JUDGMENT SURINDER SARUP —This is a tenant’s revision against the order of the Rent Controller, affirmed in appeal by the Appellate Authority, whereby on the eviction petition filed by the landlord-respondent, eviction has been ordered from the shop in dispute on the ground that the petitioner ceased to occupy the same for a continuous period of more than 12 months without reasonable cause as envisaged under Section 14 (2) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter to be called "the Act"). 2. The facts, as contained in the judgment of the Appellate Authority, Una, 4ated 3.10.1997 are that the shop in question, situated near the old Civil Hospital Main Bazar, Una, was owned by one Smt. Raj Kaur before the year 1985, having been constructed in the year 1970. The said Raj Kaur had inducted the petitioner as a tenant, but in 1985 she had sold the shop to the respondent who, thus, stepped into her shoes as landlord. The rent of the same was Rs. 150/- per month liable to be paid by the petitioner to the respondent. The latter filed eviction petition on the ground that the petitioner has ceased to occupy the shop for a continuous period of more than 12 months immediately prior to the filing of the eviction petition, without any reasonable cause. It was pleaded in the eviction petition that the petitioner had locked the shop in dispute and shifted his business to another shop situated in the same locality. This he had done about seven years prior to the filing of the eviction petition. On account of this Act of the petitioner, the value and utility of the shop in dispute was being impaired, as per the pleadings in the eviction petition. 3. In the reply filed by the petitioner to the eviction petition he denied that he had locked the shop in dispute, as alleged, and stated that he is running his business of selling cloth there. On account of heavy losses suffered by him in his business prior to the filing of the eviction petition, he had started doing his business of selling cloth as a hawker. For this reason he did not utilise the shop in dispute regularly and continuously, but he had not ceased to occupy it. 4. After rejoinder by the landlord-respondent, the Rent Controller framed the following Issues : 1. For this reason he did not utilise the shop in dispute regularly and continuously, but he had not ceased to occupy it. 4. After rejoinder by the landlord-respondent, the Rent Controller framed the following Issues : 1. Whether the respondent ceased to occupy the shop in dispute for a continuous period of more than 12 months? OPA 2. Whether the value and utility of the shop has been impaired materially by the respondent, as alleged? OPP 3. Relief. 5. Issue No. 2 was not pressed, while finding under Issue No. 1 was returned against the petitioner holding that he had ceased to occupy the shop in dispute within the legal meaning contained in the Act. As a result the Rent Controller, Court No. 2, Una, by his judgment dated 30th May, 1996, directed the petitioner to handover the vacant possession of the shop in dispute to the respondent. Having failed to get the same reversed in appeal, the petitioner-tenant has come to this Court in revision. 6. In proceedings before the Rent Controller the respondent examined himself as PW-1 and deposed that the petitioner was doing the business of cloth merchant in the shop in dispute upto 1987. Thereafter, he had closed the same. It was also stated by him that the petitioner is running another shop near Nangal Mor, which is owned by one Yadvinder Singh. PW-2, Surinder Kumar Gupta, Inspector Weights and Measurements Department, Una, stated that there is no entry in the record showing the name of the shop in dispute for the last five years. According to him, under the law, measurement rod of a person doing the business of selling cloth must be verified annually through his department. PW-2 was examined as a witness in proceedings before the Rent Controller in 1994. PW-3, Khushi Ram Shop Inspector produced the record relating to the business of the name and style of New Bombay Cloth House and stated that it was registered on 11.7.1980. According to him, registration is required to be renewed each year, and the petitioner had renewed the registration upto 1986 only, and there was no record regarding renewal thereafter from 1987 to January 1993. According to him, registration is required to be renewed each year, and the petitioner had renewed the registration upto 1986 only, and there was no record regarding renewal thereafter from 1987 to January 1993. This witness also stated that the petitioner had applied for renewal of registration on 27.1.1993, which was just four days prior to the filing of the eviction petition in the present case, the same having been filed on 1st February, 1993, as per the records. According to PW-3, the registration of the shop was done retrospectively with effect from 1987 till 1992. 7. PW-4, Surjit Singh Draughtsman prepared the site plan of the shop in dispute Ex. PW-4/A on 19.1.1993. PW-5, Charanjit, Clerk of HPSEB Sub-Division No. 1, Una, produced the record of Meter No. UB-760 C. He stated that the meter was originally installed in the name of Raj Kaur in 1972 as a Commercial meter. According to him, as per the record the meter reading in May 1990 was 5640 units. This witness further stated that, as per record, the Meter Reader had visited the shop in dispute in the months of July, October and December 1990 as well as February, April, July and October 1991 also off and on upto January 1993. On all such occasions the premises was found locked. In March 1993 when the Meter Reader visited the shop in dispute, the reading was the same as in May 1990, namely, 5640 units. 8. The petitioner appeared in support of his own case as RW-1 and stated that he had paid rent upto 31st December, 1992, and that the rent was being accepted by the respondent regularly. As per his version ac RW-1, due to his mothers illness his business had started declining, therefore, he resorted to sell old clothes as a hawker. When he was not doing this work, he used to sit along with his wife in another shop. According to him, he had been regularly opening the shop in dispute where his wife and other family members used to be present. 9. The petitioner also examined Naresh Kumar (RW-2) who stated that the petitioner had not permanently ceased to occupy the shop in dispute. RW-3, P.N. Sachdeva, Advocate, had sent a notice, copy of which is Ex. R-20, and the envelope in which that notice was sent is Ex. R-2 1. 9. The petitioner also examined Naresh Kumar (RW-2) who stated that the petitioner had not permanently ceased to occupy the shop in dispute. RW-3, P.N. Sachdeva, Advocate, had sent a notice, copy of which is Ex. R-20, and the envelope in which that notice was sent is Ex. R-2 1. This notice was sent on the instructions of Yadvinder Singh (PW-2). RW-4, Kimat Lai has merely stated the fact that due to the illness of his mother the petitioner was selling cloth by hawking, in other words he has reiterated what the petitioner has deposed as RW-1. 10. On appreciation of above evidence, along with the documentary evidence on the record, both the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority have come to the conclusion that the petitioner has not been able to satisfactorily explain why he had rented another shop at Nangal Mor and also why there was non-consumption of electricity in respect of the shop in dispute. In this connection reference may be made to para 17 of the order of the Rent Controller. Similarly, the Appellate Authority has also come to the conclusion that had the petitioner transacted his business from the shop in dispute, there should have been consumption of electricity. This, however, is belied by the evidence produced by the landlord (respondent), namely, the statement of Charanjit (PW-5), according to him, the reading in the electric meter installed there remained steady at 5640 units right from May 1990 till March 1993. 11. Another circumstance which has been stressed by the Appellate Authority in paragraph 26 of its impugned order is the non-production of the accounts books or any voucher or bill even by the petitioner showing that he had transacted business from the shop in dispute. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has taken this Court through the evidence of the parties and has submitted that in the eviction petition the period during which the shop in dispute was lying locked has not been stated. But this argument is untenable inasmuch as in para 18 of the eviction petition containing the grounds it is categorically stated that the tenant has ceased to occupy the shop in dispute for a continuous period of more than 12 months i.e. for the last about more than seven years without any reasonable cause. But this argument is untenable inasmuch as in para 18 of the eviction petition containing the grounds it is categorically stated that the tenant has ceased to occupy the shop in dispute for a continuous period of more than 12 months i.e. for the last about more than seven years without any reasonable cause. It is also stated that the shop in dispute is locked and no business is being run by the petitioner. 12. Apart from the above submissions, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has cited case law which may briefly be analysed as regards its application to the facts of the present case. In the case of M/s. Babu Ram Ram Gopal v. Mathura Dass and others (1990 (2) Rent Law Reporter 80 (SC), it has been laid down that the non-occupation of the premises by the tenant must continue till the date of the filing of the eviction petition. That test has been satisfied in the present case as would be apparent from the pleadings and evidence referred to and discussed above. 13. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has then placed reliance on the case of Ajit Singh v. Bhupinder Singh Khosla and others (1992 (2) RLR 227) (Punjab & Haryana High Court), which is to the same effect i.e. that it must be proved that the tenant ceased to occupy the premises upto the date of filing of the ejectment petition, which is the case here. 14. The next authority cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is Arjan Dass and others v. Krishan Kumar (1991 (1) RLR 102). On the facts of that case it was held that the evidence produced by the tenant had established that the premises never remained closed but remained open, and on that ground order of eviction was set aside by the Punjab 85 Haryana High Court, which is not the case here. Another ruling relied upon is a case from the Gujarat High Court reported in 1987 (2) RLR 7 (Shah Ochhavalal Motilal v. Kansara Dhanlaxmi Becharlalj. That is to the effect that onus to prove non-user of the premises is on the landlord, who cannot succeed on the weakness of the tenant. It is manifest that this authority is also distinguishable on the facts of the present case. That is to the effect that onus to prove non-user of the premises is on the landlord, who cannot succeed on the weakness of the tenant. It is manifest that this authority is also distinguishable on the facts of the present case. Lastly, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has greatly relied on a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Sohan Lal and another v. Gurbachan Singh (1989 (2) RLR 304). On the facts of that case it was held that mere non-consumption of electricity was not sufficient to hold that the tenant had ceased to occupy the premises in dispute. A perusal of the said report indicates that the facts therein were that the Meter Reader had been going and recording the meter reading from time to time and that it was nowhere stated by him that the shop in dispute in that case was found closed. However, in the present case it has been stated categorically by PW-5 that the Meter Reader had visited the shop in dispute on various occasions and had found the premises to be locked. Therefore, this ruling also is of no avail. 15. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the landlord/ respondent has cited a number of authorities to the effect that while exercising revisional jurisdiction in cases of this type relating to Urban Rent Control, the High Court cannot act as a third Appellate Court and is not entitled to reverse concurrent findings of fact. For this proposition he has cited the case of Shiv Lal v. Sat Prakash and another (MR 1993 SC 275). In Rukmini Amma Saradammav. Kallyani Sulochana and others, (1993) 1 SCC 499, the Apex Court has laid down that the revisional Court has no jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence. 16. In K.A. Anthappai v. C. Ahammed, (1992) 3 SCC 277, the Apex Court has laid down as follows : "Though the scope of the revisional jurisdiction conferred under Section 20 is wider than that conferred under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, but a revision under Section 20 cannot be equated with an appeal. Moreover, the revisional power conferred under Section 20 also embraces an order passed by the appellate authority. Moreover, the revisional power conferred under Section 20 also embraces an order passed by the appellate authority. The power conferred on the High Court is essentially a power of superintendence and despite the wide language employed, the High Court should not interfere with the findings of fact of the subordinate authority merely because it does not agree with the said findings. The revisional Court must be reluctant to embark upon an independent reassessment of the evidence and to supplant a conclusion of its own, so long as the evidence on record admitted of and supported the one reached by the Court below." Section 20 ibid is of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. 17. In the case of Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh, (1995) 4 SCC 201, the Apex Court while interpreting the provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, laid down that it does not provide a second appeal against the order passed in appeal by the Appellate Authority, but it makes a provision for revision to the High Court against any order passed or proceedings taken under the said Act. But in the case or revision whatever powers the revisional authority may have, it has no power to reassess and reappreciate the evidence unless the statute expressly confers on it that power, that limitation being implicit in the concept of revision. 18. Applying the ratio of the Supreme Court rulings cited by the learned Counsel for the respondent and referred to above, to the facts of the present case, it would be seen that both the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority, have on a correct appreciation of the evidence on the record come to the conclusion that the petitioner being a tenant had ceased to occupy the shop in dispute for a continuous period of more than 12 months without reasonable cause as provided under Section 14 (2)(v) of the Act. Thus, the revisional power of this Court cannot be exercised to reappraise the evidence, in view of the concurrent findings arrived at by both the Courts below. The revisional power of this Court under Section 24 (5) of the Act is pan materiawith the corresponding provisions of the Urban Rent Control Law of the neighbouring States of Punjab and Haryana. Thus, the revisional power of this Court cannot be exercised to reappraise the evidence, in view of the concurrent findings arrived at by both the Courts below. The revisional power of this Court under Section 24 (5) of the Act is pan materiawith the corresponding provisions of the Urban Rent Control Law of the neighbouring States of Punjab and Haryana. In these circumstances the rulings cited by the learned Counsel for the respondent and referred to above apply with full force to the facts of the present case and consequently no ground whatsoever has been made out for interference against the impugned order of the two Courts below. 19. For the reasons recorded above, this revision fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Revision dismissed.