dated 25-9-1995 was passed by the Trial Court which was challenged by the defendants before this Court in CRP No. 4020 of 1995 which came to be dismissed with its following pertinent observations: "the defendant who is the revision petitioner was the hirer of certain machineries from the respondent who had filed a suit for the amount due from the defendants. In the meantime, respondent/plaintiff had also seized machineries from the defendant in accordance with the provision contained in the Hire Purchase Agreement". In the meantime, respondent/plaintiff had also seized machineries from the defendant in accordance with the provision contained in the Hire Purchase Agreement". At para 4 of the order it was further observed: "as stated earlier, admittedly, defendant is the defaulter of payment of instalments. Accordingly, plaintiffs were entitled to seize the machineries under the provision of Hire purchase Agreement. As the defendant is a defaulter, the lower Court was right in rejecting the prayer of the defendant to return the machineries". ( 7 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, the necessary issues were raised by the Trial Court from the material pleading of the parties. At the trial, plaintiffs witness was examined as P. W. 1 and he was partly cross-examined for the defendant. Further cross-examination of P. W. 1 was deferred by the Trial court at the request of defendant's Counsel. The last sentence elicited in the cross-examination of P. W. 1 was that he was not a signatory to the suit Hire Purchase Agreement. On the subsequent day of filing of the suit, the defendants instead of proceeding with further cross-examination of P. W. 1 and allowing the plaintiff to adduce its further evidence, came up with their application. e. ,. A. 8, under Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC seeking amendment of the written statement extensively running into as many as nine pages. The substance of the amendment sought to be made in the written statement is that the suit agreement is not a Hire purchase Agreement, but it is merely a Hire Agreement, that the terms thereof are not binding on defendants, that the monthly hire instalments fixed at Rs. 37,239/- for the said machinery was highly unjust and grossly inflated, and the rate of interest stipulated therein at 14% p. a. is exorbitant and usurious; that defendants are not liable to pay the alleged finance charges of Rs. 4,06,377/- as stated in Schedule 2 of the agreement; that defendants were induced by the plaintiff by their false and frivolous representations to enter into the suit agreement; that they are not liable to pay the suit claim to plaintiff and that the latter is not entitled to recover the same from them after the said items of machinery having been seized by it; that the terms of the suit agreement is opposed to the Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment; that an amount of Rs. 2 lakhs of defendants which is lying in deposit with the plaintiff shall have to be adjusted towards the suit claim and that the defendants were induced by the plaintiff to pay an excess amount of Rs. 2,59,730/- or even more towards the hire amount for recovery of which the defendants reserve their right to take separate action. ( 8 ) THE Court below relying on a proposition laid down by High Court of Allahabad in M/s. Mahendra Radio and Television, Meerut and Another v State Bank of India, that admission and pleadings do not necessarily bind the parties and any amendment withdrawing or explaining the same could be allowed at any stage of the proceedings, proceeded to pass the impugned orders. The reason assigned by him in support of the order at para 11 thereof is that he is of the opinion that the amendment sought by the defendant is just and necessary for resolving of the issues in controversy and that it will not change the nature or character of the suit. ( 9 ) LEARNED Counsel for petitioner, Sreeshananda argued vehemently assailing the legality and correctness of the order under revision. Substantiating his argument he submitted that having due regard to the nature of the original pleadings of the parties, there will not be an iota of doubt that the sweeping amendments that are sought to be introduced in the written statement will altogether change the defence jeopardising the interest of the defendants seriously and the stage at which such amendments were sought to be made did not warrant the impugned order of the court below. In support of this contention reliance had been placed by him on a decision of supreme Court in Haji Mohammed Ishaq Wd. S. K. Mohammed and Others v Mohammed Iqbal and Mohammed Ali and Company and in Kishan Lal v Rajan Chand Khanna. ( 10 ) PER contra Mr. G. Hasyegar, learned Counsel representing respondents 1 and 2, argued supporting the validity of the impugned order. He sought to draw support from the decisions of supreme Court in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v Km. Jyoti Sahay and Others and in Akshaya restaurant v P. Anjanappa and Another. He also pressed into service the aforecited decision of allahabad High Court. G. Hasyegar, learned Counsel representing respondents 1 and 2, argued supporting the validity of the impugned order. He sought to draw support from the decisions of supreme Court in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v Km. Jyoti Sahay and Others and in Akshaya restaurant v P. Anjanappa and Another. He also pressed into service the aforecited decision of allahabad High Court. ( 11 ) IN the case of Mahendra Radio, supra, Allahabad High Court has observed that admission in pleadings spoken under Order 8, Rule 5 of the CPC is not the one on which the plaintiff could rely which would bind the defendant or which creates such right in favour of the plaintiff as to refuse amendment of that admission on record. Further, the Court referring to the propositions laid down by Supreme Court in Javed Ahmad Abdul Hamid Pawala v State of Maharashtra and in Panchadeo Narain Srivastava's case, supra, held: "the pith and substance of the principles laid down in the aforesaid two decisions of the supreme Court is that even by means of amendment an admission could be permitted to be withdrawn in a given case if admission is not one which deprives the plaintiff of the valuable right accrued to him. Thus, it is only those admissions where valuable right has accrued to the plaintiff or an amendment which introduces a new case and seeks to displace the plaintiff completely from admissions made by the defendant the amendment should not be permitted. However, where admissions are not such then permitting amendment on the facts and circumstances of case could not be such which could give rise to the other side a cause on which it should be refused". The observation of Supreme Court in the case of Panchdeo Narain, supra, is also to the effect that an admission made by an authority may be withdrawn or may be explained away and it cannot be said that by amendment an admission of fact cannot be withdrawn. In case of mohammed Ishaq, supra, the Supreme Court having regard to the fact thereof observed: "the amendment of the written statement sought was on such facts which, if permitted to be introduced by way of amendment, would have completely changed the nature of their original defence. In case of mohammed Ishaq, supra, the Supreme Court having regard to the fact thereof observed: "the amendment of the written statement sought was on such facts which, if permitted to be introduced by way of amendment, would have completely changed the nature of their original defence. It would have brought about an entirely new plea which was never taken up either at the time of the dealings between the parties or in the original pleadings. The additional evidence sought to be adduced was in respect of the facts stated in the amendment petition. The High court rightly rejected all those petitions and we need not mention in any detail the reasons thereof. With the aforesaid observations the Supreme Court upheld the order of the High Court rejecting application for amendment of written statement made by the defendants at the appellate stage. ( 12 ) THE High Court of Delhi in Kishan Lal, supra, held that amendment or withdrawal of admission of defendant made in the written statement could be permitted if it is necessary to effectively adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties and not otherwise. ( 13 ) KEEPING in view the aforestated legal propositions concerning amendment or withdrawal of the pleadings and the written statement containing admissions by way of amendment the resultant position which could be safely stated is that such an amendment could be permitted only when the same does not substantially introduce a new case for defendant in contradiction with his original defence and when the plaintiffs interest would not be put to any serious jeopardy. In the instant case I have elaborately referred to the material pleadings between the parties in the plaint and original written statement as also to the nature of amendment which was sought to be made by the defendant in the written statement. In the instant case I have elaborately referred to the material pleadings between the parties in the plaint and original written statement as also to the nature of amendment which was sought to be made by the defendant in the written statement. If the amendments are projected in juxtaposition with the original pleadings of the parties it becomes clear that they would replace and substitute the whole of original defence of the defendant by introducing an altogether new case for them and the stage of the proceedings at which the amendment was sought to be effected by them would go to show that if they are permitted the same will result in serious prejudice to the right of the plaintiff which had already accrued to him to prosecute his claim further with the definite understanding of the defendant's case set up in the written statement. This apart, permitting the defendant to carry out such sweeping amendment in the written statement would nullify the binding authority of the valid order dated 4th January of this Court in CRP No. 4020 of 1995 affirming the Trial Court's order dated 25-9-1995 made in the suit rejecting defendant's application filed under Section 151 of the CPC. It being the definite case of the defendants that he had entered into an hire purchase agreement with plaintiff, it would be too much for them to turn around at a belated stage of the suit proceeding and seek to alter their defence pleaded in the written statement by introducing an altogether a new case inconsistent therewith excepting of course their fresh plea in regard to the amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- which was stated to have been deposited with the plaintiff by them as security deposit. Therefore, the afore-mentioned observation of the Trial Court made in support of its impugned order are patently erroneous and do not enjoy the support of the pleadings. These observations are the result of in application of its judicial mind to the relevant aspect of the matter. The order under revision has been passed by it in excess of its jurisdiction excepting insofar as it relates to the said plea in regard to deposit of rs. 2,00,000/ -. ( 14 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid the revision is partly allowed. The order under revision has been passed by it in excess of its jurisdiction excepting insofar as it relates to the said plea in regard to deposit of rs. 2,00,000/ -. ( 14 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid the revision is partly allowed. The impugned order of the Court below is set aside excepting that the defendant may be permitted to further plead: "that further the sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- received in advance as security deposit on the date of the suit agreement. e. , on 19-11-1992 (Nineteenth day of November, Nineteen ninety two) which is lying with the plaintiff shall have to be adjusted towards the suit claim pertaining to the above period". Consequently, respondent's (defendant's) LA. No. 8 filed in O. S. No. 966 of 1994 stands allowed to this extent only. Parties to bear their own costs.r