JUDGMENT Dipak Misra, J. 1. This is an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') assailing the correctness of a decision of the Learned IVth Additional District Judge, Bhopal in a reference under Section 18 of the Act. 2. Under a notification dated 23-12-1962 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act land comprising of Khasras Nos. 870, 871, 872, 873 and 1623/873 in possession of the respondent-claimant was acquired by the State Government for building of certain residential houses. The Land Acquisition Officer fixed the market value at the rate of Rs. 450/- per acre and awarded a sum of Rs. 15,000/- as compensation for the land and Rs. 6,600/- for trees standing thereon. Being dissatisfied with the determination made by the Land Acquisition Officer the claimant sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act which was duly made by the Land Acquisition Officer. Before the Civil Court the respondent filed a statement of claim alleging that the land in question had potential value as a building site and the market value per square yard was Rs. 4/- at the time of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act. The claimant also claimed certain amount on account of levelling and improvement of land. Initially the learned IIIrd Additional District Judge, Bhopal by order dated 31-7-1969 rejected the prayer for enhancement on the ground that no case had been made out. The claimant preferred First Appeal No. 82/69 whereby this Court allowed the appeal and directed the reference Court to decide the matter afresh on the basis of the market value prevailing on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act. After the matter was remanded the reference Court took up the matter afresh for adjudication. Evidence was adduced by both the parties whereupon the learned Additional District Judge found the market value of land to be Rs. 2/- per sq. ft. and awarded compensation at that rate. The reference Court also awarded interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum and 15 per cent as compensation for compulsory acquisition. The State feeling aggrieved by the said determination preferred First Appeal No. 141/80 before this Court. In appeal the State filed an application for amendment of its reply filed before the reference Court. The reference Court also awarded interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum and 15 per cent as compensation for compulsory acquisition. The State feeling aggrieved by the said determination preferred First Appeal No. 141/80 before this Court. In appeal the State filed an application for amendment of its reply filed before the reference Court. Another application was filed seeking permission to file documents to throw light upon the character of the right of the claimant over the disputed land. It was putforth before this Court in the First Appeal that the respondent is only a licensee or at best a lessee and it is that right alone for which the compensation has to be ascertained. This Court partially allowed the application for amendment and permitted two additional pleas to be raised by the State Government. It also allowed the application for taking additional evidence on record. In essence, this Court entertained the defence of the State that the right of the claimant over the land in question requires to be determined as that would be the essential factor for determination of compensation. As this Court permitted the pleas to be raised, it was thought appropriate to remand the matter. For clarity it is apposite to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment passed by this Court while remanding the matter :- "3. Since the plea which we have permitted to be raised by the appellant by an amendment goes to the root of the matter and relates to the claimant's right in the land acquired, the matter has to go back to the Additional District Judge for first determining the right of the claimant in the land and then to determine the market value of those rights on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act. Shri Nihalani, learned counsel for the respondent, however, argued that this Court may retain the seisin and direct enquiry by the Additional District Judge after framing issue. We feel that it is not feasible to adopt such a course in the present case. This is so because the claimant has practically adduced no evidence in support of his claim for the value of the land. In order to arrive at the market value of the land, the learned Additional District Judge has taken into consideration the evidence of Balwant Singh (A.W. 3) and Shyamlal (A.W. 4). This is so because the claimant has practically adduced no evidence in support of his claim for the value of the land. In order to arrive at the market value of the land, the learned Additional District Judge has taken into consideration the evidence of Balwant Singh (A.W. 3) and Shyamlal (A.W. 4). We have gone through the depositions of these witnesses. They hardly afford any basis to determine the market value of the land. The claimant shall have to adduce evidence and place before the Court adequate material establishing his right in the lands and the market value of those rights. He will also be required to plead such right under the manner in which the right has been acquired. This only means that there shall have to be fresh pleadings, fresh evidence and, therefore, a fresh decision. Under these circumstances, the only proper course is to set aside the award and send back the entire case to the Additional District Judge for passing fresh award. 5. It will not be out of place to observe that while determining compensation of the land in question treating it to have a potential value as a building site, regard must be had to the town planning schemes under which nearly 30 to 40 per cent of the land has to be set apart for the purpose of roads, sewage, schools etc. In the impugned award, this aspect has been overlooked. 6. The appeal is allowed and the impugned award is set aside. The case shall go back to the IVth Additional District Judge, Bhopal who shall give the claimant an opportunity to amend its claim petition and to file documents if so desired. Fresh issues, if necessary shall be framed. Thereafter, the parties be given opportunity to adduce such oral evidence as they may like. A fresh award be thereafter made in the light of observations made above. The cross objection is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs of this appeal or the cross objection." 3. After the matter was remanded the parties adduced further evidence before the reference Court. One Awadhnarayan who was working in the office of the Director Land Records was examined as DW. 1. According to him the draft-agreement, Ex.P-4, was executed between the Commissioner, Bhopal and the claimants. He has also proved that Ex. After the matter was remanded the parties adduced further evidence before the reference Court. One Awadhnarayan who was working in the office of the Director Land Records was examined as DW. 1. According to him the draft-agreement, Ex.P-4, was executed between the Commissioner, Bhopal and the claimants. He has also proved that Ex. P-l, the letter dated 17-9-1953 which was sent by the claimant to the Director Land Records. The State Government also brought number of documents on record. The said witness admitted that the land in question was taken for the claimant and compensation was paid by the claimant. According to him no lease-deed was executed between the parties. One J. P. Shrivastava was examined as DW. 2 who could not state that whether the land belongs to the State Government or not. As there was dispute with regard to the contents of Ex. P-l 1 and 13 a report from the expert was called for, who has indicated that in Ex. P-l1 the words "realised from you" were typed later on at a different point of time. The expert was also examined as DW. 3. Controverting the aforesaid evidence adduced before the reference Court on behalf of the State Government the claimant examined Abdul Rahuf Khan as PW. 3 who had stated that their firm was the owner of the land and it was given to them for Bone Mill Factory in the year 1950 for which they had paid Rs. 1,669/- towards compensation and that was the sale price of the land. He had proved that the direction under Ex.P-7 whereby the State Government had required the firm to pay the compensation and stated with regard to the receipt of the compensation amount. 4. The reference Court on the evaluation of the material on record came to hold that there was no material on record that the claimant is a licensee. He has also opined that had the claimant been a licensee then in the reference order as well as in the other documents the firm would not have been described as owner. Being of this view he accepted the firm as the owner of the land and proceeded to determine the amount of compensation. On a scrutiny of the evidence brought on record he determined the market value at Rs. 21- per sq. ft. and accepted the price of the standing trees at Rs. 6,600/-. Being of this view he accepted the firm as the owner of the land and proceeded to determine the amount of compensation. On a scrutiny of the evidence brought on record he determined the market value at Rs. 21- per sq. ft. and accepted the price of the standing trees at Rs. 6,600/-. Thus, he determined and fixed the total compensation at Rs. 16,91,742/- and granted other statutory benefits. 5. Assailing the award Mr. P. D. Gupta, learned Government Advocate has contended that the reference Court has failed to appreciate the import of the judgment passed by this Court in First Appeal No. 141/80 wherein this Court had directed that the learned Additional District Judge shall determine the right of the claimant in the land, and thereafter, determine the market value of that right. But the reference Court in a cryptic manner has dealt with this aspect and come to the conclusion that the claimants are the owners of land in question. It is his further submission that the reference Court has inferred the title in favour of the claimant on the ground that the State had initially stated the claimant to be the owner of the land though this aspect was put to rest by the earlier judgment. It is also canvassed by Mr. Gupta that there was no relationship of lessor and lessee between the claimant and the State Government as amount of premium was not paid by the claimant and there is interpolation in the documents, and hence no compensation is payable. Alternatively, it is proponed by the learned Government Advocate that even if the documents are accepted it would amount to a lease hold right of the claimant for which the determination of compensation has to be different. He has also seriously criticised the manner and method in which the reference Court has determined the quantum of compensation. 6. Controverting the aforesaid submissions it is contended by Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned counsel for the respondent that the scope of reference and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 18 is limited and of a special nature and the reference Court cannot get into the controversy relating to title. It is also canvassed by him that the reference Court cannot travel beyond the scope of reference made under Section 18 of the Act. It is also canvassed by him that the reference Court cannot travel beyond the scope of reference made under Section 18 of the Act. The learned counsel has further contended that the direction given in First Appeal No. 141/80 should be fairly and reasonably interpreted and it should be construed that only permission/leave was granted to amend the written statement but there was no direction that it was open to the State Government to raise a plea or defence challenging the title of the claimant. It is also putforth by him that even if leave was granted to amend the written statement and take a defence with regard to title of the claimants that does not debar the claimants to rebut the said defence on the base that the reference Court lacks inherent jurisdiction to decide such controversy and the State Government is prohibited in law from raising any plea in regard to title, setting of a case adverse to the interest of the claimant. The learned counsel for the respondents has also argued that once the State Government has accepted the claimant as owner and taken steps under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act to acquire his land the principles of waiver and estoppel would operate against the State Government. Mr. Shrivastava has also tried to sustain the award by contending that the expression of 'owner' does not find place in the Act, and under the scheme of the Act, a claimant has to be a person interested. It is also proponed that the concept of person interested as has been defined under Section 3(b) of the Act is of wide amplitude and would cover a person in occupation, a statutory tenant and a person having easement. The learned counsel has combatted the contention of the Government Advocate that there exists at best a relationship of lessor and lessee between the parties and contended that under the circumstances the claimant should be regarded as the owner and be paid the market value. The last submission of Mr. Shrivastava is that the quantum of compensation as fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer is on the lower side. He has also placed emphasis on the cross objection which relates to determination of compensation. 7. The last submission of Mr. Shrivastava is that the quantum of compensation as fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer is on the lower side. He has also placed emphasis on the cross objection which relates to determination of compensation. 7. The core questions that arise for determination are that whether the State Government could have raised the plea in regard to the title of the claimant; whether the nature of right determined by the reference Court is correct in the facts and circumstances of the case; and whether the market value as determined by the reference Court is just and proper. As has been indicated above the learned counsel for the State has placed heavy reliance on the judgment passed by this Court on the previous occasion to support the contention that the State was permitted by this Court to raise a defence with regard to the title of the claimant. Per contra, Mr. Shrivastava has argued that such plea is not permissible in law. To buttress his submission he has referred to the decisions rendered in the cases of Kothamasu Kanakarathamma and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 304 , State of Madras v. K. N. Shanugha, AIR 1976 SC 1057 , Kottamkulangara Devaswom v. Kutty Amma Bhargavi Amma and Anr., AIR 1967 Kerla 144, Puran v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1976 HP 17, Land Acquisition Collector (Civil), Cuttack v. Gourapriyadas, AIR 1989 Orissa 170 and Balaram Chandra v. State of U. P., AIR 1995 SC 1552 , Though number of decisions have been referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent, we may only refer to a few. In the case of Gourapriyadas (supra), the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court has held as under :- "As a matter of fact, the reference under Section 18 is in essence an objection against the award passed by the Land Acquisition Collector. In other words the Land Acquisition Collector whose award was objected to under Section 18 of the Act had himself decided that the respondent would be entitled to the compensation the award being on the basis that the respondent had interest in the land. After passing of the award the Land Acquisition Officer cannot be categorised as a person who was dissatisfied with the award nor could he prefer an objection to the award passed by himself. After passing of the award the Land Acquisition Officer cannot be categorised as a person who was dissatisfied with the award nor could he prefer an objection to the award passed by himself. The only point which was covered by the reference was as to whether the rate of compensation as awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector represents correct compensation for the land acquired and as to whether the total extent of land under the notification being 35 acres, in which the respondent was interested, the award of compensation for 15 acres only was valid. From the language of Section 18 of the Act and the terms of reference made to the Court, it is abundantly clear that the question as to the entitlement of the respondent to the compensation was beyond the scope of reference. In other words, the Court answering the reference made to it under Section 18 of the Act was not called upon to decide as to whether the present respondent had interest in the land for the acquisition of which compensation was to be determined." In the case of Balaram Chandra (supra) it has been held that the reference Court cannot go behind the reference and declare the notification under Section 4(1) and Section 6 are null and void or illegal. His duty and powers are confined vis-a-vis the provisions contained under Sections 11, 18 and 20 to 23 and he is not supposed to traverse his powers. The aforesaid proposition of law cannot be disputed but the fact situation in the present appeal is different. This Court on the earlier occasion had directed for determination of the nature of interest which the claimants had in the land and to what amount of compensation he is entitled to in regard to that right. The judgment passed in first appeal was not challenged before the superior Court, and therefore, that has become final. The objection raised by the present respondent is that the plea of entitlement cannot be raised as defence or cannot be gone into by the reference Court is of no consequence, more so, when this Court had directed for determination of nature of interest. The objection raised by the present respondent is that the plea of entitlement cannot be raised as defence or cannot be gone into by the reference Court is of no consequence, more so, when this Court had directed for determination of nature of interest. In this context, we may usefully refer to the decision rendered in the case of The Special Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation Officer, Sagar v. M. S. Seshagiri Rao and Anr., AIR 1968 SC 1045 , wherein it has been held as under:- "The Act contemplates acquisition of land for a public purpose. By acquisition of land is intended the purchase of such interest outstanding in others as clog the right of the Government to use the land for the public purpose. Where the land is owned by a single person, the entire market value payable for deprivation of the ownership is payable to that person : if the interest is divided, for instance, where it belongs to several persons, or where there is a mortgage or a lease outstanding on the land, or the land belongs to one and a house thereon to another, or limited interests in the land are vested in different persons, apportionment of the compensation is contemplated. The Act is, it is true, silent as to the acquisition of partial interests in the land, but it cannot be inferred therefrom that interest in land restricted because of the existence of rights of the State in the land cannot be acquired. When land is notified for acquisition for a public purpose and the State has no interest therein, market value of the land must be determined and apportioned among the persons entitled to the land. Where the interest of the owner is clogged by the right of the State, the compensation payable is only the market value of that interest, subject to the clog." It would be apposite to refer at this juncture to the case of Piedade Fernandes v. Union of India, (1994) 3 Scale 860, wherein it has been held that the lease contained a condition that the State had a right to expropriate without any compensation. The Land Acquisition Officer held that the appellant was not entitled to any compensation. The Land Acquisition Officer held that the appellant was not entitled to any compensation. Considering the question whether the lessee who had taken the demised land on perpetual lease subject to the restrictive covenant, was entitled to any compensation, the Apex Court held that when the Government instead of exercising the option as per the covenant and taking possession of demised land opted to acquire land under the Land Acquisition Act the lessee is entitled to the compensation to the extent of his interest in the acquired lands, since the Government by necessary implications, had recognised the lease hold interest held by the lessee. Their Lordships further held that the lessee had an interest in the land and the said interest has to be evaluated and the compensation is to be paid to him. In the case of Indra Prasad v. Union of India, (1994) 5 SCC 239 , it has been held that when the Nazul Land was acquired in respect of which the lease was granted for 99 years to the tenant the compensation was apportioned and the Apex Court upheld the apportionment at 75% and 25% between the landlord and tenant respectively. At this juncture we may profitably refer to the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Ajit Singh, AIR 1997 SC 2669 , wherein their Lordships held that when the land acquisition proceedings are initiated though lease-deed provides the right of dispossession of tenant the compensation has to be paid to the tenant in respect of his interest. Their Lordships further held as under :- "The Court is required to take into consideration relevant factors, viz., the duration of the lease, the nature of the right to enjoyment of the lease hold interest and the improvements the tenant made on the land etc. It is equally settled law that if the Government is the owner of the land, before initiating the acquisition, it is entitled to terminate the lease and take possession of the lands in terms of the lease. Necessarily, in the above case tenant cannot have any right to compensation as he is bound by the terms of the lease. In a case where the Government in spite of the covenant contained in the sale deed, chooses to acquire the land, necessarily the tenancy right of a tenant is to be awarded suitably. Necessarily, in the above case tenant cannot have any right to compensation as he is bound by the terms of the lease. In a case where the Government in spite of the covenant contained in the sale deed, chooses to acquire the land, necessarily the tenancy right of a tenant is to be awarded suitably. In view of the fact that the lease is for 99 years and the part of the lease think that the apportionment of the compensation in the ratio of 60% to the tenant and 40% to the landlord would be reasonable ratio and payment should accordingly be made." In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of law it graphically clear that the lessee is entitled to the compensation in respect of his right. Mr. Shrivastava has strenuously urged that if there would have been reference to the Court under Section 30 of the Act for apportionment that issue would have arisen. We are afraid that the aforesaid submission, at present, in view of the judgment passed in the Court on the earlier first appeal no. 141/80 wherein there is a direction to determine the nature of right of the petitioner, is of no substance and has to be rejected. 8. Now we shall advert to the issue whether the trial Court has justified in holding that the claimants are owners in respect of the property. It has been urged by Mr. Gupta, learned Government Advocate that the finding given by the reference Court is untenable as there has been no discussion on this score. We have perused the finding of the reference Court and we are inclined to accept the submission of the learned Government Advocate as we find that the reference Court has cryptically come to the conclusion that the claimants are the owners. This Court had specifically directed on the earlier occasion for adducing fresh evidence in this regard. The parties adduced evidences before the reference Court. In this connection we may refer to the evidence of P.W. 9, Awadhnarayan, who was working in the office of Director Land Records at the relevant time. He has stated in his cross examination that the amount of compensation which was paid to the owners was realised from M/s Ahad Brothers, the owner of Bone Mill, Bhopal. It is worthwhile to refer to Ex. He has stated in his cross examination that the amount of compensation which was paid to the owners was realised from M/s Ahad Brothers, the owner of Bone Mill, Bhopal. It is worthwhile to refer to Ex. D-l1 which has been written by the Director of Land Records to Bhopal Bones Mill indicating that 23-67 acres of land was acquired for their requirement and a sum of Rs. 1,669.11 p which was realised from them has been awarded as compensation to the claimants. It is strenuously urged by Mr. Gupta, learned Government Advocate that the 'realised from you' have been interpolated later on. To substantiate the same he has referred to the evidence of PW. 8, Chandra Shekhar Sarvate, the witness who was called to comment on the type script. On a perusal of paragraph 7 of his evidence we find that he has admitted that signature under Exs. D-13 and D-l1 is of the same authority. We also notice that there is initial under the words 'realised from you'. In view of this there is no iota of doubt that the premium was paid by the respondent-claimant. Hence, we are of the considered view that the claimant is a lessee under the State Government. 9. Now, we shall proceed to deal with the issue that relates to determination of quantum of compensation. The Land Acquisition Officer had treated the acquired land to be agricultural land and accordingly fixed the price. The reference Court has observed that the land in question is situate in the National Highway between Bhopal and Jabalpur. He has also recorded a finding that it is 1 1/2 miles away from Hamidiya Bus Stand and BHEL Factory is 2 1/2 miles away from the land in question. It has also been found by the reference Court that there is facility for electricity and water on the acquired land. There is also facility for transport. There are industries situate adjacent to the land in question. The reference Court has also observed that the acquired land is within the municipal limits of Bhopal City and it was not used for agricultural purpose. On a perusal of the reasonings of the reference Court we find that he has properly held that the land in question was not agricultural land and had urban potentiality. The reference Court has also observed that the acquired land is within the municipal limits of Bhopal City and it was not used for agricultural purpose. On a perusal of the reasonings of the reference Court we find that he has properly held that the land in question was not agricultural land and had urban potentiality. After so holding the reference Court has proceeded to appreciate the material brought on record to determine the price. He has also referred to the evidence of PWs. I, 3 and 4. According to PW-3 he had sold 2400 sq. ft. of land at the price of Rs. 6,000/- on 6-3- 1963 and the said land is situate 400 yards 'away from the acquired land. PW-4 had deposed that he has purchased 60 x 33 sq. ft. of plot at the price of Rs. 4300/-. The claimant has also examined V. K. Oberai, additional PW-1 who has deposed that in the October, 1962 vide Annexure P-l his wife had purchased 33 x 60 ft plot at the rate of Rs. 214 per sq. ft. Similarly, P. K. Saxena, Additional PW-4, who was working as Record Keeper in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bhopal has deposed that one M/s Sardar Automobiles had sold vide Annexure P-18 to Shyamlal Saxena a piece of land measuring 2400 sq. ft. at Rs, 8000/-. Similar is the evidence of additional PW-4, Iftiyar Ali. Appreciating these evidence brought on record the reference Court has observed that on the date of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act the price of the acquired land was sold at various rates ranging from Rs. 2/- to Rs. 2.50/- per sq. ft. Taking note of the fact that the land in question is adjacent to the Bone Mills which spreads foul smell the reference Court has determined the price at Rs. 2/- per sq. ft. 10. Mr. P. D. Gupta, learned Government Advocate has contended that the reference Court has erroneously taken into consideration the sale-deeds which relate to small tracts of land for determination of the price of a big chunk of land. He has also criticised the fixation of price on the basis of sq.ft. . We find substantial force in the submission of the learned Government Advocate. He has also criticised the fixation of price on the basis of sq.ft. . We find substantial force in the submission of the learned Government Advocate. It is well settled in law that while determining the quantum of compensation for a big chunk of land the transactions wherein small parcel of land are sold are not to be relied upon. True it is, judicial notice can be taken of the fact that there is constant rise in the market value of the land which are suitable for homestead and industrial purposes. Potential value and the possibility of the increase of the value of the land in the vicinity have to be taken into consideration. But we find in the case at hand the sole foundation on the basis of which the reference Court has recorded the conclusion is the nature of the land and the sale-deeds which relate to a small parcel of land. This view of our's get fortified by the decision rendered in the case of Land Acquisition Officer and Sub-Collector, Gadwal v. Sreelatha Bhoopal, AIR 1997 SC 2552 . As far as the fixation of rate per square feet in respect of large tracts of land, also does not commend acceptance. While determining the quantum of compensation the Court is required to consider all the relevant circumstances and call, to his aid the experience. The Apex Court in the case of Hasanali Khanbhai & Sons v. State of Gujarat, (1995) 5 SCC 422 , has observed as follows :- "It is settled law that instead of proceeding on the feats of imagination the Court has to sit in the armchair of a prudent purchaser and then consider whether a prudent purchaser would be willing to purchase such a large extent of land and if so at what price. In this case, having considered the situation of the land being far away from the outer municipal limits though situated near about the railway line, that itself would be a factor to be taken into consideration in determining the market value. Added to that there is a possibility to impose statutory restrictions to develop the lands for building purposes. No prudent purchaser would hazard to purchase such large extent of land at the rates when small extents of lands are sold in plots. Added to that there is a possibility to impose statutory restrictions to develop the lands for building purposes. No prudent purchaser would hazard to purchase such large extent of land at the rates when small extents of lands are sold in plots. True that the purchasers hazarded to purchase lands in neighbouring survey numbers and have taken grave risk. But it would not be safe guide to adopt the same price offered by them. From totality of facts on record it must be held that the High Court was well justified in deducting 60% of the value and giving Rs. 4 per sq. yard." 11. It is well settled that the compensation has to be determined by the reference Court. Keeping in view the price which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser on the date of notification published under Section 4(1) of the Act. Court is not expected to be influenced by the future or latter development in the locality or neighbourhood and is not expected to be influenced by the obtaining situation on the date of grant of compensation. What is relevant is fixation of market value of the land under Section 23(1) of the Act is the prevailing price as on the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. We find that the sale- deed Ex.P-1 is before the date of notification whereas the sale-deed under Ex. P-18 is after the date of notification. Thus, in effect, no substantial evidence has been adduced by the claimants for determination of the land on square foot basis. In this context, we may refer to the decision rendered in the case of State of M.P. v. Harishankar Goel and Anr. etc., AIR 1996 SC 3478 , wherein their Lordships upheld that acquisition of large tract of land and determination of value on square foot basis is not proper. We may profitably quote their Lordships:- "3. The question, therefore, is: what would be the reasonable market value the lands are capable to fetch as on the date of the notification had it been sold in the open market to a willing purchaser? It is seen that when 33 and odd bighas of land was sought to be sold in the open market, no willing prudent purchaser would with any credulity agree to purchase it on sq. ft. basis. It is seen that when 33 and odd bighas of land was sought to be sold in the open market, no willing prudent purchaser would with any credulity agree to purchase it on sq. ft. basis. It is well settled law that the Judge determining compensation in a compulsory acquisition should eschew, feats of imagination; sit in the arm chair of a willing purchaser and put a question to himself whether as a willing prudent purchaser, he would offer the same price sought to be awarded for the acquired land. It would therefore, be clear that the learned Judges did not apply correct legal tests to determine the compensation but determined the compensation on the basis of sq. ft. which is illegal per se. We, therefore, hold that the learned Judges had applied wrong principle of law in determining compensation. In the aforesaid case their Lordships considering the potential value of the land further upheld as under:- "Having found that the lands were possessed of potential value the compensation could be determined on the basis of the market value on square yard basis. Considered from this perspective, we are of the view that the market value for the land would be Rs. 4/- per sq. yard. ........" Thus, we are of the considered view that the price fixed by the reference Court at the rate of Rs.. 2/- per sq. ft. does not deserve to be upheld. 12. As the fact situation exposits this Court on the previous occasion had granted opportunity to the claimants to adduce evidence with regard to its existing right and the market value of the land. In spite of opportunity being granted no substantial evidence has been adduced regarding market price of the land on the date of notification. We are not inclined to remand the matter again to the reference Court to determine the valuation. As we have indicated above the reference Court has appreciated the evidence and has indicated with regard to the situation of the land. Admittedly it had the potentiality on the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. Considering the proximity to the urban areas, its potentiality for development and its character, we think it appropriate to fix the price on the basis of square yard. Considering the entire gamut of facts, we think Rs. Admittedly it had the potentiality on the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. Considering the proximity to the urban areas, its potentiality for development and its character, we think it appropriate to fix the price on the basis of square yard. Considering the entire gamut of facts, we think Rs. 2/- should be the just price per square yard and accordingly, we so hold. 13. Now, we shall proceed to deal with the cross objection. In the cross- objection the prayer is for fixing the price of the land at Rs. 5/- per sq. ft. There are also other ancillary prayers. We notice that in the cross objection the Court fee of Rs. 20/- has been paid and Court fee on the differential valuation has not been paid. It has been held by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of State of M. P. v. Seth Gowardhandas Maheshwari, 1993 MPLJ 536 :- "As a result of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that in the matter of appeals and cross-objections relating to award of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, the amount of Court fees has to be computed according to the difference between the amount claimed by the appellant as per mandate of Section 8 of C.F. Act on which Court fees, as prescribed under Article 1 A of Schedule 1 of the C. F. Act has to be paid and not a fixed Court fees as prescribed under Article 11, Schedule 2." The aforesaid Full Bench decision was referred to by the Apex Court in the case of Indore Development Authority v. Tarak Singh and Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1828 , wherein it has been held as follows :- "In the instant case the appellant Development Authority is not the claimant. But when the appellant seeks to avoid the decree, which is made by the reference Court, it must be construed that the appellant is seeking to avoid the amount of higher compensation determined by the reference Court, as claimed by the land owners. Therefore, the appellant is required to pay the Court fee on the memorandum of appeal to the extent on which the appellant seeks to avoid the higher compensation awarded by the reference Court under the Central Act. Therefore, the appellant is required to pay the Court fee on the memorandum of appeal to the extent on which the appellant seeks to avoid the higher compensation awarded by the reference Court under the Central Act. When its legality is challenged by filing the appeal under Section 54, the difference of the amount for which appeal is filed ad valorem Court fee under Section 8 is required to be paid. Article 11 of Schedule II has no application, since it is expressly covered by Section 8 of the Act." In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of law, we are of the considered view that the cross-objection filed by the claimant is not entertainable. That apart, as we have already held in appeal preferred by the State the market price should be Rs. 2/- per square yard, the cross objection has to be rejected on merits. 14. We have already held that the claimants had lease-hold interest in the acquired land and they were not owners of the land. The State Government, however, instead of taking recourse to any other mode to get the possession has taken recourse to the provisions of the Act and, therefore, there is recognition of interest of the claimant by the State Government. Hence, there has to be grant of compensation for the aforesaid interest of the claimant. In certain cases as has been mentioned earlier the Apex Court had apportioned at 25% and 75% and in some cases 30% and 70%. In the case at hand, we are of the considered view that 30% of the quantum determined should be regarded as the compensation for the interest held by the claimants. They shall also be entitled to all the statutory benefits which are permissible in law. 15. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed in part and the cross-objection is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs of this appeal or the cross- objection.