Judgment M.Y. Eqbal, J. This appeal by the defendant-appellants is against the judgment of reversal passed by 3rd Additional District Judge, Dhanbad in Title Appeal No. 33/83, whereby he reversed the judgment and decree passed by the Munsif, Second Court, Dhanbad in Title Suit No. 83/80 and decreed the Title Suit No. 83/80 for eviction. 2. The appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law :- “(A) Whether the finding of the court below that the appellant had defaulted in paying rent for the months of January and July, 1979 can be sustained in law? (B) Whether the finding of the court below that the respondents required the building for their own use and occupation can be upheld ?” 3. The plaintiffs-respondents filed the aforesaid suit for a decree of eviction of the defendants from the suit premises on the ground of default and personal necessity. The original plaintiff was Udit Ram Barai and after his death his sons were substituted. The case of the original plaintiff is that the defendant was a monthly tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the tenanted premises on a monthly rent of Rs.57/-. It was alleged that the defendant failed and neglected to pay the monthly rent from January, 79 till the month of April, 80. The plaintiff also made out a case that he required the suit premises for his own use and occupation in order to start business for his sons after making necessary reconstruction. As stated above, during the pendency of the suit the original plaintiff died and his sons were substituted and made parties. However, no addition or alteration was made in the plaint by the substituted plaintiffs. 4. The trial court framed as many as 9 issues. Issue no.5 is with respect to the material deterioration of the building premises. The allegation made by the plaintiff was that the condition of the building i.e. tenanted premises has been materially deteriorated owing to acts to waste or negligence or default of the tenant. This issue was decided against the plaintiff. Issue no. 6 is with respect to default. The trial court after considering the entire evidences, has come to a finding that the defendant is not a defaulter as he remitted the rent to the plaintiff within time. The trial court further disbelieved the case of personal necessity as made out in the plaint. Issue no. 6 is with respect to default. The trial court after considering the entire evidences, has come to a finding that the defendant is not a defaulter as he remitted the rent to the plaintiff within time. The trial court further disbelieved the case of personal necessity as made out in the plaint. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, preferred an appeal which was allowed by the impugned judgment and decree. The appellate court affirmed the finding so far issue of materially deterioration of the building is concerned but reserved the finding on the issue of default and personal necessity. On issue of default the appellate court arrived at a finding that rent for the month of January, 79 was remitted in January itself and, therefore, that was not a valid remittance in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Ujjal Singh & Sons vs. Rajendra Kumar Kedia (AIR 1986 Patna 162). The appellate court further held that rent for the month of July, 79 was not remitted within time. The appellate court, therefore, held that the defendant is a defaulter in payment of rent for the month of January and July, 79. 5. Mr. N.N. Tiwari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, assailed the said finding of the appellate court in view of the subsequent decision of this Court in the case of Bhagwan Lal Burnwal vs. Deb Kumar Banerjee & ors. (1990 Vol. 2 PLJR 513). 6. However, Mr. Debi Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, accepted the legal position and submitted that he cannot support the finding of the appellate court and the question of default and the same will not be pressed. In my opinion, there is no need to discuss any further on the finding of default arrived at by the appellate court, which is accordingly reversed. 7. The next issue, which was decided by the appellate court, is bona fide personal necessity. For better appreciation, paragraph 25 of the appellate court judgment is reproduced herein-below: "25. It would appears that late Udit Ram Barai had made out a case of personal necessity of the disputed property to start business for his sons because the disputed property is situated in the main road and was suited for the business. For better appreciation, paragraph 25 of the appellate court judgment is reproduced herein-below: "25. It would appears that late Udit Ram Barai had made out a case of personal necessity of the disputed property to start business for his sons because the disputed property is situated in the main road and was suited for the business. The expression sons includes the grand sons and other persons for whose benefit the property is held. So, when Udit Ram Barai made out a case to the effect that he required the disputed property bonafide for his personal use and occupation to start business by his sons, it would mean that he required the disputed property for the business of his sons including the grand sons. PW 8 is one of the plaintiff in the suit clearly deposed that his father died on 12.3.81 leaving behind three sons, who are all joint. He has further stated that his elder brother has got five sons, out of which three are adults and his three sons are also adults and his youngest brother had got four sons, out of which, two are adults. He has stated that this elder brother is sitting idle and the disputed property is suitable for starting business and he requires the same to start a business of Readymade shop and he has got no other house for that purpose. It would appear from his evidence that he has got two more brothers and the brothers have got eight adult sons. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that after filing of the suit the family started four shops in different locality it can not be said that the family has got no bonafide requirement of the disputed property for the simple reason that there are eleven adult members in the family and the plaintiff may require the disputed property for those idle members of the family, who do not have any independent business. Of course, it is not the onus of the defendant still from the cross examination it could not be established that all adult members of the family of the plaintiff have got their independent business and as such, there is no requirement for the disputed property. It is undisputed that the disputed property is situated in the main market area and is ideally suited for business. It is undisputed that the disputed property is situated in the main market area and is ideally suited for business. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the plaintiff has got houses at Manitanr and other area, they are certainly free to exercise their discretion and always entitled to choose any particular premises, which may satisfy their requirement. So, this argument is of no avail to the defendant/respondent that since the plaintiff have got other houses at other places they can't have bona fide requirement of the disputed property. As already stated above PW 8 Durga Prasad has clearly stated in his evidence that he wants to start a Readymade shop in the disputed property and it has also come in his evidence that his family is joint consisting of three brothers and 8 adult grand sons and it is a business family. So, no doubt can be entertained that the plaintiffs do not require the disputed property which is situated in the market area for their bona fide personal requirement." 8. From perusal of the findings aforesaid recorded by the appellate court, it is evident that the appellate court has made out a third case in favour of the plaintiff in absence of any pleading to that effect. It is further evident that the appellate court has arrived at a finding merely on conjecture and surmises. It was not disputed by the plaintiff that during the pendency of the suit four different new shops were opened by the plaintiff and the court of appeal below has failed to take into consideration this important piece of evidence in order to arrive at a right conclusion. Although the appellate court has taken notice of fact that at the appellate stage the defendant adduced additional evidences under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC to the effect that four different new shops have been opened by the plaintiff after filing of the suit, which fact was admitted by the plaintiff but the appellate court has not given due consideration to the said fact while deciding the question of personal necessity. It is well settled that whether in a particular situation the need was reasonable or bona fide must be judged from the objective view point and not merely by assertion or denial of the parties. In doing so court should take into cautious consideration all subsequent events. It is well settled that whether in a particular situation the need was reasonable or bona fide must be judged from the objective view point and not merely by assertion or denial of the parties. In doing so court should take into cautious consideration all subsequent events. Reasonableness of the requirement has to be considered with caution and care in the totality of circumstances. In instant case, as noticed above, the suit was filed by the deceased father of the plaintiffs on the ground that the suit premises was required for his own use and occupation for the purpose of son. During the pendency of the suit not only one but four new shop's rooms were constructed and they have been occupied by the plaintiffs for their own purposes. In that view of the matter, the finding of the appellate court that still the plaintiff requires the suit premises by holding the requirement of son includes grand-son is totally unreasonable and unjustified. In my opinion, therefore, the finding arrived at by' the learned lower appellate court on the issue of personal necessity is also perversed in law. 9. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and decree passed by the appellate court is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court is restored. Consequently, the suit is dismissed as against the claim for eviction.