JUDGMENT : S. Sathasivam, J.—The amended prayer in the writ petition is as follows: To issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the first respondent to release the list of sub-staff who have been interviewed pursuant to the advertisement in 'The Hindu', dated August 1, 1988, prepared in 1989 together with list of those in the said list who have been absorbed in the vacancies upto March 31, 1977, i.e., the date on which the said list was prepared in 1989 is stated to have lapsed and to absorb the remaining 13 persons in the annexure, viz., serial Nos. 15, 24, 32, 48, 66, 67, 71, 78, 85, 87, 95 and 97 by placing them in the appropriate position based on the date of initial entry into service. 2. The case of the petitioner-union is briefly stated hereunder. The persons whose names are given in the annexure were employed by the first respondent-bank during the period July 1, 1974 to December 31, 1987 deliberately as temporary sub-staff against permanent vacancies giving periodical breaks and substituting them by others with a view to deny the rights under various labour legislations. Hence they approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. In view of the statement made by the first respondent before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the writ petition, viz., W.P (Civil) No. 542 of 1987 filed before the Supreme Court was dismissed as withdrawn. Though the first respondent called the members of their union for an interview during June/July, 1989 pursuant to the advertisement, dated August 1, 1988, for permanent appointment as sub-staff the results have not been published so far and they have not been given appointments. According to the advertisement, dated August 1, 1988, the select list will be valid till the year 1992. Instead of releasing the select list and making appointments as represented in the advertisement, the first respondent has once again issued another advertisement in 'The Hindu', dated May 1, 1991, calling upon the very same category of employees who had worked during the very same period mentioned in the advertisement, dated August 1, 1988, again for absorption as permanent sub-staff The second advertisement refers to some settlement on October 27, 1988 of which they are not aware of, between the management of State Bank of India and second respondent. Without releasing the list of successful candidates pursuant to the advertisement, dated August 1, 1988, there is no purpose in calling them over again for another interview to fill up future vacancies arising in 1995 and 1996. It is further stated that if the list pursuant to the interview held in June 1989 as per the first advertisement, dated August I, 1988, is released, a number of persons who belong to their union whose names are given in the annexure to the writ petition would have been appointed and they would have been working as permanent sub-staff and there would be absolutely no need to go through the exercise of another interview to be held pursuant to the second advertisement, dated May 1, 1991. The permanent vacancies of sub-staff have been in existence from the year 1972. The first respondent is estopped from going ahead with second advertisement without discharging their obligation under the first advertisement. Having no other effective alternative remedy, the union has approached this Court as stated above. 3. The first respondent has filed a counter-affidavit disputing the various averments made by the petitioner. It is stated that though the persons mentioned in the annexure to the writ petition and many others like them who were engaged by the bank for a few days/few occasions and who did not thereby acquire any right to be considered for permanent appointment in the bank's service, on the representation of the State Bank of India Staff Federation which is the recognized union representing the award staff of the bank, the bank decided to consider the said persons for appointment if and as and when vacancies were to arise in future and accordingly, those qualified in the interviews held for the said purpose were included in a waiting list and those wait listed were being absorbed as and when vacancies arose up to 1994. The second advertisement was made pursuant to the settlement reached between the bank and the second respondent and the petitioner has no right whatsoever to question the same. Those eligible temporary employees could not appear to the interview held in pursuance of the agreement of November 1, 1987 and were pursuing cases thereafter, were given a chance, to appear for interview, so that the then existing panels could be enlarged by way of supplementary panels. Those eligible temporary employees could not appear to the interview held in pursuance of the agreement of November 1, 1987 and were pursuing cases thereafter, were given a chance, to appear for interview, so that the then existing panels could be enlarged by way of supplementary panels. Out of the persons included in the annexure only those who qualified at the interviews were included in the wait list. The persons mentioned in the affidavit did not work in any permanent vacancies. They worked only for a few days on a few occasions and none of them by such engagement for a few days was qualified to permanent absorption. The provisions in the Bipartite Settlement have no application to persons working temporarily in leave vacancies or casual vacancies since they were not working temporarily to permanent vacancies. Only those who had worked for short periods on temporary basis and who responded to the offer for being interviewed and who qualified thereat were wait listed according to their order of merit. They alone were eligible for absorption in the order of merit if and as and when vacancies arose up to a specified period. Those who qualified at the interview have subsequently been offered employment according to the order of merit in the wait list and the allegation that the bank is not justified in not releasing the list of successful candidates is not true. Since all of them were appointed temporarily in leave and casual vacancies, they had no right to be considered for permanent absorption by virtue of such temporary service. 4. In the additional affidavit filed by the first respondent-bank, it is stated that since the questions raised by the petitioner in the writ petition are questions on which detailed investigations will have to be made and documentary and oral evidence recorded which this Court exercising writ jurisdiction will not undertake. Those are claims in respect of which the most appropriate remedy available to the persons making the claims is to invoke the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act by making claims before the Labour Courts/ Industrial Tribunal. It is further stated that the persons listed in the writ petition worked only for very short periods purely on temporary basis in leave and casual vacancies. The seniority was based on the length of temporary service each of them in the Categories A, B and C rendered. It is further stated that the persons listed in the writ petition worked only for very short periods purely on temporary basis in leave and casual vacancies. The seniority was based on the length of temporary service each of them in the Categories A, B and C rendered. All persons, who satisfied the eligibility criteria fixed in accordance with the settlement were included in the wait list in accordance with the length of service put to by them during the period July 1, 1975 to December 31, 1988. The absorption in permanent service was made strictly in the order shown in the panels, excepting candidates belonging to scheduled tribe community and physically handicapped candidates who were given priority over the others with a view to clear the backlog under the quota reserved for them. All those who qualified the eligibility criteria prescribed by the settlements were treated alike and those who qualified at the interview were included in the panels in the order based on the length of service. There was no requirement that the list of persons who qualified at the interviews and whose names were included in panels in the order of merit should be published. However, the panels containing the names were published in the notice boards at the respective zonal offices. The settlement, dated November 17, 1987 entered into between the Management of State Bank of India and the second respondent stood modified by subsequent settlements, dated July 16, 1988, October 17, 1988 and January 9, 1991, before the Regional Labour Commissioner at Hyderabad. The settlement, dated January 17, 1987, was modified by settlement, dated July 16, 1988, and further modified by settlement, dated October 27, 1988, and it is necessary to refer to them when referring to the contents of the settlement, dated November 17, 1987, i.e., to all the 3 settlements, dated November 17, 1987, July 16, 1988 and October 27, 1988, have to be read together and treat them as forming one settlement. The 1987 settlement and the 2 settlements of 1988 related to a single subject-matter, viz., extending chances of permanent appointment in the services of the State Bank of India to those persons who were in categories A, B and C of the settlement, dated November 17, 1988 and October 27, 1988, all of which have to be read together. There was no treatment of unequals as equals as alleged. There was no treatment of unequals as equals as alleged. Those interviewed pursuant to the year 1991 advertisement were treated as a distinct class and none from the said list was given any priority over those in the wait list prepared pursuant to 1989 interview. As regards 103 persons included in the annexure to the writ petition, it was stated that 102 persons were wait listed and that the persons shown in item (28) D. Ramana Babu was not in the list Out of the 102, 91 persons have bean absorbed. The names of the 11 persons who could not be absorbed in service because their names were below the name of the last person absorbed up to March 31, 1997. On scrutiny of the said list, it is seen that A. Soundarajan No. 2 therein has been absorbed in Service and that D.Ramana Kumar No. 12 therein was not one of the persons wait listed. As stated earlier, the remaining 11 persons were not absorbed as their names were below the name of the person(s) who were absorbed before March 31, 1977, the date on which, the wait lists lapsed. The petitioner is not entitled to any relief in respect of the said 11 persons. 5. The writ-petitioner-union filed a reply affidavit reiterating their claim once again. 6. In the light of the above pleadings. I have heard Sri N.G.R. Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri R. Sreekrishnan, learned counsel for the first respondent-bank. 7. Sri N.G.R. Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner, would contend that inasmuch as the persons mentioned in the annexure were appointed as temporary employees by calling for a list from the Employment Exchange, without absorbing them in the vacancies, it is not open to the first respondent to go ahead with the second advertisement, dated May 1, 1991. He also contended that the present action of the first respondent is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. He further contended that inasmuch as the petitioners' fundamental right is violated there is no need to go before the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal and this Court is competent to grant the relief as claimed by the petitioner. He also contended that the present action of the first respondent is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. He further contended that inasmuch as the petitioners' fundamental right is violated there is no need to go before the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal and this Court is competent to grant the relief as claimed by the petitioner. On the other hand, Sri R. Sreekrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent-bank, after demonstrating that in the light of the question that absorption in service was made as per settlement of questions on which detailed investigation will have to be made and oral and documentary evidence recorded which this Court exercising writ jurisdiction will not undertake and the appropriate remedy to the persons making the claim is to invoke the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act by making the claims before the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, accordingly the writ petition is not maintainable. He also contended that the second settlement in the year is in continuation of the first settlement and in view of the fact that the persons mentioned in the annexure to the writ petition could not be absorbed in service because their names were below the name of the last person absorbed up to March 31, 1997 from the relevant zone, even on merits the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 8. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. 9. In view of the contention raised regarding maintainability of the writ petition, first I shall consider the same before going into the merits of the claim made by the petitioners. It is seen from the records that the petitioner-union had filed W.P No. 542 of 1987 on behalf of their members who had worked as sub-staff against permanent vacancies during the year 1972 onwards before the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. It is seen from the records that the petitioner-union had filed W.P No. 542 of 1987 on behalf of their members who had worked as sub-staff against permanent vacancies during the year 1972 onwards before the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. When the matter came up for final hearing before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the year 1987, the first respondent-bank stated that they had already arrived at a settlement, dated November 17, 1987, with the second respondent, the recognised union and according to the settlement all temporary staff who had worked between July 1, 1975 and December 31, 1987 would be called for an interview and a list of successful candidates will be prepared and all permanent vacancies that arise upto 1992 would be filled up from among them. On the basis of the said representation, Supreme Court permitted the writ-petitioner to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to report to other remedies open to the petitioners in law. On the said basis of the assurance before the Supreme Court, the first respondent gave an advertisement in 'The Hindu', dated August 1, 1988, calling for applications from the persons who had worked as temporary sub-staff between the period July 1, 1975 to December 31, 1987 for interview and absorption against permanent vacancies of sub-staff that arose till 1992, The members whose names are given in the Annexure to the writ petition and who had worked as temporary sub-staff during that period applied and they were called for an interview held during June/July 1989. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, though the said members whose names are given in the Annexure have done well in the interview, the first respondent instead of releasing the list of successful candidates who had applied and taken the interview in June/July 1989 for permanent posts and giving them the appointment strangely issued another advertisement in 'The Hindu', dated May 1, 1991. The first respondent, in that advertisement, had invited applications from candidates who had answered the qualification under the first advertisement to apply and the wait list to be prepared is stated to be valid for the vacancies that arise during the years 1995 and 1996. The first respondent, in that advertisement, had invited applications from candidates who had answered the qualification under the first advertisement to apply and the wait list to be prepared is stated to be valid for the vacancies that arise during the years 1995 and 1996. After contending that the first respondent is not justified in not releasing the list of successful candidates pursuant to the advertisement, dated August 1, 1988, and in going for the second advertisement without releasing the earlier list, he has stated that the members have been greatly prejudiced if they had already bean included in the list as per the first advertisement and there is no need for them to apply pursuant to the second advertisement. It is clear from the narration of the facts that it is to be considered whether the 13 persons whom the petitioner-union claimed have not been absorbed in the permanent service of the first respondent-bank were amongst those who had served as temporary or casual sub-staff between the period July 1, 1975 and December 31, 1987. If so, whether they were eligible to be considered in the interview which was agreed to be conducted pursuant to the settlement, dated November 17, 1987, entered between the management of the bank and the second respondent. By pointing out the fact that in order to ascertain and answer the said questions, particularly with regard to the claim made by the petitioner-union on behalf of the persons mentioned therein, the learned counsel for the first respondent-bank contended that on those aspects, a detailed investigation will have to be made and oral/ documentary evidence to be recorded by the appropriate forum, viz., Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner by projecting certain decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court, contended that since the action of the first respondent is violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, this Court is competent to grant the relief by issuing appropriate direction and that there is no need for them to go before the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for such relief. At the foremost, Sri N.G.R Prasad has cited a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of AIR India Vs. Nergesh Meerza and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 335 . At the foremost, Sri N.G.R Prasad has cited a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of AIR India Vs. Nergesh Meerza and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 335 . In that decision, their Lordships have considered certain clauses in the agreement entered into between the management and the union and ultimately found that the provisions for termination and retirement are violative of Article 14 as being unreasonable and arbitrary, the awards or agreements confirmed by the awards would be of no assistance to the Air India Corporation. The following observation is pressed into service by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in AIR India Vs. Nergesh Meerza and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 335 : "75. In view of the authorities indicated above assuming that the two awards are binding on the petitioners, the serious question for consideration is whether the agreement, which may be binding on the parties would estop them from challenging the regulations on the ground that the same are void as being violative of Article 14 or Article 19 of the Constitution. It is well settled that there can be no estoppel against a statute much less against constitutional provisions. If, therefore, we held in agreement with the argument of the petitioners that the provisions for termination and retirement are violative of Article 14 as being unreasonable and arbitrary, the awards or the agreements confirmed by the awards would be of no assistance to the Corporation." It is clear that irrespective of the agreement/settlement which may be binding on the parties, would not estop them from challenging certain clauses on the ground that the same are void as being violative of Article 14 or Article 19 of the-Constitution of India. 10. The other decision referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner is in the case of N. Sundaramony v. State Bank of India, 1973 II LLJ 551 (Mad). In that case, similar contention was raised before the learned Judge that it was open to the petitioner to go before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal and raise an industrial dispute and they are not justified in approaching the writ Court. Rejecting the said contention, K.N. MUDALIAR, J. has concluded in 1973 II LLJ 551 : "23. In that case, similar contention was raised before the learned Judge that it was open to the petitioner to go before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal and raise an industrial dispute and they are not justified in approaching the writ Court. Rejecting the said contention, K.N. MUDALIAR, J. has concluded in 1973 II LLJ 551 : "23. The last argument of the respondent is that it was open to the petitioner to go before the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court and raise an industrial dispute and in law he is not justified in seeking a writ of certiorari from this Court. In my view, the decision in The State of Bombay and Others Vs. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Others, AIR 1960 SC 610 , would be an answer. In the said case, the termination of two respondents was not merely held to be inoperative and void, but the Supreme Court further confirmed the properiety of the writ of mandamus issued by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. When once I hold, as I have done, that the impugned order in Exhibit-A contains the termination order also within the meaning of Section 2(oo) read with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, I have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order is void in law and that the petitioner is justified in maintaining his prayer as he did in this case." The said decision of the learned Judge has been confirmed by the Division Bench as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court with slight modification. 11. The other important decision referred to by Sri N.G.R. Prasad is a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others, (1998) 8 SCC 1 . With regard to the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the alternative remedy available to the parties concerned their Lordships have held as follows: "14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. With regard to the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the alternative remedy available to the parties concerned their Lordships have held as follows: "14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, qua warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for 'any other purpose'", 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in atleast three contingencies, namely, wherein the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order of proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. The above decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court makes it clear that irrespective of availability of alternative remedy in certain cases, the parties can approach this Court for appropriate remedy." 12. In P.R. Ramachandran and Others Vs. Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board and Another, (1996) 1 LLJ 823 , AR. LAKSHMANAN, J. (as he then was) while considering an order of termination of service by the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board, after rejecting the contention advanced on the side of the Board on the ground of availability of alternative remedy, namely, Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal, have concluded thus, in Paras 5 and 6 in P.R. Ramachandran and Others Vs. Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board and Another, (1996) 1 LLJ 823 : "5. Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board and Another, (1996) 1 LLJ 823 : "5. In the instant case the respondents have acted quite contrary to the principles of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and when admittedly the impugned orders were passed in utter violation of the principles of natural justice, this Court should not only come to the aid of the aggrieved party, but it has a duty to do so. 6. In an identical situation RAJU, J. rejected the plea of driving the workman to fora under the Act and held that for non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Act, writ remedy is very much available and directed the workman's reinstatement with back-wages R. Sadasivan v. ONGC, Madras W.P No. 10702 of 1985, dated January 12, 1993. In Para. 11 of his judgment RAJU, J. has held as follows: "The next submission of learned counsel for the respondent requires to be considered is that, whether this Court should itself have undertaken the exercise of adjudicating upon the grievance of the petitioner or that the petitioner should be relegated to his remedies under the Industrial Disputes Act. As noticed supra, in the light of the facts beyond controversy, the legal inference which inevitably followed is that it is a case of retrenchment in violation of the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act and it would be futile to plead to non-suit the petitioner in these proceedings on the ground of the availability of an alternative remedy, particularly when the writ petition has been all along kept pending all these years in this Court after admission, Even that apart, I am of the view that the existence of the alternative remedy is no bar for entertaining a writ petition, when the merits of the case warrant interference in the exercise of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India". The said decision of RAJU, J., was also confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 1161 of 1993, dated January 31, 1994, and the SLP filed against the Division Bench judgment Writ Appeal No. 1161 of 1993 was also dismissed by the Apex Court. As seen already, the respondents have unceremoniously terminated the services of the petitioners who have put in more than 240 days of work, at the time of their termination. As seen already, the respondents have unceremoniously terminated the services of the petitioners who have put in more than 240 days of work, at the time of their termination. Termination of an employment is deprivation of livelihood and deprivation of livelihood would amount to deprivation of liberty. Hence, any termination without following the procedure established by rule of law would violate Article 21 of the Constitution of India......." All the above decisions clearly show that irrespective of availability of alternative remedy in certain circumstances, as observed by their Lordships in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (supra), the aggrieved person can approach this Court for appropriate relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. Sri Sreekrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent-bank, after pointing out certain factual details from the counter-affidavit and relying on a Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court rendered in Writ Appeal No. 86 of 1998. etc., batch dated May 1, 1998, (State Bank of India v. M. Jajaiah and Ors.), contended that the proper remedy for the petitioner-union is to approach the concerned Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal, accordingly the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. No doubt, similar question has been considered by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the said decision. After discussing the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and after holding that it requires more evidence in the form of oral and documentary, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh allowed all the appeals filed by the bank and dismissed the writ petitions filed by the workmen. In the light of the submission made by the learned counsel for the bank, I have carefully perused the Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court initially a learned single Judge while accepting the claim made by the workmen/ contract labourers granted necessary relief in favour of them. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned single Judge, the State Bank of India filed appeals before the Division Bench. The Division Bench while accepting the claim of the bank, dismissed all the writ petitions with a direction to seek relief for their grievance in the appropriate forum under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned single Judge, the State Bank of India filed appeals before the Division Bench. The Division Bench while accepting the claim of the bank, dismissed all the writ petitions with a direction to seek relief for their grievance in the appropriate forum under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. One distinguishable aspect in the Andhra Pradesh decision is that the writ petitions which were filed in the year 1997 and writ appeals in the year 1998 were disposed of immediately after notice to the respondents, namely, on the said years. Here in our case, the writ petition filed on May 27, 1991, was entertained and admitted on May 28, 1991 and the same was kept pending for more than eight years. In such a circumstance I am of the view that issuance of a direction to the parties to adopt the alternative remedy may not be a justifiable one. As rightly contended, even though this Court has granted interim injunction even on May 28, 1991, no effective steps have been taken either to get the interim order vacated or for early disposal of the writ petition; hence I am of the view that the matter has to be disposed of on merits. 14. It is seen from the first settlement, dated November 17, 1987, entered into between the first respondent-bank and the second respondent-union, the persons who had worked temporarily in permanent vacancies are given preference when the vacancies are filled up permanently. Further, as per the settlement, the vacancies have to be filled up within three months. The grievance of the petitioner-union is that the first respondent-bank instead of complying with the terms of settlement, continued to engage persons including the members of their union on temporary basis and when they were about to complete 90 days, a new batch was brought in. Further, it is clear from the first settlement that all the staff who had worked between July 1 and December 31, 1987 would be called for an interview and a list of successful candidates will be prepared and all permanent vacancies that arise up to 1992 would be filled up from among them. Further, it is clear from the first settlement that all the staff who had worked between July 1 and December 31, 1987 would be called for an interview and a list of successful candidates will be prepared and all permanent vacancies that arise up to 1992 would be filled up from among them. Only on the basis of the said representation, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition, viz., W. P No. 542 of 1987 filed by the petitioner workman as withdrawn with liberty to resort to other remedies open to them in law. 15. It is further seen that in pursuance of the first settlement, the first respondent gave an advertisement in 'The Hindu', dated August 1, 1988, calling for applications from the persons who had worked as temporary sub-staff between the period July 1, 1975 and December 31, 1987 to be interviewed and absorbed against permanent vacancies of sub-staff that will arise till 1992. The persons mentioned in the Annexure to the writ petition who had worked as temporary sub-staff during the relevant period applied. According to them, they were called for the interview held during June/July, 1989. The main grievance of those persons is that instead of releasing the list of successful candidates who had applied and taken the interview in June/July, 1989 for permanent posts and giving them appointment, the first respondent had issued another advertisement in 'The Hindu', dated May 1, 1991. Through the said advertisement, the first respondent had invited applications from the candidates who had answered the qualification under the first advertisement to apply and the wait list to be prepared is stated to be valid for the vacancies that arise during the years 1995 and 1996. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, there is no reference with regard to the interview held based on the first advertisement, dated August 1, 1988. Had the first respondent released the list of successful candidates, the persons mentioned in the annexure may not have any grievance. Admittedly the first respondent did not release the list of successful candidates. On the other hand the learned counsel for the bank maintained that there is no need to release/publish the list of persons selected in pursuance of the advertisement, dated August 1, 1988. Admittedly the first respondent did not release the list of successful candidates. On the other hand the learned counsel for the bank maintained that there is no need to release/publish the list of persons selected in pursuance of the advertisement, dated August 1, 1988. In that regard, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, namely, the first respondent cannot ask the persons who had qualified in the earlier interview held in June/July, pursuant to the advertisement dated August 1, 1988, to apply for second time pursuant to the advertisement dated, May 1, 1991, without making known to them the result of the interview held based on the advertisement, dated August 1, 1988, is highly arbitrary and in violation of Arts. 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India is well formulated. It is brought to my notice that in a similar writ petition filed in the Kerala High Court, by a judgment, dated August 16, 1990 in O.P No. 2596 of 1990, the first respondent was directed to publish the select list of candidates found suitable for the post of messenger pursuant to the interview held on July 10, 1989 on the basis of the advertisement, dated September 1, 1988, and consider the petitioner therein for appointment depending upon the rank he secured at the interview. In fairness as rightly directed by the Kerala High Court, the first respondent ought to have prepared a list based on seniority taking into consideration the date of first entry into service who were all found suitable. Likewise they have also not disclosed the names of persons who were given permanent appointment out of the list of the wait listed candidates. It is also clear that 1988 Settlement, did not replace 1987 Settlement and it is only a supplement to the 1987 Settlement. It is also clear that the 1987 Settlement was concerned with the temporary Class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipatriate Settlement, while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wages in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended, the respondents are not justified in combining the list of candidates covered under 1987 Settlement and 1988 Settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes. In such circumstances, as rightly contended, the respondents are not justified in combining the list of candidates covered under 1987 Settlement and 1988 Settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes. They cannot treat one class (sic) and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Further a persual of the advertisement, dated May 1, 1991, shows that it refers only to daily wagers and there is no reference to persons like those included in the annexure to the writ petition who were covered under 1987 Settlement Accordingly I hold that there is no justification for denying permanent appointment to persons listed in the annexure to the writ petition who were invited in 1989 and included in the wait list, more particularly in the absence of any publication of selected persons. Moreover, without exhausting the wait list candidates interviewed in the year 1989, the first respondent is not justified in considering the juniors in the year 1991. Denial of employment to seniors while engaging the juniors would amount to illegal termination of employment even though their employment is temporary in nature. Though the first respondent has filed a counter-affidavit and additional counter-affidavit, no details have been furnished therein with regard to the persons mentioned in the annexure, namely, their initial appointment, period of service and date of termination, etc. Even if it is stated that the persons listed therein had worked only short periods purely on temporary basis in leave or casual vacancies, in the light of the various clauses in the first settlement and of the fact that those persons were appointed through Employment Exchange, they cannot be left out even without intimating their position. 16. Under these circumstances, I am satisfied that there is justification in the claim of the petitioner-union in respect of the persons mentioned m the annexure to the writ petition. 16. Under these circumstances, I am satisfied that there is justification in the claim of the petitioner-union in respect of the persons mentioned m the annexure to the writ petition. Accordingly, there shall be a direction to the first respondent to release the list of sub-staff who had been interviewed pursuant to the advertisement in The Hindu, dated August 1, 1988, prepared in 1989 together with list of those in the said list who had been absorbed in the vacancies up to March 31, 1997 and consider the claim of the persons mentioned in the annexure to the writ petition for absorption depending upon the rank they secured at the interview and place them in the appropriate position. Writ petition is allowed to the extent mentioned above. No costs. Interim injunction petition is closed.