JUDGMENT - F.I. REBELLO, J.:---Petitioner, nephew of the deceased Shri Kakasaheb Baburao Karande has moved this petition for revocation of order dated 16th June, 1999 insofar as contents of Locker No. 604 and S.B. Account No. 014898 in the Central Bank of India, Tardeo Branch, Ground Floor, Matru Mandir, 278, Jaojee Dadaji Road, Mumbai -400 007 and for a further declaration that the applicant in the present Misc. Petition is entitled to get a letter of Administration as nominee in respect of the said contents of the locker and S.B. Account as mentioned above. The said petition has been opposed by the grantee i.e. Smt. Sharda Kakasaheb Karande, respondent No. 1. 2. The prayers sought for are restricted in character. The revocation is sought only in respect of the locker and the S.B. Account. There is no revocation sought in respect of the entire Letters of Administration granted in favour of respondent No. 1. In support of his contention it is the plea of the petitioner that he was validly nominated as a nominee both in respect of the contents of the Locker as also the S.B. Account. In view of the section 45-ZA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the petitioner, it is contended, would be entitled as a nominee to receive the contents of the locker as also the amounts standing in the S.B. Account to the exclusion of all others including any person pursuant to any disposition of property whether testamentary or otherwise. In these circumstances it is contended that the Letters of Administration granted in favour of the respondent No. 1 to the extent as prayed for must be set aside and consequently the declaration as prayed in prayer Clause (b) ought to be granted. 3. On the other hand on behalf of the respondent No. 1, it is contended that, there was no duty cast on the respondent No. 1 to serve the citation on the petitioner herein, considering Rule 376 of the Original Side Rules read with Form 103 and Rule 397 of the Original Side Rules. It is further contended that insofar as the nominee is concerned he merely holds the estate in favour of the real owners, who would be entitled to the estate. It is further contended that insofar as the nominee is concerned he merely holds the estate in favour of the real owners, who would be entitled to the estate. In support of the contention learned Counsel relies on the judgment in the case of (G.L. Bhatia v. Union of India and another)1, 1999(5) S.C.C. 237 and another judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of (Vidya Lachhmandas Khanchandani and another v. Vishin N. Khanchadani and another)2, 1999(4) Bom.C.R. 297 . 4. Having considered the arguments advanced at the bar the two issues that will arise are (1) whether the respondent No. 1 was bound to serve notice on the petitioner and (2) whether considering the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 it is the petitioner and petitioner alone who was nominee and who is entitled to receive the contents of the locker and the proceeds of the S.B. Account. 5. Insofar as who can apply for revocation to my mind is no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Privy Council in the case of (Sarala Sundari Dassya v. Dinabandhu Roy)3, 47 Bom.L.R. 571. The Privy Council has held that any person who will be affected by the grant of Probate or Letters of Administration would have a right to move the Court. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the petitioner is not a person who would not be entitled to move the Court. It is true that considering Rule 376 read with Form 103 and Rule 397 of the Original Side Rules the respondent No. 1 need not have cited the petitioner as the petitioner was not falling in the category of persons who would be the legal heirs of the deceased. To that extent the respondent No. 1 cannot be faulted, but as stated earlier the petitioner herein would still have a right as a person interested to apply to this Court. However, it is not as if merely on the petition being moved at the instance of a person who has an interest that the Court must ipso facto set aside the order. However, it is not as if merely on the petition being moved at the instance of a person who has an interest that the Court must ipso facto set aside the order. The Apex Court in the matter of (Anil Behari Ghosh v. Latika Bala Dassi and others)4, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 566 has held that the Court must look into the circumstances and the justice of the matter to find out whether just cause has been made out by the petitioner for revocation of the grant of succession certificate. In the case of (Asber Reuben Samson and others v. Ellah Solomon and others)5, A.I.R. 1991 Bom. 148 a learned Single Judge has adopted the said view. In other words it is not as if the questions have to be left to be decided only after revocation of the order. The Court has powers to consider whether in the circumstances it would be just and proper that the Letters of Administration should be revoked. Having said so I am clearly of the opinion that though the respondent was not duty bound to serve the citation on the petitioner, nevertheless the petitioner is entitled to move for revocation of the probate/letters of administration, subject to showing just cause. 6. The question No. 2 as framed as whether the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 would prevail over the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 or the rights of the legal heirs to the estate of the deceased. It is no doubt true that the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 are a special enactment. However, the Court must consider whether the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 by implication create a right in a nominee to the exclusion of those who are entitled to the estate of the deceased in other words the legal heirs when the deceased died intestate. The Banking Regulation Act only provides for the manner in which a Bank has to conduct its affairs in respect of a deposit held by it on the death of the depositor. This is in order to avoid confusion in the conduct of business. Section 45-ZA does not exclude or bar the persons entitled to the estate from claiming from the nominee. Sub-section (2) of section 45-ZA by itself makes it clear that, that right would be till the nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner. This is in order to avoid confusion in the conduct of business. Section 45-ZA does not exclude or bar the persons entitled to the estate from claiming from the nominee. Sub-section (2) of section 45-ZA by itself makes it clear that, that right would be till the nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner. In other words till such time, the nominee holds the property on behalf of the estate. He does not become the owner of the estate. To my mind the issue is no longer res integra in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of (Smt. Sarbati Devi and another v. Smt. Usha Devi)6, 1984(1) S.C.C. 424 . In that case a similar issue arose as to whether it is the nominee who will be entitled to receive the moneys from a L.I.C. policy to the exclusion of the Legal Representatives. The Apex Court after considering the law held that the nominee was merely holding the money on behalf of the estate and was duty bound to give it to those who were in law so entitled to. In the case of G.L. Bhatia v. Union of India (supra) the question before the Apex Court was whether a person who was not nominated as a nominee was entitled to family pension. In that case the husband who was not nominated applied on the death of his wife for benefits. Apex Court observed that it is well settled that rights of the parties are governed by statutory provisions and that individual nomination contrary to the statute will not operate. In that case what was under consideration was the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of G.L. Bhatia (supra) has been followed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Vidya Lachhamandas Khanchandani (supra). 7. Even otherwise, I am clearly of the opinion that in law unless there is a specific provision whereby the nominee becomes the owner or is entitled to hold the property to the exclusion of the Legal Representatives it is the Legal Representatives who are entitled to the estate. As such the Legal Representatives will be entitled to the deposit or moneys or property lying in custody with the bank after considering provisions of section 45-ZA. As such the Legal Representatives will be entitled to the deposit or moneys or property lying in custody with the bank after considering provisions of section 45-ZA. As pointed out the provisions like section 45-ZA are provisions to enable the bank to disburse the proceeds on the death of the principal, in favour of the nominee. This is in order to avoid conflict and avoid hardship. However, section 45-ZA makes it clear that this is subject to orders that may be obtained. That being the object of the section I am clearly of the opinion that it is the legal representatives of the deceased who would be entitled to the moneys in the account as also the proceeds of the lockers subject to whatever requirements that are required to be complied with under the Arms Act. 8. If that, be so, it is the respondent No. 1 who is entitled to the proceeds of the locker and the amount in the account. There is in fact no serious challenge to the respondent No. 1 being the legally wedded wife of the deceased. Even otherwise from the documentary evidence produced on record by the respondent No. 1 there can be no doubt that the marriage of respondent No. 1 with the deceased was subsisting. There is nothing on record to show that the marriage which was solemnised in the year 1961 was dissolved in the manner provided by the provisions of Hindu Divorce Act. In the light of that presumption must be held in favour of the respondent No. 1 that the marriage was subsisting. The documentary evidence on record would support such a presumption. No arguments were also advanced at the bar to contend that the marriage between the deceased and the respondent No. 1 was not subsisting. 8-A. Considering the above, though the petitioner has made out a case to show that he is interested person considering the facts and circumstances I am of the opinion that the petitioner has not shown just cause and as such it would not be a fit case where the order should be recalled or revoked. 9. Considering the above, miscellaneous petition dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. 10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner seeks stay of the order. 9. Considering the above, miscellaneous petition dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. 10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner seeks stay of the order. The interim order granted earlier to continue for a further period of 4 weeks from today. Certified copy expedited. Petition dismissed. -----