Judgment : The prayer is for a certiorari to call for the records relating to the land acquisition proceedings in award dated 1. 1995 in Reference No.5/95 on the file of the third respondent and quash the same in so far as it relates to the petitioners land comprised in S.Nos.14/1 and 14/2, Veli Semmandalam Village, Cuddalore Taluk, South Arcot District. 2. The case as set out in the affidavit, in support of the writ petition is as follows: The petitioner is the owner of the two items mentioned supra and he is cultivating double crops of paddy, groundnut, and tapiacio in the said lands. Every year the petitioner has been reclaiming and spending husge sums for the lands by adopting scientific method for improving the yield. The lands were sought to be acquired by the Government for the formation of neighbourhood scheme. Sec.4(1) Notification was published on 111. 1991. Sec.6 declaration was approved on 212. 1992 and was published in the Tamil Nadu Gazette on 30.12.1992. The petitioner challenged Sec,6 declaration stating that it was published beyond the period of one year vide W.P.No.20088 of 1993 and in W.M.P.No.31375 of 1993 stay of dispossession alone was granted on 11. 1993. The writ petition was ultimately dismissed on 21. 1996 by a Division Bench of this Court holding that Sec.6 declaration had been passed within the stipulated period. However, pending the writ petitioner award was passed on 1. 1995. This passing of the award was not communicated to the petitioner herein immediately as contemplated under Sec.12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act nor was compensation amount offered immediately to him. Only after the dismissal, of the writ petition on 21. 1996 the award was communicated to the Petitioner on 31. 1996. Till the date of filing of the present writ petition the respondents had not made the revenue deposit in favour of the petitioner. 3. By letter dated 31. 1996 the respondents alleged that the petitioner was causing damage to the lands by digging out earth. By his reply dated 13. 1996 the petitioner stated that he was not causing damage to the lands, that he was cultivating the lands and there were standing crops (sugarcane) and that it could take six months time for him to harvest the same. By his reply dated 13. 1996 the petitioner stated that he was not causing damage to the lands, that he was cultivating the lands and there were standing crops (sugarcane) and that it could take six months time for him to harvest the same. The respondents did not take possession of the lands after the said six months period and till the date of the filing of the writ petition the petitioner alone has been in possession. The petitioner also had paid kist till the year 1997. He had cultivated sugarcane and harvested the same in the year 1998 also. Suddenly in the month of January, 1999 the third respondent Land Acquisition Officer and the fourth respondent the Executive Engineer, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, started interfering with the possession of the Petitioner necessitating the petitioner filing a civil suit in O.S.No.21 of 1999 for permanent injunction before the District Munsifs Court, Cuddalore. The petitioner also obtained an interim injunction in I.A.No.255 of 1999 and the same is in force. The petitioner is aware that he cannot challenge the legality of the acquisition proceedings in a civil court. He would be withdrawing the suit. Subsequent to the filing of the suit the third respondent sent a communication on 11. 1999 and even in that communication, the third respondent has stated that the compensation amount is till lying in his hands. The petitioners reply on 2. 1999 provoked a rejoinder by the third respondent on 12. 1999 in which the third respondent has stated that possession of the lands was handed over to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board on 3. 1996. At no point of time did the petitioner part with the possession of the properties. The authorities have not followed the procedure contemplated under the Land Acquisition Act for taking possession. The entire proceedings initiated by the respondents to acquire the petitioners lands is vitiated by illegalities and infirmities. 4. On 14. 1999 Jagadeesan, J. directed the learned Government Pleader to produce the files. After a few adjournments, the matter came up on 26. 1999 and again on 7. 1999. The learned Government Pleader produced the files. 5. Mr.G.Masilamani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.K.N.Basha, counsel for the petitioner submitted that stay was granted by this Court on 11. 1993 in respect of dispossession alone, that the department claims that the award was passed on 1. 1999 and again on 7. 1999. The learned Government Pleader produced the files. 5. Mr.G.Masilamani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.K.N.Basha, counsel for the petitioner submitted that stay was granted by this Court on 11. 1993 in respect of dispossession alone, that the department claims that the award was passed on 1. 1995, but, the award was communicated only on 31. 1996, that as soon as the award was passed the petitioner had not been notified about the passing of the award and in the matter of publication of the award the relevant date would be the date of communication and in the instant case the date of communication being 31. 1996, more than two years had passed since the date of Sec.6 declaration on 30.12.1992 and therefore the entire proceedings should go and the petitioner would be entitled to reclaim the properties. The learned Senior Counsel pointed out that there was only stay of dispossession and nothing prevented the authorities from communicating the award stated to have been passed on 1. 1995 immediately thereafter and in a given situation it is possible for the authorities to ante-date the award so as to comply with the requirements of the limitation provided under the Act. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the provisions of Sec.11-A would be defeated and become otiose if the authorities are allowed to get away like this. 6. The learned Senior Counsel relied on the followed decisions: (1) Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1500: (1962)1 S.C.R. 676 . (2) State of Punjab and others v. Balbir State of Punjab and others v. Balbir State of Punjab and others v. Balbir A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 629 and (3) Collector of Central Excise v. New Tobacco Co. etc. etc. Collector of Central Excise v. New Tobacco Co. etc. etc. Collector of Central Excise v. New Tobacco Co. etc. etc. A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 668. 7. etc. etc. Collector of Central Excise v. New Tobacco Co. etc. etc. Collector of Central Excise v. New Tobacco Co. etc. etc. A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 668. 7. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acqusition Officer and another Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acqusition Officer and another Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acqusition Officer and another A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1500: (1962)1 S.C.C. 676 relied on by the learned Senior Counsel the Supreme Court took the view that for purposes of calculating the period of limitation prescribed for making application requesting the Collector to refer the question relating to the evaluation of the land acquired under the Act to the civil court under Sec.18 of the Act, the date on which the notice of the award was served on the owner of the land would be treated as the date of the award and that the period of limitation should be accounted from the date of the service of the said notice. 8. In State of Punjab and others v. Balbir Singh etc. etc. State of Punjab and others v. Balbir Singh etc. etc. State of Punjab and others v. Balbir Singh etc. etc. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 629 after referring to a number of its earlier decisions the Supreme Court held that the material date is the date when an order went out of the control of the authorities concerned and that it is immaterial as to when the affected party receives the same. “ The learned Senior Counsel also drew an analogy from O.41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure dealing with the contents date and signature of judgment of the Appellate court. In Collector of Central Excise v. New Tobacco Co. Collector of Central Excise v. New Tobacco Co. Collector of Central Excise v. New Tobacco Co. “ The learned Senior Counsel also drew an analogy from O.41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure dealing with the contents date and signature of judgment of the Appellate court. In Collector of Central Excise v. New Tobacco Co. Collector of Central Excise v. New Tobacco Co. Collector of Central Excise v. New Tobacco Co. A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 668 relied on by the learned Senior Counsel dealing with the question as to when publication of notification under Central Excise becomes effective, the Supreme Court has held that it would be a proper publication if it is published in such manner that persons can if they are so interested acquaint themselves with its contents that if publication is through a Gazette the mere printing of it in the Gazette would not be enough that unless the Gazette containing the notification is made available to the public, the notification cannot be said to have been duly published. There is absolutely no quarrel over the proposition that the date of communication is the material date for fixing the date of publication of the award for purposes of Sec.18 reference. It must be held that the award had been passed only on 31. 1996 for that purpose. 9. According to the learned Senior Counsel the decision of the Supreme Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1500 : (1962)1 S.C.R. 676 would directly apply to the instant case it must be deemed that the award had been passed only on 31. 1996. The learned Senior Counsel is right in his submission if we are concerned only with the reference contemplated under Sec.18. We cannot impute knowledge to the owner of the land, unless there is publication and communication. Therefore, for purpose of Sec.18 it must be deemed that limitation would commence only from 31. 1996, but by the same token it cannot be said that it would be the date for all purpose particularly when it comes to limitation for passing the award. 10. Therefore, for purpose of Sec.18 it must be deemed that limitation would commence only from 31. 1996, but by the same token it cannot be said that it would be the date for all purpose particularly when it comes to limitation for passing the award. 10. The Supreme Court in Kaliyappan v. State of Kerala and others Kaliyappan v. State of Kerala and others Kaliyappan v. State of Kerala and others 1989 L.A.C.C. 11 pointed out the difference between the meaning given by the court in , A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1500 : (1962)1 S.C.R. 676 to the words ‘date of the award’ in Sec.18 of the Act and the words ‘the Collector shall make an award’ or ‘the award shall be made’ in Sec.11-A of the Act. The Supreme Court pointed out that ‘such a distinction had to be maintained because the object of and the reason for prescribing the period of limitation. Under Sec.11-AA of the Act are different from the object and the reason for prescribing the period of limitation under Sec.18 of the Act and the consequences that would flow from the violation of the rule of limitation in the two cases are also different. In the former case the period of limitation is prescribed for preventing official delay in making the award and the consequent adverse effect on the person or persons interested in the land, but in the latter case the period of limitation is prescribed for providing a remedy to the persons whose lands are acquired to seek a reference to the civil court on the determination of proper and just compensation. Secondly, while in the former case violation of the rule of limitation would result in the acquisition proceeding becoming ineffective in the later case such a violation will not have any effect on the validity of acquisition proceedings. Thirdly, while in the former case the period of limitation prescribed represent the outer limit within which an award can be made in the latter case they are concerned with the point of time at which the time to make an application under Sec.18 of the Act will begin to run against the person interested in the land. The Supreme Court cautioned that the provisions of Sec.11-A have to be construed bearing in mind these points of difference. The Supreme Court cautioned that the provisions of Sec.11-A have to be construed bearing in mind these points of difference. It is well known that the meaning to be assigned to the words in a statute depends upon the context in which they are found and the purpose behind them.” 11. In , 1989 L.A.C.C. 11, it has been held that, “to make an award “ in Sec.11-A of the Act means’ sign the award’ and that is the ordinary meaning to be ascribed to the words ‘to make an award’ and that too an extended or a different meaning assigned to the words ‘the date of the award’ by the Supreme Court in , A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1500 : (1962)1 S.C.R. 676 cannot be applied in the case since such an extended or different meaning is neither warranted by equity not will it advance the object of the statute.” The Supreme Court in , 1989 L.A.C.C. 11, did not find any analogy between Sec.11-A and Sec.18 of the Act in so for as the above question was concerned. 12. The next question would be whether the award has been made within the period of two years from the date of Sec.6 declaration. Sec.6 declaration was published on 30.12.1992. The award should have been passed within two years from that date i.e., by 212. 1994. This Court granted interim stay of dispossession alone on 11. 1993 and the same was in force till 211. 1996 when the main writ petition was dismissed. Though it was contended by the learned Senior Counsel that there was stay of dispossession only and there was no embargo for passing the award and communicating the same during the period, this stand was not seriously pursued having regard to the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Government of Tamil Nadu and another v. Vasantha Bai Government of Tamil Nadu and another v. Vasantha Bai Government of Tamil Nadu and another v. Vasantha Bai A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1778 : (1995) 2 S.C.C. (Supp.) 423. L.N.Venkatesan that stay of dispossession passed by the High Court would tantamount to stay of further proceedings being taken under Sec.11 and that the entire period of stay has to be excluded in computing the period of two years prescribed by Sec.11-A. 13. L.N.Venkatesan that stay of dispossession passed by the High Court would tantamount to stay of further proceedings being taken under Sec.11 and that the entire period of stay has to be excluded in computing the period of two years prescribed by Sec.11-A. 13. According to the learned Senior Counsel, it is possible for the authorities to antedate the award so as to bring it within the period of limitation. Indeed such a possibility cannot be ruled out if the authority concerned had bene slack and with a view to escape reproach and reprimand or disciplinary proceedings he might attempt to antedate to satisfy the requirements of Sec.11-A. 14. But in the present case, I am satisfied on a perusal of the documents that the authority concerned had signed the award on 1. 1995 and as has been held by the Supreme Court in Kaliyappans case already referred to, the date of signing and putting the seal on the award is the date of making the award and the fact that the petitioner was communicated about the passing of the award on a subsequent date would not mean that the award was made on the said subsequent date and that the same would be the date for purposes of computing the period of two years, under Sec.11-A. Even otherwise, whether it is 1. 1995 or 31. 1996 it does not make any difference in as much as there was stay from 11. 1993 till 21. 1996 and this position is fairly accepted by the learned Senior Counsel. There are two different dates, one for purposes of Sec.11-A and the other for purposes of Sec.18. 15. Sec.6 declaration was published on 30.12.1992. There was day of dispossession granted on 11. 1993. It is seen from the records that the Petitioner had notice of the award enquiry. He had participated in the enquiry and give a statement that he had no objection to parting withe the land and he would be willing to receive the compensation under protest. This was on 1. 1995. The main writ petition was taken up in January, 1996 had actually dismissed on 21. 1996. The petitioner knew about the further proceedings. He had participated in the enquiry and give a statement that he had no objection to parting withe the land and he would be willing to receive the compensation under protest. This was on 1. 1995. The main writ petition was taken up in January, 1996 had actually dismissed on 21. 1996. The petitioner knew about the further proceedings. He himself having participated in the same, it is rightly pointed out by Mr.Thirumaran, the learned Government Advocate that the writ petitioner ought to have at the time the writ petition was taken up, raised the point that the award had not been passed within the two year period prescribed under Sec.11-A. In as much as he did not raise the point, as has been held by the Supreme Court in Sharadchandra Ganesh Muley v. State of Maharashtra and others A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 61 the doctrine of might and ought engrafted in Explanation IV to Sec.11 of Code of Civil Procedure would come into play and the petitioner is precluded to raise the controversy once over’. The doctrine of constructive res judicata puts an embargo to raise the plea of bar of limitation under Sec.11-A. 16. Having regard to the discussion above, it has to be held that there are no merits in the writ petition and the same is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs. Consequently, the miscellaneous petition W.M.P.No.9685 of 1999 is also dismissed.